TANILLE WADE and SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
[2012] AATA 372
•20 June 2012
[2012] AATA 372
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2010/3977
Re
TANILLE WADE
APPLICANT
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal The Hon R J Groom AO (Deputy President)
Date 20 June 2012 Place Hobart
The decision under review is affirmed.
[Sgd Hon R J Groom]
Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
Social Security - parenting payment single and family tax benefit - whether "member of a couple" - consideration of relevant circumstances - applicant is "member of a couple" - whether debts should be written off or waived - debts recoverable.
LEGISLATION
Social Security Act 1991 ss 4(2), 4(2) (b), 4(3), 1236, 1237A, 1237AAD
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 s 3(1), 95, 97, 101
CASES
Staunton-Smith and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 76 SSR 1107
Lynam and Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128
Roberts and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1987) 12 ALD 723
Haggerty and Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (2000) 31 AAR 529
Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1REASONS FOR DECISION
The Hon R J Groom AO (Deputy President)
INTRODUCTION
During the period 8 August 2003 to the 5 August 2008 (“the relevant period”) Ms Wade received parenting payment under the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”) and also family tax benefit under the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (“the FA Act”) on the basis that she was not then a “member of a couple” for the purposes of the two Acts.
Entitlements to parenting payment and family tax benefit are paid at a higher rate if the individual concerned is not a “member of a couple”.
On the 21 October 2009 Centrelink decided that Ms Wade and Mr David Loughborough were “members of a couple” for the whole of the relevant period. It also decided that as a result Ms Wade had received overpayments of parenting payment and family tax benefit. It further decided that the full amount of those overpayments are recoverable from her.
Ms Wade appealed to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”). On the 8 August 2010 that Tribunal affirmed the decisions made by Centrelink. This Tribunal is now asked by Ms Wade to review the SSAT decisions of the 8 August 2010.
It is noted that since 6 August 2008 Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough have been treated by Centrelink as not being members of a couple. Centrelink recognised that on and from that date the two have been living separately.
THE ISSUES
The principal issue for determination is whether Ms Wade was a “member of a couple” in the relevant period.
If it is determined that Ms Wade was a “member of a couple” then it will be necessary for the Tribunal to also decide whether the amounts of the overpayments are correct and whether they are recoverable from her.
THE LEGISLATION
The phrase “member of a couple” is defined in Section 4 of the Act as follows :
“Member of a couple – general
(2) Subject to subsection (3), a person is a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act if:
(a) the person is legally married to another person and is not, in the Secretary’s opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis; or
(aa) both of the following conditions are met:
(i) a relationship between the person and another person (whether of the same sex or a different sex) is registered under a law of a State or Territory prescribed for the purposes of section 2E of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 as a kind of relationship prescribed for the purposes of that section;
(ii) the person is not, in the Secretary’s opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis;
or
(b) all of the following conditions are met:
(i) the person has a relationship with another person, whether of the same sex or a different sex (in this paragraph called the partner);
(ii) the person is not legally married to the partner;
(iii) the relationship between the person and the partner is, in the Secretary’s opinion (formed as mentioned in subsections (3) and (3A)), a de facto relationship;
(iv) both the person and the partner are over the age of consent applicable in the State or Territory in which they live;
(v) the person and the partner are not within a prohibited relationship.
Member of a couple – criteria for forming opinion about relationship
(3) In forming an opinion about the relationship between 2 people for the purposes of paragraph (2) (a), subparagraph (2)(aa)(ii) or subparagraph (2)(b)(iii), the Secretary is to have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship including, in particular, the following matters:
(a)the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i)any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets and any joint liabilities;
and
(ii)any significant pooling of financial resources especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
any legal obligations owed by one person in respect of the other person; and
(iii)the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses;
(a)the nature of the household, including:
(i)any joint responsibility for providing care or support of children; and
(ii)the living arrangements of the people; and
(iii)the basis on which responsibility for housework is distributed;
(b)the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i)whether the people hold themselves out as married to, or in a de factor relationship with, each other, and
(ii)the assessment of friends and regular associates of the people about the nature of their relationship; and
(iii)the basis on which the people make plans for, or engage in, joint social activities;
(c)any sexual relationship between the people;
(d)the nature of the people’s commitment to each other, including:
(i)the length of the relationship; and
(ii)the nature of any companionship and emotional support that the people provide to each other; and
(iii)whether the people consider that the relationship is likely to continue indefinitely; and
(iv)whether the people see their relationship as a marriage-like relationship or a de facto relationship.
(3A) The Secretary must not form the opinion that the relationship between a person and his or her partner is a de facto relationship if the person is living separately and apart from the partner on a permanent or indefinite basis.”
In the FA Act “member of a couple” has the same meaning as in the Act (see s 3(1) of the FA Act).
Although there have been a number of amendments to the Act during the relevant period there have been no changes in that period to the criteria set out in s 4(3) of the Act.
In this application section 4(2)(b) is the relevant provision as Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough were not married.
The criteria set out in section 4(3) are not exhaustive. The weight to be given to each of those criteria, and any other relevant factors, will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. (See Staunton-Smith and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 76 SSR 1107).
An earlier statutory formula to that now in section 4 of the Act was considered by Fitzgerald J in Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128. His Honour made the following helpful observation (at page 131):
“Each element of a relationship draws its colour and its significance from the other elements, some of which may point in one direction and some in the other. What must be looked at is the composite picture. Any attempt to isolate individual factors and to attribute to them relative degrees of materiality or importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error. The endless scope for differences in human attitudes and activities means that there will be an almost infinite variety of combinations of circumstances which may fall for consideration. In any particular case, it will be a question of fact and degree, a jury question, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the statutory test”.
Several documents were forwarded to the Tribunal following the hearing on 19 April 2012. All of those documents were received into evidence except the document which commences “Once upon a time…” Other documents included several accounts for rates, telephone, insurance etc. paid by Ms Wade. Also included is a letter from Dr Gardner of “Newstead Medical”. The Tribunal concludes that this letter cannot be accepted as cogent evidence that Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough had not maintained “…any type of relationship… at least since early 2006…” Dr Gardner did not have direct knowledge of the relationship but was relying on the “impression” he gained from others.
CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT FACTORS
The Tribunal will now consider each of the factors set out at section 4(3) of the Act and any other matters it considers relevant.
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
There is no joint ownership of real estate property or other major assets. As well there is no evidence of any significant joint liability.
In the financial sense Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough have lived reasonably independent lives with no pooling of financial resources. They did not enter into any major joint financial commitments.
Ms Wade’s property at Turners Marsh in Tasmania (“the property”) is owned solely by her. It was purchased by her on the 16 November 2004 which was during the relevant period. Ms Wade had earlier leased the property from sometime in early 2003.
Although not the registered owner of the property, Mr Loughborough did assist in building a structure on it. The SSAT said :
“Mr Loughborough told the Tribunal that he had put a shed on Ms Wade’s property and used her address to try and establish his own business”. (T2 page 11).
Ms Wade denies that “a shed” as such has been built on the property by Mr Loughborough. Whether or not the building can be properly described as a “shed” it is clear from the evidence that some kind of three sided structure was placed on the property and that additions have been made to it by Mr Loughborough and his father as well as by other people. The evidence also establishes that Mr Loughborough had at one point in time considered erecting “a shed” on the property for the purposes of establishing a business there.
At the hearing Ms Wade was asked by Mr Sparkes for the respondent as follows:
“So when he said to the SSAT that he put a shed on your property and used your address to try and establish his own business, that makes sense in – given what you have said now, doesn’t it?”
Ms Wade answered:
“I suppose so” (Transcript page 38)
Mr Loughborough’s father provided a Honda Civic car to Ms Wade for her use. Ms Wade appeared to play down the significance of this gesture. She described the car as “a little civic” and a “little hatch thing, two doors” (Transcript page 39).
Ms Wade said she gave that car back to Mr Loughborough’s father when she bought herself a new car.
It was acknowledged by Ms Wade that Mr Loughborough’s pay was deposited directly into her bank account for a short period of time. This was said to be for possibly “four” to “six” pays. Ms Wade said she gave all the money back to him. Mr Loughborough did not have a bank account at the time.
Ms Wade said Mr Loughborough did not provide her with any money but that “he might have bought some nappies if I needed them” (Transcript page 43).
Mr Loughborough told the Tribunal that he would:
“Sometimes give her maybe $20 if she wanted to take him (the child) to whatever”
and:
“…you put fuel in the car instead of giving her the money for the fuel…” (Transcript page 42)
and:
“…I used to buy the nappies instead of giving her $50 for nappies.”
and:
“… I probably bought him clothes” (Transcript page 63).
The Tribunal finds that Mr Loughborough did sometimes pay money to Ms Wade for their son’s outings. He is the only child of the relationship and was born in 2003. The Tribunal also finds that Mr Loughborough bought nappies and clothes for the child, on occasions for petrol for Ms Wade’s car, and probably other items. (Transcript page 62)
NATURE OF THE HOUSEHOLD
Both Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough told the Tribunal that during the relevant period Mr Loughborough regularly attended at the property to care for their son. This occurred when Ms Wade was attending her workplace in Launceston. The evidence indicates that Ms Wade was attending work on week days for much of the relevant period. She was content to rely on Mr Loughborough to care for her young child.
The birth of their son occurred some two months after the relevant period commenced. He was approximately five years of age when the relevant period ended on the 5 August 2008.
Ms Wade said Mr Loughborough came to the property to care for their son at about 7.30 a.m. each working day. He would regularly stay until about 6 p.m. or 6.30 p.m. when Ms Wade would arrive home from work.
Sometimes Mr Loughborough would stay at the property “to discuss things”. If a visitor who was known to Mr Loughborough came to the house then he might stay “to have a talk to them”.Sometimes he would stay overnight “to make it easier for the next day”.
Ms Wade also said that sometimes Mr Loughborough “…would stay because he had drank too much alcohol to actually drive” (Transcript page 14).
The Tribunal was told by Ms Wade that at no time during the relevant period did Mr Loughborough sleep in her bed “unless he had a nap with my boy on it during the day” (Transcript page 14).
Ms Wade said that Mr Loughborough would sleep on “a sofa bed in my spare room” or he would “just end up on the couch”.
Mr Loughborough told the Tribunal that he didn’t sleep with Ms Wade but slept “either on the couch or in the spare room on the fold out settee thing” (Transcript page 61).
It is of significance that in a Tasmania Police “FVMS Incident Report” of 6 August 2008 it is stated as follows :
“Both parties were in a de facto relationship for nine (9) years, during which time they have resided together …. Parties have recently separated about six weeks ago”.
Ms Wade told the Tribunal that statement made to the Police was untrue and that “I probably made a false statement, sir, to get what I wanted” (Transcript page 53). Ms Wade indicated that she made that statement in order to obtain a restraint order to provide her with police protection.
Whilst at the property Mr Loughborough carried out all of the necessary tasks required of a person caring for a young child including providing him with meals.
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough said they attended their son’s various sporting events together. However it would appear that those events probably occurred after the relevant period expired as their son was just five years of age when the period concluded in August 2008.
As mentioned above the two would sometimes be present when mutual friends called at the property. They would have a drink and socialise with those friends.
On occasions Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough would watch television together including news services (Transcript page 48).
In a job application of the 17 January 2005 Mr Loughborough recorded Ms Wade as his next of kin and de facto. His address was given as that of the property. Mr Loughborough said in evidence that he stated that Ms Wade was his de facto to discourage fellow workers from “… trying to come on to her” (Transcript page 68) The Tribunal finds this reason to be implausible.
Mr Loughborough was admitted to the Launceston General Hospital on 23 April 2008 for treatment of a foot fracture. The hospital record shows that “Tanille Wade” was his “next of kin” and he described the relationship as “partner”. His address was given as that of the property. Ms Wade was admitted to the Launceston General Hospital on three separate occasions on the 8 August 2003, 30 October 2003 and 16 July 2007. On each of those occasions she named as her partner “David Loughborough”. His address was recorded as the address of the property.
In her evidence before the Tribunal Ms Wade claimed that she did not name Mr Loughborough as her partner but that a hospital employee had wrongly assumed that he was her partner and wrote it on the form. She said “I just went with the flow”. Other explanations were provided including a need to “save face and embarrassment” (Supplementary T Documents Page 9) The Tribunal finds the explanations to be contrived to assist Ms Wade’s case.
ANY SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE
It is not in dispute that Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough are the natural parents of their only child. It is noted that Mr Loughborough attended the birth of the child.
Ms Wade admitted under oath during cross examination by Mr Sparkes that she had a sexual relationship with Mr Loughborough during the relevant period. She said:
“I think I just did say that we had sex throughout that period” (Transcript page 45).
In contrast Mr Loughborough denied he had any sexual relationship with Ms Wade during the relevant period.
THE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT TO EACH OTHER
There has been a long term relationship between Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough. Mr Loughborough said in evidence that it went back “ten years ... eleven years?”.
There was a form of relationship between the two from early 2003 until August 2008. Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough contend that the essence of that relationship was not as a couple but rather as devoted parents of their son. They say their only continuing contact was in connection with the care and support of their son.
Quite recently, on the 17 February 2012 Malcolm Bartley, a process server, served a summons on Mr Loughborough to attend the hearing. It was served personally on Mr Loughborough at approximately 12.15 p.m. on that day at the property.
WAS THE APPLICANT A “MEMBER OF A COUPLE”?
Ms Wade has attempted to explain away evidence which might damage her cause by providing contrived explanations. Examples include the Launceston General Hospital records naming Mr Loughborough as her partner and the police record of 6 August 2008 stating that Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough had been in a de facto relationship for nine years.
Ms Wade has readily admitted that in the past she has been willing to make false statements to gain some advantage. She claimed rent assistance which she now admits she was not entitled to and “…knew was wrong” (Transcript page 72). She said she “delayed the truth in that situation”.
As has been said it is necessary to consider all of the factors set out in section 4(3) of the Act and any other matters which may help establish whether or not Ms Wade was a “member of a couple” during the relevant period.
Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough deny, of course, that they were “members of a couple” or in a de facto relationship during the relevant period except perhaps for a few weeks in March 2003. But even if they truly believe that they were not a couple their subjective belief is not determinative of whether in fact they were members of a couple (Roberts and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1987) 12 ALD 723).
Those denials are not persuasive as both individuals have displayed a propensity to make misleading and sometimes untruthful statements. Mr Loughborough’s firm denial of any sexual relationship during the relevant period is unreliable in light of Ms Wade’s ready admission that the two had a sexual relationship “…throughout the period…” She would hardly make such a statement against her interest if it were untrue. The Tribunal accepts that there was a sexual relationship between the two during at least most of the relevant period.
As far as the financial aspects of the relationship are concerned there is limited evidence of a financial nature pointing to the two living as a couple. There is no jointly owned property, pooling of resources, legal obligations owed to the other and only a limited sharing of household expenses.
Ms Wade has stated that Mr Loughborough made no financial contributions to the household. The accounts for rates, telephone, insurance and other services were in her name alone. Ms Wade was the steady breadwinner throughout the period although Mr Loughborough did do some paid work from time to time. However Mr Loughborough did contribute in a very significant way by regularly caring for the child while Ms Wade was at work. This avoided Ms Wade paying for child care or for another carer. In addition he paid for nappies and some clothes and, it is reasonable to infer, for other items from time to time. The fact that one person is the principal money earner and the other makes limited financial contributions of course does not of itself mean that they are not “members of a couple”.
The Tribunal is satisfied that there is present in this case a shared responsibility for the care and support of the only child of the relationship. Ms Wade was obviously the principal carer. As mentioned Mr Loughborough has made a substantial contribution in time and effort to care for the child. It can be inferred from the evidence that most of the housework was undertaken by Ms Wade. However as Mr Loughborough was frequently present at the house for most of the day he would have shared in at least some household responsibilities.
Both Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough claim that they lived in separate rooms when they were both at the house and at no stage in the relevant period did they share a bed. As there was an ongoing sexual relationship between the two the Tribunal finds the claim that they have not at any time in the period shared the same bed to be implausible.
On the evidence before it the Tribunal is satisfied that Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough held themselves out to others as living in a de facto relationship. The police record (exhibit R2), the Launceston General Hospital records (T14, T15 and T16) and the application for employment with Southern Marine Shiplift (T11) all indicate that either the couple were “partners” or in a “de facto” relationship. Importantly the records cover various periods between 2003 and 2008.
The only two people who gave oral evidence were Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough. There is no evidence from friends or associates about the nature of the relationship.
There is very little evidence that Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough enjoyed joint social activities except for the two socialising together and having a drink on occasions with friends and acquaintances at the property. Sometimes they watched television together. They also have attended together at their son’s various sporting activities. As mentioned that attendance was probably after the relevant period expired.
There is evidence of a degree of commitment to each other. They have known each other for many years and had a child together. Mr Loughborough attended at the birth of the child. The child is clearly a focal point of the relationship with both wishing to be very supportive and caring parents.
Without doubt the relationship has had its difficulties. It has clearly been tempestuous at times. Ms Wade reported his conduct to the police on a number of occasions. The police incident report of the 6 August 2008 refers to claims that Mr Loughborough has an “… explosive and unpredictable nature” (R2).
Ms Wade had sought police protection when she was fearful of possible violence against her. A police family violence order (“PFVO”) was issued in November 2006 and another issued in August 2008. The evidence from Ms Wade is that the PFVOs have been largely ignored by both and that despite the order the two have continued to associate including attending their son’s events together.
The Tribunal was told by Mr Loughborough that he did not keep any clothes or personal belongings at the property. The Tribunal notes that in the “FVMS incident report “ (R2) the following is recorded:
“…only contact allowed in relation to the couple’s son and offender’s remaining property, one time approval to collect”.
When asked whether Mr Loughborough may have stayed more than one or two nights a week Ms Wade said :
“No, otherwise I would have been breaching everything …”
Mr Sparkes then asked her - “breaching what?”
Ms Wade replied - “Centrelink rules and stuff”.
Mr Sparkes:
“So is it true that what you were doing was limiting his stays… to one or two nights a week … because if you knew it was more than that alarm bells would go off and Centrelink would focus in on your circumstances and might reduce your payments. Is that why you had this arrangement with him?”
Ms Wade:
“No sir” (Transcript page 44).
After considering all the material before it the Tribunal concludes that although Mr Loughborough stayed on occasions at his parent’s house or with friends his frequent place of residence throughout the relevant period was at the property.
CONCLUSION
Clearly some of the factors set out in section 4(3) are not present in this case including in particular joint ownership of property, pooling of financial resources and a full sharing of household responsibilities. On the other hand the two resided together for much of the time, there is present a sexual relationship, they jointly cared for their son and there is some evidence of companionship and support. There is also plain evidence that each on occasions held out to the wider community that he or she was a partner of the other.
The Tribunal’s conclusion is influenced in part by the content of the records of Tasmania Police and the description of the “relationship history” as a “de facto relationship for nine (9) years”. It does not accept the claim that the police were told this as a deliberate untruth to ensure that a PFVO was issued. It appreciates that the relevant legislation is directed to protecting a spouse or partner from acts of violence. However if there was a different form of relationship or no relationship at all no doubt some form of police protection would still be available. Why did Ms Wade say that the relationship had lasted for “nine (9) years”?
Of particular importance however are the numerous contemporaneous documents which referred to Ms Wade and Mr Loughborough as being “partners” or in a “de facto” relationship and which also state that Mr Loughborough’s address was at the property. These references were made on a number of occasions from 2003 until 2008 and are persuasive elements within the totality of the evidence before the Tribunal. As an example, when Mr Loughborough was admitted to the Launceston General Hospital on the 23 April 2008 for treatment of a foot fracture the admission form states that his address was that of the property. Tenille Wade is referred to as his “partner” and as “next of kin”. The Tribunal does not accept as truthful the various explanations provided for these references.
The Tribunal finds that Mr Loughborough was regularly present at the property during the working week caring for their child. He was also quite frequently at that property during the night. It was his frequent place of residence throughout the relevant period even though, on occasions, he would spend some nights at his parent’s house or with friends.
Although the child was a central factor in their ongoing relationship there was also a degree of commitment and support from each to the other. They had a continuing sexual relationship, they spent time in each other’s company at the property and each showed a degree of concern for the other. Although Ms Wade, who was obviously a devoted mother with a good work ethic, provided most of the financial support for the household Mr Loughborough did contribute significantly particularly in caring for the child when Ms Wade was at work.
The relationship was far from perfect and was seriously strained at times. But clearly a relationship did continue between the two throughout the relevant period.
After considering all of the material before it the Tribunal finds that the relationship satisfies sufficient of the criteria in section 4(3) of the Act and other relevant circumstances to conclude that throughout the relevant period Ms Wade was a “member of a couple” within the meaning of that term in the Act.
SHOULD THE DEBTS BE RECOVERED?
The Tribunal is satisfied that the debts for overpayment of both parenting payment and family tax benefit during the relevant period have been properly assessed and calculated.
It is noted that section 1237A of the Act and section 97 of the FA Act provide that if particular circumstances are found to exist then the recovery of the debts must be waived. These provisions have no application in the circumstances of this case. The debts were not the sole consequence of administrative error nor can it be said that the payments here were received in good faith. (See Haggerty v Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (2000) 31 AAR 529).
Section 1236 of the Act and section 95 of the FA Act provide for the write-off of debts in certain circumstances. Again on the evidence before the Tribunal those provisions have no application here.
There are also provisions in the two acts which allow for waiver of recovery of the debts in “special circumstances” (see section 1237AAD of the Act and section 101 of the FA Act).
The meaning of the term “special circumstances” has been considered in many cases. In Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 Toohey J. explained the term as follows:
“An expression such as “special circumstances” is by its very nature incapable of precise exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend on the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special”.
Ms Wade said in evidence that she is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. A worker’s compensation claim was made but payments have since ceased. Ms Wade is presently not working. She is clearly finding it difficult to make her mortgage and other payments from the amount of her current income.
No doubt Ms Wade is suffering ill health and is finding it very difficult to manage her financial affairs. Thiose factors are not particularly unusual in this type of case. In the Tribunal’s view none of the circumstances of this case are “special circumstances” within the meaning of that term in the two Acts.
DECISION
The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 78 (seventy-eight) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of The Hon R J Groom AO (Deputy President) ........................................................................
Administrative Assistant
Dated 20 June 2012
Date(s) of hearing 20 February 2012 and 19 April 2012 Applicant In person Counsel for the Respondent Mr Brian Sparkes Solicitors for the Respondent Program Litigation and Review Branch
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