Tate v Duncan-Strelec - [2020] NSWSC 52

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2020] NSWSC 52
Hearing dates: 6 February 2020
Date of orders: 06 February 2020
Decision date: 06 February 2020
Jurisdiction: Equity
Before: Kunc J
Decision:
Contemnor fined $2,000 and placed on a 2 year good behaviour bond

Catchwords: CONTEMPT — Criminal contempt — Penalties — Fines — Indemnity costs order
Legislation Cited: Fines Act 1996 (NSW)
Cases Cited: ASIC v Matthews [2009] NSWSC 285
Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) (1992) 26 NSWLR 309
Ronowska v Kus (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 817
Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2015] NSWSC 190
Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2019] NSWSC 1383
Category: Principal judgment
Parties:
Thomas Richard Tate (Plaintiff)
Amanda Duncan-Strelec (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:

G R Rubagotti and E F C Thompson (Plaintiff)
A Duncan-Strelec (Defendant – self represented)

Solicitors:
Hickey Lawyers (Plaintiff)

File Number(s): 2018/91914
Publication restriction: NO

ex tempore Judgment (revised)

Introduction

By judgment delivered on 11 October 2019, the Court found the defendant, Ms Duncan-Strelec, guilty of four charges of criminal contempt: Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2019] NSWSC 1383 (the “Principal Judgment”). The proceedings were brought by the plaintiff, Mr Tate. There had been a long history of litigation between Ms Duncan-Strelec and her husband against Mr Tate. The detail of that history is set out in the Principal Judgment and it is not necessary for me to repeat it. These reasons, which are concerned with imposing an appropriate penalty for the contempts of which Ms Duncan-Strelec has been found guilty, should be read with the Principal Judgment.
Before me today, Mr Tate was represented by Ms G R Rubagotti of Counsel with Mr E F C Thompson of Counsel. Ms Duncan-Strelec appeared for herself. After the delivery of the Principal Judgment, directions were made for the filing of evidence and submissions on the question of penalty. The Court has had the advantage of written outlines from each party.
Mr Tate relies on two affidavits of his solicitor in relation to technical aspects of transferring a domain name and website about which I need say nothing further because orders to that effect are not opposed by Ms Duncan-Strelec. Ms Duncan-Strelec has filed no affidavit evidence but, without objection from Ms Rubagotti, I have treated what is in Ms Duncan-Strelec's outline of submissions and what she has said to me today from the bar table as evidence.

The legal principles applicable to sentencing for a criminal contempt

Insofar as sentencing for contempt is concerned, there are two matters of principle which I keep in mind when making the intuitive synthesis that is involved in determining an appropriate penalty for what are four criminal contempts. Those two principles are, first, that the purpose of punishing contempts of this kind is to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice, taking into account the need not only to punish but also to deter the contemnor and others, and to denounce the contempt: Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) (1992)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tate v Duncan-Strelec

Details

AGLC: Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2020] NSWSC 52
Case: [2020] NSWSC 52
Decision Date: 06 February 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties involved in this case were Tate, the appellant, and Duncan-Strelec, the respondent. The dispute arose from an action initiated by the respondent against the appellant for defamation, which the respondent claimed was false and malicious. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the respondent sought various penalties and costs related to the defamation case. The court had to determine whether the respondent was entitled to the penalties and indemnity costs sought. The respondent argued that the appellant's conduct during the litigation was contemptuous and that they were entitled to the penalties and costs as a result.

The legal issues before the court were whether the appellant's conduct amounted to contempt and, if so, whether the respondent was entitled to the penalties and indemnity costs sought. The court had to consider the principles of criminal contempt and the appropriate penalties and costs for such conduct. The respondent argued that the appellant's conduct was contemptuous because it involved making false and misleading statements during the litigation. The respondent contended that the penalties and costs should be awarded to deter similar conduct in the future and to compensate for the additional costs incurred as a result of the contempt.

The court found that the appellant's conduct amounted to contempt and that the respondent was entitled to the penalties and costs sought. The court held that the appellant's conduct was deliberately obstructive and designed to undermine the judicial process. The court emphasised the importance of maintaining the integrity of the legal system and the need to deter contemptuous conduct. The court awarded the respondent the penalties and indemnity costs sought, finding that these were appropriate to achieve the objectives of deterrence and compensation. The court's decision was based on a careful consideration of the principles of criminal contempt and the specific circumstances of the case.

Orders