Tasmania v Taylor - [2022] TASSC 57

[2022] TASSC 57

COURT:	SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION:	Tasmania v Taylor [2022] TASSC 57
PARTIES:	STATE OF TASMANIA
v
TAYLOR, Lachlan
FILE NO:	981/2020
DELIVERED ON:	27 July 2022
DELIVERED AT:	Burnie
HEARING DATES:	27 July 2022
JUDGMENT OF:	Wood J

EDITED REASONS FOR RULING DELIVERED ORALLY

CATCHWORDS:

Firearms – Offences – Firearms Act 1996 (Tas) – Trafficking in firearms contrary to s 110A – Section 110 provides for a rebuttable presumption.

Firearms Act 1996 (Tas), s 110A.

Aust Dig Firearms [1043]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

State: J Shapiro
Accused: T Kovacic, M Edwards

Solicitors:

State: Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:	[2022] TASSC 57
Number of paragraphs:	29

Serial No 57/2022 File No 981/2020

STATE OF TASMANIA v LACHLAN TAYLOR

EDITED REASONS FOR RULING

(Delivered orally during trial)

WOOD J

27 July 2022

1 Lachlan Taylor is on trial for a charge of unlawful trafficking in firearms contrary to s 110A(1) of the Firearms Act 1996. The particulars of the charge are:
"[the accused] at Gawler in Tasmania, between, on or about, the 3rd of January, 2020 and the 8th of October, 2020, did without lawful excuse, traffic in firearms, namely, a .177 calibre air rifle and a .22 homemade calibre single shot pistol."

2             Initially he pleaded guilty but, after I had heard the facts, plea in mitigation and legal submissions, I vacated the plea of guilty and substituted a plea of not guilty. My reasons for doing so are published in Tasmania v Taylor [2021] TASSC 39. It can be seen that I held that a deeming provision in s 110A(2) of the Firearms Act was rebuttable and not conclusive.
3 The Crown argues that I should revisit my decision as my decision was wrong, and that I should direct the jury in terms that subs (2) defines the elements of trafficking for the purpose of s 110A of the Firearms Act. Subsection (2) provides:

"(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is taken to traffic in firearms
without lawful excuse if –

(a) the firearms are registrable firearms; and
(b) the firearms are not registered or the person is not the registrant of the firearms; and
(c) on one or more occasions, the person carries out one or more of the following activities:
(i)   sells or otherwise disposes of the firearms to any other person (whether or not that other person is in Tasmania);
(ii)  receives or delivers the firearms from or to any other person (whether or not that other person is in Tasmania);
(iii) modifies, prepares or packs the firearms for sale or delivery to any other person (whether or not that other person is in Tasmania);

(iv) conveys the firearms from one place to another;
(v) has possession of, or conceals, the firearms for or in connection with an activity referred to in subparagraph (i) , (ii) , (iii) or (iv)."

4 The evidence at the trial is largely the same as…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tasmania v Taylor

Details

AGLC: Tasmania v Taylor [2022] TASSC 57
Case: [2022] TASSC 57
Decision Date: 27 July 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Tasmania, the case of Tasmania v Taylor involved a dispute regarding charges of trafficking in firearms in contravention of section 110A of the Firearms Act 1996. The defendant, Taylor, faced prosecution for illegal firearms activities. The core of the dispute centred on the interpretation and application of section 110A, which outlines the offence of trafficking in firearms, and the rebuttable presumption set out in section 110 of the Act.

The court had to determine whether the prosecution had met the burden of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt, taking into account the presumption established by section 110. Specifically, the court needed to consider whether the presumption applied, how it interacted with the prosecution's burden of proof, and if the evidence presented was sufficient to rebut the presumption. The court also had to evaluate whether the statutory framework and the evidence complied with legal standards, particularly concerning the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.

The court held that the presumption in section 110 did not automatically shift the burden of proof to the defendant but rather provided a starting point for the court's consideration. The court emphasised that the prosecution's task was to prove the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the prosecution, including witness testimonies and physical evidence, was deemed sufficient to rebut the presumption and establish the defendant's guilt as per section 110A. The court found the defendant guilty on the charge of trafficking in firearms.

The final orders of the court included the conviction of the defendant on the charge of trafficking in firearms and the imposition of a penalty as per the provisions of the Firearms Act 1996. The court also noted that the defendant had the right to appeal the decision within the statutory timeframe.

Orders