Tasmania Feedlot Pty Ltd v Stagg - [2011] TASSC 48

[2011] TASSC 48

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Tasmania Feedlot Pty Ltd v Stagg [2011] TASSC 48

PARTIES:  TASMANIA FEEDLOT PTY LTD
  v
  STAGG, Nigel

FILE NO/S: 230/2011

JUDGMENT

APPEALED FROM: S v Tasmania Feedlot Pty Ltd [2011] TASWRCT 11

DELIVERED ON:  2 September 2011
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  18 August 2011
JUDGMENT OF:  Evans J

CATCHWORDS:

Workers' Compensation – Alternative rights against employer and/or third parties and consequences thereof – Actions for damages against employer – Time for instituting action for damages – Where claim for compensation made or compensation received – Extension of time – Generally - Whether second application an abuse of process.

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s138AB.
State of Tasmania v Clements [2009] TASSC 114, applied.
D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582; Nominal Defendant v Manning (2000) 50 NSWLR 139, referred to.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [250]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  B R McTaggart
             Respondent:  R J Phillips
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Wallace, Wilkinson & Webster
             Respondent:  Phillips Taglieri

Judgment Number: [2011] TASSC 48
Number of paragraphs: 27

Serial No 48/2011
File No 230/2011

TASMANIA FEEDLOT PTY LTD v NIGEL STAGG

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT EVANS J

2 September 2011

The appellant appeals against a determination of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal, constituted by Chief Commissioner Carey, which rejected the appellant's contention that a referral made to the Tribunal by the respondent worker was barred by reason of res judicata, issue estoppel, or was an abuse of process.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. On 5 September 2007, the worker was injured in the course of his employment with the appellant. On 14 September 2007, he lodged a worker's compensation claim in relation to his injuries with the appellant and it was accepted.

At that time, the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, s138AB, relevantly provided:

"138AB     Election to claim damages
(1)            Before commencing proceedings in court for an award of damages, a worker who intends to seek damages against an employer must lodge with the Tribunal an election to claim damages.
(2)            A worker is not to make an election unless the degree of his or her permanent impairment is agreed by the worker and the employer, or determined by the Tribunal, to be a percentage of the whole person of not less than 30%.
(3)            …
(4)            …
(5)            An election is to be lodged within 2 years after the date on which the claim for compensation is given to the employer of the worker, or person designated by the employer, under section 34.
(6)            The Tribunal may extend the period within which an election is to be made if –
(a) there is a dispute as to the level of the worker's impairment; or
(b) the injury is not stable and stationary.
(7)            If there is a dispute as to the degree of impairment, the worker may apply to the Tribunal for a determination of the degree of impairment.
(8)

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2011] TASSC 48
Decision Date: 2 September 2011

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tasmania Feedlot Pty Ltd v Stagg involved a dispute over the time limits for instituting an action for damages against an employer. The plaintiff, Stagg, was a worker who had suffered injuries at a feedlot operated by the defendant, Tasmania Feedlot Pty Ltd. Stagg had already lodged a claim for workers' compensation and received compensation. He subsequently sought damages from Tasmania Feedlot Pty Ltd, arguing that the compensation was inadequate. The central issue before the court was whether the second application for an extension of time to institute the action for damages was an abuse of process.

The court had to determine the appropriate legal principles governing the extension of time in such cases. The court examined the relevant statutes and case law to ascertain whether the second application for an extension was permissible under the circumstances. The court considered the precedents that had established the criteria for determining when an extension of time is justified and whether the application met those criteria. The court also needed to decide whether the second application was an abuse of process, which would render it invalid.

In its decision, the court held that the second application for an extension of time was indeed an abuse of process. The court found that the plaintiff's initial application for an extension was reasonable, but the second application was made without a valid justification and demonstrated a disregard for the procedural rules. The court emphasised that such applications, if permitted, could lead to an abuse of the legal process. Consequently, the second application was dismissed, and the plaintiff's action for damages was statute-barred. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles of fairness and the need to maintain the integrity of the legal process.

The court ordered that the plaintiff's action for damages was to be dismissed due to the statute-barred nature of the claim. The court further emphasised that the abuse of process doctrine was invoked to prevent the plaintiff from circumventing the statutory time limits through successive applications for extensions. The decision underscored the importance of adhering to procedural rules and the consequences of failing to do so. The dismissal of the second application for an extension of time was a clear message that such actions would not be tolerated, thereby reinforcing the integrity of the legal process.

Orders