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Tasmania v Chatters (No 2)

Tasmania v Chatters (No 2)

Case [2017] TASSC 74 16 August 2017

Plea of Guilty

Abuse of Process

Criminal Law

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[2017] TASSC 74

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Tasmania v Chatters (No 2) [2017] TASSC 74

PARTIES:  STATE OF TASMANIA
  v
  CHATTERS, Heath Lance

FILE NO:  375/2015
DELIVERED ON:  16 August 2017 (Parties Only)
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  15, 17 May, 1, 13, 19, 20, 23 June 2017
JUDGMENT OF:  Brett J

CATCHWORDS

Criminal Law – Procedure – Pleas – General pleas – Plea of guilty – Withdrawal and restoration of plea – Generally – Whether further application for leave to withdraw plea of guilty after determination of first application is an abuse of process.

Criminal Code 1924 (Tas), s 356.
Marlow v The Queen [1990] Tas R 1; Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132; Wong v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] NSWSC 129, 155 A Crim R 37; R v Pugh [2005] SASC 427, 158 A Crim R 302; Thalari v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 170, 75 NSWLR 307; Loury v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 158; R v S, RP [2011] SASCFC 42; Bajramovic v Calubaquib [2015] NSWCA 139, 71 MVR 15; Weston (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 354, cited.
R v Plummer [2000] NSWCCA 363; R v Wilkinson (2009) 195 A Crim R 20; Ritchie v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 21, referred to.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3091]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

State: M Wilson
Accused: G A Richardson

Solicitors:

State: Director of Public Prosecutions
Accused: G A Richardson

Judgment Number: [2017] TASSC 74

Number of paragraphs: 87

Serial No 74/2017
File No 375/2015

STATE OF TASMANIA v HEATH LANCE CHATTERS (No 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BRETT J

16 August 2017

On 30 August 2016, Mr Chatters pleaded guilty before another judge to the crimes of armed robbery, assault and rape. He subsequently applied for leave to withdraw those pleas and enter pleas of not guilty in their place, pursuant to s 356 of the Criminal Code. The application was heard and refused by a second judge. When the matter came before me for the purpose of sentencing, Mr Chatters again asserted his innocence in respect of all charges, and made assertions of fact inconsistent with the allegations made by the State. He subsequently made a further application for leave to withdraw the pleas of guilty.
The proceedings described above raise the following issues for determination by me:
(a)Whether I have jurisdiction to determine the fresh application for leave to withdraw the pleas of guilty and, if so, the relevance, if any, of the determination of the earlier application by another judge.
(b)If I have jurisdiction to determine the application, whether leave should be granted for the withdrawal of the pleas.
(c)If leave is not granted, then it is necessary to determine the factual basis of sentencing, given the dispute which has arisen as to that question.
It was agreed by both parties that I would hear all of the evidence relevant…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tasmania v Chatters (No 2)

Details

AGLC: Tasmania v Chatters (No 2) [2017] TASSC 74
Case: [2017] TASSC 74
Decision Date: 16 August 2017 (Parties Only)

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Tasmania v Chatters (No 2), the defendant, Chatters, sought to withdraw his plea of guilty to charges of aggravated sexual assault and kidnapping after the Supreme Court of Tasmania had previously denied his application to do so. The court was required to determine whether Chatters' second application for leave to withdraw his plea constituted an abuse of process. This involved considering the circumstances under which the initial plea was entered, the reasons for Chatters' desire to withdraw it, and the broader implications of permitting further applications of this nature.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the making of a second application for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty, subsequent to the denial of a first application, amounted to an abuse of process. The court had to balance the defendant's right to make a voluntary and informed plea against the need for finality and efficiency in criminal proceedings. The court also considered whether the application was frivolous or vexatious and whether it had the potential to cause an unfair trial or waste of court resources.

The Supreme Court of Tasmania concluded that the second application for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty was indeed an abuse of process. The court found that Chatters' application was not made in good faith and that it had the potential to cause significant prejudice to the prosecution and the administration of justice. The court emphasised the importance of finality in the plea process and noted that allowing further applications could undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and Chatters' plea of guilty remained in place.

The final orders of the court were that Chatters' second application to withdraw his plea of guilty was dismissed. The plea of guilty would stand, and the trial proceeded on that basis. The court's decision underscored the principle that once a plea has been determined, further applications to withdraw it may be seen as an abuse of process, particularly if they lack merit or are made in bad faith.

Orders