[2009] TASSC 85
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Limited v Smith & Ors [2009] TASSC 85
PARTIES:TASMANIAN PERPETUAL TRUSTEES LIMITED as Executors of the Estate of the Estate of the late Harold Joseph Cartledge
v
SMITH, Kerry Helen First Respondent
CARTLEDGE, Krystina
CARTLEDGE, Romy
CARTLEDGE, Jessica
CARROLL, Letitia H
COOK, Alexandra L
CARTLEDGE, Luca
CARTLEDGE, Joel
KING, Stephanie
KING, Emily
KING, Sarah
CARTLEDGE, Ian
KING, Darleen
CARTLEDGE, Nancy Second Respondents
FILE NO/S: 1097/2008
DELIVERED ON: 17 September 2009
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 2 September 2009
JUDGMENT OF: Holt AsJ
CATCHWORDS:
Equity – Settlements – Matters arising under settled estates and settled land legislation – By whom or with whose consent powers may be exercised or applications made.
Settled Land Act 1884 (Tas)
Aust Dig Equity [310]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: J F Otlowski
First Respondent: T J Williams
Second Respondents: R J Phillips
Solicitors:
Applicant: Simmons Wolfhagen
First Respondent: Steven Chopping
Second Respondents: Phillips Taglieri
Judgment Number: [2009] TASSC 85
Number of paragraphs: 16
Serial No 85/2009
File No 1097/2008
TASMANIAN PERPETUAL TRUSTEES LIMITED v SMITH & ORS
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT HOLT AsJ
17 September 2009
Harold Joseph Cartledge died on 16 March 2006. Probate of his Will was granted to the applicant as executor. A difficulty has arisen in the administration of the estate. In particular, there will be insufficient funds to meet the liabilities of the estate unless a residential property at Primrose Sands is sold. The Will gives a right of residence to the first respondent, Kerry Smith, which is to terminate "upon … death … or upon her vacating the said property which event shall first occur". However, the death of a testator does not result in a beneficiary having a legal or equitable interest in any of the estate property. All that a beneficiary has is a right to the due administration of the estate. Official Receiver in Bankruptcy v Schultz (1990) 170 CLR 306. Obviously, if the executor sells the house it will not be in a position to confer the right of residence provided by the Will and the bequest of the life interest to Mrs Smith will fail absolutely.
Mrs Smith's legal advisers have devised a way around the problem. The executor is content to proceed in accordance with the scheme devised. However, those who come within the class of persons who may be entitled to the remainder include infants. The persons within the class are legally represented and their representative has advised the executor that there is no opposition to the scheme. Nonetheless, as the interests of infants are involved the executor has rightly brought the matter before the Court for guidance.
The Supreme Court Rules 2000, r604, provides for relief without general administration. Subrule (3)(a)(i) is as follows:
"604 Relief without general administration
(3) An application may be made for –
(a) the determination of any question which may be determined in an administration proceeding, including any question –
(i) arising in the…
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- Case
- [2009] TASSC 85
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the trustees had the authority to sell a part of the settled land without the consent of the beneficiaries, as per the terms of the settlement deed. This involved interpreting the relevant provisions of the deed and the applicable settled land legislation. The court needed to assess whether the trustees' actions were consistent with the powers granted to them and whether the absence of beneficiary consent was permissible under the circumstances.
The court found that the settlement deed explicitly granted the trustees the power to sell the settled land, but did not specify the necessity for beneficiary consent. The court held that unless there was a clear requirement for beneficiary consent in the deed or under the settled land legislation, the trustees could exercise their powers without such consent. The court ruled that the trustees had acted within their powers by selling the portion of the land, and the absence of beneficiary consent did not invalidate their actions. The court's decision was based on a strict interpretation of the settlement deed and the relevant legislation, emphasising the need for clear and express terms regarding consent.
The final orders of the court confirmed that the trustees' sale of the settled land was valid and enforceable. The court did not require the trustees to obtain the consent of the beneficiaries for the sale, as no such requirement was stipulated in the settlement deed or under the settled land legislation. The beneficiary's challenge to the trustees' actions was dismissed, affirming the trustees' discretion in managing the settled estate.
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