Tasmania v Eather - [2015] TASSC 27

[2015] TASSC 27

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Tasmania v Eather [2015] TASSC 27

PARTIES:  STATE OF TASMANIA
  v
  EATHER, Mark William

FILE NO:  180/2013
DELIVERED ON:  25 June 2015
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  17 and 22 June 2015
RULING OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Primary Industry – Fish – Offences – Other offences – Trafficking in fish - Proper construction of Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 (Tas), s 264A.

Living Marine Resources Management Act1995 (Tas), s 264A.
Fisheries (Rock Lobster) Rules2006 (Tas), rr 21, 93.
Aust Dig Primary Industry [1129]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Crown:  M Wilson and C Robinson
             Accused:  C Gunson and R Browne
Solicitors:
             Crown:  Acting Director of Public Prosecutions
             Accused:  FitzGerald and Browne

Judgment Number: [2015] TASSC 27
Number of paragraphs: 58

Serial No 27/2015
File No 180/2013

STATE OF TASMANIA v MARK WILLIAM EATHER

REASONS FOR RULING TENNENT J

25 June 2015

On 23 June 2015, I ruled that the accused on this trial, Mark William Eather, had no case to answer and directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. These are my reasons for that decision.
The accused was charged with one count of trafficking in fish contrary to the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 ("the Act"), s 264A. It is alleged that between on or about 17 January 2011 and 6 October 2011 the accused trafficked in fish, namely approximately 624.95 kilograms of rock lobster without lawful excuse. The accused pleaded not guilty.
Counsel for the State opened her case on Wednesday, 10 June. In that opening, she outlined by reference to the Act what it was the State needed to prove. Counsel for the accused indicated he took a different view of the law but did not explain what that view was. The State closed its case on the afternoon of Tuesday, 16 June. At that point, counsel for the accused advised that he wished to make a no case to answer submission, and the matter was adjourned until the following morning for argument. As it transpired when the argument commenced, counsel for the accused's application was based on a construction of s 264A which was significantly different from that which it appeared from Crown counsel's opening address to be that propounded by the State. As a consequence of the construction propounded by counsel for the accused, it was his submission that in relation to one element of the crime charged, the State had presented no evidence at all, and, hence, no jury properly instructed could convict the accused. It would be fair to say that Crown counsel was taken completely by surprise by the nature of the argument. There was a secondary and alternative argument in the event the first failed.

The Act, s 264A

The Act, s 264A, provides as follows:
"264A        Trafficking in fish
(1)     A person must not traffic in fish without lawful excuse.
(2)     For the purposes of subsection (1), a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tasmania v Eather

Details

AGLC: Tasmania v Eather [2015] TASSC 27
Case: [2015] TASSC 27
Decision Date: 25 June 2015

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tasmania versus Eather involved the prosecution of the defendant for trafficking in fish, specifically for engaging in activities that contravened the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 of Tasmania, section 264A. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The defendant was accused of a range of offences relating to the illegal harvesting and sale of fish, actions that were said to have occurred within the state's jurisdiction.

The court had to determine the proper interpretation of section 264A of the Act. Specifically, it needed to ascertain whether the defendant's actions constituted the offence of trafficking in fish as defined by the statute. This required a close examination of the language and intent of the legislation, as well as the circumstances surrounding the defendant's activities. The court was tasked with ensuring that the law was applied correctly and that the rights of the defendant were protected in the process.

In reaching its decision, the court considered the plain meaning of the statutory provisions and the context in which they were enacted. It took into account the purpose of the Act, which is to manage and conserve marine resources, and the need to prevent unlawful exploitation of fish stocks. The court also examined the legal principles that guide the interpretation of legislation, such as the importance of giving effect to the ordinary meaning of words and the avoidance of interpretations that might lead to absurd or unjust outcomes. Ultimately, the court found that the defendant's actions did not fall within the scope of the trafficking offence as defined by section 264A. The decision hinged on the specific elements required to prove trafficking under the Act, and the court concluded that these elements were not satisfied in this case.

As a result of this decision, the charges against the defendant were dismissed. The court's judgment provided clarity on the application of section 264A, ensuring that the law was interpreted in a manner that was consistent with its legislative intent and the principles of justice.

Orders