TAYLOR and CITY OF SWAN
[2023] WASAT 78
•29 AUGUST 2023
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2005 (WA)
CITATION: TAYLOR and CITY OF SWAN [2023] WASAT 78
MEMBER: MS C BARTON, MEMBER
HEARD: 1 JUNE 2023
DELIVERED : 29 AUGUST 2023
FILE NO/S: DR 185 of 2022
BETWEEN: FRANCES ANN TAYLOR
Applicant
AND
CITY OF SWAN
Respondent
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Town planning - Enforcement action - Costs - Conduct of parties - Relevance of conduct prior to commencement of proceeding - Meaning of 'matter because of which the proceeding was brought'
Legislation:
Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 9, s 29(3)
Legal Profession (State Administrative Tribunal) Determination 2022 (WA)
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), s 133(1), s 299(2)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 214(2), s 255(1)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 31, s 46(3), s 47, s 48, s 87, s 87(2), s 87(3), s 87(4)
Result:
Application for costs dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Mr T Houweling |
| Respondent | : | Mr TL Beckett |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Cornerstone Legal |
| Respondent | : | McLeods |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Citygate Properties Pty Ltd and City of Bunbury (2005) 38 SR (WA) 246; [2005] WASAT 53
Hamilton and City of Gosnells [2017] WASAT 139
Lee v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2023] WASC 247
Marvelle Investments Pty Ltd and Argyle Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASAT 125 (S)
Medical Board of Western Australia and Kyi [2009] WASAT 22
Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58
Perth Central Holdings Pty Ltd and Doric Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] WASAT 302
Rae and Prima Homes Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] WASAT 24
Rainbow Pty Ltd and Hawkins & Anor [2007] WASAT 216 (S)
Ransberg Pty Ltd and City of Bayswater [2016] WASAT 43 (S)
Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of August-Margaret River [2005] WASAT 143 (S)
Summerville and Department of Education and Training & Ors [2006] WASAT 368 (S)
Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
On 21 September 2022, the respondent in this proceeding, the City of Swan (respondent), commenced enforcement action against the applicant, Ms Frances Taylor (applicant) by giving a written direction to her pursuant to s 214(2) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) (PD Act) (direction).
The direction required the applicant to reduce the number of dogs at her property in Bullsbrook (property) to 20 dogs and to secure the fencing sufficient to contain all dogs.
On 19 October 2022, the applicant sought review of the direction in the Tribunal after the respondent had attended her property on 12 October 2022 and seized the dogs pursuant to the provisions of the Dog Act 1976 (WA) (Dog Act).
On 21 November 2022, the direction was withdrawn by the respondent. Consequently, there was no hearing or decision by the Tribunal on the substantive application.
The applicant is seeking her costs in respect of DR 185/2022 (review proceeding).
For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the application for costs should be dismissed.
Issues for determination
The following key issue arises for determination by the Tribunal:
1)Is the applicant entitled to an order for costs in this review proceeding?
In determining the key issue, the following subsidiary issues that relate to the conduct of the respondent are relevant:
a)Does the seizure of the dogs prior to the commencement of the review proceeding provide a proper basis for a costs order in favour of the applicant?
b)Does the withdrawal of the direction after the review proceeding was commenced by the applicant provide a proper basis for a costs order in her favour?
Chronology of events
On 16 January 2020, the respondent granted the applicant development approval for an 'Animal Establishment' (approval).[1] The approval was subject to conditions which allowed the keeping of up to 20 dogs on the property and required the applicant to construct fencing on the property that was sufficient to contain the dogs (conditions of approval).[2]
[1] Affidavit of Kay Smith sworn on 13 March 2023, para 3.
[2] Affidavit of Frances Ann Taylor sworn 1 March 2023, page 6.
The approval included the following advice to applicants (advice note):[3]
This is a Development Approval issued by the City of Swan under its Local Planning Scheme No. 17 and under the Metropolitan Region Scheme in accordance with the delegation provided by Western Australian Planning Commission. It is not a building permit or an approval to commence or carry out development under any other law. It is the responsibility of the applicant to obtain any other necessary approvals, consents or licen[c]es required under any other law, and to commence and carry out development in accordance with all relevant laws.
[3] Affidavit of Frances Ann Taylor sworn 1 March 2023, page 6.
An officer of the respondent inspected the applicant's property on 19 September 2022 and found 79 adult dogs, as well as 30-40 puppies, contrary to the conditions of approval.[4] The number of dogs kept on the property is disputed by the applicant and, in any event, is not relevant to the determination of her costs application.
[4] Affidavit of Kay Smith sworn on 13 March 2023, para 4.
On 20 September 2022, the respondent issued the applicant with the direction in the following terms:[5]
1.Pursuant to section 214(2) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (Act), the City of Swan (City) hereby directs you to reduce the number of dogs to 20 and secure the fencing sufficient to contain all dogs within 60 days of the service of this notice.
2.If you fail to comply with this Direction, you commit an offence under section S214 of the Act and will be liable to a penalty not exceeding $200,000 and a further daily penalty of $25,000 for each day the offence continues.
3.You have a right to apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of this direction and your attention is drawn to the need to make such an application within 28 days of the date on which this notice is given to you, as prescribed by Rule 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004. Pending the determination of any such application, the direction continues to have effect.
[5] Affidavit of Kay Smith sworn on 13 March 2023, para 6; Affidavit of Frances Ann Taylor sworn on 1 March 2023, Annexure FT-2.
On 12 October 2022, officers of the respondent seized and impounded the majority of the applicant's adult dogs pursuant to s 29(3) of the Dog Act.[6]
[6] Affidavit of Kay Smith sworn on 13 March 2023, para 8.
On 19 October 2022, the applicant commenced proceedings in the Tribunal pursuant to s 255(1) of the PD Act seeking a review of the respondent's decision to give the direction.
On 21 November 2022, the respondent withdrew the direction and advised the applicant accordingly.[7]
The legal framework and principles
[7] Affidavit of Kay Smith sworn on 13 March 2023, para 15 and Annexure FT-4.
The parties to a proceeding before the Tribunal bear their own costs unless otherwise specified in the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), the enabling Act, or an order of the Tribunal under s 87 of the SAT Act.[8] The relevant enabling Act in the review proceeding is the PD Act. There is nothing in the PD Act that limits the Tribunal's discretion under s 87 of the SAT Act in respect of the making of an order for costs.
[8] SAT Act, s 87(1).
Whilst the presumptive position in a review proceeding is that each party will bear its own costs, the Tribunal may make an order for the payment by a party of all or any of the costs of another party under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[9] The principles relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion under s 87(2) of the SAT Act are set out in the Western Australian Court of Appeal decision in Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32 (Questdale).
[9] SAT Act, s 87(2).
In Questdale, the WA Court of Appeal observed that s 87(2) of the SAT Act is to be construed in the context that the legal rationale for an order for costs is to compensate the party in whose favour it is made and not to punish the party the subject of the order.[10] This rationale is evident in s 87(3) of the SAT Act which provides that the power of the Tribunal to make an order for the payment of costs includes 'the power to make an order for the payment of an amount to compensate the other party for any expenses, loss, inconvenience, or embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought'.
[10] Questdale at [51].
In the recent Western Australian Supreme Court decision of Lee v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2023] WASC 247 (Lee), Lundberg J considered the scope of s 87(3) of the SAT Act. His Honour stated:[11]
… [I]t should be observed that the power in s 87(3) of the SAT Act is conferred on the SAT in relation to the exercise of its statutory jurisdiction, and the SAT has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon general law causes of action or to award damages for breach of duty: Lee v Law Complaints Officer as the Delegate of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2023] WASCA 60 [33] (Murphy and Vaughan JJA). I recognise the Court of Appeal did not attempt a definitive construction of the scope of s 87(3) in that decision. Nonetheless, it is evident that the scope of the power is not so broad as to permit a party to claim compensation in the nature of damages from a decision-maker on the basis that the decision-maker's conduct fell short of acceptable standards. Indeed, this is the basis on which the SAT itself has construed the provision: Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of AugustaMargaret River [2005] WASAT 143 [S] [51] – [65].
[11] Lee at [67].
It is generally accepted that the words 'or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought' in s 87(3) of the SAT Act expands the range of expenses that may be recovered for the purposes of an order under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[12] However, the expenses that are the subject of an order must be costs in a proceeding of the Tribunal because of the reference in s 87(3) of the SAT Act to the words 'an order for the payment by a party of the costs of another party'.[13] In Springmist Pty Ltd and Shire of Augusta-Margaret River [2005] WASAT 143 (S) (Springmist), the Tribunal explained the scope of s 87(3) of the SAT Act as follows:[14]
The effect of s 87(3) is that the expenses that may be recovered are not limited to the traditional notion of legal costs, but can include other expenses and loss in connection with the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal. For example, the costs may include the costs of a non lawyer advocate, the expenses of a party having to travel to a hearing or some amount which compensates a party for the inconvenience or expense of its participation in the proceedings.
[12] Springmist at [63].
[13] Springmist at [63].
[14] Springmist at [64].
There are a range of factors that might contribute to the Tribunal making a costs order under s 87(2) of the SAT Act. One such factor is where a party conducts itself unreasonably or inappropriately, particularly where that conduct leads to unnecessary costs to be incurred by the other party.[15] Section 87(4) of the SAT Act also identifies factors to which the Tribunal is to have regard in exercising its discretion to award costs in a review proceeding. Specifically, whether there was a genuine attempt by a party to assist the original decision-maker to make a decision on its merits, and whether the decision-maker genuinely attempted to do so.[16] Section 87(4) does not limit the range of factors which may be considered in the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[17]
[15] See Ransberg Pty Ltd and City of Bayswater [2016] WASAT 43 (S) (Ransberg) at [22].
[16] See SAT Act, s 87(4); Ransberg at [22] and [52].
[17] Citygate Properties Pty Ltd and City of Bunbury (2005) 38 SR (WA) 246; [2005] WASAT 53 at [32].
In Medical Board of Western Australia and Kyi [2009] WASAT 22 (Kyi), the Tribunal observed as follows:[18]
… If a party has conducted itself in such a way as to unnecessarily prolong the hearing, has acted unreasonably or inappropriately in its conduct of the proceedings, has been capricious, or the proceedings in some other way constitute an abuse of process, then this may give rise to an exercise of the discretion to award costs. This encompasses a situation where proceedings should not have been maintained against a party because it is clearly untenable and no reasonable person would have believed they could be successful[.]
[18] Kyi at [73] referring to the general principles regarding costs discussed in Summerville and Department of Education and Training & Ors [2006] WASAT 368 (S) at [23] - [44].
It follows that conduct of a kind referred to in s 46(3), s 47 and s 48 of the SAT Act (which includes failure on the part of an applicant to prosecute a matter, frivolous proceedings and vexatious conduct) is relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[19] Further, in Springmist, the Tribunal acknowledged that the phrase 'or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought' in s 87(3) of the SAT Act does expand the range of conduct that might be examined for the purposes of an order under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.[20] This construction of s 87(3) of the SAT Act is supported by s 87(4) of the SAT Act which, if the latter provision is to be given effect, necessarily involves an examination of the parties conduct prior to the commencement of an application for review.[21]
[19] Questdale at [64].
[20] Springmist at [63].
[21] See Springmist at [61].
The discretion to award costs is to be exercised judicially; not arbitrarily or capriciously or so as to frustrate the legislative intent.[22] The question for the Tribunal is whether it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case that a party should be compensated for the costs it has incurred. The onus of proof is on the party seeking an order in its favour.[23]
Principles relevant to the assessment of costs
[22] Questdale at [48].
[23] Questdale at [51].
In the Western Australian Court of Appeal decision, Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58 (Panegyres), Vaughan JA provided the following guidance on the minimum amount of information required by the Tribunal to ensure it is able to evaluate and assess a claim for costs:[24]
The Tribunal should, however, ensure that it is in a position to evaluate and assess the Board's claim as to costs. At the least this requires that the Tribunal be appropriately informed as to the work done and time taken as is claimed for and the rates which are said to apply to that work. The detail required in this respect is a matter for the Tribunal. It may take the form of an affidavit attaching the tax invoices as charged. Alternatively, the Tribunal may consider it appropriate to require a short form bill of costs[.]
[24] Panegyres at [415].
An assessment of costs 'should be approached in a broad fashion and should not have to descend into an inquiry into small items of expenditure'.[25] Although the assessment of costs involves a relatively broad and robust approach, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the costs claimed are reasonable and necessary.[26] The Tribunal must also be satisfied that the costs claimed are not excessive in nature.[27] There is an expectation that parties will approach a proceeding in a way that minimises their costs.[28] An assessment of costs will reflect this expectation, but consideration will be given to 'the nature of the matter, its complexity, its importance, urgency, and the amount of time and effort required to properly prepare and present the case'.[29]
The applicant's contentions
[25] Perth Central Holdings Pty Ltd and Doric Constructions Pty Ltd [2008] WASAT 302 at [67].
[26] Marvelle Investments Pty Ltd and Argyle Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] WASAT 125 (S) at [48] - [49].
[27] Rae and Prima Homes Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] WASAT 24 at [69].
[28] Ransberg at [31].
[29] Ransberg at [31] and [33]; See Rainbow Pty Ltd and Hawkins & Anor [2007] WASAT 216 (S).
The application for costs is supported by an itemised bill of costs (Bill of Costs). The items claimed by the applicant in the Bill of Costs are at the maximum allowable hourly rates that apply to a proceeding in the Tribunal prescribed by the Legal Profession (State Administrative Tribunal) Determination 2022 (Determination).[30] According to the Bill of Costs, the total (including estimated) legal costs incurred by the applicant in the review proceeding is $33,933.70.
[30] Affidavit of Frances Ann Taylor sworn on 1 March 2023, Annexure FT-3. Following the repeal of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), the Determination is taken to have been made under s 133(1) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) (Application Act): s 299(2) of the Application Act.
The applicant's contentions in support of her application for costs may be summarised as follows:
1)The applicant had 28 days from the date the direction was given to her on 21 September 2022 (date of service) to make an application to the Tribunal for review of the respondent's decision to give the direction, meanwhile the direction continued to have effect.[31]
2)By its terms, the applicant had 60 days to comply with the direction from the date of service (and, therefore, a legitimate expectation that in accordance with the direction she could reduce the number of dogs).[32] However, within that 60-day period, on 12 October 2022, the respondent entered the property and frustrated the practical utility of any review proceeding by seizing the dogs pursuant to the Dog Act.[33] Consequently, the respondent did not act in good faith because it should have known that its actions would subvert the applicant's right of review in the Tribunal, similar to the conduct of the respondent in Hamilton and City of Gosnells [2017] WASAT 139 (Hamilton).[34]
3)By giving the direction, the respondent was effectively estopped from taking action under the Dog Act.[35]
4)Relying on a direction under the PD Act to reduce the number of dogs on the property was misconceived; it was a matter that should properly have been dealt with under the Dog Act.[36]
5)Because the respondent did not withdraw the direction until 21 November 2022, the applicant continued to incur costs in respect of the review proceeding. The significant expenses incurred by the applicant were necessary to review the respondent's decision to give the direction but were ultimately thrown away by virtue of the unreasonable conduct of the respondent.[37]
6)The respondent withdrew the direction without being invited to reconsider its decision pursuant to s 31 of the SAT Act.[38]
[31] Applicant's written submissions dated 29 March 2023, para 24.
[32] Applicant's supplementary written submissions dated 29 May 2023, para 5.
[33] Applicant's written submissions dated 29 March 2023, para 25.
[34] ts 4, 1 June 2023.
[35] ts 7, 1 June 2023.
[36] Applicant's supplementary written submissions dated 29 May 2023, para 3.
[37] Applicant's written submissions dated 29 March 2023, para 27.
[38] Applicant's written submissions dated 29 March 2023, para 11.
Having regard to these circumstances, the applicant says that she is entitled to a costs order in her favour pursuant to s 87(2) of the SAT Act.
The respondent's contentions
The respondent says that there is no proper basis for an award of costs to be made in respect of the review proceeding. The contentions in support of the respondent's position may be summarised as follows:
1)For the purposes of the Dog Act, the applicant was only permitted to keep two dogs on the property. Irrespective of the requirements of the Dog Act, the applicant was in breach of a condition of the approval because she had more than 20 dogs on the property. The approval under the PD Act does not constitute permission for the purposes of the Dog Act, as reflected in the advice note which identifies the need to obtain any other necessary approvals.
2)The respondent's action to remove the dogs from the property under the Dog Act was independent of the enforcement action taken by the respondent under the PD Act and did not relate to the direction. The respondent exercised two separate statutory functions, one that relates to land use and amenity, and the other that relates to the proper keeping, maintenance and control of dogs.[39]
3)The withdrawal of the direction on 21 November 2021 occurred only 17 days after the first directions hearing.[40] The direction was withdrawn because, at that time, there was not more than 20 adult dogs being kept on the property. The direction in respect of the fencing could have been maintained, but the respondent considered it appropriate to withdraw the direction to enable the review proceeding to be finalised.[41]
4)The decision of the respondent to withdraw the direction does not constitute any concession that the direction was not properly issued in the first instance or was not capable of being sustained at the time it was withdrawn.[42]
5)The making of an application for costs is unjustified having regard to the fact that the direction was withdrawn, and the review proceeding resolved in the space of several weeks, without the need for the preparation of witness statements and evidence for a final hearing. The respondent sought to finalise the review proceeding at the earliest opportunity to prevent further costs to either party in litigating the matter.[43]
[39] ts 16, 1 June 2023.
[40] Respondent's submission in response to application for costs dated 14 March 2023, para 11.
[41] Respondent's submission in response to application for costs dated 14 March 2023, para 12.
[42] Respondent's submission in response to application for costs dated 14 March 2023, para 14.
[43] ts 15, 1 June 2023.
Consequently, it is the respondent's position that the applicant has failed to discharge the onus of proving it is fair and reasonable that she should be reimbursed for the costs of the review proceeding.[44]
Exercise of discretion in this case
[44] Respondent's submission in response to application for costs dated 14 March 2023, para 20.
The presumptive position is that each party will bear its own costs in a review proceeding. Although the Tribunal is a 'no cost' jurisdiction, the Tribunal has power under s 87(2) of the SAT Act to order the payment by a party of all or any of the costs of another party if it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case that a party should be compensated for the costs it has incurred.
It is relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion under s 87(2) of the SAT Act whether, and to what extent, the party who bears the onus on costs can establish that the other party's conduct has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives.[45] One of the objectives of the Tribunal in s 9 of the SAT Act is to achieve the resolution of disputes, fairly, and according to the substantial merits of the case. A further objective is to act speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable and minimise the costs to the parties.
Seizure of the dogs
[45] Questdale at [54].
For the reasons already provided, the Tribunal may have regard to the conduct of a party before the commencement of the review proceeding in deciding whether to make an award of costs.
On 19 October 2022, the applicant sought review by the Tribunal of the respondent's decision to give the direction. Shortly before this date, on 12 October 2022, the respondent seized and impounded the dogs that were found at the applicant's property.
The conduct of the respondent in seizing the dogs under the Dog Act is a matter which I consider is relevant to the exercise of my discretion under s 87(2) of the SAT Act. However, I find that the respondent's exercise of enforcement powers under the Dog Act does not form a proper basis to make an award of costs in favour of the applicant in this review proceeding. The respondent has a statutory duty to administer and enforce the provisions of the Dog Act within its district.[46] Having regard to the respondent's role under the Dog Act and the large number of dogs that were found at the applicant's property, I am satisfied that the respondent's decision to seize and impound the dogs was not unreasonable. Whilst it may not always be necessary or practicable to do so, I observe that the respondent was not prevented from exercising its enforcement powers under both the Dog Act and the PD Act concurrently.
Withdrawal of the direction
[46] Dog Act, s 9.
The conduct of the parties during the course of the review proceeding is also relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion pursuant to s 87(2) of the SAT Act. A factor that might contribute to the Tribunal making a costs order is where the conduct of a party during the course of a proceeding is unreasonable or inappropriate, particularly if it leads to unnecessary costs to the other party. Whilst it is unusual for the Tribunal to have regard to the actions of a party outside the day-to-day conduct of a proceeding when determining a costs application, I consider that the withdrawal of the direction by the respondent is relevant to the exercise of my discretion pursuant to s 87(2) of the SAT Act because the direction is the subject of the application for review.
The applicant contends that she continued to incur unnecessary legal costs because the direction was not withdrawn by the respondent until 21 November 2022, approximately one month after she commenced the review proceeding to challenge it. The applicant did not contend that the respondent had acted unreasonably or inappropriately in the conduct of the review proceeding itself.
For the reasons that follow, I find that the withdrawal of the direction by the respondent is not a matter which supports the making of a costs order in favour of the applicant. First, I am satisfied that the respondent's decision to withdraw the direction was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances because, following the seizure of the dogs, there were not more than 20 dogs on the property and, consequently, the direction had no work to do. Second, the respondent did not unnecessarily prolong the proceeding. I consider that the respondent acted reasonably by not pursuing that aspect of the direction that related to the fencing at the property, or allowing the direction to remain on foot when there was no basis to do so, thus avoiding the unnecessary costs of a final hearing. Third, the withdrawal of the direction without an invitation by the Tribunal for the respondent to reconsider its decision to give the direction to the applicant (pursuant to s 31 of the SAT Act) is not a matter that I can properly have regard to in determining a costs application. Finally, I consider that Hamilton is of limited assistance in determining, in the context of an application for costs, whether the withdrawal of the direction by the respondent was reasonable and appropriate conduct. In any event, the Tribunal in that case found that the direction given under the PD Act had not, in substance, been withdrawn.[47]
[47] Hamilton at [30].
Further, I do not consider it would be fair or reasonable for the applicant to be compensated for her legal costs and expenses in circumstances where she commenced the review proceeding challenging the direction after the dogs, the subject of the direction, had already been seized by the respondent.
Costs claimed
Given my findings, it is unnecessary for me to undertake an assessment of the Bill of Costs. However, I observe that the costs claimed by the applicant appear excessive, particularly in the circumstances of this case which is limited to a review of the direction and where the matter had not been listed for a final hearing.
Conclusion
The presumptive position is that a party to a review proceeding before the Tribunal will bear its own costs. However, the Tribunal may order a party to pay all or any of the costs of another party under s 87(2) of the SAT Act. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it would not be fair or reasonable for the applicant to be compensated for the costs that she has incurred.
Accordingly, I will decline to make an order for costs in favour of the applicant and will make an order dismissing her costs application. I will make a further order that each party must bear its own costs of the review proceeding.
Orders
The Tribunal orders:
1.The application for costs is dismissed.
2.Each party must bear its own costs.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MS C BARTON, MEMBER
29 AUGUST 2023
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