Taylor v Younge - [2000] WASCA 64

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION: TAYLOR -v- YOUNGE [2000] WASCA 64

CORAM: SCOTT J

HEARD: 22 FEBRUARY 2000

DELIVERED : 16 MARCH 2000

FILE NO/S: SJA 1205 of 1999

BETWEEN: TERRY CHARLES TAYLOR
Appellant
AND
SHARRON PATRICIA CHARMIAN YOUNGE
Respondent

Catchwords:

Appeal against decision on a voir dire - Admissibility of blood and urine samples - Driving under influence of drugs to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of vehicle - Samples taken from respondent not "given" to respondent in accordance with Road Traffic Act 1974 s 69(1) - Respondent under sedation in hospital - Unable to comprehend questions or statements - Respondent not of sufficient consciousness to be aware of samples being give to her - Divergence in wording of legislation between States - Respondent denied of lawful opportunity to independently test samples taken from her - Evidence rightly excluded

Legislation:

Road Traffic Act 1974 s 63(1), s 69(1)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr J A Thomson
Respondent: Mr I Weldon

Solicitors:

Appellant: State Crown Solicitor
Respondent: Corinne Griffin & Associates

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Beauglehole v Smith [1972] WAR 61
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54
Currie v Houweling (1994) 20 MVR 376
McKechnie v Jones (1975) 13 SASR 184
Police (SA) v Fountaine (1999) 29 MVR 191
Police v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429
R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159
R v Turner (1975) 12 SASR 373
Smith v Brooks (1983) 1 MVR 89
The Queen v Little (1976) 14 SASR 556

Case(s) also cited:

Bracken v Gordon [1981] WAR 14
DPP v Kindred (1995-96) 15 WAR 133
IW v City of Perth (1997) 146 ALR 696
Thompson v Lill (1989) 9 MVR 287

SCOTT J: The respondent was charged by summons that on 29 January 1998 at Maida Vale, she drove a motor vehicle, registration No 6ZW 649 on a road, namely Kalamunda Road, whilst under the influence of drugs to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of such vehicle, contrary to s 63(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (the "Road Traffic Act"). Following a voir dire, as to the admissibility of the analysis of the respondent's blood taken in circumstances to which I will refer later in these reasons, the blood analysis results were excluded. The prosecution was therefore unable to prove the charges which were dismissed.
The appellant relies upon three grounds of appeal, namely:
"The learned Magistrate erred in dismissing the complaint in that he:
(a)erred in fact and in law in finding that samples of blood and urine taken from the Respondent were not given to or retained by the Respondent in accordance with Section 69(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974;
(b)erred in law in excluding evidence of the results of the analysis of the samples of the Respondent's blood and urine;
(c)further and in the alternative, erred in law in excluding evidence of the results of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Taylor v Younge

Details

AGLC: Taylor v Younge [2000] WASCA 64
Case: [2000] WASCA 64
Decision Date: 16 MARCH 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Taylor v Younge involved a dispute regarding the admissibility of blood and urine samples taken from a respondent, Younge, following an incident where she was found to be driving under the influence of drugs to such an extent that she was incapable of properly controlling her vehicle. The case was heard in an Australian court, which was tasked with determining the admissibility of the samples obtained from Younge. The court had to consider whether the samples were taken in accordance with the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1974, specifically section 69(1), which requires that samples be "given" to the person from whom they are taken. Younge was under sedation in the hospital at the time the samples were taken and was unable to comprehend questions or statements, raising questions about whether she was sufficiently conscious to be aware of the samples being taken from her.

The legal issues before the court were whether the samples were "given" to Younge as required by the statute and whether Younge was denied the lawful opportunity to independently test the samples taken from her. The court had to examine the wording of the legislation and consider the respondent's state of consciousness at the time of the sample collection. The divergence in wording of the legislation between different states further complicated the issue. The court was required to balance the statutory requirements with the practicalities of the situation, including Younge's medical condition.

The court found that the samples were not taken in compliance with the statutory requirement of being "given" to Younge due to her state of sedation and unawareness. Consequently, the evidence was rightly excluded as it did not meet the legal criteria for admissibility. The court determined that Younge was denied the lawful opportunity to independently test the samples, which further supported the exclusion of the evidence. The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory language and the respondent's inability to comprehend or be aware of the sample collection process. The outcome was that the evidence of the blood and urine samples was inadmissible in the proceedings against Younge.

Orders