Taylor v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police

[2006] NSWADT 48

CITATION:	Taylor v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2006] NSWADT 48
DIVISION:	General Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Raymond Weeah Taylor RESPONDENT Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police
FILE NUMBER:	053311
HEARING DATES:	25/10/05
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	10/25/2005
EXTEMPORE DECISION DATE:	10/25/2005
DATE OF DECISION:	02/14/2006
BEFORE:	O'Connor K - DCJ (President)
CATCHWORDS:	Firearms Act - firearms prohibition order - making of - Firearms prohibition order - making of
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Jurisdiction
LEGISLATION CITED:	Firearms Act 1996
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT E Jones, solicitor, Lovett & Green RESPONDENT W Pisani, agent, New South Wales Police
ORDERS:	Application dismissed.

1 This is a revised version of ex tempore reasons.

2 The Tribunal has before it an application purporting to apply for a review of a firearms prohibition order issued by the Commissioner of Police against the applicant in 1985 under the legislation then in force.

3 The respondent has put in issue the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The relevant provision is paragraph (f) of s 75(1) of the Firearms Act 1996. The whole of s 75(1) is relevant to the submissions of the respondent. It provides:

‘ 75 Review by Administrative Decisions Tribunal of certain decisions

(1) A person may apply to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for a review of any of the following decisions:

(a) the refusal of or failure by the Commissioner to issue a licence or permit (other than a permit in respect of a prohibited firearm) to the person,

(b) a condition imposed by the Commissioner on a licence or permit issued to the person,

(c) the revocation of a licence or permit issued to the person (other than a revocation on the basis that the holder of the licence or permit is subject to a firearms prohibition order or an apprehended violence order),

(d) the refusal of or failure by the Commissioner to register a firearm,

(e) the cancellation of the registration of a firearm by the Commissioner,

(f) a firearms prohibition order made against the person,

(g) a decision made under the regulations concerning the person that belongs to a class of decisions prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph.’

4 The respondent’s submission is that s 75(1)(f) does not authorise an applicant to basically uplift for review by the Tribunal an old order, an order in this instance made in 1985. There is nothing in the words of the provision to indicate that it is time-limited in the way suggested by Mr Pisani, but it would arguably be a strange state of affairs if we could re-open the question of an order made 20 years ago.

5 The application describes itself as an application to review the revocation of a firearms prohibition order.

6 I think it is clear that the Tribunal has not been given an express jurisdiction to review the revocation of a firearms prohibition order. The other provisions of the legislation conferring jurisdiction that appear at s 75(1) do refer to decisions made by the Commissioner that involve revocation, so we see in s 75(1)(c) a reference to the revocation of a licence or permit issued to the person as being a matter for review. Then there are other forms of responses to applications which can be brought before the Tribunal, say for example in (d), ‘The refusal or failure of the Commissioner to register a firearm’ can be brought before the Tribunal.

7 My conclusion is that the applicant is not entitled to seek review in the terms in which the application for review has been presented, which is to have us review the Commissioner’s refusal to revoke a firearms prohibition order.

8 It may be that it could be argued that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the making of the order, even though that occurred twenty years ago. There is no time limitation in s 75(1)(f). I leave that matter open to be considered on some future occasion. The barrier to such an application, presumably, is the discretion to refuse leave to file out of time.

9 [The Tribunal then referred to alternative remedies in other jurisdictions that might be available.]