Taruk and Taruk

[2017] FamCA 463

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TARUK & TARUK [2017] FamCA 463

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Where matter proceeded undefended – Mother to have disengaged from litigation - Where mother found to have abandoned child – Family violence occurred – Where mother has left child in care of father - Father to have sole parental responsibility – Child live with father – Child spend time with mother as agreed

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA, 65DAC

APPLICANT: Ms Taruk

RESPONDENT: Mr Taruk

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Keyworth

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1833 of 2009

DATE DELIVERED: 26 June 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Cairns

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane (via video link to Cairns)

JUDGMENT OF: Tree J

HEARING DATE: 27 March 2017

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT: No appearance

THE RESPONDENT: In person

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT

CHILDREN'S LAWYER:

Ms Frizelle

SOLICITORS FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER: Keyworth Harris & Lowe Family Lawyers

Orders

1. All prior orders be discharged.

2. The father have sole parental responsibility in relation to the major long term issues for the child of the marriage B born … 2009 (“the child”).

3. For the purposes of exercising his sole parental responsibility pursuant to Order 2, the father must:

   (a)Consult with the mother in writing setting out any major long-term decision he is considering and the reasons for that decision prior to acting on his decision;

   (b)Give careful consideration to any written response received from the mother within seven days of his notification to her;

   (c)Within seven days of making his decision forward to the mother written notification of his decision.

4. Without limiting either parent of their responsibility set out in order 1, each parent shall keep the other parent informed of any major long-term issues, which include:

   (a)The child’s education;

   (b)The child’s religious and cultural upbringing;

   (c)The child’s health;

   (d)The health of each party including their ability to care for the child;

   (e)The names by which the child is known;

   (f)Changes to the child’s living arrangements that may make it more difficult for the child to live with or see a parent, including all changes of address and telephone number.

5. The child shall live with the father.

6. The child spend unsupervised time with the mother as agreed between the parties in writing.

7. All handovers shall occur at a location agreed upon in writing between the parties.

8. The mother have telephone/face time/Skype time with the child every Sunday at 5:00pm unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, with the mother to initiate the call.

9. The father have telephone/face time/Skype time with the child if the child be with the mother overnight at 5:00pm unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing with the father to initiate the call.

10. The mother have telephone/face time/Skype time with the child on special occasions such as Christmas Day, the mother’s and child’s birthdays, Mother’s Day and any other day of importance to the mother at 5:00pm unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing with the mother to initiate the call.

11. The father communicate with the mother only through the email address the child…. unless otherwise notified in writing by the mother.

12. The father and mother shall not and are hereby restrained from abusing, insulting, denigrating, assaulting, intimidating or threatening each other in the presence of the child and shall do all that is necessary to ensure that no other person does the same.

13. Either parent is to report to the other parent any information regarding the health and wellbeing and educational progress and development of the child.

14. This order is sufficient authority for the child’s school or day care centre to give each party information about the child’s education progress and other school related activities and supply to them copies of school reports, photographs, certificates and awards obtained by the child at the requesting parties cost and both parties are at liberty to attend any school event such as parent teacher interviews, sports carnivals and productions.

15. These orders are authority for any treating medical practitioners, specialist or dentist to release the child’s medical information to each party and for this purpose both parties shall as soon as reasonably practicable inform the other of any medical conditions, health issue or illness suffered by the child whilst the child is in their care and the name and contact number of any practitioner upon whom they have attended with the child.

16. By these orders, the parents be a liberty to consult with/liaise with all health care providers and educational experts involved with the said child from time to time and the father ensure that the mother is kept informed of the full name, address and contact telephone numbers of all health care providers and educational experts so involved with the said child from time to time and, as far as is necessary the father do likewise.

17. Each party is to immediately address any major illness or accident/injury and then forthwith notify the other within at least 12 hours of any medical emergency involving the child that occurs whilst the child are in the parties’ respective care.

18. Each party shall speak of the other party respectfully and not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the child and use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the child.

19. During the time the child is with either parent, that parent shall:

    (a)Respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the child about the personal life of the other parent;

    (b)Speak of the other parent respectfully; and

    (c)Not discuss adult issues/court proceedings with or in the presence or hearing of the child.

20. The mother be restrained from removing the child from the Commonwealth of Australia.

21. The mother is to use her best endeavours to advise the father of a Skype address for the child’s maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather and maternal aunt and uncle, and use her best endeavours to obtain and advise the father of days and times when those persons are able to receive Skype calls initiated by the child.

22. The Independent Children's Lawyer is forthwith discharged with the thanks of the Court at the later of the expiration of the appeal period in respect of these orders, or the determination of any appeal.

23. Otherwise all extant applications are dismissed and the matter is removed from the list of active pending cases.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Taruk & Taruk has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CAIRNS

FILE NUMBER: BRC1833/2009

Ms Taruk

Applicant

And

Mr Taruk

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION  

1. This is a sad case which involves a six year old boy who has been, for all intents and purposes, abandoned by his mother, Ms Taruk (“the mother”).  Although as late as June 2015 by her Amended Initiating Application she was seeking equal shared parental responsibility for the child B (“the child”) and for him to live with her, but spend considerable time with Mr Taruk (“the father”), it appears as though later that year she determined that she should move interstate from Brisbane, with or without the child.  That is what she told the Family Report writer in December 2015, and true to her word, albeit without any other warning to the father, on 30 January 2016 the mother handed the child over to him pursuant to the then arrangements, and moved to Melbourne.  Thereafter she has not spent any face-to-face time with him and, to the extent that she has remained in contact, it is by irregular and unpredictable telephone communication with the child, totalling about five occasions since February 2015.

2. That outcome is all the more remarkable because the father had never, prior to January 2016, had, or sought that, the child primarily live with him, or had or sought to have, sole parental responsibility for him.  Nonetheless to his credit, the evidence suggests that he has done an exemplary job in thereafter raising the child, and in attempting to assist him deal with the inevitable grief at the almost complete loss of his mother.

3. The mother has disengaged from the litigation, and by letter of 9 March 2017 to the court, advised that she did not intend to participate further in it.  Her non-participation was a live prospect when the matter had a Trial Management Hearing before me on 20 December 2016, on which occasion it was acknowledged that if the mother remained disengaged, the matter may proceed undefended.  The mother thereafter failed to file any material in accordance with the directions that I made on that occasion, and when the matter finally came on for trial before me on 27 March 2017, she did not appear.

4. Nonetheless there remained a slender area of disagreement between the father and the Independent Children's Lawyer as to the appropriate orders, insofar as the father sought orders that the mother’s time in future with the child (if she chose to avail herself of any such orders) should be supervised, whereas the Independent Children's Lawyer contended that there was no need for supervision.  That is the only area of dispute between those parties who remain engaged in the litigation, although of course the mother’s failure to engage does not absolve me from being satisfied that the orders otherwise agreed between the Independent Children's Lawyer and the father are in the child’s best interests.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The father

1. The father was born in the United Kingdom in 1953, and hence is presently 64 years of age.  It appears as though much of his life was spent working around the world.  Prior to his relationship with the mother, he had been married twice, and in each relationship fathered a child.  Both of those children are now adult.

2. The father first met the mother in Country F, Africa in December 2005, when, at age 52, he was holidaying there.

The mother

1. The mother was born in 1978 in Country F, and hence is presently 39 years of age.  I know little of her past life other than that she was apparently not sufficiently academically successful to qualify for free university education when she completed her schooling, and her parents (who by then were separated) were unable to afford to fund further education for her.  It appears as though she has a brother and a sister, although I know little of them.  After leaving school she was able to obtain work in a hotel, and was so employed when she met the father in that capacity in December 2005, when she was 27 years old.

The relationship

1. The parties quickly formed a friendship and a relationship, and although the father soon after left Country F for further travel, they kept in regular contact.  He eventually returned to Australia (his second wife had been Australian) and was able to arrange for the mother to leave Country F and travel to Australia in September in 2006.  The parties married here in 2007.

2. Unfortunately their relationship appeared to encounter difficulties from an early stage.  Things did not improve when a business which the father went into financially failed, and the father was also troubled that the mother was sending excessive amounts of money back to Country F derived from, at least, her full time employment in Australia.

3. It appears as though the father had a considerable drinking problem during the relationship, and the mother told Ms C, the Family Report writer, that they regularly argued, and during the course of those arguments, would throw items about.

4. The parties ultimately separated on 27 February 2009; the father points out that that neatly coincided with the expiration of the two year period of residence which entitled the mother to thereafter remain in Australia.

5. At the time of separation the mother was in fact three months pregnant with the child.

6. On 4 March 2009 the mother commenced proceedings for property settlement and maintenance.  Next, on 21 May 2009, she obtained a protection order against the father for a period of two years, based upon his alleged stalking behaviours.

7. The child was born in 2009.  Some 16 days later, consent orders were made between the parties in relation to their property proceedings.

8. The father says he was not initially told of the birth of the child by the mother, and that thereafter she placed numerous impediments in the way of him even seeing the child.  He says that shortly after the birth the mother stopped all contact between him and the child, and he did not see the child for almost 10 months.  That led to him bringing an application on 5 May 2010, and on 10 September 2010, then Federal Magistrate Howard made orders which permitted the father to have supervised time with the child.  Consent final orders were made on 16 March 2011 which provided for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility, and for the child to live with the mother but spend increasing amounts of unsupervised time with the father.

9. On 30 April 2013 the mother commenced further proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, including seeking an order for the recovery of the child who had been allegedly held over by the father.  The proceedings were then transferred to this court on 25 August 2013.  On 27 November 2014 Principal Registrar Filippello made orders for equal shared parental responsibility, and for the child to live with the mother but to spend time with the father.  Those orders remained in place at the time of the hearing before me, although events had overtaken them.

10. On 22 September 2015 the Family Report writer undertook the relevant interviews.  As I have previously observed, during those interviews the mother intimated that she was desirous of relocating away from Brisbane, and proposed to do so irrespective of whether the child was permitted to accompany her or not.

11. On 27 January 2016 the child commenced year one at D School.  However on 1 February 2016 the mother moved interstate leaving the child in the care of the father.  Because of the distance between the parties’ respective households, and the change of care, later that month the child in fact commenced at E School, where he continued in year two as at the time of trial before me.

THE ISSUES

1. At the Trial Management Hearing which I conducted on 20 December 2016, with the assistance of the parties who then appeared, I identified eight issues in these proceedings, the determination of which was likely to substantially impact upon the exercise of my discretion in relation to parenting orders.  At that time there was the prospect that the mother may still engage in the proceedings; as it eventuated, given that she did not, a number of those issues are no longer live.  Nonetheless I shall address those briefly.

2. The issues are as follows:

   1.What is the nature of the relationship between each parent and the child.

   2.Would the child benefit from a meaningful relationship with each parent, and if so, how might it best be facilitated.

   3.What risk of harm, if any, does the father pose to the child, and what means are available to adequately mitigate any such risk.

   4.What risk of harm, if any, does the mother pose to the child, and what means are available to adequately mitigate any such risk.

   5.Does the mother and father have the capacity to adequately parent the child given his developmental needs.

   6.What would be the likely effect on the child if one parent does not live in the greater Brisbane area.

   7.What is the likelihood that the mother would withhold the child in Country F if she were permitted to travel there with the child.

   8.Would each parent facilitate a meaningful relationship between the other and the child.

3. After I have discussed the relevant statutory provisions and legal principles, but in advance of a traverse of any residual s 60CC consideration, I will discuss those issues and then turn to the appropriate parenting orders in this case.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. Part VII of the Family Law Act contains the relevant statutory provisions dealing with children.  Section 60B specifies the objects of Part VII, and the principles underlying those objects in the following terms:

   (1) The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:

   (a) ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and

   (b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and

   (c) ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and

   (d) ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.

   (2) The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):

   (a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and

   (b) children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and

   (c) parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and

   (d) parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and

   (e) children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).

2. Section 61DA(1) of the Family Law Act provides that the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child. In the event that, either because that presumption applies, or because it is otherwise in the child’s best interests that there be an order providing for equal shared parental responsibility, the court is obliged pursuant to s 65DAA(1) to then consider certain matters, including whether the child should spend equal time with each of the parents, or substantial and significant time.

3. However s 61DA(2) provides that the presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child (or a person who lives with a parent of the child) has engaged in either abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family) or family violence. Further, subsection 61DA(4) provides that the presumption may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for its parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.

4. In this context it is convenient to also advert to s 65DAC, which sets out the effect of a parenting order that provides for shared parental responsibility. By subsection (3) such an order is taken to require each of the persons subject to it to consult with the other person in relation to the decision to be made about any major long-term issue in relation to the child, and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about that issue. It can therefore be seen that the obligations which an order effecting equal shared parental responsibility imposes are potentially onerous.

1. Finally s 60CA provides that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. The matters which a court must have regard to in determining the best interests of a child are set out in s 60CC.

NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EACH PARENT AND CHILD

1. The Family Report of Ms C was based upon her interviews and observations on 10 November 2015; it is therefore now of considerable vintage.  Particularly, it pre-dates the mother’s abandoning the child in February 2016.  However it is apparent from Ms C’s report that nonetheless, even when the child was living with the mother, there were some peculiarities in the relationship between him and the mother.  For instance although the child described his father as “a great dad,” when asked if his mother “great too,” the child was unable to given any meaningful response.  Likewise Ms C said “when asked if he thought his mum was a good mum, [the child] said, “Ummm.  Ummm.  Ummm.””  Then, during the observation phase, Ms C noted that the mother was not interactive with the child, who “seemed somewhat deflated by his mother’s lack of involvement and inability to pick up on his cues, in stark contrast, the father did naturally and with ease.”

2. Since then, of course, the mother has effectively abandoned the child, and only telephoned him on five occasions, seemingly without any predictability.  The father says that in these conversations the mother has asked the child about what the father is doing, rather than engaging with the child.  Further, the father reports that after those conversations the child has become distressed or emotionally withdrawn.  Plainly, however, the child does remember his mother, and has some form of relationship with her.

3. Doing the best I can, I am satisfied that the nature of the relationship between the child and the mother was likely always a somewhat distant one, and that the mother’s abandonment of the child has increased that distance, and likely further emotionally fractured it.

4. On the other hand, the nature of relationship between the child and the father appears to be a sound and meaningful one.  Not only was the father actively engaged with the child during observations with Ms C, but his evidence is that the child and he now enjoy an excellent relationship.  I accept that evidence.

BENEFIT OF MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH PARENT

1. It is likely that the child would still benefit from a meaningful relationship with both parents, which would likely best be facilitated by regular face-to-face time being spent with each of them, with both being involved in all areas of the child’s life.  Indeed, notwithstanding the somewhat distant relationship observed by Ms C in November 2015, and its subsequent further fracture by the mother abandoning the child, it is still likely that the child would obtain benefit from a meaningful relationship with her, if it were able to be re-established.  However the mother’s conduct makes it seem very unlikely that she has any intention of maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child.

2. I am well satisfied, on the other hand, that the child would benefit from a meaningful relationship with the father, and that it would be best facilitated by him spending regular face-to-face time with the child and being involved in all areas of his life.

RISK OF HARM POSED BY FATHER

1. At one stage this appeared to be a live issue in these proceedings, given that the mother made allegations that the father posed a risk of sexual harm to the child, apparently based upon things which the child had disclosed to her.  However there can be no more telling retraction of those claims by the mother than her abandoning the child to the father’s care in February 2016.  Further, when the mother first made those allegations in 2013, they were investigated by the relevant authorities and found to be unsubstantiated.  Since the child has been in the full-time care of the father, no such disclosures have again been made.

2. The evidence falls far short of demonstrating that the father poses any risk of harm to the child, in any respect, if he remains in his primary care.

RISK OF HARM POSED TO CHILD BY MOTHER

1. This ultimately became the primary matter in dispute between the parties who appeared before me at trial.  The father asserted that the mother posed a flight risk, a risk of physical assault on the child, and a risk of emotional harm based upon the child’s adverse reaction to her telephone calls after February 2016.  Based upon these asserted risks, the father argued that the mother’s time should be supervised, as that was the only means of adequately mitigating them.  The Independent Children's Lawyer did not accept that the risks were of a magnitude that required supervision.

2. Turning firstly to the asserted flight risk, the father is troubled that the mother may, if the opportunity arose, take the child to Country F and leave him with relatives there.  His concern is that Country F is not a signatory to the relevant Hague Convention and hence the return of the child to Australia would likely be problematic.  However two matters strongly suggest that the mother is unlikely to so act.  The first is that notwithstanding that the mother has had the child in her primary care for several years prior to February 2016, she has never in fact attempted to do that which the father now fears.  The second, and more telling matter, is that, far from wishing to secrete the child from the father, what the mother did in February 2016 was to abandon the child to the father’s care.  That does not speak to a desire to remove the child from the father’s care.

3. Whilst it is likely the case that, if the mother were able to take the child to Country F with an intention not to return him, that could be achieved, and hence effect real emotional damage to the child, as I have discussed the prospect of her doing so is, I assess, very, very low.  I am not satisfied that the mother poses any risk of substance in relation to removing the child from the jurisdiction. 

4. Further, as discussed with the father during the course of the hearing, I am persuaded that there should be an injunction restraining the mother from taking the child out of the country.  Finally I should say that, even if it be that I am wrong in assessing that the mother poses no appreciable flight risk, it is difficult to see how supervision of the kind contemplated by the father would necessarily stop that.  The supervisor could not possibly be expected to intervene in a physical way, and the most that could be hoped for is that the supervisor would forewarn the father as to what the mother was proposing, or seemingly proposing, to do.

5. Next the father relied upon the physical discipline of the child by the mother as justifying supervision.  It appears as though the child may have disclosed that on occasions the mother has disciplined him in a physical way, but it is not suggested that it was disproportionate or necessarily criminal nature or in the means of its administration.

6. The material is simply incapable of supporting the finding that the mother poses such a risk of harm to the child by way of corporal punishment that her time with him needs to be strictly supervised.

7. Finally I turn to the asserted risk of emotional harm to the child.  The father bases this upon the child’s reaction to the mother’s telephone calls from time to time, as previously discussed.  It is indeed likely that the child is upset by his abandonment by the mother, and the unpredictable, irregular and infrequent telephone calls from her upset him because it reminds him of that loss.  However the father proposed, and is supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer, that the mother’s telephone or Skype time with the child should continue, and further proposes that the child continue to engage with the mother by seeing her on a face-to-face basis from time to time.  Against those proposals, it is difficult to see how supervision of the mother’s time with the child will in some way minimise or obviate the emotional harm which may be suffered in consequence.

8. I am not persuaded that the mother poses a risk of harm to the child of any species which requires her time with him to be supervised.

PARTIES CAPACITY TO PARENT CHILD

1. This is an issue which fell away by virtue of the mother’s failure to engage in the trial.  The only party who seeks to parent the child is the father; as to that I am well satisfied that he has the capacity to adequately do so.

EFFECT ON CHILD IF ONE PARENT RELOCATES

1. Again this issue evaporated by virtue of the mother’s abandonment of the child in February 2016, and her apparent intention to remain living in Melbourne.  The effect on the child, whilst regrettable, has already been visited upon him.

LIKELIHOOD MOTHER WITHHOLD CHILD IN COUNTRY F

1. Again this issue largely fell away, in that the mother did not seek any orders permitting her to travel with the child to Country F, and both the father and the Independent Children's Lawyer accepted that there should be an order restraining the mother from removing the child from the Commonwealth.  In any event, the evidence does not persuade me that the mother has a desire to take the child to Country F with a view to withholding him there.

PARENTS’ FACILITATION OF MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD AND THE OTHER

1. Again this issue fell away because the mother did not pursue any orders in her favour.  In the past the father has asserted that the mother positively impeded the development of a relationship between him and the child, but plainly her abandonment of him in February 2016 effected quite the opposite.  As to the father, I am well satisfied that he recognises the benefits which the child would have from a meaningful relationship with the mother, and will seek to facilitate it, if at all possible.  Of course it remains to be seen whether the mother wishes to have such a relationship. 

SECTION 60CC CONSIDERATIONS

1. It will be appreciated that I have already discussed both of the primary considerations and a number of the additional considerations when traversing the issues.  However by reference to the remaining relevant additional considerations I observe as follows.

2. The child is too young to express any views which deserve weight.

3. The child appears to have a strong relationship with the paternal grandparents, but to have little current relationship with the maternal grandparents or his Country F relatives more generally.

4. The mother’s abandonment of the child is a point strongly adverse to her.  Further, it appears as though she is not presently paying any child support in relation to the child.

5. Plainly there is practical difficulty in the child spending time with the mother in Melbourne, because of the cost and distance between it and Brisbane.

6. It is asserted by the mother that the father engaged in relatively low level family violence during the course of the relationship.  However this is not accepted by the father, who on the other hand says that the mother engaged in family violence.

7. A family violence order has applied in which the mother was the aggrieved and the father the respondent.  No relevant inferences can be drawn from it beyond the discussion above.

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. The mother does not seek an order for parental responsibility, whether sole or shared.  On a practical level therefore, the father is the only candidate for parental responsibility in relation to the child.

2. Given the parties mutual allegations, there are reasonable grounds to believe that there was family violence, and hence the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply.  Even if I am wrong as to that, I am satisfied that in the circumstances of this case it is in the child’s best interests that there be an order sole parental responsibility in favour of the father, and will so order.

WITH WHOM SHOULD CHILD LIVE

1. Again the mother does not seek an order in her favour that the child live with her, whether primarily or at all.  Her abandonment of the child in February 2016 would raise serious concerns in relation to her parenting in any event.  I am well satisfied that the child should live with the father, and that such an order is in the child’s best interests.

TIME AND COMMUNICATION WITH MOTHER

1. In her letter of 9 March 2017 the mother sought that she be permitted to have telephone contact with the child, and to spend time with the child if she were to travel to Brisbane as may be agreed between the parties.  In substance that was the position of the Independent Children's Lawyer, and the father differed only insofar as he wanted the mother’s time supervised.  As has been seen, I am not persuaded that the mother poses any risk of harm of a magnitude that justifies supervision.

2. I am otherwise satisfied that the orders in this respect sought by the Independent Children's Lawyer are in the child’s best interests and otherwise appropriate, and will make them.

OTHER ORDERS

1. Otherwise the orders sought by the Independent Children's Lawyer are appropriate and will make them.

CONCLUSION

1. For these reasons there will be orders as set out at the commencement of this judgment.      

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Tree delivered on 26 June 2017.

Associate:

Date: 26 June 2017