SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Tate v Aarjets Pty Ltd ATF The Jurgholme Trust & Anor [2010] QCA 243
PARTIES:
GREGOR GORDON TATE
(applicant)
v
AARJETS PTY LTD ATF THE JURGHOLME TRUST
(first respondent)
ROBERT JAMES VAUGHAN
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 311 of 2009
DC No 100 of 2008DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Ipswich
DELIVERED ON:
10 September 2010
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 May 2010
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, Muir JA and Fraser JA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal granted, but only as to the construction of s 230 Liquor Act.
2. Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
LIQUOR LAW – PENAL PROVISIONS – OFFENCES – SUPPLYING LIQUOR TO PERSONS UNDERAGE – first and second respondent lessee and nominee of licensed premises – applicant and other officers found four customers under 18 years of age on premises – customers were not asked for proof of age identification – employee bar manager had seen customers in bar previously and inferred they were over 18 years old – whether respondents have defence under
s 230(2) Liquor Act that employee had reasonable belief customers were over 18 years old – whether judge erred in interpreting s 230(2)LIQUOR LAW – PENAL PROVISIONS – EVIDENCE AND ONUS OF PROOF GENERALLY – RELEVANT PRINCIPLES – judge did not overtly refer to principles under s 223 District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) requiring own determinations and due deference to magistrate's view – whether judge erred in fact and law determining that on balance of probabilities respondent employee had honest and reasonable belief that customers were over 18 years of age – whether judge conducted a rehearing and evaluated the evidence before magistrate as required by s 223
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14B
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118(3), s 223
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222
Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 230Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207; [1990] HCA 51 cited
RARingwood Pty Ltd v Lower [1968] SASR 454, cited
R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607, cited
Ross v The Queen (1979) 141 CLR 432; [1979] HCA 29, cited
Rowe v Kemper [2009] 1 Qd R 247; [2008] QCA 175, appliedSodeman v R [1936] 2 All ER 1138, cited
Stevenson v Yasso [2006] 2 Qd R 150; [2006] QCA 40, citedCOUNSEL:
J D Henry, with R W Frigo, for the applicant
No appearance for the respondentsSOLICITORS:
Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation (Queensland) for the applicant
No appearance for the respondents
McMURDO P: The first respondent was the lessee and nominee of the Coronation Hotel, Ipswich. It has been in liquidation since 24 July 2009. Its liquidator, Mr John Park of Korda Mentha, has informed the Court that he does not intend to participate…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Tate v Aarjets Pty Ltd ATF the Jurgholme Trust and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2010] QCA 243
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the trial judge had erred in law by not overtly referring to the principles under section 223 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), which requires the court to make its own determinations and give due deference to the magistrate's view. The court noted that the trial judge did not explicitly address these principles but concluded that there was no error in the judge's interpretation of the statutory provisions. The court found that the evidence before the magistrate, which included the bar manager's prior observations of the customers, supported the finding that the employee had a reasonable belief that the customers were over 18 years of age. The court held that the judge had conducted a proper evaluation of the evidence and that there was no error in the trial judge's findings.
The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal was granted, but only in relation to the construction of section 230 of the Liquor Act. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety, as the court found no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and the evaluation of the evidence. The court did not find it necessary to address the other issues raised by the respondents regarding the principles of evidence and onus of proof.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal granted, but only as to the construction of s 230 Liquor Act.
2. Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated from an appeal against a decision made by a magistrate under the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld). The appeal was heard in the District Court of Queensland. The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal on two grounds: firstly, concerning the interpretation of s 230(2) of the Liquor Act, and secondly, regarding the principles of evidence and onus of proof as outlined in s 223 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). The District Court granted leave to appeal only as to the construction of s 230(2) of the Liquor Act. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed by the Queensland Court of Appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judge erred in interpreting s 230(2) of the Liquor Act that the employee had a reasonable belief that the customers were over 18 years old.
2. Whether the judge erred in fact and law in determining that on the balance of probabilities the respondent employee had an honest and reasonable belief that the customers were over 18 years of age.
3. Whether the judge conducted a rehearing and evaluated the evidence before the magistrate as required by s 223 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).
Held
1. The court concluded that the judge did not err in interpreting s 230(2) of the Liquor Act that the employee had a reasonable belief that the customers were over 18 years old. The court held that the interpretation was correct.
2. The court determined that the judge did not err in fact and law in concluding that on the balance of probabilities the respondent employee had an honest and reasonable belief that the customers were over 18 years of age. The court held that this finding was not erroneous.
3. The court found that the judge did not conduct a rehearing and evaluate the evidence before the magistrate as required by s 223 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). The court held that there was an error in this respect.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering the interpretation of s 230(2) of the Liquor Act, the court examined the language of the statute and the context in which the provision operates. The court held that the judge correctly interpreted the statutory provision to mean that the employee's belief as to the age of the customers must be reasonable and honest, but it need not be based on evidence or proof of age identification. The court found that the judge's interpretation aligned with the purpose of the Act, which is to prevent the supply of liquor to minors. Therefore, the court upheld the judge's interpretation of s 230(2).
Regarding the judge's determination of the respondent employee's belief, the court examined the evidence presented and the judge's assessment of that evidence. The court found that the evidence supported the judge's conclusion that the employee had an honest and reasonable belief that the customers were over 18 years of age. The court held that the judge's conclusion was not erroneous and did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.
Lastly, the court scrutinized the judge's adherence to s 223 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). The court noted that the judge did not explicitly reference the statutory requirement to conduct a rehearing and evaluate the evidence before the magistrate. However, the court held that the judge's determination was not so flawed as to warrant setting it aside. The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the judge did not follow the statutory requirement, the error did not affect the outcome of the case and thus did not constitute a basis for appeal.