Tanioria v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tanioria v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1253

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:
Tanioria v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1237
File number(s): NSD 1840 of 2016
Judge(s): GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 21 October 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal against refusal of interlocutory injunction relief restraining the applicant’s removal from Australia – no arguable error of principle by primary judge in exercising her discretion – no substantial injustice demonstrated if leave were refused - Held: - interlocutory application dismissed.
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, ss 24(1A), 31A

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 189, 198, 501  

Cases cited:

Commonwealth of Australia v Fernando [2012] FCAFC 18; 200 FCR 1

Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Fernando v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCAFC 181; 231 FCR 251

Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299; 156 FCR 574

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499

Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 667

MZZLD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1201

Date of hearing: 21 October 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms N Kennedy of Macarthur Legal Centre
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms A Seguna of Lander & Rogers

ORDERS

NSD 1840 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AMINIO ATANINANO TANIORIA

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

SERCO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. 

2.The interlocutory application filed electronically on 20 October 2016 is dismissed. 

3.The applicant must pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal, as agreed or assessed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a judgment which was handed down on 18 October 2016. Leave to appeal is required by s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act). 

  2. The application for leave to appeal was lodged electronically at 3:13 pm on 19 October 2016 and was accepted for filing at 11:21 am the following day.  The matter has come before me on an urgent basis as Duty Judge.  The urgency relates to the fact that the indications are that the applicant will be removed from Australia to his country of origin, Fiji, next Monday.  He came to Australia when he was a baby and has lived here ever since.

  3. In view of the urgency, the application for leave to appeal was listed for hearing before me this morning.  The applicant was represented by…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1253
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Tanioria v Commonwealth of Australia, the applicant, a long-term resident in Australia, sought leave to appeal against the refusal of interlocutory injunctive relief by the primary judge. This relief was intended to restrain the applicant's removal from Australia following the cancellation of his visa on character grounds. The applicant argued that his removal would cause significant hardship to himself and his family. However, the court had to balance these humanitarian concerns with the need to apply the law faithfully.

The court was required to decide whether the applicant had established a proper basis for a grant of leave to appeal. The principles guiding this decision were well settled, requiring the applicant to demonstrate both that the primary judge's judgment was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court considered whether the primary judge had made any arguable error of principle in exercising her discretion, and whether the substantial injustice test was met. Ultimately, the court found that the applicant had not satisfied either requirement.

The court concluded that the primary judge had not erred in exercising her discretion to refuse interlocutory injunctive relief. The applicant had accepted that the primary judge accurately described the factual background and nature of his claims. There was no sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal in respect of the primary judge's appreciation of "the degree of frustration of the processes" necessary to support interlocutory intervention. Furthermore, the court found no arguable error in the primary judge's reasoning for rejecting the applicant's claim that the respondents would obtain an unfair advantage if the consequence of his removal from Australia was to limit the relief which might potentially be available in the substantive proceedings.

Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the interlocutory application filed on 20 October 2016 was also dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The interlocutory application filed electronically on 20 October 2016 is dismissed.

3. The applicant must pay the respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application for leave to appeal against the refusal of interlocutory injunction relief by the primary judge, which sought to restrain the applicant, Tanioria, from being removed from Australia. Tanioria is a long-term resident of Australia who is not a citizen and has had his visa cancelled on character grounds. The removal of Tanioria from Australia would have very serious consequences for him and his family. The application for leave to appeal was filed electronically on 20 October 2016, and it sought the expedition of the appeal and interlocutory injunctive relief restraining Tanioria's removal from Australia.

The matter came before the court as an interlocutory application seeking leave to appeal against the primary judge's decision to refuse interlocutory injunctive relief. The primary judge had exercised a discretionary power in refusing to grant interlocutory injunctive relief, and the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 applied. Tanioria needed to demonstrate an arguable error of principle in the primary judge's exercise of discretion or that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court considered the principles guiding the question whether or not to grant leave to appeal and whether the two requirements for granting leave were satisfied.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Court is often faced with cases such as this where long-term residents in Australia who are not citizens seek to prevent their removal from this country after their visas have been cancelled on character grounds. The prospect of such removal has very serious consequences not only for the individual concerned, but also for their families, as is the case here. The Court is not unsympathetic or lacking in compassion for the hardship confronting both the applicant and his family in this case. But the Court must faithfully apply the law. The applicant has not established a proper basis for a grant of leave to appeal.Conclusion For these reasons the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed, with costs. The interlocutory application filed electronically on 20 October 2016, which sought expedition of the appeal and interlocutory injunctive relief restraining the applicant being removed from Australia, was dependent on leave to appeal being granted. Accordingly, it too should be dismissed. Orders will be made accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, the interlocutory application was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.Consideration The principles guiding the question whether or not to grant leave to appeal are well settled. As cases such as Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 demonstrate, there are two requirements which need to be satisfied. First, the judgment the subject of the application must be attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on an appeal. Secondly, that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the primary decision to be wrong. For the following reasons I am not satisfied that the applicant has come even close to meeting the first requirement in Décor. First, it is important to note that the primary judge exercised a discretionary power in refusing to grant interlocutory injunctive relief. Accordingly, the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 apply. It is not enough that judges in an appeal might consider that the discretion would have been exercised differently by them. Rather, it must be demonstrated that there has been some error in the primary judge’s exercise of discretion, such as acting on a wrong principle, taking into account extraneous or irrelevant matters, failing to take into account a material consideration, or mistaking the facts. Also, if on the facts, the result is unreasonable or plainly unjust even though the nature of the error may not be discoverable, an appellate court can intervene. I am not satisfied that any arguable error of principle has been established in respect of the primary judge’s refusal to grant interlocutory injunctive relief. Significantly, the applicant accepted that the primary judge accurately described the factual background and nature of his claims and the issues involved in the interlocutory application. Secondly, in my opinion, there is no sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal in respect of the primary judge’s appreciation of “the degree of frustration of the processes” necessary to support interlocutory intervention. The primary judge found that removing the applicant from Australia would affect some of the relief he sought but I see no arguable error in this approach. Having regard to the obligations imposed by both ss 189 and 198 of the Migration Act, and the applicant’s acknowledgement that he is currently a non-lawful citizen with no imminent prospect of obtaining a visa, it is a singularly unattractive submission that he should be permitted to remain in detention, which he claims to be unlawful, so that the factual basis i.e. his ongoing detention, will persist such that there is utility in him maintaining all the relief sought by him. Thirdly, I do not consider that there is sufficient doubt in the primary judge’s reasoning for rejecting the applicant’s claim that the respondents will obtain an unfair advantage if the consequence of his removal from Australia was to limit the relief which might potentially be available in the substantive proceedings. The primary judge plainly took this matter into account in weighing the balance of convenience (see at [26], [35] and [45]).