Tasevski v Westpac Banking Corporation
[2024] NSWPICMP 521
•30 July 2024
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL | |
| CITATION: | Tasevski v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] NSWPICMP 521 |
| APPELLANT: | Mirjana Tasevski |
| RESPONDENT: | Westpac Banking Corporation |
| APPEAL PANEL | |
| MEMBER: | Parnel McAdam |
| MEDICAL ASSESSOR: | John Baker |
| MEDICAL ASSESSOR: | Graham Blom |
| DATE OF DECISION: | 30 July 2024 |
| CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; matter remitted from the Supreme Court of NSW; application of the psychiatric impairment rating scale (PIRS); whether Medical Assessor (MA) had considered worker’s age, sex and cultural norms in accordance with clause 11.12 of the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed, 1 March 2021; Ferguson v State of New South Wales & Ors, Johnson v Suncorp Staff Pty Ltd, Lancaster v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd, Henderson v Canterbury Hurlstone Park RSL Club Ltd considered; Held – MA’s conclusion inconsistent with history and evidence available; Medical Assessment Certificate revoked. |
BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL
On 28 March 2023, Mirjana Tasevski (the appellant) lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Michael Hong, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 28 February 2024.
This matter has previously proceeded through the appeal process resulting in an Appeal Panel issuing a decision dated 23 May 2023. That decision was the subject of judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court, with judgement being handed down on 18 April 2024, in the matter of Tasevski v Westpac Banking Corporation [2024] NSWSC 401 (Tasevski). The relevant orders made by her Honour Schmidt AJ (putting aside a costs order) were:
“(1) The Appeal Panel’s decision is set aside;
(2) The matter is remitted to a differently constituted appeal panel to be considered according to law.”
Accordingly, the Appeal Panel are determining the matter according to law, based on the Application to Appeal and Notice of Opposition filed by the parties in the proceedings. The Appeal Panel have had no regard to the decision of the original Appeal Panel which was set aside by the Court, but are obviously bound by the orders made in the Supreme Court in Tasevski and have considered in detail the reasons provided in that judgment.
The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
· the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
· the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
The delegate has remitted the matter to be determined according to law. Incumbent in that remitter is a decision that the delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed
1 March 2021 (the Guidelines).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ms Tasevski is highly experienced in the banking industry, having spent a career of over 40 years working for Westpac Banking Corporation (the respondent). She worked primarily in customer service and unfortunately on a number of occasions during her work career was involved in robberies. These incidents affected her psychologically for a period, but she was always able to return to work.
In January 2019, a colleague made comments describing her as a “scammer” and that the bank is better off without her. Shortly after that, the colleague’s husband attended the bank and Ms Tasevski served him. As a result of the comments made by her colleague, and incidents after she suffered a psychological injury. That injury proceeded through the Personal Injury Commission’s (Commission) dispute resolution pathway on a number of occasions. Of relevance to these proceedings is a Certificate of Determination issued on 5 October 2022, referring the matter to a Medical Assessor for an assessment of whole person impairment.
The Medical Assessor issued a MAC on 28 February 2023, finding that Ms Tasevski suffered from 11% whole person impairment (10% assessed under the Psychiatric Impairment Rating Scales (PIRS) and 1% allowed for the effect of treatment).
That MAC was appealed in March 2023, and proceeded through determination by a differently constituted Appeal Panel (original Appeal Panel). As discussed above, the original Appeal Panel’s decision was set aside, and the matter remitted to the current Appeal Panel to determine according to law.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW
The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7. The Appeal Panel was provided with the Medical Appeal brief, which included all of the material sent to the Medical Assessor, the MAC dated 28 February 2023, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Tasevski. Having considered that material, the Appeal Panel is satisfied that the matter is capable of determination on the papers. It is noted that the appellant did not request that she be re-examined by a member of the Appeal Panel, and in the Appeal Panel’s view that is not necessary.
The Appeal Panel has also had regard to the decision in Tasevski. The Appeal Panel is obviously bound by the orders made in that matter and are determining the matter as if no previous decision were made. The Appeal Panel has also had regard to the reasons for judgement provided by Her Honour Schmidt AJ.
EVIDENCE
Documentary evidence
The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.
Medical Assessment Certificate
The parts of the medical certificate given by the Medical Assessor that are relevant to the appeal are set out, where relevant, in the body of this decision.
SUBMISSIONS
Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
The scope of this issues raised on appeal are limited. The appellant challenges the Medical Assessor’s assessment under the PIRS in the scale of self care and personal hygiene. The appellant’s contention is that a class rating of 3, equating to “moderate impairment”, should have been assessed by the Medical Assessor.
The appellant refers to the relevant parts of the Guidelines, in particular Table 11.1, being the criteria in the PIRS of self care and personal hygiene, and cl 11.12. The appellant refers to the factual matrix of the appellant’s life, being a married woman in her sixties from a foreign cultural background, in the context of the type of activities referred to in the PIRS. The appellant submits that these are activities that one would expect Ms Tasevski to undertake.
The appellant also refers to the appellant’s statement evidence relating to her lack of motivation to shower, submitting that the conclusion reached is erroneous. The appellant submits that the reliance placed by the Medical Assessor on an attempt to lose weight through intermittent fasting should be construed as an attempt to comply with medical directions rather than independence in self care.
The appellant submits that all of the above matters are inconsistent with a finding that the worker is independent in self care and hygiene and a finding of class 2 is erroneous.
In reply, the respondent submits that the appeal must fail as her submissions are, in effect, a complaint that relates merely to a difference of opinion, which is not a ground of appeal. The respondent refers to various authorities discussing the PIRS. The respondent refers to the relevant parts of the MAC where the assessment of the PIRS was conducted, and the discussion of the independent medical opinions provide by the parties.
The respondent submits that an assessment of class 2 under the PIRS was not glaringly improbable, and it has not been demonstrated that the Medical Assessor was unaware of significant factual matters, or that there was a clear misunderstanding, or that there was an unsupportable error in the reasoning process. The submissions do no more than cavil with the MAC.
FINDINGS AND REASONS
The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made. The appeal concerns the application of s 323 of the 1998 Act and accordingly the Appeal Panel’s consideration of the matter is limited to that issue (per Basten JA in Queanbeyan Racing Club Ltd v Burton [2021] NSWCA 304 at [26]):
“Secondly, s 328(2) requires that the review ‘is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.’ Because the gateway function of the Registrar is satisfied if ‘at least one of the grounds’ has been made out, it appears that the Appeal Panel is not limited to the ground held by the Registrar to have been made out, but may consider all grounds of appeal raised in the appellant’s application. On the other hand, it is clear that the Appeal Panel is not permitted to look for errors which are not part of the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.”
In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.
As set out above, the issue in dispute in this appeal is a narrow one, concerning only one of the PIRS (self care and personal hygiene). The appellant challenges the assessment of class 2 on a number of bases. Of particular relevance in this case is the appellant’s personal history, including her age, marital status and cultural background.
Assessments of permanent impairment are to be conducted in accordance with the Guidelines (s 322(1) of the 1998 Act). The Guidelines have been held to have the force or effect of delegated legislation (Ballas v Department of Education (State of NSW) [2020] NSWCA 86 (Ballas) at [97]). In Kempe, Griffiths AJ discussed the principles in construing the Guidelines (at [30]):
“There was also broad agreement between the parties concerning the principles to apply in construing the Guidelines. Although the Guidelines are neither a statute nor subordinate legislation, they have been held to have the effect of subordinate legislation: see Ballas v Department of Education (NSW) (2020) 102 NSWLR 783; [2020] NSWCA 86 at [97] per Bell P and Payne JA. They are issued under s 376 of the 1998 Act and, by dint of the operation of ss 3(1) and 5(2) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), they are also an ‘instrument’ to which that Act applies subject to a contrary intention. Generally speaking, therefore, the ordinary principles of legislative construction apply to the Guidelines (see Robbie v Strasburger Enterprises Pty Ltd t/as Quix Food Stores [2017] NSWSC 363 at [61]–[63] per N Adams J). Thus considerations of text, context and purpose are important (see SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 at [14] per Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ, [37]–[40] per Gageler J). Appropriate allowance needs to be made for the form of the Guidelines, which is not the form of primary or secondary legislation.”
There are a number of critical parts of the Guidelines that must be considered to properly determine the issues in dispute in this case. The first is cl 11.1 which sets out the purpose of the PIRS: “Behavioural consequences of psychiatric disorder are assessed on six scales, each of which evaluates an area of functional impairment”. Clause 11.12 goes on to describe how the descriptors contained in each class are to be considered:
“Impairment in each area is rated using class descriptors. Classes range from 1 to 5, in accordance with severity. The standard form must be used when scoring the PIRS. The examples of activities are examples only. The assessing psychiatrist should take account of the person’s cultural background. Consider activities that are usual for the person’s age, sex and cultural norms.”
The consideration of a person’s “age, sex and cultural norms” plays an important part in this matter, based on the submissions of the parties.
Finally, the relevant criteria for self care and personal hygiene provide (only classes 2 and 3):
“Class 2 Mild impairment: Able to live independently; looks after self adequately, although may look unkempt occasionally; sometimes misses a meal or relies on take-away food.
Class 3 Moderate impairment: Can't live independently without regular support. Needs prompting to shower daily and wear clean clothes. Does not prepare own meals, frequently misses meals. Family member or community nurse visits (or should visit) 2-3 times per week to ensure minimum level of hygiene and nutrition.”
The respondent refers to a number of decisions concerning the assessment of psychiatric disorders under the PIRS: Ferguson v State of New South Wales & Ors [2017] NSWSC 887 (Ferguson); Glenn William Parker v Select Civil Pty Limited [2018] NSWSC 140; Jenkins v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [2015] NSWSC 633 (Jenkins) and Ballas. These authorities, along with Vannini v Worldwide Demolitions Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 324 were discussed in Tasevski. As explained, it was agreed by that parties that the original Appeal Panel had misunderstood the authorities, causing it to fall into error.
From that discussion, at [15], it is apparent that Jenkins is irrelevant to the present question. Likewise, what was decided in Ferguson must be considered with caution. That case concerned a “no evidence” conclusion, whereas here there is relevant evidence that supports a class 3 classification. A similar caution to the approach taken in Ferguson was expressed in Johnson v Suncorp Staff Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 102:
“Secondly, Campbell J’s observations in Ferguson at [27] (see at [82] above) must be understood in the circumstances of that particular case. In Ferguson, Campbell J held that the appeal panel adopted a legally incorrect approach in proceeding to make its own assessment without it having itself first determined that one of the grounds of appeal in s 327(3) was established (see at [20]ff). Campbell J then focused on the appeal panel’s reasoning as to whether the failure of the claimant’s relationship with her sometime partner had the degree of severity necessary to assess it as Class 3 in the scale of Social functioning. Paragraph 27 of Ferguson needs to be read in this context. I do not see Campbell J as laying down a general principle in that paragraph. Rather, his Honour was emphasising the need for the appeal panel in that case to conduct a full assessment of the relationship between the claimant and her companion in order to assess whether or not it was ‘severely strained’. A ‘“full assessment” required the appeal panel there to inquire into “the critical question that impressed the AMS, being a significant change from a life partnership involving sexual intimacy to a more platonic friendship” (at [85])
The respondent relies on what was said in Ferguson at [24], which has become something of a guideline for the circumstances where an Appeal Panel may intervene:
“The Appeal Panel accepted that intervention was only justified: if the categorisation was glaringly improbable; if it could be demonstrated that the AMS was unaware of significant factual matters; if a clear misunderstanding could be demonstrated; or if an unsupportable reasoning process could be made out. I understood that all of these matters were regarded by the Appeal Panel as interpretations of the statutory grounds of applying incorrect criteria or demonstrable error. One takes from this that the Appeal Panel understood that more than a mere difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ is required to establish error in the statutory sense.”
Basten AJ was particularly critical of Ferguson in Lancaster v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 929 (Lancaster), describing it as “perilously close to a merit assessment of a factual issue”.
Those are matters regarded by the Appeal Panel as being relevant. What is critical from the above is that “In relation to Classes of PIRS there has to be more than a difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ to establish error in the statutory sense: Ferguson at [24]” (per Harrison AsJ in Henderson v Canterbury Hurlstone Park RSL Club Ltd [2024] NSWSC 473).
Based on the above, the only relevant aspect of Ferguson is the conclusion that there has to be more than a difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ. The other aspects set out in [24] puts a “gloss on the language of s 327(3), read with s 328(2)” per Lancaster at [87]. Accordingly, the Appeal Panel rejects the respondent’s submission at [15].
In Tasevski, Her Honour was critical of the original Appeal Panel’s failure to consider or properly apply Ballas. Reference was made to what was held in Ballas at [94], where the application of the Guidelines was discussed:
“Even if there may, as a matter of English language, be some overlap between some of the scales or categories of functional impairment, for the purposes of the WPI assessment exercise, particular conduct will fit within one or other of the scales. This calls for the correct characterisation of the conduct, ie whether it goes to ‘self care and personal hygiene’, ‘social and recreational activities’, ‘travel’, ‘social functioning (relationships)’, ‘concentration, persistence and pace’ or ‘employability’. This does not involve an exercise of discretion. If conduct is wrongly assigned to one scale, when it should have been assigned to another, this will result in the AMS taking into account an irrelevant consideration in the context of assigning a class to each of the distinct scales. This will inevitably bear upon the calculation of the WPI which is critical for an injured worker’s entitlement to compensation.”
The appellant’s submissions do not refer to Ballas. The respondent refers to the conclusion in Ballas expressed to be that “the conduct assessed must be consigned to the correct category (scale) and a failure to do so would result in appealable error”. The Appeal Panel appreciates the importance of Ballas. It present circumstances, it does not appear that the appellant is arguing that the Medical Assessor incorrectly assigned the conduct of the appellant to an incorrect PIRS, but rather that aspects of the appellant’s history, including the history taken by the Medical Assessor and other material included in the information before the Medical Assessor, were inconsistent with the conclusion he reached.
The reasons provided in the PIRS table for self care and personal hygiene are:
“Ms Tasevski said she only showers 1 to 2 times per week and eats 1 to 2 meals a day, and engages in intermittent fasting.
She does a small amount of shopping and cooking. She is capable of independent living without regular support, and does not need prompting with self-care.”
These reasons must be read in conjunction with other relevant parts of the MAC. The Medical Assessor records the following present history:
“Ms Tasevski's husband does most of the cooking and shopping and complains she does not do the washing up like she used to. She said she only goes to the shop when she has to, maybe every couple of weeks. She has been trying to manage her weight better and does intermittent fasting and avoids carbohydrates, but has not been successful. She said she only showers when she has to go out and averages once or twice a week only.”
The Medical Assessor also considered the assessment of Dr Allan, the appellant’s independent medical expert, who assessed class 3 in this PIRS. He states:
“In terms of self-care, Dr Allan rated 3 and noted that it is mainly Ms Tasevski's husband who does the cooking. She may assist him in doing basic things. Her husband generally does the shopping, she does it occasionally on her own. Her self-care is poor and she would shower at most twice a week. In my assessment, I took a history that she is independent and initiates all self-care activity without prompting. She is also engaged in intermittent fasting to lose weight, although without much success, and I rated it 2.”
The Appeal Panel is of the view that the Medical Assessor has not failed to, or improperly classified the relevant conduct for consideration. He has assessed the appellant’s capacity for self care and personal hygiene based on the factors set out in Table 11.1: her capacity to look after herself through her ability to cook, how she presents and looks after herself, and her level of hygiene (through showering) and nutrition (through a reported history of intermittent fasting). These are all activities relevant to an assessment of self care and personal hygiene, and not some other PIRS.
That does not mean that the conclusion reached by the Medical Assessor was the correct one based on the history he took. It is not appropriate to make a finding that the conclusion reached by the Medical Assessor was “open” (Tasevski at [35]). The exercise to be undertaken by the Appeal Panel is set out in Tasevski at [36]:
“It must rather consider and determine whether the assessor applied the incorrect criteria in arriving at his or her conclusion. Or whether there was a demonstrable error in the conclusion reached about that class assignment. For example, by impermissibly taking into account conduct not relevant to the scale, or by arriving at the incorrect conclusion about the class into which that scale fell into, given the conduct which arose to be considered in light of the requirement to take into account cultural background, age, sex and cultural norms.”
Here, the Appeal Panel is satisfied that the Medical Assessor has applied incorrect criteria by failing to consider the appellant’s cultural background, age, sex and cultural norms, and by failing to consider those factors in the context of the material placed before him on assessment.
The Appeal Panel accepts that cl 11.12 provide a relevant criterion that must be applied when applying the PIRS for the purposes of an assessment. A failure to consider activities that are usual for the person’s age, sex and cultural norms will lead to an application of incorrect criteria. The Appeal Panel notes, however, that cl 11.12 must be approached with caution and such an assessment must be based on the material available before the Medical Assessor, not based on hypothesis or cultural assumptions. Taking the circumstances of the present case, it should not be assumed that other people with similar factual backgrounds (older Macedonian women, who have been married for an extensive period) will necessarily perform all of the cooking and “homemaking” duties. That would be to apply the criteria in the Guidelines on the basis of an assumption. Further, cl 11.12 directs specific consideration to the activities that are usual for the person being assessed, not a general hypothetical person in similar circumstances to the person.
Accordingly, the Appeal Panel has considered the history taken by the Medical Assessor and the documentary evidence provided to him to consider activities that would be usual for the appellant. The Medical Assessor records that the appellant’s husband does most of the cooking and shopping, and she does not do the washing up. The Medical Assessor also discusses the assessment of Dr Allan and notes that Ms Tasevski’s husband does most of the cooking and shopping, and Ms Tasevski only assists in doing basic things.
The appellant’s submissions refer to the statement provided in the Application and in particular that “my husband does most of the cooking now” (emphasis added). It is submitted that this is in contrast to her pre-injury functioning and the cultural norms expected of a woman in her age group from a foreign cultural background, which it would be expected that it would be Ms Tasevski’s responsibility to undertake. The Appeal Panel has already indicated that such a construction should be treated with caution. However, there is evidence to support a conclusion that for Ms Tasevski, her functioning in this regard has changed as a result of her work injury.
The following material contained in the evidence before the Medical Assessor supports this conclusion:
(a) in the report of Dr Goran Stevens dated 13 August 2021, he records “she isn’t motivated to do any cooking and her husband has been pressuring her to cook”;
(b) in a clinical note dated 21 February 2020, Dr Stevens records: “She can't attend to her house chores and her husband does the cooking”;
(c) in a clinical note dated 20 May 2019, Dr Stevens records: “She was spotless in her cleaning and putting things in their place. Her husband now does the cooking and the dishes”, and
(d) in a vocational assessment report dated 16 November 2021 it is recorded:
“Ms. Tasevski confirmed she was independent with personal and domestic care tasks but explained she often lacked the energy to cook and clean and these chores had fallen to her husband which had caused some conflict in their relationship. Ms. Tasevski stated ‘I was the cook, I enjoyed cooking but now I just don’t do it. I hardly clean at all, and he (my husband) has to do it all’”.
It is clear, based on the above, that Ms Tasevski used to do all or the majority of the cooking in her household, and since the work injury, her husband has done so. This is a cultural norm for Ms Tasevski that has not adequately been considered by the Medical Assessor.
Further, based on her present inability to cook (in spite of the cultural norm expecting her to do so) it cannot be said that she fits into class 2, requiring that she “sometimes misses a meal or relies on take-away food”. The history taken by the Medicals Assessor is that Ms Tasevski can only assist in basic things in the kitchen and relies on her husband to complete the shopping, cooking and washing up. This history is consistent with class 3 impairment which requires “does not prepare own meals, frequently misses meals”.
Another relevant part of the criteria for this PIRS relates to personal appearance and hygiene. Class 2 provides that a person “may look unkempt occasionally” whilst class 3 provides that a person “needs prompting to shower daily and wear clean clothes”. Here, the Medical Assessor records that the appellant only showers when she has to go out and averages once or twice a week only, a finding reflected in the PIRS table.
Again, the Appeal Panel is of the view that the history recorded by the Medical Assessor of restriction in showering and personal hygiene is inconsistent with an assessment of class 2. Showering once or twice a week is more than looking “unkempt occasionally” and it is clear that the appellant only showers when she goes out. Without the assistance of her husband, the appellant would not meet the minimum level of hygiene for her age, sex and cultural norms.
It appears that the Medical Assessor has placed some weight on the conclusion that Ms Tasevski would be capable of independent living without support. The Appeal Panel accepts that this is a relevant consideration under Table 11.1 – class 2 provides that a person is “able to live independently”, while class 3 provides that a person “can’t live independently without regular support”. The Medical Assessor has concluded that the appellant is capable of independent living without regular support.
It is the Appeal Panel’s view that this finding is inconsistent with the other findings made and the history taken by the Medical Assessor. The Medical Assessor records that the appellant “does a small amount of shopping and cooking”. On this basis it would not be possible for the appellant to live independently – she would not be able to adequately feed herself. Likewise she would not maintain adequate personal hygiene as she is only showering once or twice a week.
The internal inconsistencies in the MAC as set out above, when considered in the context of the material made available to the Medical Assessor, fit within the definition of a demonstrable error as explained in Vannini v Worldwide Demolitions Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 324 at [77]-[78].
The correct classification of the appellant under the PIRS of self care and personal hygiene is class 3.
Accordingly, the MAC must be revoked.
The only challenge made on appeal was to the assessment of self care and personal hygiene. Changing that to a class 3 results in a median class of 3 and an aggregate of 17. In accordance with Table 11.7 of the Guidelines, that is 19% whole person impairment. The Medical Assessor also made an addition of 1% for treatment which has not been challenged on appeal and accordingly will be included, for a total of 20% whole person impairment. The impairment table below reflects the above conclusion.
WORKERS COMPENSATION DIVISION
APPEAL PANEL
MEDICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE
Injuries received after 1 January 2002
Matter number: | M1-W5593/22 |
Applicant: | Mirjana Tasevski |
Respondent: | Westpac Banking Corporation |
This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998.
The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Michael Hong and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the table below:
Table - whole person impairment (WPI)
| Body Part or system | Date of Injury | Chapter, page and paragraph number in NSW workers compensation guidelines | Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides | % WPI | Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition | Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6) |
| Psychiatric / Psychological | 15 October 2021 | 11 Page 55-60 | 20 | 0 | 20 | |
| Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals) | 20% | |||||
0
14
0