Tariwal v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 991
•22 May 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| TARIWAL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 991 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – application for vocational student visa – satisfaction of criterion that entry is temporary and student is genuine – applicant claims Tribunal failed to consider her evidence of strong ties to her home country by not asking her about such matters – failure to inquire as basis of jurisdictional error – matters to be considered – no jurisdictional error established. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.348; 359(1); 474; 476; 499 Migration Regulations 1994, cl.572.223(1)(a) |
| Cases cited: Plaintiff 157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 Minister for Immigration & Citzenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 Khant v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 1247 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI & Anor (2009) 259 ALR 429 See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 |
| Applicant: | RAJPREET KAUR TARIWAL |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | ADG 216 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Brown |
| Hearing date: | 1 May 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 1 May 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 22 May 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Not Applicable |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms Stanley |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application filed 14 July 2016 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,000.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADG 216 of 2016
| RAJPREET KAUR TARIWAL |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for the issue of constitutional writs in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal “the Tribunal” made on 21 June 2016.
The relevant decision affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration & Border Protection not to grant the applicant, Rajpreet Kaur Tariwal “the applicant”, a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa, (hereinafter referred to as “the vocational education sector visa” or “the visa”) pursuant to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) “the Act”.
The applicant is a citizen of India. She arrived in Australia on 28 November 2013. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree, issued by the Manav Bharti University, in Himachal Pradesh, on 24 April 2013.
Prior to her arrival in Australia, in October of 2013, Ms Tariwal applied, under the streamlined visa process, for a Higher Education Sector Student (Class TU Subclass 573) visa (hereinafter referred to as “the higher education visa”). This visa is distinct, in nature, from the visa, the refusal of which is the subject of these proceedings. In her visa application Ms Tariwal indicated her intention to study, in Australia, as follows:
·a course in ELICOS[1] between January 2014 and May 2014, at the South Australia Institute of Business & Technology; to be followed by
·a Master of International Business (Extension) from 30 June 2014 to 31 July 2016, at the University of South Australia.
[1] English Language Intensive Course For Overseas Students
Thereafter, Ms Tariwal completed a course in Academic English, at the University of South Australia, which included assessment of five modalities of academic English. She achieved an average score of 59/100.[2] Her results were published on 29 May 2014.
[2] See casebook at page 42
On 19 May 2014, the applicant cancelled her enrolment in the Masters of International Business (extension) course at the University of South Australia. It was a condition of the higher education visa that the applicant be enrolled in a master’s degree course or a similar course of tertiary education.[3]
[3] See Claus 8516 of Schedule 8 of the Migration Regulation Act 1994 which requires the holder of a visa to comply with the primary or secondary criteria of the visa in question, which in this case required enrolment in an approved course of tertiary education.
On 22 August 2014, Ms Tariwal applied for a Student (Temporary) (class TU subclass 572) indicating her intention to study for a Diploma of Management followed by a Diploma of Marketing at the Jabin Hopkins Institute of Technology based in Adelaide. She anticipated being involved in her diploma studies until October of 2017. She provided a formal confirmation of her enrolment in the marketing diploma course.
In general terms, both these courses are classified as vocational education courses and are subject to a different visa regime than that applicable to a higher education visa. In support of her application, Ms Tariwal provided the following brief statement, in support of her reasons for choosing the course in question:
“I have a great aptitude for career in marketing and management roles in multinational companies. This industry is growing at very fast pace due to growing economy of India and many international companies are making their way to India for new business ventures. After gaining proposed qualifications I would prepare myself for management analysis and communication, managing accounts and clients’ database for decision making and future growth of the business of such companies. Though I started my studies in Australia with Academic English but I was failed in Level 5 and was not able to start Masters of International Business in June 2014. I was not doing well at all so I decided to start with easier levels and slowly upgrade my skills. I have chosen Jabin Hopkins Institute of Technology for course structure based on practical work that will provide the necessary technical skills and knowledge, supported by the theoretical managerial skills and industry operations. Australian qualification is highly regarded in India and it gives a solid impact in your resume or business profile to be trained in Australia in this field. The added advantage of doing this course from Australia is that it would provide me exposure on international level.”[4]
[4] Ibid at page 14
The conditions applicable to the visa
The visa sought by Ms Tariwal is subject to the satisfaction of conditions specified in clause 572.223(1)(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994. The relevant portions of the provision reads as follows:
“(1)The Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:
(a)The Minster is satisfied that the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:
(i) The applicant’s circumstances; and
(ii) The applicant’s immigration history; and
(iii)If the applicant is a minor – the intentions of apparent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and
(iv) Any other relevant matter; and
(b) …”
On 3 November 2011, the then Minister for Immigration & Citizenship issued a Ministerial Direction, pursuant to section 499 of the Act, in respect of this regulation and other related ones. The Ministerial Direction remains in force.
Pursuant to section 499, the Minister is empowered to give written directions, to any person or body, having functions or powers under the Migration Act, as to how those functions and powers are to be respectively performed or exercised. Both the AAT and the Minister’s delegate are such bodies.
The relevant direction was entitled Ministerial Direction No 53 – Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa applications. The directions pick up and elaborate upon the considerations outlined in clause 572.223(1)(a) and the relevant portions of them can be summarised as follows:
·The applicant’s circumstances in his/her home country, particularly –
vhas the applicant sound reasons for not undertaking the study in his/her home country;
vthe extent of the applicant’s personal ties to his/her home country and whether those ties represent a significant incentive to return;
vdoes the applicant have a significant economic incentive not to return to his/her home country.
·The applicant’s potential circumstances in Australia, particularly –
vthe applicant’s ties with Australia;
vevidence that the student visa program is being used to circumvent the migration program;
vwhether the student visa is being used to maintain on-going residence;
vthe applicant’s previous study and qualifications in the context of the intended course of study.
·The value of the course to the applicant’s future, particularly–
vis the course consistent with the applicant’s current level of education and will assist in obtaining employment in the home country;
vrelevance of the course to the student’s past or proposed future employment in the home country;
vremuneration prospects arising from the proposed course of study.
·The applicant’s immigration history.
The Ministerial Direction includes the direction that relevant decision makers should not use the various factors specified as a check list. Rather, they are intended to guide decision makers to weigh up the relevant applicant’s circumstances as a whole, particularly in reaching a decision whether the applicant concerned satisfies the genuine temporary entrant criterion.
Procedural history to date
A delegate of the Minister rejected Ms Tariwal’s application for the relevant visa on 11 September 2014. The delegate considered the various provisions contained in Ministerial Direction 53 and noted that Ms Tariwal held a Batchelor of Arts degree, which in the ordinary course of things would be regarded as an entry point for a tertiary qualification rather than a vocational one.
The delegate also noted that the applicant had changed her study and career pathway within six months of arriving in Australia. In these circumstances, the delegate expressed the view that she was not persuaded that diploma qualifications in either marketing or management would advance the applicant’s career prospects.
The delegate was further concerned that the applicant had an adverse immigration history in the sense that Ms Tariwal had breached the condition of her initial entry visa and had subsequently failed to provide what was considered a reasonable explanation for so doing. As a consequence, the delegate concluded that Ms Tariwal was not genuine in her intention to stay temporarily, in Australia, as a student. Accordingly, her application for the relevant visa was rejected.
As a consequence of this decision, the applicant applied for a review of the decision in the AAT. In a letter dated 22 June 2015, she was invited to appear before the Tribunal, on 16 July 2015, to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in the case. Along with the relevant invitation, Ms Tariwal was provided with a copy of Ministerial Direction 53. She was asked to provide a written statement addressing the issue of whether you are a genuine temporary entrant by referring to the matters listed in the Direction.
The applicant did not provide the requested statement regarding the application of the Ministerial Direction to her circumstances. During the hearing, she indicated to the Tribunal that she had read the Delegate’s decision and understood that the Delegate’s decision turned on the issue of whether she was a genuine student.[5]
[5] See Casebook at page 93 [18]
The hearing before the AAT
The Tribunal noted the following:
·Ms Tariwal had cancelled her enrolment in her masters course on 19 May 2014, which was prior to her results coming to hand in respect of her Academic English course;
·Ms Tariwal was unable to provide a coherent answer as to whether a score of 59% was satisfactory to support entry into a masters level course;
·Ms Tariwal complained that she had been unfairly treated by the person running the English language course at the University of South Australia, who refused to provide her with her results and insisted she do another course;
·Ms Tariwal believed that she required level V English, but had not as yet obtained this degree of assessed proficiency;
·Ms Tariwal stated that she could do a masters level course if she had level IV or level V English but as she did not have these qualifications, she believed she had no other option other than to study at diploma level;
·In these circumstances, Ms Tariwal indicated she would do any study required to enable her to remain in Australia and acquire a level V proficiency in English;
·The Tribunal was of the view that Ms Tariwal had not provided an adequate explanation as to what would be the benefits to her of a diploma in marketing qualification;
·In this context, Ms Tariwal indicated that she would get English and then do Masters;
·The Tribunal noted that Ms Tariwal was not currently engaged in any course of English language studies;
·The Tribunal also noted that, under the streamline visa procedure, applicable to higher education visas, applicants were not required to provide the level of evidence regarding proficiency in English as those applying for vocational visas.
In respect of the application for review, the Tribunal found Ms Tariwal’s claims, provided in support of her visa application, regarding her aptitude for a career in marketing to be vague and general. It considered her oral evidence, provided at hearing, in respect of her future plans to be rambling and often contradictory.
The Tribunal made the following formal findings:
“From Miss Tariwal's evidence, the Tribunal finds she is not studying on a determine pathway to achieve an academic outcome but rather is studying for the purposes of maintaining ongoing residence in Australia.
Given she is already the holder of a Bachelor of Arts degree and is unable to provide any coherent description of her future plans, the Tribunal questions the value of her current and proposed courses to her future.
When asked why she does not study her proposed courses in India, where they are available, her only response is that it was her choice to study in Australia.
Miss Tariwal has lived with her sister and her sister's husband since arriving in Australia which the Tribunal believes provides a strong tie to remain in Australia.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal of strong reasons for Miss Tariwal to return home.
On the basis of the above, and having considered Miss Tariwal's circumstances, immigration history, and other matters it considers relevant, the Tribunal is not satisfied that Miss Tariwal intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily. Accordingly, Miss Tariwal does not meet cl.572.223(1 )(a).”[6]
[6] See Casebook at page 96 [47] – [52]
The review application to this court
In her amended application filed on 23 March 2017 the applicant provides the following ground for her application:
“I am a genuine student and willing to study and make my career back home.”
The particulars underpinning this application can be summarised as follows:
·The Tribunal did not properly apply the directions contained in Ministerial Direction Number 53 particularly in respect of Ms Tariwal’s ties to her home country of India, particularly to her family, community and in terms of her employment, which it was submitted provided a significant level of incentive for Ms Tariwal ultimately to return to India;
·In this context, it was submitted that the Tribunal had failed in its obligation to investigate or inquire of Ms Tariwal what was the nature of her personal ties in India and had therefore fallen into jurisdictional error;
·Ms Tariwal further indicated that her mother, two brothers and a sister lived in India. She was a member of a Sikh family and intended to practice her religion in India. She intended to work, in India, once she had finished her education in Australia.
The legal principles applicable
The legal principles applying to applications of this type are complex. I will do my best to explain them. In simple terms, the process of judicial review is not a re-hearing of the original application, in which this court is free to substitute its own findings of fact and exercise its own discretion in place of what the original decision-maker did.
Rather, what an applicant for judicial review must establish is that there is some form of legal error in what the original decision maker decided or how it was decided, which caused the Tribunal in question not to properly exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it.
Accordingly, the focus, in these proceedings, is on whether there has been a jurisdictional error in the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Part VIII of the Act deals with judicial review. Pursuant to section 476(1), this court has the same original jurisdiction, as does the High Court, in what are termed migration decisions.
Pursuant to paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution, the High Court has authority to grant prerogative writs against any officer of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, in migration decisions, this court has authority to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal by way of a writ of certiorari, which is what, in effect, the applicant seeks.
However, pursuant to section 476(2), the Federal Circuit Court has no jurisdiction in respect of what are termed to be privative clause decisions. A migration decision is defined, in the applicable provision of the Act, as such a privative clause decision.[7]
[7] See Migration Act at section 5
Pursuant to section 474, privative clauses are deemed to be final and conclusive and as such, must not be challenged or reviewed in any court or subject to writs of certiorari or mandamus.
Accordingly, the decision in question, in these proceedings, being a migration decision is also a privative clause decision. As such, the court does not have jurisdiction to re-hear the matter, as a consequence of the provisions contained in section 474 of the Act.
However, in a number of cases, the High Court has held that the provisions of section 474 do not prevent the review of decisions, made by Tribunals, which are affected by jurisdictional error or have been made in bad faith.[8]
[8] See Plaintiff 157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
In general terms, an administrative Tribunal exceeds its powers and thus falls into jurisdictional error, if it identifies a wrong issue; asks a wrong question; ignores relevant material; relies on irrelevant material; or, in some circumstances, makes an erroneous finding or reaches a mistaken conclusion, in a way that affects the exercise or purported exercise of the power conferred upon it.[9]
[9] See Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
As previously indicated, jurisdictional error is a complex concept. In addition to the matters listed above, it can also encompass a breach of procedural fairness or a denial of natural justice, as it has been held that such breaches have the consequence of vitiating the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned and be in themselves errors of jurisdiction.
In Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li[10] the plurality of the High Court (Hayne, Kiefel & Bell JJ) determined that a decision which lacked “an evident and intelligible justification” was liable to be characterised as an unreasonable one and therefore one which did not involve the proper exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the relevant decision-maker. As such, decisions lacking such an intelligible justification are also liable to be vitiated on the basis of jurisdictional error.
[10] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 at [75] – [76]
The Applicant’s submissions
The applicant relied on her written submissions, which she informed me had been largely prepared by her brother. In the submission, the applicant contends that the Tribunal’s finding that there is no evidence of strong reasons for Ms Tariwal to return home is erroneous because the Tribunal failed to consider properly the extent of Ms Tariwal’s ties to India, which it failed to do. In failing to do, the Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it and therefore did not conduct a review of the type envisaged by section 348.
In the submission, the applicant reiterates the nature of her familial and religious ties in India. It is her contention that the Tribunal could have easily asked her about these matters, but failed to do so. In this context, reliance is placed on what was said by the majority of the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Minister for Immigration & Citzenship v SZIAI as follows:
“It may be a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdiction error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error.”[11]
[11] Minister for Immigration & Citzenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 at 436 [25]
The applicant submits as follows:
“The applicant submits that a failure to make obvious further inquiries of the applicant’s personal ties to India, coupled with the ease at which such inquiry could be made under ss359 and/or 364 of the Act, coupled with the scarcity of information the Tribunal had to make its decision, leads to the conclusion that the Tribunal failed to conduct a proper review pursuant to s348 of the Act and there has therefore been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.”[12]
[12] See applicant’s written submissions at paragraph 23
The submissions also refer to Khant v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship, a case in which the Federal Court found that the failure of the Tribunal to make further inquiries amounted to a failure by the Tribunal to conduct a proper review, in circumstances where the relevant inquiries could be made with ease and where it was found there was a paucity of information.[13]
[13] Khant v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 1247 at [82]
The Minister’s submissions
The Minister accepts, in general terms, that a failure by a Tribunal to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, may give rise to a jurisdictional error. However, in this particular case, the Minister refutes any submission that the Tribunal was under any such imperative to do so in the current matter given its overall circumstances.
In particular, the Minister points to the fact that the applicant, in her invitation letter, was requested to provide written submissions in respect of the issues raised by Ministerial Direction number 53. She was also provided with a copy of the direction in question. However, the applicant chose not to address these matters in any way whatsoever.
In these circumstances, it is the Minister’s contention that the onus lay on the applicant to present her own case, rather than on the Tribunal to inquire what that case was. Accordingly, the Minister contends that there has been no error in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal.
In addition, the Minister contends that the Tribunal was not required to specifically ask questions of Ms Tariwal to ascertain evidence in relation to each and every factor listed in the ministerial direction. Rather, it was required to have regard to the evidence led before it.
Conclusions
The statutory duty, incumbent on the Tribunal, is to review decisions falling within its jurisdiction [see Migration Act section 348(1)]. In so doing, the Tribunal may obtain such information as it considers relevant [see Migration Act section 359(1)].
As a consequence of these provisions, the High Court has indicated that the Tribunal has an inquisitorial function but this does not impose upon it a:
“A general duty to undertake its own inquiries in addition to information provided to it by the applicant … .”[14]
[14] See Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI & Anor (2009) 259 ALR 429 at 431
In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB[15] the High Court (Gummow & Hayne JJ, Gleeson CJ agreeing) bluntly said that the Tribunal is under no duty to inquire.
[15] See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at 22 [43]
In this particular case, the major issue before the Tribunal turned on Ms Tariwal’s decision to change the direction of her study, within Australia, from one orientated towards the acquisition of a master’s degree to one which involved her obtaining a vocational diploma. In this context, the Tribunal was required to consider whether she was a genuine student, in the sense that she would remain in this country only long enough to obtain her qualifications.
In the exercise of this function, the Tribunal was required to consider the matters listed in Ministerial Direction Number 53. However, the satisfaction or otherwise of each of the factors listed within the Direction is not required. Rather, they are intended to assist a decision maker to weigh up, the relevant applicant’s circumstances as a whole, particularly in determining whether he or she satisfies the genuine temporary entrant criterion.
In this context, there can be no doubt that Ms Tariwal had been made aware of the relevant ministerial direction, including its intended function of providing guidelines for the relevant decision maker. In this context, she was explicitly invited to address the Direction within the scope of her own idiosyncratic circumstances.
In these circumstances, given Ms Tariwal had been made aware of the relevant ministerial direction, but elected not to address it, I do not accept that the Tribunal was under any duty to inquire of her, in respect of either the issue of her home ties in India or any other of the factors set out in the direction. Rather, it was incumbent upon Ms Tariwal to make out her case, as she saw fit.
Although the High Court, in SZIAI, indicated that a failure to inquire, by a Tribunal, may amount to a jurisdictional error, it was careful not to elevate such a principle to any sort of duty incumbent upon the Tribunal concerned. Rather, it considered that a reference to a duty to inquire might direct the attention of a reviewing court, such as this one, away from its responsibility to determine whether the decision under review was vitiated by jurisdictional error.
In this context, the High Court considered that the issue of what inquiries a Tribunal should have made and whether the failure to make such inquiries amounted to a jurisdictional error was to be considered within the matrix of overall procedural fairness or alternatively unreasonableness, in the sense that no reasonable decision maker would have failed to make the inquiries concerned.
In this case, in my view, there can be no issue of procedural fairness because Ms Tariwal had been advised of the relevant ministerial direction, and, as such, it was open to her to present the evidence regarding her familial and religious ties, in India, to the Tribunal. In addition, given the review function of the Tribunal, it does not seem to me to be unreasonable that it did not directly ask Ms Tariwal about her family ties in India.
Rather, it is clear from a reading of the Tribunal’s decision, as a whole, that it determined Ms Tariwal was not to be regarded as a person who intended to remain temporarily in Australia, whilst she studied, because of its concerns about discrepancies arising in her evidence in respect of her study plans in Australia. As such, it reached the conclusion that Ms Tariwal had not provided any strong reason why she would return home, at the end of her studies.
In this context, in my view, what was said by Kirby J in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs[16] is apposite. He observed as follows:
“… the Tribunal acts in a generally inquisitorial way. This does not mean that a party before it can simply present the facts and leave it to the Tribunal to search out, and find, any available evidence, which theoretically the Act provides for relief. This court has rejected that approach to the Tribunal’s duties. The function of the Tribunal, as of the delegate, is to respond to the case that the applicant advances ….”
[16] Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at [78]
It is the case that in Khant, Cowdroy J considered that a failure, by the Tribunal, to make an inquiry constituted a failure of jurisdiction. However, he did so in the context of a failure to accord procedural fairness to the applicant concerned. In this context, the factual circumstances of the case concerned are relevant.
The applicant concerned held a student visa, which was subject to the condition that he attend classes regularly. He was invited to attend a departmental interview, at which it was stated that issues to do with the regularity of his attendance would be discussed with him. The departmental record did not indicate whether the scheduled interview, which led to the decision to cancel the relevant visa, did in fact take place.
Given the deficiencies in the record, Cowdroy J considered that it would have been an easy task for the Tribunal to have either asked the applicant himself or the relevant decision maker whether there was relevant evidence, either documentary or otherwise, surrounding the interview in question, particularly whether the applicant had been formally invited to it. As such, the issue before Cowdroy J was one of procedural fairness and whether, in its absence, the Tribunal had constructively exercised the jurisdiction conferred upon it.
In my view, the factual circumstances of the current matter are significantly different to those prevailing in Khant. The most significant difference being that Ms Tariwal had been advised of the salient criteria contained in Ministerial Direction Number 53 and chose not to address them.
As Cowdroy J indicated in Khant it is undoubtedly correct that a Tribunal is not required to make the case for an applicant before it, rather it is for the applicant to make his or her submissions.
In all these circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that there is no discernible legal error, on any of the basis asserted by the applicant, in the decision of the Tribunal under review. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed. The first respondent seeks costs in the sum of $6,000.00. In this case I accept that costs should follow the result.
For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown
Date: 22 May 2017
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