Targett v Targett
[1999] TASSC 87
•26 August 1999
[1999] TASSC 87
CITATION: Targett & Ors v Targett [1999] TASSC 87
PARTIES: TARGETT, Samantha Lee
PRICE, Ryan John (infants by their next friend)
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
TARGETT, Sharyn Maree
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S: 2/1997
DELIVERED ON: 26 August 1999
DELIVERED AT: HOBART
HEARING DATES: 8, 9 June 1999
JUDGMENT OF: Wright J
CATCHWORDS:
Torts - Negligence - Fatal accidents legislation - Damages - Measure of damages - Benefits for deceased wife or mother - Cost of replacing services - Loss suffered by children.
Nguyen v Nguyen (1989 - 1990) 169 CLR 245; Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, considered.
Van Gervan v Fenton (1991 - 1992) 175 CLR 327, applied.
NSW Insurance Ministerial Corp v Willis (1995) 35 NSWLR 668, followed.
Nguyen v Nguyen[No 2] [1992] 1 Qd R 405, distinguished.
Fatal Accidents Act1934 (Tas), s5.
Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act 1986 (Tas), ss5, 4.
Aust Dig Torts [143]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs: A M Blow QC
Defendant: S Walsh QC
Solicitors:
Plaintiffs: Jennings Elliott
Defendant: Murdoch Clarke
Judgment Number: [1999] TASSC 87
Number of Paragraphs: 23
Serial No 87/1999
File No 2/1997
SAMANTHA LEE TARGETT and RYAN JOHN PRICE (infants by their next friend) THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v SHARYN MAREE TARGETT
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT WRIGHT J
26 August 1999
This is an action for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1934 ("the Act"), by the two infant children of Donna Lee Targett, who died on 15 May 1995 from injuries received whilst travelling as a passenger in a motor vehicle negligently driven by her sister, Sharyn Maree Targett. A consent judgment in the plaintiffs' favour was entered against the defendant for damages to be assessed on 11 March 1997.
Donna Lee Targett was born in Tasmania on 27 May 1968. She was nearly 27 years of age at the time of her death. Her daughter, Samantha was born on 10 December 1989 and her son, Ryan, was born on 2 July 1992. At the time of her death, she was living in a de facto relationship with Darren John Price at Carrum Downs in Victoria. This relationship had commenced in October or November 1989, shortly before the birth of Samantha. Darren John Price was not Samantha's father, but he has treated her as his own daughter since birth. The name of Samantha's biological father is unknown. That person never had an enduring relationship with her. Darren Price is the natural father of Ryan and he has, at all times, recognised and observed his parental duties towards his son. Donna Targett was not employed in paid work at the time of her death. She was fully engaged in caring for her children and de facto husband. Mr Price was at this time employed by Vic Rail. On 28 July 1995, as a direct result of his de facto wife's death, he resigned from this employment and took a redundancy package. This was done to enable him to care full time for the two children. He has continued in this caring role ever since, and is now in receipt of a sole parent pension. Carrum Downs is a comparatively new and developing neighbourhood and Mr Price is in the process of purchasing the home in which the family unit now resides. Donna Targett died without leaving a will and is survived by relatives who reside in Tasmania. She owned little or no property of value at the time of her death and had no legal interest in the matrimonial home. There is no executor or administrator of her estate and the present proceedings were instituted pursuant to the Act, s8.
Donna Targett had ceased her education at about 16 years of age and after leaving school, she sought and obtained employment at Purity Supermarket in Hobart. This employment ceased before the birth of her children and from the time of Samantha's birth until Donna Targett's death, she was engaged full time in domestic household duties, including cleaning, cooking, washing, ironing and various other domestic tasks, including, of course, caring for her children. Since Donna Targett's death, Darren Price has taken over the dual role of father and mother.
A good deal of detailed evidence was given during the trial by Mr Price and a neighbourhood friend, Mrs Jill Wemys who recounted in detail the daily routine and activities which Mr Price now undertakes with the children. What I was told can really be summed up in a few short sentences. He is a good and attentive father and he has now completely taken over the role as carer for the children which Miss Targett was fulfilling so competently and admirably at the time of her death. He also continues to fulfil the role as their father, and because of his receipt of the supporting parent's benefit, he has no need to engage paid services or rely heavily upon the assistance of friends and relatives for household help. He has commenced a new relationship with a young woman who lives nearby and this relationship could possibly lead to marriage. If it does, and Mr Price was very guarded about the prospect, there is no reasonable likelihood that the new situation will materially disrupt the present arrangement or lead to a significantly changed relationship with the two plaintiffs, or either of them.
Having regard to the method of approach which I have determined is appropriate to the assessment of damages in this case, there is no need, I think, to conduct a detailed analysis of the specific services provided by Mr Price for the children, nor is there any reason to conduct an analysis of the time which he spends upon discrete tasks in the household.
There was considerable debate between counsel as to whether or not the principles expounded by the High Court in Nguyen v Nguyen (1989 - 1990) 169 CLR 245 had been changed or modified by the views subsequently expressed in Van Gervan v Fenton (1991 - 1992) 175 CLR 327. In Nguyen v Nguyen, all members of the Court were at pains to point out that a claim for hospital, nursing or domestic services necessitated by personal injury under the "so-called" rule in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 is of a different nature from a claim under Lord Campbell's Act which is a claim for the loss of a material benefit. In the judgment of the majority, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 264 and 265, the following observations were made:
"Griffiths v Kerkemeyer has nothing to say about a claim under Lord Campbell's Act for damages for the loss of domestic services. As we have said, such a claim is not related to need. A husband claiming for the loss of housekeeping services by reason of the death of his wife may have no need of those services in that he may be able to perform them himself. But if he has suffered the loss he is entitled to recover for it and, as Gibbs J pointed out in Seymour, at p 230, it does not matter whether he intends to use the damages to replace the services or not.
…The services formerly rendered by a deceased wife may not be capable of being reproduced faithfully by services which are commercially available and the scope and cost of the only services commercially available may be disproportionate in comparison with the scope and value of the services which were actually provided by the deceased wife. In circumstances such as that it will not be reasonable to regard the cost of substitute services as any more than a starting point in assessing a plaintiff's loss. Indeed, in cases where the disproportion is severe, the cost of commercially available services may offer no real guide at all. It must always be borne in mind that the damages to be assessed are those suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the death alone."
These observations were made, of course, in a case in which the bereaved husband of the deceased woman was, himself, a claimant, together with the two children of the marriage, under the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act. In the present case, however, Mr Price is not a co-plaintiff. Presumably he does not qualify as a claimant under the provisions of the Act, s3, but whatever the reason, the action currently before the Court is brought on behalf of the children alone.
The Act, s5 provides that every such action as this shall be for the benefit of the members of the family of the deceased person:
"… and in every such action the jury may give damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered … shall be divided amongst the parties aforesaid in such shares as the jury by their verdicts shall find and direct."
The Queensland equivalent to this provision was discussed in Nguyen v Nguyen by Deane J at 254 and 255:
"It has long been recognized that the loss of gratuitous domestic services, which are replaced or will be replaced at pecuniary cost, may provide a basis for compensation under Lord Campbell's Act if the circumstances are such that 'there was a reasonable prospect of (the services) being rendered freely in the future but for the death'.
…It is true that the assessment of the damages "proportioned" to the injury sustained may be more difficult in a case where the services have not been and will not be replaced than in a case where the actual cost of replacement services has been incurred and is available to assist in determining the value of the lost services. In both cases, however, the injury is the same. It is the loss of the services: 'the widower, who does without and fends for himself, suffers loss as much as the widower who replaces the lost services with those of a housekeeper'."
The Court in Nguyen v Nguyen also discussed the way in which the possibility of remarriage by a claimant may reduce damages otherwise recoverable but, in my opinion, issues such as possible remarriage by Mr Price do not enter into the picture here as he is not a claimant in the action. The fact that Mr Price may remarry in future, or commence a new de facto relationship, is not a factor which is capable of reducing the children's claim for damages. Whilst one would hope that any such new domestic relationship would introduce a caring female into the family unit who may contribute positively to the children's upbringing and well-being, this is by no means the invariable outcome of such a reformation of the family group. New relationships of this kind can sometimes be unsettling or even disruptive, no matter how well intentioned the parties may be, or how promising the relationship may have seemed during the courting process.
I accept that the process of assessing damages for the children must commence with a valuation of the deceased mother's services by reference to the commercial cost of replacing those services, regardless of whether or not those services have been or will be replaced at such cost. This approach is not only supported by Nguyen v Nguyen, but has been reinforced by what was said by the majority of the Court in Van Gervan v Fenton (supra).
To reach this conclusion, I have rejected Mr Walsh QC's submission that the provisions of the Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act 1986 disentitle the plaintiffs to succeed in any claim formulated upon the notional cost of any past or future care or services to be provided for the two bereaved children. Mr Walsh QC argued that the present claim was a claim to which the Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act s5, applied as it is a claim relating to personal injury of the deceased. He pointed out that "personal injury" is not defined in exhaustive terms by s6 and that the Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act, s5(a) does not refer to "the person injured", but rather to "the person in whose favour the award is made". This, he says, indicates that Parliament has contemplated awards to persons other than the person actually injured, for example, claimants under the Fatal Accidents Act. In my opinion, this argument overlooks the important fact that the Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act, s4, places a discount rate of 7 per cent on "an award of damages that relates to personal injury or the death of a person", whereas s5, places restrictions on awards made in respect of services relating to "personal injury" but makes no mention of claims relating to "the death of a person". To me, this omission is of paramount importance and plainly indicates that s5 was never intended to apply in respect of a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act. This is a view shared by Meagher JA in NSW Insurance Ministerial Corp v Willis (1995) 35 NSWLR 668 where, dealing with the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW), s35C, a provision in terms very similar to the Tasmanian Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act, s5, his Honour made the following comments at 672 - 273:
"The elements of a claim under s35C are the same as those applicable to a Griffiths v Kerkmeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 claim. The submissions advanced for the respondent in the principal part of the appeal emphasised the difference between a claim made pursuant to Griffiths v Kerkmeyer (supra), from a claim under Lord Campbell's Act. The majority in Nguyen v Nguyen (1989) 169 CLR 245 describe the difference as follows (at 262 - 263):
'The claim in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer was, as we have said, a claim for damages for personal injuries. It was of a different nature from a claim under Lord Campbell's Act, which is a claim for the loss of a material benefit. The plaintiff's loss in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer was caused by his physical disability. It was in accordance with accepted principle to assess part of that loss by reference to the cost of the services which were required to satisfy the need to which the disability gave rise. What was novel about the decision was the application of that principle even though the plaintiff had not borne and would not bear the cost of the services. The novelty was not in valuing the necessary services, both retrospectively and prospectively; there was nothing new in that. The novelty lay in giving the plaintiff the cost of those services even though he had not paid, and would not pay, for them, in order that he, and not the defendant, should reap the benefit.
By way of contrast, a claim for damages under Lord Campbell's Act is a claim for recompense for some tangible advantage which has been lost by reason of the death of the deceased. As Gibbs J observed in Ruby v Marsh, in relation to a claim for damages sustained through the death of a husband and father, the loss occurred "at the moment of death" and:
"The expectation of future benefit was destroyed by the death and no subsequent event can increase or diminish the extent of the pecuniary loss then suffered, although it is true that subsequent events may be relevant to the assessment of damages in so far as they render it unnecessary for the court to speculate about possibilities that may have existed at the date of death when the facts themselves have become known."
In this type of claim the loss can be identified directly and it is unnecessary to point to some need by which it is represented.'
Section 35C is clearly intended to apply to circumstances where the services have been or are to be provided by another person. That is the basis for the entitlement arising under Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (supra), but it has nothing to do with a claim under Lord Campbell's Act. A claim under Lord Campbell's Act for damages for the loss of domestic services is not related to need; it is recompense for the value of the loss which is suffered and the plaintiff is entitled to recover for such loss whether the plaintiff intends to use the damages to replace the services or not: see Nguyen v Nguyen (supra). Hence, such damages are recoverable as damages under Lord Campbell's Act even though the actual loss of services has been met from another source: see Budget Rent-a-Car Limited v Van Der Kemp (1984) 3 NSWLR 303."
It may be noted that in Nguyen v Nguyen, Deane J at 257, suggested that if the need created by the death can be satisfied by something less than a replacement of the actual services provided by the deceased (which may have been greater than actually needed by the claimants), this must be taken into account, presumably in reduction of the claim. In my opinion, it is very doubtful whether Deane J's proposition is sustainable. As endorsed by the Court, the loss to be recovered in a fatal accidents claim is "the loss of the reasonable prospect of material benefit". It seems to me that Deane J's view in Nguyen v Nguyen is not consistent with the majority in Van Gervan v Fenton. It is noteworthy that Deane and Dawson JJ formed the minority in that case.
It seems to me that as Mr Price, the surviving de facto spouse of Miss Targett, is not a claimant in these proceedings, there is really little, if any, scope for the operation of any of the factors adverted to in Nguyen v Nguyen as possibly reducing a claim of this kind. That he is the surviving parent is almost irrelevant for present purposes. The role which he currently fulfils could equally have been fulfilled by a caring relative or friend, except, of course, that he provides emotional stability and support which would otherwise probably be absent. Provided the children are recompensed solely on the basis of the care now given from a source other than their mother, it seems that any discount to the commercial value of that support which is provided by their father as the care giver, should only result from a deduction from the time which the evidence establishes he directs to household duties which can be fairly attributable to satisfying his own personal needs or which are attributable to duties which he previously provided and has continued to provide as the children's father in the household structure. The fact that he receives a social security benefit and is no longer able to seek or obtain paid employment of any substantial kind is not directly relevant. This approach, in my opinion, is consistent with both Nguyen v Nguyen and Van Gervan v Fenton.
I would also subscribe to the proposition which is indirectly supported by the views of Meagher JA and Sheller JA in NSW Insurance Ministerial Corp v Willis (supra) that the father's replacement of the mother's services after her death cannot be taken into account as reducing the children's entitlement, merely because he has an independent legal duty to care for his off-spring during their childhood. This is particularly obvious in the case of Samantha who is not his child, although he has cared for her as her father since birth. If he were to die in circumstances giving the children a claim against a third party under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, the approach I favour would not produce an anomaly by providing the children with double compensation because any funds provided by the Public Trustee to Mr Price out of any award which I might make as consideration for his caring role should, and I presume would, be regarded by any court dealing with a new fatal accident's claim, as non-gratuitous services, the loss of which would not justify compensation because the same payment would continue to be provided to a substitute caregiver at no additional cost to the children.
It is plain from the evidence of Mr Price that Miss Targett used to spread out her duties in the household over the day from about 7.30am when the members of the family arose from their slumbers, until the children went to bed at night at about 7.30pm. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the services provided by Miss Targett could not have been provided by a hired carer, working as a cook, cleaner and general housekeeper, over a much shorter period of time, had the need arisen. Mr Blow QC, counsel for the plaintiffs, approached their claim on the basis that a carer engaged in the household would be present during the children's waking hours whenever the children were at home, but to adopt this approach appears to me to over-compensate for holidays and weekends and to under-compensate for school days. The assumption underlying this approach seems to me to be that the person so engaged would act principally as a child minder, rather than a housekeeper. Of course, such was not the role occupied by Miss Targett. It may also be observed that one would expect that with a full time home-maker, her duties or services in respect of each individual member of the household, including attending to her own requirements, would be fragmented over the day and would differ, perhaps significantly, from one day to the next. Neither on the basis of experience, logic, nor the evidence in this case, can it be said with conviction that Donna Targett was spending more time on the needs of one member of the family unit than the others and the only fair way to approach the issue seems to me to be to say that she was catering for the domestic requirements of the family as a whole, including washing, cooking, ironing, clothing repairs, child minding, tidying and cleaning, in a manner which reflected the traditional role of a housewife and homemaker in years gone by. No doubt my use of such a simile will attract the disapproval of those who have such prickly concerns for inappropriate type-casting these days, but I am sure that what I am intending to convey is quite clear to most of those who read this judgment. If this is a correct characterisation of her role, it is difficult to see how I would be justified in assessing damages on the basis of the assumed engagement of a person at commercial rates to dispense the same services as she was dispensing to the children over the same time span as she delivered those services each day during her lifetime.
Mr Blow QC referred to NSW Insurance Ministerial Corp v Willis (supra) in support of his proposition that the services being provided by a deceased mother may require compensation for the bereaved children at a cost of even more than the full cost of engagement of a commercially motivated care giver. Reasoning from this, it would be possible to also argue that each child should receive an award representing the full commercial cost of a housekeeper for 24 hours a day, but plainly an award calculated on such a basis would be excessive. The simple fact is that both claimant children are living in the same household with Mr Price and I find on the balance of probabilities that they are likely to continue doing so until they respectively attain the age of about 18 years.
As I have already said, Mr Price is not himself a claimant for damages but, nonetheless, I do not see how the children's claim can be "proportioned" to their loss as the Act requires, unless the assumed total cost of providing commercial assistance for the home duties equivalent to those which Miss Targett was providing, and was likely to provide at the time of her death, is reduced by at least one third, being the cost of the contemporaneous care notionally being provided for Mr Price himself by such expenditure. The conceptual grounds for a claim such as this are plainly more difficult than they would be in a claim for personal injuries where the need created by the injury and the resultant disability can usually be more readily assessed. It may, indeed, be possible to argue that only one half of the assumed commercial cost of a housekeeper should be allowed in the children's claim because, prior to her death, Miss Targett would have been spending about one quarter of her working day attending to her own needs. With a commercial carer, of course, presumably coming daily to the house as an employee, no such assumption could be made.
I do not feel able to adopt the approach to damages urged upon me by counsel for the plaintiffs. That approach has discriminated between the cost of caring for the plaintiffs during school time and school holidays. It has also been assumed that there will be a need for care over a longer period each week than I would allow and no deductions have been made for the benefit which the non-claimant father would undoubtedly also derive from the notional housekeeper's services. I also reject important elements of the defence approach. It was suggested by Mr Walsh QC that as their father now fulfils the role previously occupied by their mother and as he is being paid a supporting parent's benefit to recompense him for the care provided to the children, the children have lost nothing. I cannot accept this argument. In Nguyen v Nguyen[No 2] [1992] 1 Qd R 405, Derrington J suggested that the supporting parent's benefit should be taken into account, but as I have already pointed out, in that case there was a surviving male spouse who was a claimant and, in any event, I do not think that Derrington J's approach would be supported by the High Court since Van Gervan v Fenton. It is, of course, Mr Price who receives the payment of supporting parent's benefit, not the children.
Mr Blow QC argued that in addition to assessing damages on the basis of the assumed commercial cost of providing care for the children, an allowance should be made for the prospect that once both children were of school age, Miss Targett would have returned to the work force and contributed part of her earnings, directly or indirectly, to the children. It should be noted, however, that Miss Targett had no formal qualifications and did not hold a driver's licence. She had experience as a supermarket checkout operator and it may be inferred from conversations which were led in evidence from Mr Price and Miss Targett's father, that she wanted to return to similar paid employment in the future. Mr Walsh QC pointed out that there was no evidence as to the ready availability of such work and that with two young children and a working husband, it could not be assumed that even if employment were to become available, Miss Targett would obtain or even seek engagement for more than a few hours per day. More importantly, however, there is no real basis for assuming that contributions of an identifiable kind would be made to the children as distinct from the family unit as a whole. I am afraid that I regard this aspect of the claim as fairly nebulous and as justifying no more than a relatively small sum for the loss of a chance.
It was urged upon me by Mr Blow QC that if financial contributions are in fact made to children by a parent, they do not necessarily stop when the child reaches 18 or even 21. This is true, of course, and I have taken that into account in assessing damages in this case. This, however, was not a family unit with significant actual or prospective financial resources and it does not appear to me particularly realistic to assume that any such contributions would be of significance at all.
In my opinion, the only sensible approach in a case such as that now before me is to make an allowance for housekeeping services on the assumption that the same would be provided over an eight hour day, seven days per week, irrespective of whether or not the children are at school or at home on vacation. However, because such services would inevitably also benefit the deceased's de facto husband, the value at which they should be assessed for the purposes of the claim, should be reduced by one third. It would be appropriate to allow compensation according to this formula until each child attains 18 years of age. When assessing the value of satisfying a need for care created by personal injury of the kind recognised in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (supra), or, indeed, the value of the loss of services being provided by a deceased relative which can found a claim under the Act, difficulties can arise. As illustrated by the facts in both Van Gervan (supra) and the present case, the care required may be intermittent over a full day. In such circumstances, the assessment becomes difficult, simply because it is not sensible to expect that a commercially engaged care giver would come and go to the home to give care for relatively short periods of time fragmented over a 24 hour period.
In such cases, it is obvious that the maternal services have been in the past, and would be in the future, spread over the period of time between awakening in the morning and going to bed at night. On the other hand, an efficient home maker during this period would be engaged in activities which not only benefited the children, but also benefited herself and her partner, as I have already observed. Indeed, most house cleaning, shopping and meal preparation activities would be included in this category. Furthermore, once the children have started attending school, there will probably be periods during the day when such a mother will have a little time to herself. This would be so, particularly in small families where there are only one or two children. In such circumstances, it is, in my opinion, unrealistic and unnecessary to tote up the hours attributable to child care and multiply them by the appropriate commercial rate. It is also inappropriate to count the hours when the children are away from home, either at school or playing with friends, as periods in respect of which no compensation is recoverable. Child care does not necessarily depend upon the presence of the child at the home, as washing, ironing, tidying up and preparing meals for the children all take place, whether they are present or not. The hourly commercial cost of providing house keeping services since the date of Donna Targett's death was agreed between counsel and are to be found in Exhibit P1. I propose to use that document as the basis for my assessment on the principles which I have attempted to explain in the foregoing reasons. I propose to allow damages as follows:
Past Loss
Assessed on basis of eight hours per day. Calculated to nearest dollar.
1 Year ending 15/5/96 @ $10.50 per hour
$30,660 less 1/3 = $20,440($10,220 each child)
2 Year ending 14/5/97 @ $11.50 per hour
$33,580 less 1/3 = $22,386($11,193 each child)
3 Year ending 14/5/98 @ $12.50 per hour
$36,500 less 1/3 = $24,333($12,166 each child)
4 Year ending 14/5/99 @ $13.50 per hour
$39,420 less 1/3 = $26,280($13,140 each child)
5 Period 15/5/99 to 26/8/99 @ $14.50 per hour (103 days)
$11,948 less 1/3 = $7,965($3,983 each child)
Future Loss
6 Samantha (DOB 10/12/89)
56 hours per week until Samantha turns 18 on 10/12/2007 ¾ 8.33 years @ $14.50 per hour
7% discount multiplier = 361 - $293,132, less 2/3 = $97,710
7 Ryan (DOB 2/7/92)
56 hours per week until Ryan turns 18 on 2/7/2010 ¾ 10.8 years @ $14.50 per hour
7% discount multiplier = 400 - $347,200, less 2/3 = $115,733
I also allow for contingencies generally, including, but not limited to:
(a) the possibility of the early death or disablement of Donna Targett from causes other than the motor accident; and
(b) the possibility of the early death of each claimant child
and I propose to apply a 20 per cent discount factor to past loss and a 40 per cent discount factor to future loss in each case. As both children are still living at the time of this assessment, the reason for the different contingency rates will be obvious.
Accordingly, I assess damages as follows:
Samantha
1 Past loss $50,702
Less 20% $10,140
$40,562$40,562
2 Future loss $97,710
Less 40% $39,084
$58,626$58,626
3 Loss of chance of future financial contributions $500 $99,688
Ryan
1 Past loss $50,702
Less 20% $10,140
$40,562$40,562
2 Future Loss $115,733
Less 40% $46,293
$69,440$69,440
3 Loss of chance of future financial contributions $500 $110,502
Judgment in a case of the present kind should take into account the balance of gains and losses which have accrued to the claimant as a result of the death of the deceased. In the present case, it has not been submitted that there have been any gains and consequently I propose to enter judgment as follows.
For the plaintiff, Samantha Lee Targett $99,688.
For the plaintiff, Ryan John Price $110,502.
In the absence of any application to the contrary, these sums are to be paid to the Public Trustee to be invested and applied for the benefit of each of the plaintiffs.
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