FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tanioria v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1253
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:
Tanioria v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1237File number(s): NSD 1840 of 2016 Judge(s): GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 21 October 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal against refusal of interlocutory injunction relief restraining the applicant’s removal from Australia – no arguable error of principle by primary judge in exercising her discretion – no substantial injustice demonstrated if leave were refused - Held: - interlocutory application dismissed. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, ss 24(1A), 31A
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 189, 198, 501
Cases cited: Commonwealth of Australia v Fernando [2012] FCAFC 18; 200 FCR 1
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397
Fernando v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCAFC 181; 231 FCR 251
Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299; 156 FCR 574
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 667
MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1201
Date of hearing: 21 October 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 34 Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms N Kennedy of Macarthur Legal Centre Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms A Seguna of Lander & Rogers ORDERS
NSD 1840 of 2016 BETWEEN: AMINIO ATANINANO TANIORIA
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
SERCO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 OCTOBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The interlocutory application filed electronically on 20 October 2016 is dismissed.
3.The applicant must pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a judgment which was handed down on 18 October 2016. Leave to appeal is required by s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act).
The application for leave to appeal was lodged electronically at 3:13 pm on 19 October 2016 and was accepted for filing at 11:21 am the following day. The matter has come before me on an urgent basis as Duty Judge. The urgency relates to the fact that the indications are that the applicant will be removed from Australia to his country of origin, Fiji, next Monday. He came to Australia when he was a baby and has lived here ever since.
In view of the urgency, the application for leave to appeal was listed for hearing before me this morning. The applicant was represented by…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1253
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the applicant had established a proper basis for a grant of leave to appeal. The principles guiding this decision were well settled, requiring the applicant to demonstrate both that the primary judge's judgment was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court considered whether the primary judge had made any arguable error of principle in exercising her discretion, and whether the substantial injustice test was met. Ultimately, the court found that the applicant had not satisfied either requirement.
The court concluded that the primary judge had not erred in exercising her discretion to refuse interlocutory injunctive relief. The applicant had accepted that the primary judge accurately described the factual background and nature of his claims. There was no sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal in respect of the primary judge's appreciation of "the degree of frustration of the processes" necessary to support interlocutory intervention. Furthermore, the court found no arguable error in the primary judge's reasoning for rejecting the applicant's claim that the respondents would obtain an unfair advantage if the consequence of his removal from Australia was to limit the relief which might potentially be available in the substantive proceedings.
Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the interlocutory application filed on 20 October 2016 was also dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application for leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The interlocutory application filed electronically on 20 October 2016 is dismissed.
3. The applicant must pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an interlocutory application seeking leave to appeal against the primary judge's decision to refuse interlocutory injunctive relief. The primary judge had exercised a discretionary power in refusing to grant interlocutory injunctive relief, and the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 applied. Tanioria needed to demonstrate an arguable error of principle in the primary judge's exercise of discretion or that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court considered the principles guiding the question whether or not to grant leave to appeal and whether the two requirements for granting leave were satisfied.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, the interlocutory application was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.Consideration The principles guiding the question whether or not to grant leave to appeal are well settled. As cases such as Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 demonstrate, there are two requirements which need to be satisfied. First, the judgment the subject of the application must be attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on an appeal. Secondly, that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the primary decision to be wrong. For the following reasons I am not satisfied that the applicant has come even close to meeting the first requirement in Décor. First, it is important to note that the primary judge exercised a discretionary power in refusing to grant interlocutory injunctive relief. Accordingly, the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 apply. It is not enough that judges in an appeal might consider that the discretion would have been exercised differently by them. Rather, it must be demonstrated that there has been some error in the primary judge’s exercise of discretion, such as acting on a wrong principle, taking into account extraneous or irrelevant matters, failing to take into account a material consideration, or mistaking the facts. Also, if on the facts, the result is unreasonable or plainly unjust even though the nature of the error may not be discoverable, an appellate court can intervene. I am not satisfied that any arguable error of principle has been established in respect of the primary judge’s refusal to grant interlocutory injunctive relief. Significantly, the applicant accepted that the primary judge accurately described the factual background and nature of his claims and the issues involved in the interlocutory application. Secondly, in my opinion, there is no sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal in respect of the primary judge’s appreciation of “the degree of frustration of the processes” necessary to support interlocutory intervention. The primary judge found that removing the applicant from Australia would affect some of the relief he sought but I see no arguable error in this approach. Having regard to the obligations imposed by both ss 189 and 198 of the Migration Act, and the applicant’s acknowledgement that he is currently a non-lawful citizen with no imminent prospect of obtaining a visa, it is a singularly unattractive submission that he should be permitted to remain in detention, which he claims to be unlawful, so that the factual basis i.e. his ongoing detention, will persist such that there is utility in him maintaining all the relief sought by him. Thirdly, I do not consider that there is sufficient doubt in the primary judge’s reasoning for rejecting the applicant’s claim that the respondents will obtain an unfair advantage if the consequence of his removal from Australia was to limit the relief which might potentially be available in the substantive proceedings. The primary judge plainly took this matter into account in weighing the balance of convenience (see at [26], [35] and [45]).