TCWY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TCWY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1276

File number: NSD 1268 of 2017
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 31 October 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – decision of Tribunal under s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Direction No. 65, made by the Minister under s 499 of the Migration Act, does not reflect the applicable law and is therefore an unlawful Direction – whether Tribunal failed to take into consideration a mandatory relevant consideration – s 197C of the Migration Act provided that an officer’s duty to remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non‑citizen under s 198 arose irrespective of whether there has been an assessment, according to law, of Australia’s non‑refoulement obligations in respect of the non‑citizen – whether the Tribunal failed to take into consideration s 197C when reviewing the decision of the delegate
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 197C, 198, 499, 501CA
Cases cited: DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 448
Date of hearing: 27 October 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M. Finnane QC with Ms E. Grotte
Solicitor for the Applicant: Michaela Byers
Counsel for the Respondent:  Ms R. Graycar
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

NSD 1268 of 2017
BETWEEN:

TCWY

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Grant leave to the applicant to amend his notice of appeal to add question of law 2 and paragraph 2 of the grounds relied on.

2.Refuse leave to the applicant to amend his notice of appeal to add paragraph 3 of the grounds relied on.

3.The appeal is dismissed.

4.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant appeals by way of judicial review from the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) given on 9 June 2017 at Sydney. The Court made an order on 23 August 2017 extending time for the applicant to seek judicial review of the AAT’s decision.

  2. The Tribunal, acting under s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), affirmed the decision under review, that decision being the decision of the Minister’s delegate dated 23 December 2016.

  3. The applicant has a lengthy history of offences in Australia. This history is set out in a National Police Certificate dated 13 January 2015. As a consequence of that history, and pursuant to s 501(3A), the applicant’s protection visa was cancelled on 19 January 2015.

  4. The delegate stated that the applicant had made representations about revocation of the visa cancellation decision but the delegate was…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1276
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of TCWY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, an Iranian citizen who had lived in Australia since 1999, sought to appeal a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had cancelled his protection visa and directed his removal to Iran. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider certain provisions of the Migration Act, including section 197C, which imposes a duty on the Minister to remove an unlawful non-citizen as soon as reasonably practicable. The applicant contended that the Tribunal's failure to consider section 197C constituted a legal error.

The court considered whether the AAT had failed to take into account the statutory duty to remove the applicant as soon as reasonably practicable. The court found that Direction No. 65, issued by the Minister under the Migration Act, did not prevent the AAT from considering section 197C where relevant. The court noted that the AAT had indeed considered the international non-refoulement obligations, which were not engaged in this case, and had determined that there were no such obligations preventing the applicant's removal to Iran. Consequently, the court concluded that the AAT had appropriately considered the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the Direction. The court held that the AAT had correctly found that the applicant could be removed to Iran and that the appeal against the AAT's decision was accordingly dismissed.

The court further found that the applicant's application to amend his notice of appeal to include additional grounds was not in the interests of justice. The court granted leave to amend the notice of appeal to include certain specified grounds but denied leave to include the additional ground concerning the consideration of section 197C. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to the applicant to amend his notice of appeal to add question of law 2 and paragraph 2 of the grounds relied on.

2. Refuse leave to the applicant to amend his notice of appeal to add paragraph 3 of the grounds relied on.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

4. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to permit the amendment to add ground 3. That application is refused.The decision of the AAT The AAT found as follows. I reproduce its language. It was satisfied that the applicant was born in Iraq, that he and his family fled when he was a toddler to Iran, and that he knew no country other than Iran and Australia. The AAT found the applicant came to Australia in 1999 as “an unlawful boat person” with his father. After a short time in Australia his father decided to return to Iran. In terms of whether the applicant was a citizen of Iran or not, the AAT accepted that his mother is Iranian, his younger sister is Iranian, and the rest of the family are Iraqis. The AAT said that it would seem that the applicant’s father is certainly a citizen of Iraq. The applicant’s evidence indicated “the family is well; there is evidence that they are surviving; there is evidence that his father has been back there for about 16 years and has managed to buy and sell a property, regardless of whether he was entitled to or not…”. It also appeared that they were settled and that all of the family remained in Iran. The AAT said that it appeared from the evidence that it was possible to get by in Iran and live a reasonable life, albeit not to the same standard as in Australia. The AAT said that were some issues in relation to whether in fact the applicant would be able to go back to Iran and whether indeed he was quite correct in saying he would end up stateless. The AAT also accepted that the Department indicated that the applicant was, in their view, an Iranian citizen. The AAT said the Department indicated that they would do their best to have him go back to Iran, but accepted the possibility that this may not happen because the Iranian government simply may not play ball. At [115] and following of its reasons for decision, the AAT considered the international non-refoulement obligations. The AAT said it was certainly not necessarily the case that if the applicant went back to Iran he would be tortured or shot or anything like that, although it may not be a terribly easy life. The AAT said that the applicant had family in Iran, but still it would expect that if he were to be sent back to Iran – if the Iranians were to take him – that would not be an ideal outcome for him, although the AAT accepted the respondent’s views in relation to the international non-refoulement obligations. At the end of the day, the AAT said, it suspected the applicant may well be able to go back to Iran, should the Department of Immigration and Border Protection make the arrangements. The AAT said it was quite clear that he would be able to go back to Iraq, but that seemed to be the least preferred option than going back to his family in Iran. The AAT said it would appear that some weight needed to be given to the applicant’s submission that he may well be stateless. This was because despite the respondent’s cautious optimism that the Iranians may well take him, that may not be the case. That was something outside the AAT’s control, it said, and that was something for the Department to work out.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the applicant’s submission that, had the Tribunal understood the effect of s 197C, “there is a possibility that it would not have cancelled the protection visa in order to avoid the consequences that the applicant would be removed to Iran”, the Minister submitted that what was said in DMH16 at [30] was that had the Minister in that case “properly understood the consequence of the refusal of the protection visa … there is a possibility that he would have granted the protection visa in order to avoid the consequence that the applicant would be returned to Syria in contravention of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in respect of the applicant” (emphasis added). In the present case, the Minister submitted, there were no such obligations to be considered.Consideration Turning first to ground 2, I do not regard the contention that Direction No. 65 is invalid as well-founded since the contention depends on a conclusion that the Direction is exhaustive, which it is not. The relevant provision of Direction No. 65 is para 14 which expressly states that “other considerations must be taken into account where relevant. These considerations include (but are not limited to): a) International non-refoulement obligations”. It follows, in my view, that para 14 of Direction No. 65 does not purport to prevent the decision-maker from taking into account, where relevant, s 197C and s 198. I do not concern myself presently with cases where a non-refoulement obligation exists. It is also to be recalled that s 499(2) of the Migration Act provides that s 499(1), the power to give written directions, does not empower the Minister to give directions that would be inconsistent with the Act or the regulations. I accept the submission on behalf of the Minister that, independently of the Direction, if the legislative scheme required a decision-maker to have regard to s 197C, then a failure to consider that provision would constitute a relevant legal error. In my opinion, the appeal turns on what the AAT decided in this case, against the factual background relevant to the applicant before the AAT. It was common ground that the ITOA dated 23 November 2016 determined that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations were not engaged. At [89], the AAT set out the relevant parts of para 14 of the Direction, see [55] above. Then at [90], the AAT referred to one of the considerations relevant to the applicant’s case as being the international non-refoulement obligations. At [115], the AAT turned to consider the international non-refoulement obligations. At [116], the AAT accepted the respondent’s views in relation to the international non-refoulement obligations. In my view therefore the Direction in this instance operated to direct the AAT’s attention to non-refoulement obligations, but the AAT accepted that there were none. Paragraph 14.1 of Direction No. 65 was not applicable. Thus the obligation in s 197C operated, together with s 198, to remove the applicant as soon as practicable. In my opinion, the AAT’s considerations of how that might work out were relevant to the question of practicability, as referred to in s 197C(2). There would be no issue of indefinite detention. I return below to what the AAT said at [120].