Tazebe v Police - [2013] SASC 194

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
TAZEBE v POLICE
[2013] SASC 194
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Nicholson
13 December 2013
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - GROUNDS - OTHER MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - DISCRETION TO RECORD CONVICTION - RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT - SENTENCE
On 12 September 2013 the appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court for the offence of assault causing harm. Pursuant to s39 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 the Magistrate discharged the appellant without sentence but on a bond to be of good behaviour and to be called up for sentence following any breach of the bond. The Magistrate also ordered the appellant to perform 250 hours of community service and exercised the discretion to record a conviction.
The appellant appeals solely on the ground that the Magistrate erred in the exercise of her discretion to record a conviction.
Held:
1. Appeal allowed on the basis that: (a) the Magistrate placed undue weight on the seriousness of the offending; and (b) when all of the circumstances are considered, the Magistrate placed insufficient weight on the effect of conviction upon the appellant.
2. The sentence of the Magistrates Court on 12 September 2013 be set aside.
3. Upon resentencing the appellant is to be subject to the same sentencing outcome as ordered by the Magistrate but with the exception that no conviction is to be recorded.
4. The Magistrate's orders that court costs be remitted, that the victims of crime levy be paid, that prosecution costs of $100 be paid and that the appellant pay compensation to the victim in the sum of $800 are undisturbed.
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s16, s39; Magistrates Court Act 1991 s42, referred to.
R v Yousef [2005] SASC 203; Hodgins v Police [2008] SASC 176; R v Stubberfield [2010] SASC 9; Gilev v Police [2013] SASC 108; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Dinsdale v R (2000) 202 CLR 321; Naera v Police (1995) LSJS 328; Taylor v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 252; Ware v Betts (1987) LSJS 212; Wessling v Police (2004) 88 SASR 57; R v Briese (1997) 92 A Crim R 75; McAvaney v Quigley (1992) 58 A Crim R 457; Attorney-General v Smith [2002] TASSC 10; Zefi v Police [2003] SASC 218; Szep v Police [2003] SASC 144; Brown v Police [2009] SASC 45, considered.

TAZEBE v POLICE
[2013] SASC 194
Magistrates Appeal: Criminal

NICHOLSON J.
Introduction
On 12 September 2013 the appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court for the offence of assault causing harm. The appellant was convicted following a trial during which the charge was contested, unsuccessfully, on the basis of self-defence. In sentencing the appellant, the Magistrate relied upon s39 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 to discharge the appellant without sentence. However, and in accordance with the discretion available when acting pursuant to s39, a conviction was recorded, a two year bond to be of good behaviour was imposed which if breached required the appellant to be called up for sentence, an order was made that the appellant complete 250 hours of community service and the appellant was required to compensate the victim in the amount of $800.
The appellant has appealed to this Court against the Magistrate’s decision. The single ground of appeal is that the Magistrate “erred in the exercise of her discretion to record a conviction”. The only order sought by the appellant is that the conviction be set aside and in lieu thereof an order made for no conviction to be recorded.
The circumstances of the offence
The appellant was 20 at the time of committing the offence and was working as a licensed security guard. He had no prior convictions. The factual basis of the offending as determined by the Magistrate[1] was, perhaps, of more than usual importance to the sentencing outcome. Both parties have summarised the Magistrate’s findings in this respect at some length in their respective written summaries of argument. There is little difference between the two accounts and for convenience I will quote directly from the account given in the respondent’s written summary.[2]
The assault occurred shortly after 10.56 pm on 20 July 2012.
The victim [MG] had attended the Pier Plaza Hotel with his girlfriend and her friends. He had been drinking over the course of the evening and continued to do so at the Pier Plaza Hotel. He was intoxicated.
At about 10.50 pm, the victim had attracted the attention of security staff on account of his disruptive and aggressive behaviour towards his girlfriend and other patrons. He became verbally abusive and shoved the male patron his girlfriend was socialising with.[3]
He was asked to leave the venue by security staff. He persisted in his behaviour towards patrons and became verbally abusive towards security staff. The victim was forcibly removed from the Hotel by several security staff, including the appellant. The victim persisted with aggressive comments towards security staff.
The victim was restrained face down on the ground outside the Hotel by security staff including the accused. When on the ground he continued to abuse them and made provocative and threatening remarks towards the appellant. He said: “Go back to your fucken country, you black cunt” and “I know where you work. You’re not so tough by yourself.”
Shortly after this, the appellant and another security staff member left the victim. They were attending to another apparent disturbance at the Hotel. The victim continued to be abusive of security staff. The appellant returned to the area – he told another staff member that he thought the police should be called. He was approximately 2 metres away from the victim at the time. The victim then said to the appellant: “Come and fight me right now, you fucken black cunt. I’ll kill you. … I’ll kill your family and rape your mother.”
The appellant then approached the victim and asked him what he had said, to which the victim replied that he would kill the appellant’s family and rape his mother.
The appellant struck the victim with a “round arm punch to the face.” The victim fell to the ground and sustained a major cut to the back of the head, and an injury to the front of his head from the punch. He was unconscious for some time. Medical assistance was sought.
[1]    Tazebe v Police (AMC-12-12477) Judgment dated 3 September 2013.
[2]    Respondent’s summary of argument filed 29 November 2013, at paragraphs [5] to [7]. Footnote references to the Magistrate’s judgment have been omitted.
[3]    Ibid.
The Magistrate’s reasons
The Magistrate recorded, in her comprehensive written remarks on penalty, various considerations to which she had regard, including the following topics:
(i)the seriousness of the offending itself particularly given that it was perpetrated by a licensed security guard;
(ii)the seriousness of the offending given the now commonly understood risks that can arise from a single blow which causes a victim to fall to the ground, including significant potential for serious head injury or even death;
(iii)the effects on the victim in accordance with the victim impact statement that had been provided to the Court;
(iv)the particular sensitivity which this appellant had with respect to the type of abuse which had been directed towards him and the fact that his behaviour was completely out of character;
(v)the appellant’s expressions of remorse and regret;
(vi)the difficulties the appellant had experienced as a child in the Sudan and also in this country as a new migrant and the extent to which the appellant had accommodated these difficulties and had assimilated into the Australian way of life, as demonstrated by a number of favourable and supportive references; and
(vii)the importance of general deterrence and for the Court to make it plain, in particular, that this type of behaviour by a security guard cannot be tolerated.
Her Honour concluded that neither imprisonment nor the imposition of a fine would be an appropriate sentence in all of the circumstances and that the matter could be dealt with by the entry of the appellant into a bond to be of good behaviour.
Issues relating to deterrence, in my view, can be properly reflected by the length of that bond and also by me requiring you to do some community service. The requirement that you do community service will mean that you must commit yourself to doing some work for the community at least one day a week and in my view, that will reflect issues relating to deterrence adequately, given the circumstances of this particular offending.[4]
[4] Ex tempore remarks on penalty, 12 September 2013, at [16].
On the question of whether or not to record a criminal conviction the Magistrate said this.[5]
Under s39 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, the discretion to record a conviction is essentially at large but the factors that I must weigh up are; the seriousness of the offence which includes what you did and what the risk was to the victim, the fact that it occurred under provocation, your personal history which includes your background history and the fact that you are generally a law abiding person.
Considering all of those matters, I am nevertheless drawn to the conclusion that a conviction must be recorded and that is because this offending is serious. The recording of a conviction is one of the ways in which a court can indicate the seriousness of an offence. I therefore do not accept the submission that dealing with the matter without recording a conviction is an appropriate disposition. In the exercise of my discretion I am not prepared to do that. A conviction will be recorded. I will however release you on a bond. The bond will be a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of two years. The amount of the bond will be set in the sum of $1,000.
[5] At [17] to [18].
The submissions of the parties in brief
Counsel for the appellant drew attention to a number of the authorities in this Court dealing with s39 of the Sentencing Act and, in particular, the question of the circumstances in which a court might refrain from recording a conviction, including R v Yousef,[6] Hodgins v Police[7] and R v Stubberfield.[8] Counsel submitted that the Magistrate erred in her consideration of whether or not to record a consideration by not considering the effect that a conviction would have on the appellant’s immediate and future employment and by placing too much emphasis on the seriousness of the offending.
[6] [2005] SASC 203.
[7] [2008] SASC 176.
[8] [2010] SASC 9.
Counsel for the respondent pointed to the fact that during sentencing submissions the appellant’s personal circumstances had been outlined for the Magistrate in quite some detail. These included that he had lost his employment as a security guard and his licence as a result of the proved charge and that his plans for the future with respect to employment and, in particular, his aspirations to join the military might be seriously affected by the recording of a conviction. It was submitted that even though these matters were not specifically addressed in the Magistrate’s remarks on penalty, the remarks read as a whole do indicate that the consequences for the appellant as to future employment and generally were considered as part of the weighing up process. Earlier in the remarks and in the context of identifying the appellant’s submissions, the Magistrate said this.[9]
There is a reference from a Mr Campbell from the Ex-military Rehabilitation Centre. As has counsel, he is urging me to deal with this matter by way of without conviction because he suggests that one of your plans in the future may involve the military as a career. Because of your background you have found it difficult to obtain employment. As I understand it, you are the income earner for your family and as I understand it, you also provide support for family who have remained in the Sudan. You are focussing at the moment on trying to get your sister and her family from Sudan, and in the mean time you are trying to find employment so that you can continue to support your family.
[9] At [7].
Counsel for the respondent submitted, correctly with respect,[10] the mere fact that a matter is not expressly set out as having been relied upon or considered by a sentencing judge will not of itself indicate that it was not considered. Counsel submitted that, in the circumstances of this case, the decision to impose a conviction was appropriate even after taking account of the risk presented by a conviction to the appellant’s future employment prospects. In this respect, counsel relied principally on three matters: the need to give effect to general deterrence where offending of this nature has been committed by a security guard, the fact that the matter was contested at trial which should serve to limit credit given for remorse and contrition and the serious nature of the offence itself.
[10] See, for example, Gilev v Police [2013] SASC 108 at [7] (David J).
Disposition of the appeal
The Magistrate proceeded in accordance with s39 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 which provides as follows.
39—Discharge without sentence on defendant entering into bond
(1)Where a court finds a person guilty of an offence the court may, if it thinks that good reason exists for doing so, discharge the defendant with or without recording a conviction and without imposing a penalty, upon condition that the defendant enter into a bond—
(a)     to be of good behaviour; and
(ab)   to comply with the other conditions (if any) included in the bond; and
(b)     if the terms of the bond so require, to appear before the court for sentence, or conviction and sentence, if the defendant fails during the term of the bond to comply with a condition of the bond.
(1a)However, if the defendant is not to be so required to appear before the court, the court cannot impose any conditions under subsection (1)(ab).
(2)Where a defendant is discharged under this section—
(a)     no fresh prosecution may be commenced in respect of the offence; and
(b)     the defendant will only be liable to sentence, or conviction and sentence, if he or she fails to comply with a condition of the bond and the terms of the bond require the defendant to appear before the court for sentencing in that event.
There is no suggestion by either party that, in the circumstances of this case, it was inappropriate for the Magistrate to proceed by way of discharging the appellant upon entry into a bond requiring the appellant to be of good behaviour and without penalty but requiring the appellant to be called up for sentence in the event of a failure to comply with a condition of the bond.
When exercising the powers conferred by s39, a sentencing judicial officer has a discretion whether to discharge the defendant with or without recording a conviction. Whilst s39 gives rise to a wide discretion in this respect,[11] it must be exercised judicially. The section does not specify any particular matters to which the court must have regard.[12] Gray J observed the following in Hodgins v Police.[13]
There is no requirement for the Court to have regard to particular factors in arriving at the conclusion that good reason exists to discharge the defendant without recording a conviction. No doubt as observed in Yousef, the factors to be considered by the Court in exercising the section 39 discretion may be similar to the factors that arise under section 16. However, it is important to recognise that the sections have different work to do and operate in different circumstances.
[11] R v Yousef [2005] SASC 203 at [47] (Sulan and Layton JJ).
[12] R v Yousef at [81] (White J).
[13] [2008] SASC 176 at [15], footnote omitted.
The factors relevant to the cognate power under s16 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act to refrain from recording a conviction include (but are not limited to) the character, antecedents, age or physical or mental condition of the defendant or the fact that the offence was trifling or any other extenuating circumstances.
The appeal to this Court is pursuant to s42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991. As I have indicated, the decision whether or not to record a conviction involves the exercise of a discretion. An appeal from such an exercise of discretion is of the nature described by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King.[14]
It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.
[14] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505; see also Dinsdale v R (2000) 202 CLR 321 at 324-325; Naera v Police (1995) LSJS 328 at 329; Taylor v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 252 at 291; Ware v Betts (1987) LSJS 212 at 216; Wessling v Police (2004) 88 SASR 57 at 60.
A helpful decision considering the circumstances as to when it is or is not appropriate not to record a conviction is R v Stubberfield.[15] In its single judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeal made some general observations as to the required approach to this issue, whether or not it falls to be considered under s16 or s39 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act.[16] In so doing, the Court quoted with approval certain observations from the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Briese.[17]
In deciding whether to impose a conviction, this Court should weigh the beneficial nature of the order to proceed without a conviction to the offender, with the public interest inherent in convictions being recorded. The tension between these factors or interests was highlighted by the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in Briese:
…the effect of such an order is capable of considerable effect in the community. Persons who may have an interest in knowing the truth in such matters include potential employers, insurers, and various government departments including the Immigration Department…For present purposes it is enough to note that the making of an order [to proceed without conviction] has considerable ramifications of a public nature, and courts need to be aware of this potential effect...
On the other hand the beneficial nature of such an order to the offender needs to be kept in view. It is reasonable to think that this power has been given to the courts because it has been realised that social prejudice against conviction of a criminal offence may in some circumstances be so grave that the offender will be continually punished in the future well after appropriate punishment has been received. This potential oppression may stand in the way of rehabilitation…
...
The express mention…of the nature of the offence as a factor to which the court must have regard in the exercise of the discretion whether or not to record a conviction suggests that there are certain types of offences which will call for the recording of a conviction…A court will be more easily persuaded against the recording of a conviction where there are no prior convictions or a very minor history and where the offence in question is a so called ‘victimless’ crime.
Observations to this effect have since been enunciated by a number of courts in different jurisdictions, including this Court.[18]
[15] [2010] SASC 9.
[16] At [44] (Gray, Sulan and David JJ).
[17] (1997) 92 A Crim R 75 at 79-81.
[18] The Court cited Attorney-General v Smith [2002] TASSC 10 at [18] -[26]; Zefi v Police [2003] SASC 218 at [15]-[16]; Szep v Police [2003] SASC 144.

The Court in Stubberfield noted that it has been consistently observed in this Court that the risk to future employment is a relevant factor to be considered when assessing whether to proceed without a conviction.[19] The Court in Stubberfield also observed that the discretion to proceed without a conviction has been exercised in the past “even in cases of quite serious offending” and cited McAvaney v Quigley[20] which concerned a plea by a young man to a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and Hodgins v Police[21] where a conviction was not recorded in circumstances of an assault. In Stubberfield itself, the Court described the defendant’s conduct as grave. It involved an assault which caused significant injury to the victim. However the Court, on appeal, saw the circumstances as unusual and took the view that it was appropriate to exercise the discretion (upon a resentencing) to refrain from recording a conviction and to otherwise deal with the matter pursuant to s39 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act.[22]
[19] Citing, for example, O’Hanlon v SA Police (1994) 62 SASR 553 at 557; MacGregor v Police (1995) 66 SASR 269 at 272 and Buttigieg v Police (1994) 74 SASR 229 at [24].
[20] (1992) 58 A Crim R 457.
[21] [2008] SASC 176.
[22] Stubberfield at [49].
The present case does not involve the type of offence sometimes described as a regulatory type offence and does not therefore give rise to the special considerations that can be relevant to the issue of whether or not a conviction ought to be recorded for such an offence.[23]
[23] See, for example, Brown v Police [2009] SASC 45.
To my mind there are two factors which suggest that the discretion not to record a conviction ought to have been exercised in the present case. These two factors need to be considered in the context of the appellant’s personal circumstances as a whole. I agree with the appellant’s submission that the Magistrate would seem to have placed undue weight on the seriousness of the offending. It must be accepted that the offending itself was objectively serious for all of the reasons the Magistrate gave. However, various features of the circumstances leading up to the offending and various features personal to the appellant (his youth, immaturity and background) combine to reduce significantly, in my view, the moral culpability of the appellant for what was otherwise, as I say, objectively serious offending. That is the first consideration. The second consideration is that, again, as the appellant submitted, when all of the circumstances are considered the Magistrate would appear to have placed insufficient weight on the potential effect a conviction will have for this appellant’s future prospects of employment and generally. Again, the appellant’s youth, immaturity and personal circumstances are such as to exacerbate the potential effect of a conviction in this respect.
I need to expand on these two considerations a little. The appellant is now 21 and a first offender. He came and settled in Australia from the Sudan when he was of primary school age. He arrived under a new arrivals program for non-English speaking migrants or refugees. He undertook an intensive English program catering for refugee students with limited or interrupted schooling in their home countries. According to his home group teacher at Adelaide High School, the appellant progressed from a shy young boy to a well mannered cheerful student who was always polite and respectful. He displayed an ability to relate to a wide range of students at the school. The various references provided to the Court all confirm that the appellant has maintained this disposition as a young adult. In one reference he is described as a “polite, considerate, gentle person, helpful and conscientious young man.” In another he is described as an “active and valuable member of the church – his good manner, sociable character and helpfulness are very much appreciated by our congregation”. The Magistrate accepted that the appellant’s behaviour was completely out of character and that he sincerely regretted his actions. The Magistrate recorded that, as an immigrant, he faced hurdles that those who have lived in Australia all their lives have not and that he came with scars from his childhood and the way of life he had left behind in the Sudan. The Magistrate formed an impression of the appellant when he gave evidence that he was “normally a gentle person who simply lost control of [his] emotions in a flashpoint moment on the night in question”.[24]
[24] Ex tempore Remarks on penalty, 12 September 2013, at [6].
The description of the offending indicates that the appellant was sorely provoked on the night in question. He was not only provoked in a way that might encourage a response from ordinary people of reasonable fortitude, he was provoked in ways that, to my mind, spoke directly to him and marked him out in a racially and sexually degrading way. He was described as a “black cunt” on more than one occasion. He was told to “go back to your own fucken country” and immediately prior to the assault itself the victim confronted him and twice asserted that he would kill the appellant’s family and rape his mother. These were powerful, obscene threats and insults made worse by being directed to this appellant given his relative youth and immaturity, the difficulties confronting him in making his way in an alien country, his racial background and the importance he would be expected to place on respect for family and concern for their safety.
Provocation is, of course, not a defence to the offence of assault causing harm. However, in appropriate circumstances, it can and, in the present circumstances, it should be seen to operate as significantly reducing the appellant’s moral culpability for the offence. From a reading of the sentencing remarks as a whole the Magistrate appears to have placed insufficient weight on these matters as part of her consideration of the seriousness of the offending. It is in this sense that I take the view that the Magistrate overstated the seriousness of the offending notwithstanding that, in other contexts, she was plainly alive to and had great sympathy for the appellant’s personal circumstances.
It is true that the appellant was trained as and had assumed the responsibilities of a licensed security guard. His behaviour must be measured against those obligations voluntarily undertaken. However, this seems to demonstrate, as the Magistrate noted, that the appellant was probably in the wrong job. It was highly likely, perhaps inevitable, that at some stage while working as a security guard he would be exposed to this type of appalling and provocative behaviour. Given his background and his level of maturity the appellant failed to cope.
It also follows from the forgoing that I do not see this appellant as a good vehicle for expressing the importance of general deterrence, particularly in the context of security guard operations. The appellant’s personal circumstances and the circumstances of the offending in combination were quite unusual. Other security guards must understand that such criminal conduct whether or not committed during an overzealous performance of their responsibilities, ordinarily, will attract a recorded conviction and often a prison sentence.
It is for these reasons, that whilst the Magistrate clearly took account of the appellant’s personal circumstances and the provocative nature of the victim’s conduct, she erred in that she did not do so in a way that properly reflected the seriousness of the offending by this appellant. It is true that her Honour recognised that deterrence issues could be dealt with by way of a bond of the type she imposed together with an order to perform community service and did not require the imposition of a prison term or a fine.[25] However, once this is recognised and the moral culpability of the appellant were to be reduced for the reasons I have explained, it is difficult to see what further aspect of the “seriousness” of the offending demanded the recording of a conviction, given the otherwise favourable personal circumstances of the appellant.
[25] Remarks on penalty, at [16].
I am satisfied that the appellant by being placed on a bond of the type ordered and by being required to perform 250 hours of community service within 12 months together with having lost both his job as a security guard and his licence to work in that field, has been, in the overall scheme of things, firmly if not severely punished. I am also satisfied that a recorded conviction is likely to cause significant prejudice to the appellant’s future employment prospects and generally. Again, this appellant is in a slightly different situation from many that come before the courts. He is still very young and from the Sudan. He is likely, in any event, to face difficulties in securing appropriate employment. As the Magistrate recognised, he is the income earner for his family and also provides support for those of his family who have remained in the Sudan. The appellant’s plans for the future involve the possibility of pursuing the military as a career. A referee who is a member of the Ex-military Rehabilitation Centre has told the Court that a criminal record would deny the appellant such an opportunity. I also accept that a conviction will hamper his ability to be a leader in his own community and in the community generally.
It is for these reasons that I have reached the view, when all of the circumstances are considered, that the Magistrate placed too much weight on the seriousness of the offending and insufficient weight on the extent to which the recording of a conviction might continue to exacerbate the punishment of the appellant into the future unnecessarily and inappropriately.
I allow the appeal. As a consequence the sentence as a whole must be set aside and the appellant resentenced. However, the only aspect of the sentence to which objection has been taken and the only aspect with respect to which the Magistrate has erred is the component of recording a conviction. In all other aspects I would resentence in the same way as did the Magistrate. The appellant will need to enter into a fresh bond the terms of which will be the same as the previous bond but with no conviction being recorded.
The Court was informed during the hearing of the appeal that the appellant has performed 70 hours of the community service ordered by the Magistrate. Counsel for the respondent was not in a position to be able to confirm this. The appellant is entitled to credit for such hours of community services that have been performed.
I make the following orders.
(i)Appeal allowed.
(ii)The orders of the Magistrates Court made on 12 September 2013 are set aside.
(iii)The appellant is to be released on a bond in the amount of $1,000 to be of good behaviour for a period of two years with no conviction recorded. Terms of the bond will include: that the appellant is to be called up for conviction and sentence in the event that the bond is breached, the appellant is to perform 250 hours of community service within 12 months of 12 September 2013 and the appellant must report within two working days of today to the Courts Unit of the Department of Correctional Services.
(iv)To the extent that the appellant has already performed some hours of community service, in accordance with the Magistrate’s earlier order, those hours are to be credited against the 250 hours ordered by me today.
The Magistrate’s orders that court costs be remitted, that the victims of crime levy be paid, that prosecution costs of $100 be paid and that the appellant pay compensation to the victim in the sum of $800 are not to be interfered with.