Tange v the Queen S224/1999

[2000] HCATrans 614

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S224 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

STUART TANGE

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GUMMOW J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 17 OCTOBER 2000, AT 2.14 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR S. TANGE appeared in person.

MR R.D. ELLIS:  I appear for the respondent Crown, your Honour. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)

GUMMOW J:   Yes, Mr Tange.  Now, just before you start, we have a 20 minute time limit.  You have had that explained to you I guess?

MR TANGE:   Yes, your Honour.  I will just point out to your Honour that judging from the newspapers and so forth - I made several applications.  It is in the support document book - for pro bono representation and I have written to three or four different solicitors and could not get it.  The Bar Association will not acknowledge it and the Law Society handed it on to the Bar Association.  They will not acknowledge it, so I am forced to do this case by myself at the moment.  So do I start proceeding?

GUMMOW J:   Yes, start from now.  But if I just indicate to you two things:  firstly, of course, there is a long lapse of time which you would need to explain to us and, secondly, on the actual central merits of it all, the respondent has put on some written submissions.  Have you seen them?  That is Mr Ellis.  He has some written submissions.

MR TANGE:   More ones, is it?

GUMMOW J:   Yes, the respondent’s summary of argument.

MR TANGE:   That was just in the original book here.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, it is in the book, yes, that is right.  Have you got a copy of the book?

MR TANGE:   Yes.

GUMMOW J:   At pages 125, 126 and 127 are really the heart of what he wants to say.  So if you can focus on that, as well as on the question of lapse of time, and anything else you want to say within that 20-minute period.

MR TANGE:   That is on the empanelling into jury, is it, your Honour?

GUMMOW J:   Three points you see there.

MR TANGE:   Yes, thank you, sure.  Okay, well, I will start with the empanelling the jury.  I have done most of it in draft written submission which is in the book and that is, if you go to arguments on page 109.  My grounds on the empanelling a jury is this, that when the jury is selected, right, if the accused person does not wish to challenge any member of the jury, then the prosecution or the Crown should not have the same privilege to challenge if the accused does not challenge themselves; and in the book itself, it says at the back of the page there where it says Jury Act, it clearly states that the Crown is entitled to the same challenges, where it says on page 196, it says, say point 42:

In any criminal proceedings each person prosecuted shall be allowed –

(a) in the case of an offence that is capital or murder – 20 peremptory challenges; or

(b) in any other case – 8 peremptory challenges.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR TANGE:   Yes.  Then it goes on to say, at 43:

(1) In any criminal proceedings, and in any civil proceedings in which the Crown is a party, the Crown shall have the same right of challenge as any person being prosecuted or any other party to the proceedings, as the case may be.

So, the Crown has the same right as a challenge as the accused, but my point would be if the accused does not challenge one member of the jury, then the prosecution should not be allowed to challenge any member of the jury either.  On those bases, I put this point, that the Crown has access to names, addresses, qualifications, everything about the jury they want to know they have access to.  The accused person does not have access to that at all.  Besides a name being called out and presenting themselves in court, there is no indication as to what that person’s state of mind might be, whether they are wearing clothes or no clothes, it is very hard to tell what a of the jury member’s opinion or qualifications might be.  So it virtually boils down to a lucky dip on the accused’s side, so that if the accused person wishes not to challenge one member of the jury, then the Crown has no right or should not have any rights to challenge any of those jury members because he has first knowledge access to files and data that could indicate to him what a person or a member of the jury would be.

If we allow the Crown to challenge, the same as if a person does not want to challenge and allow the Crown to challenge, then we may as well give the opportunity of the accused person to go like the American system where you can cross‑examine the jury members and find out exactly where they are coming from because the Crown has all that information themselves.  So it is a bit one-sided when you are talking about the Crown being allowed to challenge if the person does not challenge and I am not saying that if the person challenged, the Crown cannot challenge.  I agree that if the accused does challenge, then the Crown has the rights to challenge too.  But we must be fair about the onus of what documents they have and what they are looking at behind the scenes, compared to what the accused is looking at.  The accused is in the dock and he has to take face values, so the only face value he could take, the accused, would be to have a lucky dip and the first 12 people that walked through that door and sit down, if the accused wants it that way, should be allowed to sit on the accused’s jury.  I say it would be biased towards the Crown if the Crown is allowed to challenge if the accused does not want to challenge, and that is the point on that one, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, well, there are other points too.

MR TANGE:   In the draft, you are talking about, your Honour, the jury empanelling?

GUMMOW J:   No, just look at page 125, if you would.

MR TANGE:   Yes.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, three grounds, right:  empanelment of the jury, you have dealt with that; the next one is the indictment; and the next one is the admissibility of evidence point.

MR TANGE:   Yes, different grounds, yes.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR TANGE:   As far as the indictment goes, your Honour, if we go back to the indictments on page 5, the accused asked the trial judge, there was one indictment left out – this is a technicality that is to do with the Attorney‑General and the Crown Law Department because the accused, on a date ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   It does not matter, the precise date.

MR TANGE:   The accused was taken before a judge and four charges were submitted to the court and a plea was taken on each one of those charges and a date trial was set for those particular charges.  Now, when the trial proceeded on 14/4/1982, one of the charges was withdrawn from the Crown’s case, that being the unlicensed pistol.  Now, the charges that relate to are:

(CHARGE---(1.) Armed Robbery.), (CHARGE ---(2.) Use an offensive weapon to prevent lawful apprehension), (CHARGE---(3.) Harbour an escapee prisoner), (CHARGE ---(4.) Possess unlicensed pistol).

Now, they kept unlicensed pistol back and only proceeded on three charges.  Now, I asked the judge at the time, on the trial day - which we go back to page 5 - to look at the matter before the jury sat down to find out why the unlicensed pistol was left out because the whole strength of the Crown’s case was that an unlicensed pistol was used “to prevent lawful apprehension”.  That is the strength of the Crown’s case and that is what the initial arrest was.  The Crown claims that I produced a pistol and stopped myself from being arrested. Then came the other charges.  Now, if that is the case, that is the most ingredient part of the whole case is the possession of an unlicensed pistol.  The Crown took a plea on that of not guilty from myself, but when they went to the trial, they left that out, they only wanted to proceed on the others.  But during the trial, which is all in written drafts here  ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   But they proceeded on the more serious charge, did they not?

MR TANGE:   They proceeded on offensive weapon.  Who can tell which is the most serious charge:  threatening to lawful apprehension to be arrested, or unlicensed pistol?

GUMMOW J:   It is offensive weapon with intent, et cetera.

MR TANGE:   Yes, well, what I am saying is that they left the possession of unlicensed pistol out, which is the most ingredient and the most dangerous thing of all.  They left that charge out and held it back, and they only proceeded on all the others.  But a plea had already been taken on those indictments, but after the trial was over the Attorney‑General, given nolle prosequi, which is a no bill, and dropped that charge.  Now, I state this, that once a plea has been taken on something, the Attorney‑General, I do not believe has the right, once the plea has been taken, to null that charge of possession of unlicensed pistol or even to do anything about it because it is still before the courts because the not guilty plea in front of a judge in a trial day set means that that charge is still active.  Now, we know that an Attorney‑General cannot interfere with a magistrate’s decision before the case is over.  So, therefore, how can he interfere with a judge’s decision before the case is over.  Now, this not reflected on any particular Attorney‑General, this is just a point of law. 

So, the most ingredient parts of the whole case, right - it is all written here - is the Crown used the unlicensed pistol in the trial.  They mentioned on several occasions - it is all in draft here in the book - they mentioned it so many times and they matched up shells, and they said it was working and they called people to say it was a working pistol, and ballistics and every police officer mentioned it in the case, but it was not in the case officially.  Now, if the no bill has the same power and weight as a dismissing by a jury, which means that if you get a no bill in some particular matter, I think the High Court states that it has got the same effective power as being acquitted or nolle’d.  If that is the case, the Attorney‑General has actually given me a no bill or a nolle, which means that I was not in possession of an unlicensed pistol, which means that the charge of “use an offensive weapon to prevent lawful apprehension” cannot stand.

GUMMOW J:   That is the point, I suppose, but is the answer not at page 126, the answer put against you, paragraph (iv) there, line 51, on page 126?

MR TANGE:   Yes.

GUMMOW J:   That is what is put against you on ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TANGE:   That is true, but I am just – yes, that is what the prosecutors are saying, that it could anything to be an offensive weapon, but the fact is it is an unlicensed pistol, so they say, but I have been given a nolle or no bill on it, and if I have been given a no bill on it, I cannot be in possession of it.  If I am not in possession of it, therefore, it does not matter what sort of weapon it would have been, it did not exist. 

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR TANGE:   If a no bill means you are virtually acquitted or it has got the same weight as a jury acquitting you, right, then an offensive weapon cannot exist.  Now, if that is the case, where do we stand here?  Does the no bill got power over a charge that cannot stand without the other, or does the case have to go to trial?  You see the Attorney‑General has stepped in and given a no bill on a possession of unlicensed pistol, but the same pistol they are talking about they are saying was used to resist arrest.  So, we cannot have two law.  Like, the Attorney‑General’s power in giving a no bill, which has got the same weight as a jury, must override the “use offensive weapon”, which means it did not exist in the first place.

If the Crown had gone ahead with the “possession of unlicensed pistol” and I was found guilty, then it would have been a different story.  But for the Attorney‑General to give a no bill with an outstanding charge that was before the court – see, on 27 November 1981 – sorry  ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   I think we understand what you are saying on the second point, but you had better come to the third, I think, because time is marching on.

MR TANGE:   Yes, okay, yes, sure.  The identification, right, there is a lot of identification points in this book here, it would be too far to go through them, but the identification boils down to this, that the Crown claims that three people, four people were in a police station and they identified me by photographs, right, as being a suspect involved with them in a robbery.  Now, going through all the statement of those people and even the judge’s summing up to the jury a little bit later down here, all those people - no one has identified me in any photograph whatsoever as being involved in an armed robbery or being the driver in an armed robbery; and if we went to the point of law as far as being identified by people at this robbery, the identification is, one person said, that I had black curly hair, black beard, and that is all they can remember, or those words to the effect.  That is where the law of Kirk Pitkin v The Queen would come into it.

GUMMOW J:   Was that all the Crown case was?

MR TANGE:   Judging from the sentence report on page ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   You see, what is said against you is that there was a lot of other matters too.

MR TANGE:   Judging from what the judge said, if he is correct, on page 17 of the support document folder, the judge says at point 7:

The only view that the jury could have taken in finding the prisoner guilty, on the charge of armed robbery, is that he was the driver of the car involved.

Now, all these alleged statements and involvement and naming of photographs just do not exist, they are not there.  In the police statements by these people, there is nobody identifying me in photographs as being the driver in the car by the co-accused, none of them whatsoever, and there was something like four or five them.  Now, also, two of the co-accused, who at first hand implicated themselves under oath, stated that they did not even know me at the time and I was not the person referred to by anybody else as the allegations go by the Crown.  So they gave evidence under oath.  Their evidence was they were at the armed robbery, there was two of them at the armed robbery and so far in the whole trial there is only two people and they are trying to make me the third person and there is no third person, and their evidence is that I was not involved whatsoever.  Now, that is their evidence under oath and there is nothing to contradict that.

If we go to the judge’s summing up in his – the jury come back with some questions and they asked – this is very uncanny of a jury foreman to make these comments, but they asked about whether these two people - on page 65 of the main book - they asked them if they had implicated me in this particular armed robbery and identified me and so forth.  Well, that is completely wrong because there has been no identification photograph of me whatsoever.

CALLINAN J:   What page is that, Mr Tange?

MR TANGE:   That was 65, your Honour, main book.

GUMMOW J:   Page 65.  Line?

MR TANGE:   Yes, 65, main book.  It is on 15.  It is where the Crown claims that I verbally confessed to owning the gun at this ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   It really starts on 64, does it not, line 36:

(At 12.05 p.m. the jury returned with two questions.)

MR TANGE:   That is right, your Honour, yes.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, it follows on from that.

MR TANGE:   Right.  Then they go over to ask the questions.  The Crown claims that I verbally confessed to police that the weapon that I was supposed to have had, to produce to police to resist arrest, was part of the armed robbery scene.  This is where the jury is asking them about Chester and Hateley, whether they got in the witness box and changed their evidence under oath.  Well, these two co-accused never changed their evidence under oath at all.  Their evidence was straightforward, they were to the point, and they did that in the first instance in the Magistrates Court.  So there is no indication of changing evidence whatsoever. 

Then there was a witness at the actual robbery itself and these particular people go to the ID.  Now, one witness said here, he was somewhere between 15 and – see, here is something I will just read out that was in the jury foreman’s mind at the time ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Page?

MR TANGE:   Page 67, your Honour, and it is down at number 50, main book.  This is in the jury foreman’s mind at the time and that is why I am saying, like, the Crown had access to picking all the jury and this is where it comes into it.  This is the foreman of the jury.  The question was asked about guilt.  This is what the foreman has asked him:

FOREMAN:  Not from Mr. Bown’s evidence , but I have one other question, though –

this is the question –

In the confessions that the accused was alleged to have stated, was anything said by him or alleged to have been said by him relative to him using the gun at the incident at Berrima?  I know he implicated himself –

right, so how did the foreman of the jury know I have implicated myself, unless he is taking notice of the verbal unsigned record of interviews and stated by police, that “I know he has implicated himself”?  What sort of state of mind is that jury man in to make a statement like that to the court and the rest of the jury?  Then he goes on to say:

is alleged to have implicated himself in the robbery by saying he was only the driver and things like that.  We would like, specifically, if any reference was made to the incident at Berrima in any of those confessions?

So, here again – it is very hard to read because of the poor transcript, your Honour – the jury foreman is quoting here, the last paragraph “in any of those confessions”, so was the jury foreman indicating to the court and the rest of the jury that “in those confessions”?  Well, it is only an alleged confession, right, and I had strongly denied there was any confessions at all, right, and if we took back some of the laws in Domican’s Case and a few other cases, and go back to verbal ten years, this would be thrown out of court, because “in those confessions”.  Well, the jury is making a state of mind.  I say the jury foreman at the time was leading the rest of the jury in the court into believing that all these confessions and all these events were true.  That is where it goes back to the Crown being able to pick members of the jury at its own discretion.

GUMMOW J:   Now, you can see the red light has gone on?

MR TANGE:   Yes, sure.

GUMMOW J:   Now, tell me this, Mr Tange, these events happened in 1982?

MR TANGE:   In 1981 the event and the trial was 1982.

GUMMOW J:   The trial, yes, now, that is a long while ago.  What do you say should happen now?

MR TANGE:   Well, I think - it is a point where I think the Crown has indicated in one of their responses that they do not want another trial and they do not want anything; but the fact is that it is a catch-22, if ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   But, Mr Tange, did you not also make an application to this Court and then it was withdrawn by consent?

MR TANGE:   I did not make consent to do that, your Honour.  I was given a proposition back in 1985.  I was still in gaol and I was doing all these little bits and pieces trying to get this done in gaol, and because in gaol you have no rights, your cells can be raided, I lost documents, I lost everything, I would move sometimes overnight ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   But there was an application in 1985 ‑ ‑ ‑

MR TANGE:   Yes.

CALLINAN J:    ‑ ‑ ‑ and you did have solicitors then, I think?

MR TANGE:   No, I still did it by myself and I ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   You still did it by yourself?

MR TANGE:    ‑ ‑ ‑ I did have a solicitor who ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   You had Mr Sankey at one stage, did you not?

MR TANGE:   Yes, Danny Sankey.  I did have him on side to look at the case for me and to see what he could do, but I did not have any money and I could not go any further, and the Crown wrote to me and told me that if I withdrew the appeal to the High Court, that was in 1985, that they would have an inquiry, section 475, and I had all the documents and I filled them out, and I said “No, there is something wrong here because I want something in writing”, so I wrote back to the Crown and asked them to take it before a court that that was their intentions.  If I did withdraw the appeal, is the 475 actually going to take place?  I think within a couple of days there, I was moved from cells and transferred.  So, I do not know what happened to it after that, and I did not even know, and I think it was in months or days after that I was released from gaol after doing my six years.  So I did not even know the outcome of this case until I made a further application to try and do something about this time, I was not even aware that it was dismissed in 1985, I did not even have a clue.

GUMMOW J:   All right.  Yes, thank you, Mr Tange.

MR TANGE:   Thank you.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, Mr Ellis.

MR ELLIS:   Thank you, your Honour.  Your Honours, in relation to the question of time, the Crown does not consent to an extension of time and, in fact, there are a number of grounds the Crown would suggest which strongly militate against this Court extending the time.  The fact is that an application has previously been lodged, was in fact dealt with by the Full Court, there is a document on file which was a consent dismissal document signed by the then solicitor for the current applicant and, indeed, even if there is an explanation given in relation to that, there is still no explanation given as to why since 1985 until this application which was filed, I think, in December of last year, there is no explanation for that 14 year gap.

GUMMOW J:   There is to some extent, but it is, nevertheless, an extremely long period.  What do you say about the substantive matters?

MR ELLIS:   Your Honours, briefly, I would say, firstly, in relation to the jury issue, the situation was that the Crown had access to no further information at the time of this trial than the accused, that is the Crown in terms of the prosecution.  The prosecutor had the name of the proposed juror at the same time, that is, when the name was called.  The Crown in this State has never been, certainly at that time, in any event – I should not say never, it may have been earlier – but certainly as at 1982, the Crown was not in receipt, as it is in some other States, of details in terms of names and employment.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, we had a case about that.

CALLINAN J:   And we said something about that from Victoria.

MR ELLIS:   Yes, I think that is so.  But New South Wales has not had that system and, in fact, the system in place now, it is just a number that is called.  No one gets any further detail than that.  I rely upon my submissions in paragraph 3.2 in relation to the rest of that point and the finding of the Court of Criminal Appeal on this point was that the course which was followed was regular and proper.  The Crown would say no special leave point arises from that.

In terms of the indictment issue, it was not a question of whether an unlicensed pistol was used, but whether a pistol was used.  One was certainly a lesser offence in terms of penalty.  Some of the things that my friend has said about the Attorney‑General’s right to nolle prosequi are not

quite accurate at law; but, in any event, the Crown at that time had the appropriate power to determine what charge would be proceeded upon and what charges would not be followed, and the issue for the jury, as I have set out in my written submissions, was simply a question of whether a pistol was used, not whether it or the current applicant was licensed.  The ground was dealt with by the Court of Criminal Appeal, at application book 86 and the court there said that the Crown has the discretion that the court cannot intervene and that there was no miscarriage or unfairness.  Again, the Crown would say that there is no special leave point which arises from the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision.

On the issues of the identification, I rely upon, again, the written submissions.  The fact was that the identification evidence, as it was, was really but another piece of circumstantial evidence which was to be added to the circumstantial material which came from the witnesses, Carter and Singleton, in terms of their knowledge of the applicant’s involvement being at their house and after the actual robbery, and their various observations as to money and weapons.  The case was made up essentially of that material ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   We do not need to hear you any further, Mr Ellis.

MR ELLIS:   Thank you, your Honours.

GUMMOW J:   Yes, Mr Tange, anything in reply to that?

MR TANGE:   Yes, your Honour.  It is a little bit ludicrous that the Crown says going back in those times they did not have access to people’s names, addresses and their occupations.  That is what the Crown is for and in the Jury Act it states that the Crown must investigate people to see if they have good character or bad character before they sit on the jury.  So, how could the Crown say in 1980 that all they knew was that was Fanny Jenny?  How could they possibly say that when they got all those details, and they must be failing their obligation to check a jury list, if that is the case.  This QC here might not be the person who knows all the details, but the people behind him and behind him behind him knows them, and that is what I am saying, you just cannot say, “I am calling Joe Blow, and that is it”.  They know exactly who that person is, they know where he lives, they know their telephone number - the electoral roll.  They know everything about that person, and it makes me suspicious that at the time that foreman of the jury was making all these funny comments about my guilt, where he quotes at “in any of those confessions” or “I know he implicated himself”.  Why would a foreman of a jury say “I know he implicated himself”?  To me, that means that there is some sort of verbal evidence there that suggests that maybe the Crown had access to more than what we want.

As far as I could see, there is this, that we basically put it down to a point of law.  The fact is that either the whole case has to be retried again and the unlicensed pistol has to be put into that case or, if they want to hold one charge about the unlicensed pistol, then they have to proceed on that one, and if they proceed on that one and lose, then they would have to proceed on the armed robbery charge and use of offensive again.  So ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   Mr Tange, when were you released from prison?

MR TANGE:   In 1986, I think it was.  Six years I did, Goulburn Gaol.

CALLINAN J:   It would be in 1988, then I should think?

MR TANGE:   I beg your pardon?

CALLINAN J:   It would 1988, then, would it?

MR TANGE:   No, 1981, I was arrested, 1982 was the trial and 1986.

MR ELLIS:   The non-parole expired on 9 April 1987.

MR TANGE:   Oh 1987, yes, 87 sorry, a couple of years out.

CALLINAN J:   You were sentenced to five and six years cumulative, is that right?

MR TANGE:   Yes, there was 11 years all up on top, and six on the bottom.  I did it all at Goulburn Gaol.  That is where I tried to put some of the appeal together to far as what I have ‑ ‑ ‑

CALLINAN J:   But you have been out of prison now for 13 years?

MR TANGE:   Yes.  The reason why it has been so long is that – I have tried to let it go and just get on with my life and step around it and just put it back as a bad misery, you know, but I can handle it myself, but there is the people, my friends and family around me who suffer, you know.  I get on with life, my brain is strong enough and willing enough to get on with life, but the people around me have suffered and they are still suffering today because of what happened then.  That was injustice then, and those people cannot forget it, my family cannot forget it.  I can.  I can put it aside.  Because of what my family went through, I brought this up to stop any more of this happening, because I have never been convicted of a firearm offence in my life.  The only charge that I have never been able to contest is the no bill from the Attorney‑General, and they used that charge to put the other three charges on me to get me convicted, but the original charge they started off with is in a limbo situation – well, not limbo, it is a no bill.  I am

just trying to get on with my life, but, you know, it is getting a little bit too difficult to put this behind me because every time everyone reads my record or anything about me, all they can see is all these guns, and I have never been convicted of a gun, unlicensed or licensed gun, in my life.  So, you know, I have got to try and put it behind me and I cannot put it behind me because they will not let me put it behind me.

GUMMOW J:   Thank you, Mr Tange.

The applicant was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales in Sydney of armed robbery and of malicious threat to use an offensive weapon with intent to prevent his own lawful apprehension.

On 4 May 1982, he was sentenced to cumulative terms of imprisonment in respect of these offences.  He eventually regained his liberty in 1987.  An appeal in the meantime to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales was dismissed on 10 December 1982.  The applicant applied for special leave to appeal to this Court on 15 August 1983.  Sometime thereafter, on 13 March 1985, an order was made by this Court dismissing that application.  The order, apparently, was made by consent, though the applicant now disputes that this truly was so.

In any event, some 15 years later the applicant again seeks special leave to appeal.  He does so by an application filed 3 December 1999.  The application is one in respect of which leave would have to be given in respect of its late filing.  In particular, there would have to be an extension of time.

Very special circumstances, indeed, would need to be shown before the Court would entertain an application made so long out of time, and approximately 15 years after the dismissal of an earlier application.  Notwithstanding all that has been put to us by Mr Tange, we of the view that there are no sufficiently special circumstances existing here.

Furthermore, the Court is satisfied that, in any event, the application, on its merits, would not warrant a grant of special leave because there would be insufficient prospects of success on an appeal consequent upon such a grant.

Accordingly, the application for extension of time is refused.  It follows from that, that the matter is dismissed.

AT 2.50 PM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED