Taubert v Body Corporate for Grenache CTS 29711

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND


ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Taubert & Ors v Body Corporate for Grenache CTS 29711 [2025] QCATA 61

PARTIES:

STEPHAN TAUBERT

(APPELLANT)

ROBERT VANDERMAAT

(APPELLANT)

SHARON VANDERMAAT

(appellant)

v

BODY CORPORATE FOR GRENACHE CTS 29711

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL006-24

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

27 June 2025

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Lumb

ORDERS:

The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – QUESTION OF LAW – where s 289(2) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) allows a person aggrieved by an adjudicator’s order to appeal only on a question of law to Appeal Tribunal – meaning of ‘only on a question of law’ – where motion put to extraordinary general meeting of a body corporate to allocate part of common property for exclusive use parking for two lot owners – where motion opposed by the owners of one lot and motion not passed – where adjudicator found that opposition was not unreasonable in the circumstances – whether denial of procedural fairness – whether adjudicator acted in breach of the Act – whether grounds of appeal raise a question of law only

Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), s 269, s 271, s 276, s 289, s 290, s 294

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 146, s 147, s 150

Ainsworth v Albrecht (2016) 261 CLR 167

Allen & Anor v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2024] QCA 24
Deemal-Hall v Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] QCATA 131

Pivovarova v Michelsen [2019] QCA 256

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

  1. Stephan Taubert and Robert Vandermaat and Sharon Vandermaat (collectively ‘the appellants’) are lot owners in the Grenache Community Titles Scheme 29711 (‘the Scheme’). The Vandermaats are the registered owner of Lot 4 in the Scheme and Mr Taubert is the registered owner of Lot 5 in the Scheme.

  2. The Respondent (‘the Body Corporate’) is the body corporate for the Scheme.

  3. The Scheme comprises six lots together with common property, being a residential apartment complex at Broadbeach on the Gold Coast. The Scheme is regulated by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (‘the BCCMA’) and the Body Corporate and Community Management (Small Schemes Module) Regulation 2020 (Qld). A New Community Management Statement for the Scheme (‘the CMS’) was recorded on 16 March 2023.

  1. In May 2023, a motion (Motion 2) was proposed at an extraordinary general meeting of the Body Corporate. Motion 2 proposed that ‘Lot 4’ (the Vandermaats’ lot) and ‘Lot 5’ (Mr Taubert’s lot) each be granted exclusive use of a separate area of common property (identified as Areas ‘J’ and ‘K’ respectively) for use as a car parking space in the basement of the complex. Motion…

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Details
Case
[2025] QCATA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Taubert v Body Corporate for Grenache CTS 29711 arose from a dispute within a body corporate, specifically regarding the allocation of common property for exclusive use parking. The parties involved were the appellants, who were lot owners, and the respondent, the body corporate representing the owners of the scheme. The dispute centred around a motion put to an extraordinary general meeting, which aimed to allocate part of the common property for exclusive use parking for two lot owners. The motion was opposed by the owners of another lot and did not pass. An adjudicator was appointed to review the matter, finding that the opposition was not unreasonable in the circumstances. The appellants challenged this decision, arguing that the opposition was unreasonable and that the adjudicator had breached procedural fairness.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the grounds of appeal raised a question of law only, as required by section 289(2) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld). The court had to determine the meaning of "only on a question of law" and whether the adjudicator's decision could be appealed on the grounds of procedural fairness or if it solely concerned questions of law. The appellants argued that the adjudicator's conclusion that the opposition was not unreasonable in the circumstances involved both a question of law and fact. The respondent maintained that the appeal was limited to questions of law and that the adjudicator's decision was correct.

The court held that an appeal under section 289 of the BCCMA must be on a pure question of law. It clarified that the subject matter of the appeal must be a question of law, and the powers of the Appeal Tribunal were those set out in section 146 of the QCAT Act. The court found that the adjudicator's conclusion that the opposition was not unreasonable in the circumstances was a mixed question of law and fact, as it involved an assessment of the reasonableness of the opposition based on the specific circumstances. Given that the appeal included both legal and factual components, the court determined that it did not solely concern a question of law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as it did not meet the statutory requirement of being on a question of law only.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed. The court found that the appeal did not raise a question of law only, as required by section 289(2) of the BCCMA, and therefore the appeal was not valid. The decision of the adjudicator remained in place, and the motion to allocate part of the common property for exclusive use parking did not proceed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In summary, I am of the view that:(a)an appeal under s 289 of the BCCMA must be on a question of law only (or, in other words, on a ‘pure’ question of law);(b)the very subject matter of the appeal must be a question of law; and(c)the powers exercisable by the Appeal Tribunal on such an appeal are those set out in s 146 of the QCAT Act.The Reasons for Decision The Adjudicator considered three issues: first, what were the existing rights to the scheme land in the basement of the scheme as per the registered survey plan and the CMS; second, whether there was a mistake or error in the CMS relating to Areas ‘J’ and ‘K’ of the common property; and, third, the ‘main question’ of whether the opposition to Motion 2 was unreasonable in the circumstances. The Adjudicator:(a)concluded that Areas J and K were unallocated areas of common property in the Scheme;[10](b)was not satisfied that the CMS mistakenly omitted an allocation of areas of basement common property for the exclusive use of Lots 4 and 5;[11] and(c)was not satisfied that Motion 2 failed to pass because of opposition that in the circumstances was unreasonable.[12][10]Reasons [47].[11]Ibid [59].[12]Ibid [76]. The appellants do not challenge the findings in [30](a) and (b) above. The appellants do challenge the conclusion in [30](c) above. The Adjudicator primarily addressed this issue at Reasons [60]-[80]. In relation to the opposition of the Lot 6 owners in respect of Motion 2, the Adjudicator said:[13][70] I now turn to the grounds of opposition raised by dissenting voters. Examining those reasons and applying the principles articulated by the High Court in Ainsworth, I find as follows.[71] Some of the stated reasons for the dissenting vote were objectively unreasonable in the circumstances. For example, where Areas J and K have been used for parking for many years, including by the owners of Lot 6 for parking their own vehicles and boats, basing a decision to vote “No” on the grounds it would remove two turn around points is unreasonable.[72] The owners of Lot 6 also say a grant of exclusive use for Area K would adversely affect access to their exclusive use storage cage. I am inclined to the view that this is also objectively unreasonable. I am satisfied Lot 6 could continue to access its storage space even when vehicles are parked in Area K. Moreover, Motion 2 specifically included a condition providing for access to the storage space.[73] However, I am satisfied some of the reasons given by the owners of Lot 6 for voting “No” were not objectively unreasonable in the circumstances.[74] The owners of Lot 6 also say they voted against Motion 2 because they have a right to use and enjoy common property. It is not necessarily unreasonable for a lot owner to vote to conserve their property interest. The owners of Lot 6 are also entitled to vote in their own self-interest especially where the exclusive use is reasonably viewed as adverse to their interest.[75] In the present case, owners of Lot 6 thought they had a right to use the common property for visitor parking and wanted to continue to exercise that right. They now understand Areas J and K are areas of unallocated common property and that, technically, no-one is permitted to park on them. In my view, although it may seem unfair to the applicants, it is not objectively unreasonable for the owners of Lot 6 to vote “No” because they prefer that Areas J and K be allocated to visitor parking rather than exclusively for Lots 4 and 5.[76] For the above reasons I am not satisfied Motion 2 failed to pass because of opposition that in the circumstances was unreasonable.(citations omitted)[13]Ibid [70]-[76].The grounds of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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