Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 582

Citation: Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 582
Appeal from: Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd v Tarrant [2011] FMCA 861; Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd v Tarrant (No 2) [2011] FMCA 862
Parties: SANDRA LEE TARRANT v STATEWIDE SECURED INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
File number: NSD 1927 of 2011
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 6 June 2012
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Appeal from sequestration order – where federal magistrate refused to adjourn creditor’s petition – federal magistrate allowed the creditor’s petition to be amended to correct judgment date and dispensed with service of the amended petition –  federal magistrate refused to receive bankrupt’s evidence where bankrupt required for cross-examination on her affidavits but did not attend – whether grounds of appeal disclose any appealable error 
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 33, 52(2)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 27
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s 64
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 4.05, 7.01, 15.29A
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 36.4(3), 36.6
Cases cited: Alexander v Jansson [2010] NSWCA 176
Allen v Allen [1894] P 248
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 40 FLR 364
GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
MacDonald, in the matter of MacDonald v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1999] FCA 1303
Moore v Wilson [2006] FCA 79
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 8) (1999) 161 ALR 581; [1999] FCA 266
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 147 CLR 589
Re James; Ex parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 51 FCR 14
Re Schmidt; Ex parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111
Statewide Secured Investments Ltd v Hawkins & Tarrant [2011] NSWSC 144
Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Ltd [2011] NSWCA 248
Date of hearing: 14 May 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr JD Catlin
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Cutler

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1927 of 2011

BETWEEN:

SANDRA LEE TARRANT
Appellant

AND:

STATEWIDE SECURED INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 JUNE 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed by the appellant on 8 December 2011 be dismissed.

2.The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 12 December 2011 be dismissed.

3.The appeal be dismissed.

4.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1927 of 2011

BETWEEN:

SANDRA LEE TARRANT
Appellant

AND:

STATEWIDE SECURED INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE:

6 JUNE 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 18 October…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 582
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Tarrant v Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd involves Ms. Tarrant, the appellant, appealing a sequestration order made by the Federal Magistrates Court against her. The respondent, Statewide Secured Investments Pty Ltd, had petitioned for Ms. Tarrant's bankruptcy, which the Federal Magistrate granted. Ms. Tarrant's appeal focuses on several alleged errors made by the Federal Magistrate during the proceedings, including the refusal to adjourn the hearing, the allowance of an amendment to the creditor's petition, the decision to dispense with service of the amended petition, and the refusal to receive her evidence.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the grounds of appeal disclosed any appealable error by the Federal Magistrate. Specifically, the court examined if the Federal Magistrate misapplied the law in denying the adjournment, improperly allowed the amendment to the petition, correctly dispensed with service of the amended petition, and rightly refused to accept Ms. Tarrant's evidence. The court also had to determine if these errors were such that they would warrant setting aside the sequestration order.

The court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal were substantiated. The Federal Magistrate's decisions were within the proper exercise of discretion. The court found that the Federal Magistrate had adequately considered all relevant matters, including the High Court proceedings and the pending Supreme Court motion, and did not misapply the law. Additionally, the court found that Ms. Tarrant's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment and the release from her mortgage obligations were without merit, having been previously rejected by another judge. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the appellant on 8 December 2011 be dismissed.

2. The interlocutory application filed by the respondent on 12 December 2011 be dismissed.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before considering the issues raised on the appeal, it is necessary to say something about the factual background. The factual background On 2 September 2008 Statewide sued Ms Tarrant and her husband, David Hawkins, in the NSW Supreme Court. It sought judgment in the amount outstanding on a mortgage over certain property owned by them as joint tenants. The property is situated in Bardo Road Newport (“the Bardo Road property”). Later that month Ms Tarrant and Mr Hawkins filed a defence but in November 2008 Statewide applied for summary judgment. On 9 March 2009 Mr Hawkins consented to judgment against him and the proceedings were then twice adjourned. On 14 May 2009, in her absence, Adams J pronounced judgment against Ms Tarrant but stayed the enforcement of the orders for seven days (“the Adams judgment”). Before doing so (and despite her absence) his Honour read an affidavit sworn by Ms Tarrant on 13 May 2009 which, his Honour found, disclosed no defence to Statewide’s claim. In so far as the orders concerned the payment of money, judgment was given in the amount of $2,675,419.31 together with interest at the rate of 12.95% per annum. On 17 June 2009 Adams J signed a minute recording the judgment. On 27 July 2009 the stay on the enforcement of the judgment was lifted. But Ms Tarrant did not pay the amount she was ordered to pay and on 24 September 2010 Statewide applied to the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia to issue a bankruptcy notice to Ms Tarrant. By that time the total amount of the debt had risen to $3,137,691. On 14 October 2010 Statewide sold the Bardo Road property as mortgagee in possession for $1.42 million. A week later the bankruptcy notice was served on Ms Tarrant. On 9 November 2010 Ms Tarrant applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice and, the same day, she filed a notice of motion in the Supreme Court to set aside the Adams judgment. On 21 December 2010 orders were made by consent in the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. On 7 February 2011 Ms Tarrant’s notice of motion to set aside the Adams judgment came on for hearing in the Supreme Court before Garling J. Ms Tarrant contended that the judgment had been entered irregularly on 17 June 2009 because there was a stay in existence on that date. Secondly, Ms Tarrant asserted that the judgment was not intended to include the amount of the debt, only the order for possession of the property. Thirdly, Ms Tarrant complained that the judgment was given at a time when she was not personally present and her solicitor had indicated to the Court that he could no longer act because of a perceived conflict of interest. Fourthly, she argued that Statewide was estopped from maintaining and enforcing the judgment because of an arrangement between her and her husband of which Statewide was aware, and that, because of this agreement, (save for an amount of $25,000) she had fully discharged all of her obligations to Statewide.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I am not satisfied that the discretion to grant the amendment miscarried.Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 5: The appellant’s evidence These four grounds allege that the federal magistrate erred by disregarding certain matters. Each of these grounds should also be rejected. First, his Honour did not disregard the High Court proceedings. He referred to them. In her written submissions Ms Tarrant effectively acknowledged as much, noting that his Honour had said there was no indication about whether the (proposed) appeal had merit. Her submission was that “the Court did not avail itself of the opportunity to determine this issue as it refused the adjournment application that would have provided the material upon which to base an assessment”. I do not accept this submission. If there were an available argument that there was a real prospect that special leave would be granted and an appeal to the High Court would succeed, I would expect that Ms Tarrant’s solicitor would have advanced it. Once again Ms Tarrant’s written submissions contain errors of fact. His Honour did not find in para 11 of his reasons, as she submitted, that she had not attempted to reinstate the High Court “appeal”. Indeed, he said quite the opposite. It is true that the federal magistrate did not refer to the pending Supreme Court proceeding in his judgment on the sequestration order. But that does not mean he fell into error. In the first place, he had already considered the claim in the context of his decision on the adjournment. If the claim did not justify an adjournment, it would not defeat the creditor’s prima facie entitlement to a sequestration order. It is likely that Mr Pope recognised as much. Perhaps that is why he did not rely on the ground of opposition that raised it. Another explanation is that the evidence on which he sought to rely was not admitted. Yet, Mr Catlin submitted that here, too, his Honour was in error in failing to consider the evidence in Ms Tarrant’s affidavits. Based on this material, Mr Catlin argued that Ms Tarrant was not in fact indebted to Statewide because she had been released from her obligations under the mortgage over the Bardo Road property. The argument is without merit. This was the very issue raised in ground 2 of the notice of grounds of opposition to the creditor’s petition which Mr Pope expressly abandoned. I note parenthetically that Garling J considered the same argument and the evidence relied upon to support it and emphatically rejected it.Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal is made out. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the first place, he had already considered the claim in the context of his decision on the adjournment. If the claim did not justify an adjournment, it would not defeat the creditor’s prima facie entitlement to a sequestration order. It is likely that Mr Pope recognised as much. Perhaps that is why he did not rely on the ground of opposition that raised it. Another explanation is that the evidence on which he sought to rely was not admitted. Yet, Mr Catlin submitted that here, too, his Honour was in error in failing to consider the evidence in Ms Tarrant’s affidavits. Based on this material, Mr Catlin argued that Ms Tarrant was not in fact indebted to Statewide because she had been released from her obligations under the mortgage over the Bardo Road property. The argument is without merit. This was the very issue raised in ground 2 of the notice of grounds of opposition to the creditor’s petition which Mr Pope expressly abandoned. I note parenthetically that Garling J considered the same argument and the evidence relied upon to support it and emphatically rejected it.Conclusion None of the grounds of appeal is made out. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.