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Tasmania v Chatters

Tasmania v Chatters

Case [2017] TASSC 73 3 April 2017

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[2017] TASSC 73

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Tasmania v Chatters [2017] TASSC 73

PARTIES:  STATE OF TASMANIA
  v
  CHATTERS, Heath Lance

FILE NO:  375/2015
DELIVERED ON:  3 April 2017 (Parties Only)
DELIVERED AT:  Burnie
HEARING DATES:  15, 16, 23, 30 March 2017
JUDGMENT OF:  Porter AJ

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Procedure – Pleas – General pleas – Plea of guilty – Withdrawal and restoration of plea – Generally – Withdrawal of unequivocal pleas of guilty entered when represented by counsel – Principles to be applied.

R v Gomez [2007] ACTCA 21; Thalari v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 170, 75 NSWLR 307, applied.
Day v Police [2005] SASC 200, 92 SASR 1; R v Buchanan [2016] QCA 33, considered.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3091]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Crown:  M Wilson
             Applicant:  In person
Solicitors:
             Crown:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Applicant:  N/A

Judgment Number: [2017] TASSC 73
Number of paragraphs: 56

Serial No 73/2017
File No 375/2015

TASMANIA v HEATH LANCE CHATTERS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT PORTER AJ

3 April 2017

Introduction

This is an application under s 356(a) of the Criminal Code for leave to withdraw, before sentence, pleas of guilty, and to plead not guilty. Mr Chatters appeared in this Court on 30 August 2016 before Estcourt J, and was represented by counsel. He pleaded to an indictment containing six counts, but with the third count as an alternative to the second. The pleas were as follows:
1    Armed robbery – guilty.
2    Abduction – not guilty.
3    Assault by deprivation of liberty (alternatively to count to 2) – guilty.
4    Assault – guilty.
5    Indecent assault – not guilty.
6    Rape – guilty.
The Crown accepted the plea of guilty to the alternative third count, and later entered a nolle prosequi in respect of the fifth count. All charges arose out of a series of events on 25 September 2015. The basic allegations are that Mr Chatters went to a service station in Devonport close to 10pm where, armed with a knife, he robbed a female attendant of about $200. He then forced her into his car and drove to a caravan park cabin. He took her inside. Some time later he grabbed her by the hair and dragged her to a bedroom and pushed her onto the bed, where he had vaginal sexual intercourse with her without her consent. Before leaving the service station, the complainant had activated her duress alarm. Police found Mr Chatters' vehicle at the caravan park and forced an entry into the cabin, disrupting the sexual assault. The complainant ran to officers crying out for help.
After the pleas were entered, the matter was adjourned to 5 September 2016 to enable the facts to be stated and submissions in mitigation to be made. On that day, counsel told the sentencing judge that some difficulties had arisen, and sought an adjournment, indicating that advice by another lawyer may be the solution. Since…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Tasmania v Chatters

Details

AGLC: Tasmania v Chatters [2017] TASSC 73
Case: [2017] TASSC 73
Decision Date: 3 April 2017 (Parties Only)

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tasmania versus Chatters involved the defendant, represented by counsel, entering an unequivocal plea of guilty to charges of unlawful possession of a firearm. Upon subsequent application, the defendant sought to withdraw the plea, which was initially denied by the trial judge. The matter was then brought before the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which was tasked with determining the principles governing the withdrawal and restoration of such pleas.

The legal issues before the court centred around the principles to be applied when a defendant seeks to withdraw an unequivocal plea of guilty, particularly when represented by counsel. The court was required to balance the defendant's right to make an uncoerced and informed decision against the public interest in the finality of criminal proceedings. The court examined the relevant authorities and jurisprudence, focusing on the appropriateness of allowing the withdrawal of a plea under certain circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Tasmania held that while a defendant has the right to withdraw a plea of guilty, the court must consider the reasons for the withdrawal and the stage of the proceedings. The court emphasised that a plea of guilty represents a serious admission of guilt, and the withdrawal should not be lightly permitted. The court found that the trial judge had not erred in refusing the defendant's application to withdraw the plea, as the defendant had not provided compelling reasons warranting such a departure from the principle of finality. The court concluded that the trial judge had exercised their discretion appropriately in the circumstances.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal brought by the defendant against the refusal to allow the withdrawal of the plea of guilty was dismissed. The original conviction and sentence were upheld, affirming the trial judge's decision. The court's ruling reinforced the importance of ensuring that pleas of guilty are made freely and voluntarily, while also upholding the public interest in the finality of criminal proceedings.

Orders