SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Taylor v State of Queensland [2000] QSC 312 PARTIES: KIM MAREE TAYLOR
(plaintiff)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(defendant)FILE NO/S: SC No 1550 of 1994
SC No 2081 of 1995DIVISION: Trial Division DELIVERED ON: 13 September 2000 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 6 September 2000 JUDGE: Chief Justice ORDER: Application for extension of the limitations period in each action dismissed, with costs to be assessed. CATCHWORDS: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION OF PERIOD – CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS – MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – plaintiff signed consent to the adoption of her child – plaintiff subsequently issued two writs against the defendant – plaintiff claims declaration that adoption was invalid and that plaintiff is the child’s guardian, an injunction, damages for personal injuries for negligence and breach of statutory or fiduciary duty – defendant relies on the plaintiff’s action being barred under the State of Limitations – plaintiff applies summarily for extension of limitations periods – whether material facts of a decisive character relating to the actions were not within the plaintiff’s means of knowledge prior to the requisite date in each action – whether facts on which the plaintiff relies were ‘reasonably ascertainable’ and ‘decisive’
Adoption of Children Act 1964
Limitation of Actions Act 1974, s 3(2), s 11, s 30(d)(ii), s 31(2)(a), s 31(2)(b)Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262, referred to
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996-7) 186 CLR 541, referred to
Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v McPhee [1979] QdR 469, followed
Dick v University of Queensland [1999] QCA 474, referred to
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1983-4) 154 CLR 234, referred to
Jaensch v Coffey (1983-4) 155 CLR 549, referred to
Sugden v Crawford [1989] 1 QdR 683, considered
Woodhead v Elbourne [2000] QSC 042, referred toCOUNSEL: L Boccabella, with CJ Forrest for the plaintiff
GJ Gibson QC, with KA McMillan for the defendant in SC No 1550 of 1994
JA McDougall for the defendant in SC No 2081 of 1995SOLICITORS: Conroy & Associates for the plaintiff
Crown Solicitor for the defendant in SC No 1550 of 1994
Corrs Chambers Westgarth for the defendant in SC No 2081 of 1995
de JERSEY CJ: The plaintiff gave birth to a son at Royal Women’s Hospital, Brisbane, on 25 April 1987. On 5 May 1987 she signed a form of consent to the adoption of the child. (She disputes the validity of that consent.) The child was adopted out under the then applicable Adoption of Children Act 1964.
The material before me indicates that twice before the birth, and three times subsequently, the last of them four days before the plaintiff signed that form of consent to adoption, the plaintiff saw Diane Clough, a social worker employed at the hospital, and received counselling from her. The adoption was handled on behalf of the…
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- Case
- [2000] QSC 312
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the material facts that the plaintiff relied upon to bring her claims were not within her means of knowledge prior to the requisite date in each action, and whether these facts were ‘reasonably ascertainable’ and ‘decisive’. The court had to determine whether these facts were of such a decisive character that they should have been apparent to the plaintiff prior to the limitation period expiring.
The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the material facts on which she relied were not within her means of knowledge prior to the requisite date in each action. It held that the facts on which the plaintiff relied were ‘reasonably ascertainable’ and ‘decisive’. As such, the plaintiff's application for an extension of the limitation periods was dismissed. The court determined that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred and that the application for an extension should not be granted.
The court ordered that the application for an extension of the limitation periods in each action be dismissed, with costs to be assessed. This decision underscores the importance of timely legal action and the stringent criteria required to extend limitation periods in cases involving personal injuries and adoption.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for extension of the limitations period in each action dismissed, with costs to be assessed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was brought before the court for a summary application to extend the limitation periods. The plaintiff, Taylor, filed an application to extend the time limits within which she could bring her claims against the defendant, the State of Queensland. The application was heard summarily, with the court required to determine whether the material facts of a decisive character relating to the actions were not within the plaintiff's means of knowledge prior to the requisite date in each action. The application was based on the contention that the facts on which the plaintiff relied were'reasonably ascertainable' and 'decisive' after the requisite date.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether material facts of a decisive character relating to the actions were not within the plaintiff's means of knowledge prior to the requisite date in each action?
2. Whether the facts on which the plaintiff relies were 'reasonably ascertainable' and 'decisive'?
Held
1. The court held that the material facts of a decisive character relating to the actions were not within the plaintiff's means of knowledge prior to the requisite date in each action.
2. The court held that the facts on which the plaintiff relies were not 'reasonably ascertainable' and 'decisive'.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In dismissing the application for an extension of the limitations period, the court considered whether the plaintiff had knowledge of material facts that were decisive to the actions prior to the requisite date. The court found that the plaintiff had signed a consent to the adoption of her child without knowledge of material facts that would have been decisive in bringing the action. The court applied the principle that an action for personal injuries accrues when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known of the injury and its cause. Here, the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the material facts meant that the limitation period had expired before she could have reasonably discovered the cause of action.
The court also assessed whether the facts on which the plaintiff relied were 'reasonably ascertainable' and 'decisive'. The court noted that the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that despite exercising reasonable diligence, she could not have discovered the facts earlier. However, the court found that the facts were not 'reasonably ascertainable' in the circumstances and thus the plaintiff's application for an extension was unsuccessful. The ratio decidendi of this case lies in the application of the principles of limitation periods in personal injury actions, particularly the requirement for knowledge of decisive material facts and the threshold for claiming an extension of time. The court adhered to established precedent regarding the stringent requirements for extending limitation periods in such cases.