FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Telstra Corporation Limited v Vocus Fibre Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 77
Citation: Telstra Corporation Limited v Vocus Fibre Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 77 Appeal from: Telstra Corporation Limited v Vocus Fibre Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 198 Parties: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED v VOCUS FIBRE PTY LTD, ADAM INTERNET PTY LTD, CHIME COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD and AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION File number: NSD 343 of 2014 Judges: BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND GRIFFITHS JJ Date of judgment: 2 July 2014 Catchwords: CONTRACT – agreement as to terms and conditions – agreement to vary – construction of term allowing variation in price
TELECOMMUNICATIONS – access to network facilities – terms and conditions – dispute as to increased charges – power of ACCC to arbitrate
Legislation: Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) Cases cited: Telstra Corporation Limited v Vocus Fibre Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 198 Date of hearing: 18 June 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Archibald QC with Mr S Free Solicitor for the Appellant: Gilbert + Tobin Counsel for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Mr J Gleeson SC with Mr M Hayne Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Thomson Geer Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr N Williams QC with Ms A Mitchelmore Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 343 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
Appellant
AND: VOCUS FIBRE PTY LTD
First RespondentADAM INTERNET PTY LTD
Second RespondentCHIME COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD
Third RespondentAUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Fourth Respondent
JUDGES:
BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND GRIFFITHS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
2 JULY 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN SYDNEY)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The Notice of Contention of the First to Third Respondents be dismissed.
3.The orders made by the primary judge on 12 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a)A declaration that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘the Commission’) has no power to hear or determine the matters notified to the Commission by Vocus Fibre Pty Ltd on 11 September 2012.
(b)A declaration that the Commission has no power to hear and determine the matters notified to the Commission by Adam Internet Pty Ltd on 18 September 2012.
(c)A declaration that the Commission has no power to hear or determine the matters notified to the Commission by Chime Communications Pty Ltd on 25 September 2012.
(d)An order that the First to Third Respondents pay the applicant’s costs.
4.The First to Third Respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 343 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
Appellant
AND: VOCUS FIBRE PTY LTD
First Respondent
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- Case
- [2014] FCAFC 77
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the interpretation of clause 6 of the Facilities Access Service Terms, particularly the phrase "failing agreement," which appeared in clauses 18(1) and 36(3) of Schedule 1. The primary judge ruled that Telstra did not have a unilateral power to vary charges as long as they did not exceed the amount calculated in accordance with clause 6.3. The court found that the agreement between Telstra and the respondents only allowed Telstra to vary charges up to a certain limit, with the respondents having the right to dispute any variation. The court held that until a dispute was resolved, even if it was a dispute about the quantum of a variation within a limited range, the parties had failed to reach an agreement.
The court's reasoning led to the conclusion that the primary judge's interpretation of the terms of the agreement was incorrect. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the primary judge. The court found that the ACCC had no power to hear or determine the matters notified to it by the respondents. The court also ordered the respondents to pay Telstra's costs and the costs of the appeal. This decision clarified the scope of the ACCC's powers to arbitrate and the terms of the agreement between Telstra and the respondents regarding the variation of charges for accessing Telstra's network facilities.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The Notice of Contention of the First to Third Respondents be dismissed.
3. The orders made by the primary judge on 12 March 2014 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) A declaration that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘the Commission’) has no power to hear or determine the matters notified to the Commission by Vocus Fibre Pty Ltd on 11 September 2012.
(b) A declaration that the Commission has no power to hear and determine the matters notified to the Commission by Adam Internet Pty Ltd on 18 September 2012.
(c) A declaration that the Commission has no power to hear or determine the matters notified to the Commission by Chime Communications Pty Ltd on 25 September 2012.
(d) An order that the First to Third Respondents pay the applicant’s costs.
4. The First to Third Respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Common to both cls 18(1) and 36(3) of Sch 1 is the phrase “failing agreement”. That phrase, as the primary judge indicated, is to be construed in the immediate context of Sch 1 and in a manner which promotes the objects and purposes of that Schedule.CONSIDERATION The primary judge observed that the issue dividing the parties was to be resolved by reference to the proper characterisation of the ambit of the dispute between the parties and the proper construction and application of cl 6 of the Facilities Access Service Terms. To that we would add, and a proper characterisation of the phrase “failing agreement” in cll 18(1) and 36(3) of Sch 1. The primary judge noted that there was agreement between Telstra and the First to Third Respondents that:·the variations notified by Telstra to each of the First to Third Respondents was a variation within the constraints imposed by cl 6.3; and·the dispute raised by each of the First to Third Respondents was simply that the quantum of the increase was “too high”, albeit a variation within the constraint imposed by cl 6.3. The primary judge rejected the construction advanced by Telstra that cl 6 conferred a unilateral power to vary the charges specified in the “Price List”, provided the variation did not exceed the amount calculated in accordance with cl 6.3. The primary judge said at [25] to [26]:25 Clause 6.1, it is concluded, does not confer any unilateral and unchallengeable power upon Telstra to vary the “the Charge(s) specified in the Price List(s)” subject only to the constraints imposed by cl 6.3. 26 Clause 6.1, clearly enough, confers a power to vary those Charges. But it is a power to vary subject to the right of an Acquirer to “dispute” the variation. The contractual agreement reached between Telstra and Vocus Fibre in June 2011 (for example) was an agreement to pay the amounts initially set forth in the Agreement and an agreement that Telstra could later vary those Charges subject to the right of Vocus Fibre to “dispute” the variation. The Agreement recorded in the June 2011 contract was not an agreement confining Vocus Fibre to an entitlement to “dispute” the mere application of the terms of that clause to the facts. The Agreement recorded in June 2011 was, accordingly, an agreement:•as to the initial terms and conditions upon which services were to be provided including an agreement that:•Telstra “may” vary the charges up to the “cap” imposed by cl 6.3; and •Vocus Fibre could “dispute” the variation.The June 2011 Agreement, not surprisingly, does not record any agreement whereby Telstra could vary the charges in an amount in excess of the “cap”. Any variation which purported to impose a variation in excess of that which had been agreed, would simply not be authorised by the terms of the Agreement; but even within the limited range of authorised variations, both parties recognised the contractual right to “dispute” the variation. Until that “dispute” was resolved, albeit a dispute as to the quantum of a variation within a limited range, the parties had failed to reach agreement. (Emphasis in original).