Taylor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales

The appeal concerned a disciplinary application brought by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales against Mr. Taylor. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the proceedings commenced in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales (NCAT) were validly instituted, as jurisdiction was contingent upon the existence of a "complaint" that was "duly made" under the *Legal Profession Act 2004* (NSW). The Council had passed a resolution that a complaint "be made," and the central question was whether this resolution itself constituted a complaint for the purposes of the Act.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, it had to ascertain whether the language used in the Council's resolution, stating that a complaint "be made," satisfied the definition of a "complaint" as contemplated by section 504 of the *Legal Profession Act 2004* (NSW). Secondly, the Court considered the transitional application of the *Legal Profession Act 2004* (NSW) to complaints made prior to the commencement of the Uniform Law.

The Court reasoned that a resolution that a complaint "be made" did not, in itself, constitute a complaint duly made. For a complaint to be duly made, it required more than a mere directive to initiate proceedings; it necessitated the actual formulation and submission of the complaint itself. The Court found that the Council's resolution was a preliminary step, authorising the preparation and lodging of a complaint, rather than the complaint itself. Consequently, the disciplinary application filed in NCAT was not founded upon a duly made complaint, and therefore, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales dated 13 May 2020 were set aside. In their place, the Court ordered that the disciplinary application filed on 14 May 2019 be dismissed, with the respondent ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.