Taylor and National Disability Insurance Agency [2021] AATA 1042 (16 April 2021)
Division:NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME DIVISION
File Number(s): 2020/5184
Re:Arlene Taylor
APPLICANT
AndNational Disability Insurance Agency
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Member W Frost
Date of decision: 16 April 2021
Date of written reasons: 28 April 2021
Place:Canberra
The Tribunal dismisses the application under review pursuant to subsection 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
...........................[sgd].................................
Member W Frost
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for dismissal under s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 – whether the application should be dismissed – whether application is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance – whether application is futile or being pursued for a collateral purpose – application dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss 2A, 28, 42B, 43
Freedom of Information Act 1982
National Disability Insurance Agency Act 2013 ss 33, 37, 48, 100, 103
Ombudsman Act 1976
Privacy Act 1988
Cases
Abrahams v Comcare (2006) 93 ALD 147
Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481
General Steel Industries Inc v Cmr for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Re Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90
Re Kowalski and Repatriation Commission [2008] AATA 903
Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 923
REASONS FOR DECISION
Member W Frost
28 April 2021
INTRODUCTION
This decision relates to the Tribunal’s dismissal of the application brought by the Applicant, Dr Arlene Taylor, pursuant to subsection 42B(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act), because it was satisfied that the application had become ‘frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance’. Last year, Dr Taylor sought review by the Tribunal of a decision made by the Respondent, the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) regarding her statement of participant supports for the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).
In March this year, the NDIA applied to the Tribunal for dismissal of Dr Taylor’s application pursuant to section 42B of the AAT Act. The Tribunal held an interlocutory hearing by Microsoft Teams regarding the NDIA’s dismissal application and the Tribunal considered the materials filed in the proceeding, including the written and verbal submissions received from both parties in relation to the NDIA’s dismissal application.
On balance, the Tribunal was satisfied that Dr Taylor’s application for review of the NDIA’s decision should be dismissed pursuant to subsection 42B(1)(a) of the AAT Act. Accordingly, the application was dismissed without the Tribunal proceeding to review the NDIA’s decision. The Tribunal read out a short statement of its reasons at the interlocutory hearing. Following that hearing, Dr Taylor requested a statement of the Tribunal’s written reasons. These are those written reasons for the dismissal of Dr Taylor’s application.
LEGISLATION
Section 2A of the AAT Act provides as follows:
In carrying out its functions, the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that:
(a) is accessible; and
(b) is fair, just, economical, informal and quick; and
(c) is proportionate to the importance and complexity…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Taylor and National Disability Insurance Agency and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] AATA 1042
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine whether Dr Taylor's application for review of the 27 July 2020 decision should be dismissed. This involved considering the NDIA's contentions that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over subsequent plans, that the application served no purpose as the plan was no longer in force, and that Dr Taylor was seeking to invoke the Tribunal's power in relation to matters outside the scope of the decision under review. The Tribunal also had to apply the principles outlined in *Re Filsell and Comcare* regarding the cautious exercise of its power to dismiss applications under section 42B of the AAT Act.
The Tribunal reasoned that while it had jurisdiction to review the 27 July 2020 decision, the subsequent NDIS plans issued in November, December 2020, and January 2021, had replaced the plan that was the subject of the review. The Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited to the decision of 27 July 2020, which was in force until 27 November 2020. Despite Dr Taylor's arguments that the review was necessary to understand the NDIA's decision-making process and to prevent a dangerous precedent of avoiding accountability, the Tribunal found that the application had no reasonable prospect of success in providing her with any greater benefit than the decision already made. The Tribunal noted that the subsequent plans, which were not before it, had already addressed the issues of funding and supports.
Consequently, the Tribunal was satisfied that Dr Taylor's application should be dismissed pursuant to subsection 42B(1) of the AAT Act. The Tribunal concluded that it would be futile for the proceedings to continue, and inappropriate to expend the Tribunal's time and resources, or to put the NDIA to further expense, when the application could not provide Dr Taylor with a more beneficial outcome than that already achieved through subsequent plan replacements.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In summary, the NDIA’s written submissions dated 14 April 2021 in support of its dismissal application were that:(a) the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to the decision that resulted in Dr Taylor's current and operative NDIS plan; (b) the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to a plan that is no longer in force;(c) Dr Taylor’s application before the Tribunal can serve no purpose for her in that the Tribunal can provide her with no greater benefit than the decision sought to be reviewed; and(d) Dr Taylor seeks to invoke the power of the Tribunal in relation to matters which are not part of the decision under review.CONSIDERATION Having regard to all the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that Dr Taylor’s application should be dismissed pursuant to subsection 42B(1) of the AAT Act. The Tribunal in Re Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90 (Filsell) at [33] set out the relevant principles in considering the dismissal power in section 42B of the AAT Act, as follows:(a) The word “frivolous” in combination with “vexatious” is a technical legal term, which means that there is no legal basis for the proceedings; it does not necessarily connote that an applicant has acted frivolously in bringing proceedings: Pitt v OneSteel Reinforcing Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 923 at [9].(b) The expression “vexatious” can include proceedings brought with the intention of annoying or embarrassing or harassing the other party, or for some collateral purpose other than having the court or tribunal adjudicate on the issues raised by the proceedings, or, irrespective of the motive of the litigant, if the proceedings are “so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless”: Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491 per Roden J, or if the proceedings have “no reasonable prospect at all of success”: Abrahams v Comcare (2006) 93 ALD 147 at [24], per Madgwick J.(c) The power of the tribunal to dismiss proceedings under s 42B is a power that should be used cautiously. Unless the tribunal is satisfied that the application is frivolous or vexatious in the sense referred to in subparas (a) and (b) above, an applicant should not be denied the right to have the tribunal review the decision in issue on the merits, by conducting a hearing de novo and considering the evidence that the applicant can properly adduce at that hearing: General Steel Industries Inc v Cmr for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129–130.(d) However, if proceedings have no reasonable prospect at all of success, they should be dismissed under s 42B, since it would be futile for the proceedings to continue, and inappropriate to use the time and resources of this tribunal, and to put the respondent to the expense that would be involved in the matter proceeding to a hearing.(e) Conversely, applications to dismiss under s 42B should not be made except in appropriate cases, since otherwise the parties will be put to additional expense, the tribunal's time and resources will be wasted, and the tribunal's ability to provide a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick (as required by s 2A of the AAT Act) will be impeded.(f) Medical or other expert evidence generally needs to be evaluated in the context of evidence from the applicant or other lay witnesses. Where an application is made under s 42B at an early stage of proceedings in this tribunal, the parties may not have submitted, or may not be in a position to submit, all of the lay or medical evidence that might be available in relation to the proceedings. Further, if the applicant is unrepresented, there is no obligation to file any document in this tribunal that would have the status of pleadings in a civil court. In addition, in some circumstances (depending on the evidence adduced at the hearing) this tribunal exercises a limited inquisitorial role, whereby it considers a case not articulated by the applicant: see the authorities I discussed in Re Kowalski and Repatriation Commission [2008] AATA 903 at [33]–[35]. All of these matters mean that the basis of the application for review is often not as readily ascertainable as is the case where applications are made to strike out actions in civil courts on the grounds that the pleadings do not disclose a cause of action. This underlines the need for the tribunal to proceed cautiously when considering applications for dismissal under s 42B.(g) Section 42B presupposes that the tribunal has jurisdiction, since it empowers the tribunal to dismiss the application, and also in appropriate cases, to direct that the applicant must not, without leave of the tribunal, make a subsequent application to the tribunal of a kind or kinds specified in the direction. If the tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the decision in question, it would not have power to take the steps contemplated by s 42B.