JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: TAYLOR -v- NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD [2009] WASC 69
CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD: 10 MARCH 2009
DELIVERED : 25 MARCH 2009
FILE NO/S: CIV 2677 of 2008
BETWEEN: MALCOLM CHARLES TAYLOR
Applicant
AND
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD (ACN 004 044 937)
First RespondentJOHN GAETANO FIOCCO on behalf of FIOCCO HOPKINS RATTIGAN (A FIRM)
Second RespondentWILLIAM JOHN WATSON
DIANA FRANCES WATSON
Third Respondents
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application for preaction discovery - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr M S Barrett-Lennard
First Respondent : Ms R A Collins
Second Respondent : Mr A T Macknay
Third Respondents : No appearance
Solicitors:
Applicant: M S BarrettLennard & Co
First Respondent : Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Second Respondent : McCallum Donovan Sweeney
Third Respondents : No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse [No 2] [2008] WASC 147
MASTER SANDERSON: By originating process filed 5 December 2008, the applicant sought from the respondents pre‑action discovery. In particular, the applicant sought production by the respondents of:
1.the executed and stamp‑dutied contract for the sale of assets purportedly dated 23 December 1994 with annexures of Tip Top Quality Meats; and
2.the settlement statement recording the transaction.
The application was opposed by the first and second respondents. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I would refuse the application and publish my reasons at a later date. These are those reasons.
Before dealing with the substantive application, I should make mention of the representation of the applicant. At the hearing, counsel appeared and sought leave to represent the applicant. Counsel's firm had not filed a notice of appointment of solicitor and, I was advised, did not intend to do so. Strictly speaking then, there was no basis upon which counsel could be heard. However, the issues raised by this application were reasonably complex. The material filed in support of and in opposition to the application was lengthy. I took the view that it was in the interests of all parties, not only in the applicant's interest, that the basis of the applicant's application be articulated by experienced counsel. Counsel for the first and second respondents raised no objection to this course of action.
An applicant for pre‑action discovery must show that objectively he may have a cause of action against the potential party which is more than mere suspicion or conjecture: see Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse [No 2] [2008] WASC 147 [35] ‑ [36]. The conditions to be satisfied for an application for discovery are:
1.the applicant wants to take proceedings against the potential party;
2.the applicant has made reasonable enquiries;
3.the applicant has not been able to obtain sufficient information to enable the decision to be made as to whether to commence or take the proceedings; and
4.there are reasonable grounds for believing that the potential party had, has, or is likely…
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- Case
- [2009] WASC 69
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently established the necessity for the pre-action discovery application. The court needed to determine whether the plaintiff had shown that the documents were essential for preparing the claim and that the usual requirement of having already filed a proceeding was appropriately waived in the circumstances of the case. The court considered the criteria for granting such an application, including whether the documents were necessary for the fair preparation and conduct of the proceeding and whether the plaintiff had acted with reasonable expedition.
In delivering the judgment, the court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the documents in question were essential for the fair preparation and conduct of the proceeding. The plaintiff had not shown how the documents would alter the case or provide information not already known. The court also noted that the plaintiff had not acted with reasonable expedition in seeking the discovery. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for pre-action discovery. The court emphasised that such applications should be granted sparingly and only where the plaintiff can convincingly demonstrate the necessity of the documents for a fair preparation of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court on an application for pre-action discovery by Mr. Taylor. This application was filed as an interlocutory step before any formal litigation was initiated. The application was heard by the court, which considered the arguments and submissions from both parties. Mr. Taylor argued that the information sought was crucial for him to assess the merits of a potential claim. In contrast, the bank maintained that the requested information was not essential and that the application was an abuse of the court process. This application was the first step in what could potentially be a broader legal dispute between the parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should grant the application for pre-action discovery made by Mr. Taylor.
2. What criteria the court should apply in determining the necessity of the requested information for the plaintiff's decision-making process.
Held
1. The court decided that the application for pre-action discovery made by Mr. Taylor should be dismissed.
2. The court established that in determining the necessity of the requested information for the plaintiff's decision-making process, the criteria should focus on the relevance and necessity of the information to the plaintiff's decision whether to commence proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's decision hinged on the understanding that the application for pre-action discovery was not justified on the facts of the case. The court examined the criteria for granting such applications, emphasizing the need for a strong showing that the information was both necessary and relevant for the plaintiff's decision-making process. The court referred to established principles and authorities that require a compelling reason for departing from the usual requirement that discovery applications are made after proceedings have commenced. The court noted that the plaintiff's decision to proceed with litigation was not contingent on the information sought in this application. The court held that the requested information did not meet the threshold for pre-action discovery, and therefore, the application was properly dismissed. The ratio decidendi here is that pre-action discovery is an exception to the general rule and should only be granted when the information sought is strictly necessary for the plaintiff's decision to initiate proceedings. This decision reaffirms the importance of maintaining the usual order of litigation processes unless there are exceptional circumstances that warrant deviation.