Tang, K.T. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs

[1986] FCA 275

IfJ THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTFALIA	)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	) 110. G292 of 1985
GENERAL DIVISION

OU APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BFITWEEN:

KHOI TRI TANG (a lso known as

CHIT TZO TSENG) and CANDICE

HUI NHI CH0

Appellants

IW&N :

Respondent

CORAM	Evatt,'Davles, Pincus JJ.
DATED	4 July 1986

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MINUTE OF ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be allowed.

2 . In lieu of the order of Sheppard J of 20 December 1985 there

be substltuted an order that the decisions under review be j e t aslde and that the matter be remltted to the Respondent

for reconslderatlon In accordance with the law.

-+ps= CATCHWORDS

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - application for

review of denial of permanent resident status and

consequent deportation order - applicant married to an Australian citizen - temporary entry permit expired -

expectation that applicant return to Taiwan before I

4 favourable consideration of application for permanent

entry permit - failure to consider merits of case -

policy inconsistent with - legislative intent -

inconsistent with policy statement of Minister

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977

(Cth) - s.5

Misration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.6, 6A, 7, 13, 18

Australian Citizenship Act	1948 (Cth)
Commonwealth Electoral Act	1918 (Cth)

Public Service Reform Act 1984 (Cth)

E v Pbrt of London Authoritv. Ex parte Kvnoch Limited

C19193 1 RB 176

Schmidt v Secretary- of State, Home Affairs	t19693 2 Ch
149

British Oxvsen Company- v Board of Trade C19713 AC 610

Saqnata Limited v Norwich Corporation E19713 2 QB 614

Re Drake and Minister for Immisration and Ethnic Affairs

(No.2) (1979) 2 ALD 634

Leqal Sejrvices Commission v Stephens (1981) 2 NSWLR 697

Kohn Ahsoo v Tuchin (unreported, 30 April 1986)

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BETWEN : KHOI TRI TANG i

(also known as CH1 TZO TSENG) I .

and CANDICE HUI NHI CH0 I

Appellants

t

AND THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHEX JOHN HURFORD.

MINISTER OF STATE FOR IMMIGRATION	AND
EI'HNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

No. V G . 2 9 2 of 1985

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CORAM	Evatt,	Davies,	Pincus	JJ	.	.- -.	7,	. P;
4 July 1986

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d.	The respondent pap the appellants' costs of the appeal and of	i
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the proceedings below.
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NOTE :

Settlement and entry of orders 1s dealt w i t h in Order 36

of the Federal Court Rules.

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IIJ THE FEDERqL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
VICTORIA DISTPZIC,T REGISTRY	) No. G292 of 1985
GENERAL DIVISIQN

ON APPEAL F R O M A SINGLE JUDGE C)F THE FEDFFAL COURT OF -4USTRALIA

KHOI TRI TANG (also known as j

CH1 TZO TSENG) and CANDICE HUI

NHI CH0 !

Appellants

-m:

THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHER i

JOHN HURFORD, MINISTFP OF l

STATE FOR IMMIGRATION AND I

AFFAIRS	ETHNIC	i
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Respondent

CORW:	Evatt. Danes, Pincus JJ.
DATED:	4 July 1986

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REASONS FOR JUM;MENT	I
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EVATT J: I agres that the appeal should be allowed with costs

for the reasons qlven by Davies J. and agree wlth the proposed

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orders set out therein.

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I certify that this page is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herem of his

Honour Mr Justice Evatt

Assoclate

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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF A U S m I A ) !

)

I	VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	)	No. VG.292 of 1985
1
GENERAL DIVISION	)

ON AF'PEAL F R O M A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

!

BETWEEN	:	KHOI TRI TANG (also known
as CH1 TZO TSENG)
--id CANDICE HUI NHI CH0

Appellants

AND

THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHER

JOHN HURFORD, MINISTER OF

STATE FOR IMMIGRATION AND

ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS €OR JUDGMENT

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CORAM	matt, Davies, Pincus JJ
4 July 1986

DAVIES J : This is an appeal from a decision of a single Judge

of this Court given on 20 December 1985 which dismissed an

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application brought by the appellants under s.5 of the

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The

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learned trial Judge described the application as follows :

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"This is an application pursuant to 5.5 of the

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act

1977 ("the Judicial Review Act") in which the

applicants seek the review of a number of

decisions which have led to a deportation order

being made against the first applicant, Mr. Tang.

Two of the decisions were made on 11 November

1985. By them the Minister, by one of his

delegates, determined that he would not grant to

Mr. Tang an entry permit pursuant to s.6A of the

Miqration Act 1958 ("the Act"), and, further, that

he would order the deportation of Mr. Tang

pursuant to 5.18 of the Act. The remaining

i decisions challenged were decisions made by the

Minister, again by	one of his delegates, to affirm
his decision made	on 11 November '1985 to refuse

the grant of a permit pursuant to s.6A of the Act

and to affirm his decision to order the

deportation of Mr. Tang. "

The relevant facts which led to the decisions under review

were set out by his Honour thus :

' I - . . The February 1957. He entered Australia as a applicant was born in Vietnam on 23

visitor

on 30 March 1983 and was issued with a temporary

entry permit subject to a condition, 'employment

prohibited without authorized officer'. The permit was valid written permission of an

for two

weeks from the date of his arrival. On 4 April

1983 Mr. Tang was granted a further temporary

entry permit until 27 May 1983 for the purpose of

tourism. No further entry permit was issued to

him. Mr. Tang did not leave Australia, and he

became, after 27 May 1983, a prohibited

non-citizen. He has had this status for the last

2 1/2 years. Officers of the Department of

Immigration discovered Mr. Tang on 25 October 1985

at his place of employment in Melbourne. He was

arrested pursuant to the provisions of 5-38 of the

Act and held at the Immigration Detention Centre,

Maribyrnong, Victoria.	He has been	in custody
ever since.

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On 24 September 1985 Mr. Tang married the second

applicant, Mrs. Tang. It is accepted by the

Minister that the marriage was genuine, not one of

convenience and not entered into for the purpose

of avoiding Mr. Tang's deportation.

Mr. Tang's mother and father live in Melbourne.

They left Vietnam for Australia in 1979 and landed I

at Derby, Western Australia, on 12 April of that

year. They came to Melbourne in May 1979 and have

remained there ever since. They arrived with two

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younger children, now 15 and 13 years old

respectively. On 16 February 1982, the father,

mother and the two younger children became

naturalized Australian citizens.

Mr. Tang has an older brother who is also believed

to be in Australia. He is said to be living in

Sydney but his whereabouts are unknown. There is

suspicion a that he may be prohibited a

non-citizen.

On 25 April 1984 Mrs. Tang senior suffered a

stroke. She has continued to be disabled and to

suffer from ill health since that time. Mrs. Tang

is partially paralyzed and is dependent on others

to look after her.

Mr. Tang senior also suffers from ill health. He

has diabetes and has recently developed a

calcified lymph node on his neck which requires

treatment. He has been told that it may be

cancerous and should be investigated by an

operation. I'

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The second-named appellant is an Australian citizen whose

parents and brothers and sisters also reside in Australia.

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Accordingly, the first-named appellant, Mr K.T. Tang, is married

to an Australian citizen who, and whose family, lives in this

country. His own parents and two of his siblings live in

Australia and are Australian citizens. Another brother may also

live in Australia but, if so, is probably a prohibited

non-citizen. I -

Mr K.T. Owen, a delegate of the respondent, made decisions

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on 11 November 1985, refusing to grant resident status to Mr K.T.

Tang pursuant to the provisions of s s . 6 and 6A of the Misration , .

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&& 1958 (Cth) and ordering his deportation pursuant to s.18 of

the Misration Act 1958 (Cth). On 19 November 1985, Mr Owen

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supplied the following reasons for his decisions :

"13. On the basis of his marriage to an Australian

I citizen the applicant was eligible for

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consideration for the grant of a resident status

under the provisions of Section 6A(l)(b) of the

Act.

14. An opinion was sought from Resident Status Sub-section, who advised that the Migration Act

and migration policy provide eligibility for

consideration of the grant of permanent resident

status for foreign nationals who have married an

Australian resident but that eligibility to apply

does not residence. In taking into account the interests of the Australian spouse and the resident family the opinion was given that the history of the carry an automatic entitlement to

! applicant's dealings with the Department and

events leading to his status support refusal of

his application.

15. In forming the opinion on the application for

resident status the Resident Status section

considered the case in light of the current policy

announced by the Minister in October 1985. It was

accepted that the applicant had married an

Australian citizen on 24 September 1985 and noted

that a defacto relationship had existed for

approximately six months prior to the marriage. application for change of status to permanent

resident for over 2 years, despite being fully

aware of his prohibited non citizen status. In

relation to his parents health problems it was

felt that the presence of an older married brother

in Australia would provide the necessary support.

It was recommended that the application be refused

and the a-pplicant be required to leave Australia

and be sponsored for migrant entry through normal

family migration channels.

16. In considering his claims the following

factors were taken into account :

the applicant's marriage to an Australian

citizen on 24 September 1985 was not

contested but it was entered into when the applicant was illegally in Australia and it L '

was not followed by an application for

change of status until 31 October 1985 after

the applicant's apprehension as a prohibited

non-citizen at his place of employment on 25

October 1985.

applicant the prohibited became a

non-citizen on the expiry of his temporary

entry permit on 27 May 1983 and has breached I

the conditions of his entry by remaining in

Australia and engaging in employment without

permission.	L
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the illness of his parents has occurred

since the applicant’s arrival in Australia

but after the expiration of his temporary

entry permit. I considered that it was not I

a mitigating circumstance in respect of the

applicant’s prohibited non-citizen status

over two years. I further considered that

the presence of other immediate family

members legally in Australia would provide the support necessary for his mother.

while deportation of the applicant will

temporarily disrupt his relationship with

his wife and his family it is possible for

him to be sponsored as spouse. a I

considered that a temporary separation and

the costs arising from return home-to apply

for migration in the normal manner were not

mitigating circumstances to be accorded

significant weight.

17. After weighing these factors carefully in

light of the Ministers policy statement in

October, I decided to refuse the application for grant of permanent resident status.

18. In addition, I formed the opinion that it is

in the public interest to ensure that persons

abide by normal migration selection processes and

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do not queue-jump by entering or remaining

illegally in Australia to the prejudice of

prospective migrants who abide by the procedures.

The presence of such queue-jumpers is inimical to

Government control of immigration programs as well

as impacting upon job availability for legal

residents. I considered that prohibited non-

citizens should expect to face the prospect of

deportation when located unless there are strong

countervailing reasons to allow them to remain. I

considered that the applicants reasons	for wishing
to	remain

in compelling to warrant departure from the policy on deportation of prohibited non-citizens, and I accordingly decided to deport the applicant from Australia are insufficiently

Australia. ‘l

Those decisions were subsequently affirmed by a delegate of the

Minister but there were no separate reasons given for the

affirmation and the matter proceeded before the learned trial review was to be determined by reference to the reasons given by

Mr Owen.

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Sections 6 ( 2 ) , (3) and ( 6 ) of the Misration Act 1958 (Cth)

provide :

" 6 . ( 2 ) An officer may, in accordance with this

section and at the request or with the consent of

a non-citizen, grant to the non-citizen an entry

i permit.

( 3 ) An entry permit shall be in a form approved

by the Minister and shall be expressed to permit

.	Australia or to remain in Australia or both.
the person to whom it is granted to enter

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! (6) An entry permit that is intended to operate

as a temporary entry *errnit shall be expressed to

authorize the person to whom it relates to remain

in Australia for a specified period only, and such

a permit may be granted subject to conditions."

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Section 7(3) provides :

" 7 . ( 3 ) Upon the expiration or cancellation of a

temporary entry permit, the person who was the

holder of the permit becomes a prohibited non- I

citizen unless a further entry permit applicable

to him comes into force upon that expiration or

cancellation."

Section 18 provides :

"18. The Minister may order the deportation of a

person who is a prohibited non-citizen under any

provision of this Act."

Mr K.T. Tang entered Australia pursuant to a temporary

entry permit. On the expiration of that temporary entry permit

he became a prohibited non-citizen. He was a prohibited

non-citizen when he was located by officers of the Department of

Immigration and Ethnic Affairs on 25 October 1985. Therefore,

the Minister was authorised to consider his deportation pursuant

to s.18.

Once he had been located, Mr Tang applied for a temporary

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entry permit and for permanent residence, that in to say, for an

entry permit not limited in time. The latter application brought

into operation the provisions of s.6A of the Misration Act 1958

(Cth) which read, inter alia,

"6A.(1) An entry permit shall not be granted to a

non-citizen after his entry into Australia unless !

more fulfilled in respect of of the following conditions is

one or

him, that is to say -

(a)	he has been granted, by instrument under the hand of a Minister, territorial asylum in Australia;
,o)	he is the spouse, child or aged parent of an
Australian citizen or of the holder of an

. entry permit;

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(c)	he is the holder of a temporary entry permit
which is in force and the Minister has
determined, by instrument in writing, that
he has the status of refugee within the
meamning of the Convention relating to the

Status of Refugees that was done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 or of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at

New York on 31 January 1967;

(d) he is the holder of a temporary entry permit

which is in force, is authorized to work in

Australia not and is a prescribed

non-citizen; or

(e) he

which is in force and there are strong

compassionate or humanitarian grounds for

is the holder of a temporary entry permit

the grant of an entry permit to him.

.....

(8) In this section, a reference to an entry

permit shall be read as a reference to an entry permit other than a temporary entry permit."

Much of the evidence placed before the learned trial Judge

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4 and many of the submissions put to him concentrated attention

4 upon the ill-health of the parents of Mr Tang, particularly that

I of his mother, and of circumstances pertaining to Mr Tang and his

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parents and siblings who are in Australia. In a lengthy and

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careful judqme$t, the learned trial Judge dealt with all these

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matters and fo4nd no error in the decision-making process or in

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the reasons f 02' decision.

I agree with the learned trial Judge that reliance by the

appellants upon-. what were said to be "strong compassionate or

humanitarian grounds" within the meaning of paragraph 6A(l)(e)

was misplaced and this for two reasons. In the first place, that

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ground does not come into operation unless the applicant for the

permit is the holder of a valid temporary entry permit, which MY

Tang was not.. It is not sufficient that an applicant can

demonstrate that there are strong compassionate or humanitarian

grounds for his being granted an entry permit unlimited in time.

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Parliament has added an additional criterion, namely, that the

applicant for the permit be the holder of a temporary entry

permit which is in force. Therefore, proof of strong

compassionate or humanitarian grounds is not of itself sufficient

for the application of paragraph (e).

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It is not necessary for me in this case to examine the

circumstances in which it may be proper for the Minister to grant

a temporary entry permit with a view to permitting consideration

of compassionate or humanitarian grounds. That matter may be

left for a case in which it is of importance. It is sufficient

for me to emphasise that proof of those grounds does not bring

paragraph (e) into operation or require the grant of a temporary

entry permit so	as to satisfy one of the criteria of paragraph
(e).

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The other reason why reliance upon paragraph	(e)	was	l
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misplaced was that Mr Tang satisfied the provisions of paragraph

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(b) by reason of being the spouse of an Australian citizen. Therefore, it was unnecessary for Mr Tang to establish strong

compassionate br humanitarian grounds. Having satisfied the

criteria of paragraph (b), he was. entitled to have his

application for permanent residence determined on its merits

whether or not such grounds existed.

Nevertheless, there is one aspect of the matter on which I

take a view dif€.erent from that taken by his Honour and, in this

respect, it is	my	opinion that the decision-makers fell into
error.

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The reasons given by Mr Owen, set out above, refer to a

policy that -

'I... persons abide by normal migration selection

processes and do not queue-jump by entering or

remaining illegally in Australia to the prejudice !

of prospective migrants who abide by the

procedures. "

Mr Owen said,

"I considered that prohibited non-citizens should

expect to face the prospect of deportation when

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? located strong countervailing unless are there

reasons to allow them to remain."

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3	The learned trial Judge took the view that there	was	nothing
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unlawful about such a policy and said :

I 'I... In the absence of any provision in the statute

to the contrary, it seems to me to be perfectly

proper for the Minister to take into account and,

if he deems it appropriate, to put to the

forefront of his decision, considerations such as

are mentioned in para.18 of the reasons of 19

November 1985. . . . " .

10.

The result of the application of this policy was that

the/

decision-makers anticipated that Mr Tang would return to Taiwan!

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and there make application for entry to Australia. Mr Owen:

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appears to have taken the view that, on such application being/[

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made, Mr Tang would be granted a permanent entry permit and,

indeed, that that would be granted to him with expedition. Mr

Owen said, in paragraph 16,

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"16. ... I considered that a temporary separation

and the costs arising from return home to apply

for migration in the	normal	manner	were	not
mitigating circumstances accorded be to significant weight."

In my opinion, such a result and, indeed, the policy or

practice that led to it, is inconsistent with the legislative

policy enunciated in s.6A of the Misration Act 1958 (Cth). The

various paragraphs in s.6A specifically distinguish between those

cases in which the application for the entry permit ought not to

be considered unless the applicant is the holder of a temporary

entry permit, and therefore legally in Australia, and those cases

in which the application for an entry permit ought to be

considered notwithstanding that the applicant is a prohibited

non-citizen. Paragraph (b) makes it plain that an entry permit

may be granted to a person who is the spouse of an Australian

citizen, notwithstanding that that person is not the holder of a

temporary entry permit. Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), on the

other hand, stipulate that the applicant for residency must hold

a temporary entry permit. By providing that an entry permit nay

be granted to a person who is the spouse of an Australian

citizen, notwithstanding that he is not the holder of a permanent

entry permit, ss.6 and 6A of the Miqration Act 1958 (Cth)

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necessarily imply that such a person may make application for	an
entry permit and that that application, once made, should be

considered on its merits.	I
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The policy or practice, which was applied in the present

case, of insisting that Mr Tang, the spouse of an Australian

citizen, should leave Australia, return to Taiwan and make his

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application from that country was, therefore, in my opinion,

inconsistent with the intent and operation of ss.6 and 6A of the

Miqration Act 1958 (Leh). Mr Tang satisfied the criteria for

making application for the grant for permanent residence and his

application ought to have been considered on its merits. It is

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plain from the reasons given by Mr Owen that it was not	SO
considered.

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The decisions were therefore in error and should be set

aside and the matter remitted for re-consideration.

I do not suggest that, in such re-consideration, Mr Tang's I

conduct in Australia will not be a relevant factor to take into

account. I agree with the observation of the learned trial Judge !

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that the fact Mr Tang is an illegal immigrant is of importance

and a matter which the Minister may properly take into account in

dealing with Mr Tang's application. In my opinion, however, s.6A

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intends that a person in Mr Tang's situation will be entitled to , _

make application for permanent residence and to have that

application considered on its merits notwithstanding that he is a

prohibited non-citizen. His conduct in Australia and his failure

to abide by Australia's migration laws are simply matters which

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I would add that, although this matter has not affected my

decision, the policy adumbrated by Mr Owen appears to me to be

1 inconsistent with the “Policy on Illegal Immigrants” tabled in the House of Representatives by the Minister for Immigration and

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Ethnic Affairs in October 1985. In that policy statement, there

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appears the following section under the heading “Marriage” :

“The Migration Act and migration policy provide i

eligibility concessions for foreign nationals who

have married an Australian citizen or permanent

resident or who have an Australian citizen child.

But e-ligibility to applv for residence does not

carry an automatic entitlement to residence. In

such circumstances, the interests of the resident

fami.ly or child are taken into account and are

weighed, alons with other factors, in the eventual

decision.

Marriage to an Australian or the existence of an

Australian citizen child do not confer upon I

illegal immigrants the right to choose their

country of residence.	Each case will be treated
on its own merits.

Similar considerations apply in respect of defacto

relationships. “

That section states expressly that, where there is a marriage to

an Australian citizen or permanent resident, the case will be

treated on its own merits.

It was submitted by Mr Santamaria that the section must be

read with the remainder of the policy statement and therefore is

subject to the general provisions earlier stated :

“People who wish to remain in Australia should do

so through the normal migration procedures and

selection process overseas.

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People who are in Australia illegally, whether

they entered without authorlty or they overstayed r

13.

their entry permits, will not readily be given

permanent residence while they remain in

Australia. ‘I

I do not read the policy statement as incorporating these

provisions into the consideration of the position of a person who

is married to an Australian citizen or permanent resident.

Indeed, to the contrary, the section appearing under the heading

“Marriage“ refers to the fact that the Act and the policy provide

for such a person’s concessional eligibility to apply for

residence.

It therefore appears to me that the policy applied by the

decision-makers in this case was not the policy enunciated by the

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and tabled in the

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House in October 1985. If I were wrong in this view, however,

and if the policy as tabled should be read as placing persons

married to Australian citizens or permanent residents in the same

position as all others, then that policy would be inconsistent

with the provisions of ss.6 and 6A which, as I have said, require

a distinction to be drawn.

For these reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs and

I would substitute in lieu of the order made by the learned trial

Judge an order that the decisions under review be set aside and

that the matter be remitted to the respondent for re-

consideration in accordance with law and an order that the respondent pay the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings below. I certify that this and the 12

preceding pages ore a true copy of the

reasons for ludgment herein of The Honour-

able Mr. Justice 5, 0 . k v i e s

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IN THE TDEFAL COTrPT OF kW?TF?FLIk )

17G 292 of 1985

! VICTOPIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY 1

G E I W A L DIVISION ) t

ON APPEAL F R O M THE

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HONOURABLE MR.

JrJSTICE SHEPPARD OF

THE FEDERAL COURT OF

ATJS'I'RALIA

BETKEEN:	KHOI TRI TANG (Also known as CH1	TZO TSENG)
and CANDICE MJI W 1 CH0

Appellants

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AND: THE HONOTJRABLE CMISTOPHER JOHN WRFORD,

MINISTER OF STATE FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC !

- AFFAIRS

Respondent

FEASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an appeal from a decision of a single judge of

this Court In which an application under s .5 of the

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, (A.D.J.R. A c t ) to review certain decisions was dismissed. The subjects of

the application were decisions made by the Minister. through his i

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deleqate: firstly, that th& first-named applicant not be qranted

an entry permit under s.6A of the Micrration Act 1958: secondly, L

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that a deportation order be issued auainst him under 5.18 of the

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Act: and a subsequent affirmation of these decisions.

There are two appellants: Mr. Tang who is the subject

of the deportation order. and his wife. I will, for the sake of

convenience. refer	to	the first-named appellant as simply "the
appellant".

The appellant was born in Vietnam in 1957. and was

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forced to flee to Taiwan in 1975. His parents remained in

Ilietnam. In 1979, the parents and a younger brother and sister

left Vietnam and became "boatpeople" and arrived in Australia as

refuqees. They were permitted to reside in Australia and became

Australian citizens on the 16 February 1982. Another brother and sister of the appellant remained in Taiwan.

The appellant entered Australia on 30 March 1983 as the

holder of a visitor's visa and was granted a temporary entry

permit which was valid €or two weeks and was subject to the

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condition "employment prohibited without written permission of an

authorised officer". On 4 April 1983. the appellant was granted	t
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a further temporary entry permlt until the 27 May 1983. Since	!

the expiration of this permit, the appellant	has not obtained any
further permit.

After he came to Australia, the appellant made contact

with his parents and younqer brother and sister. who now reside

in Melbourne. Durinu 1983, his mother was hospitalised €or heart

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disease and in 1984 she suffered a stroke as a result of which

she remains partially paralysed; she is described as being

dependent on others to look after her. The father suffers from

diabetes and is also	being treated for a large growth below his	i
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right jaw which is suspected of being cancerous. The applicant's

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younger siblinqs, who were born in 1970 and 1972 respectively, are both school children and reside with the parents. There is

also an older brother who is believed to live in Sydney, but with

whom the faFi1.y are not in contact.

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The appellant was married to his wife, Candice, on the

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24 September '1985 after some months' cohabitation. They had been

close friends in Vietnam, and Candice left Vietnam in 1978 as a

boatperson. She came to Australia in 1980 and became an

Australian citizen on 4 Map 1984.

The sequence of events leading to the decisions

challenged is as follows. On the 18 October 1985. a policy

(discussed below) concerninq illegal immigrants was tabled in

I	Parliament. The appellant was arrested as a prohibited
c	non-citizen on the 25 October 1985 at the "Shark Fin Inn". where
he had been working part-time for six months, and was then held
in custody. On the 31 October 1985 an application was made for
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resident status to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs. On 8 November. there was a recommendation by an officer
of the department against the grant of an entry permit to the
appellant and in favour of his deportation. On 11 November.

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these recommendations were adopted, an entry permit was refused

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and a deportation order signed by a delegate of the Minister. On

that same day, a stay of the deportation order was granted in

this Court. On 19 November, a statement of reasons was provided

to the appellant in response to a request made under s.13 of the

A.D.J.R. Act. Also on that day, the application under the

l

same Act was made to this Court. On the 22 November, there was a

directions hearing in which observations were made concerning the

state of the material: it appears that these observations led to

a reconsideration of the delegate's decision. On 25 November,

.' I , S .

the appellant was interviewed by a departmental officer while in

i

! custody. On -the same day, there was a telephone conversation

between an officer of the department and the appellants'

solicitor in which the solicitor was informed that the interview

had taken place and was asked whether any further submissions

would be made. The solicitor said that there would probably be

no further submissions until the hearing. The matter was then

reconsidered by the department, and on 27 November. the original

decisions were confirmed. Northrop J. granted a further stay on

28 November 1985 and the substantive hearins took place on 11 and

12 December before Sheppard S. Judgment was handed down on 20

December 1985 and in his reasons. Sheppard J. extended the stay

to 10 January 1986; the department has since agreed that the

appellant will not be deported pending this appeal.

The appellant based his application for an entry permit

on two qrounds: firstly, that he was married to an Australian

I

i

S.

!

!

citizen. and secondly, the medical condition of his parents and I .

his concern for the welfare of his younger brother and sister. :

I

The Miaration Act,, s.6(2), provides for the issue of an

entry permit to a non-citizen and under s.6(5). such a permit may

be granted to a non-citizen “subject t o s.6A after he has entered

Australia . . . “ . i

Section 6A(1), so far as is relevant. provides:

“An entry permit shall not be granted to a

non-citizen after his entry into Australia unless

one. or more of the following conditions is

fulfilled in respect of him, that is to say -

(a)	he has been granted, by instrument Gnder the
hand of a Minister. territorial asylum in

Australia:

(b) he is the spouse, child or aged parent of an

Australian citizen or of the holder of an entry permit;

...

( e ) he is the holder of A temporary entry permit

which is in force and there are strong

compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the

grant of an entry permit to him.

It is immediately clear that par.(e) cannot assist the

appellant since he was not. at the relevant time, a holder of a

i

I temporary entry permit: as mentioned above, he has not held such

a permit since 27 May 1983. The only immediately relevant

I

provision of s.6A(1), then, is par.(b). Since Candice became an

Australian citizen and married the appellant before the question

!

l .

6 .

, .

o€ granting an entry permit to the appellant most recently arose,

par.[b) operates to exclude the appellant from the prohibition i

l

imposed by s.6A(1). It should be noted that the appellant does

not fall within (b) on the ground of being the child of an Australian citizen: that is so because "child" is so defined in

s.6A(4) as to exclude the appellant.' However. that exclusion

does not appear to be of any relevance. It was enouqh that the I ,

appellant qualify for grant of an entry permit under par.(b), as

he did: there was no need for him to qualify twice. Further,

the special definition of "child" for the purposes of s.6A does

not have the effect that the appellant is deemed not to have been

a child for any purpose of the Act; in particular, his being a

child of Australian citizens was relevant to the exercise of the

discretion whether or not to urant him an entry permit.

The appellant's case relates, firstly, the to

implementation of policy in the making of the decisions:

i questions are raised as to lawfulness and the way in which policy

was applied. The second claim is that there was a denial of

natural justice.

I The application of two policies was debated, but I find ,

it necessary to deal only with one, namely a ministerial policy

on illegal immigrants which was tabled in Parliament on 18

October 1985. one week before the arrest of the appellant. The

following paragraphs appear in the introduction and form what is

known as the "queue-jumping policy" : I .

7.

"FQr many years the competition for migration to

Australia has been ~ e r v stronu. Most people are

prepared to wait overseas and go through the normal selection processes including health and character checks. Unfortunately some people are not prepared

to do this. They are not entitled to abuse

Australia's immiuration policy and laws at the

expense of those waitinu overseas or at the expense

of unemployed Australian residents.

It is not open to people from-anywhere in the world

to decide, of their own volition, that they will

live permanently in Australia. If, in attempting i

to do so, they break Australia's laws, they must

expect to face the consequences. including

prosecution	and	removal	from	Australia,	by	t
!

deportation if necessary.

...

j

'Overstayed visitors', whatever their reasons. are

unlawfully in Australia. Their status of illegal

immigrants or 'prohibited non-citizens' is of their

own making and it must be recognised as such.

It is an accepted principle of justice and fairness

that people should not derive benefit from an

illegal act immigration is no exception. Illeual immigrants	they	have	committed.	Illegal	'
i
f

simply by having succeeded in entering or remaining

in Australia do not earn a riuht to special

privilege under migration policy, nor does their

act of being in Australia illegally earn them

special rights of review which are not available to

those who abide	by the rules and wait overseas."	I '
i

The policy goes on to consider applications that are made to

remain in Australia and Bays:

"The Miqration Act severely limits the circumstances

r under which people illegally in Australia can

change their immigration status to permanent

resident. These limited provisions are not an

invitation for people to enter Australia as

visitors. then seek permanent residence when they

should have applied and qualified overseas for

entry as migrants In the usual way.

If a person illeually in Australia makes an

application to remain in Australia, it will be

accepted	and processed	specifically	the	on	i
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8.

I t

understanding th+ the policies outlined in this i '

paper wlll be apqlied ...

If detention is 'iustified, the applicant will not r

be released simplk because an application has been

Australia. considerations rezating to custody are to apply. People who are in Australia illegally, whether they The normal

made to remain1 in

entered without authority or they overstayed their

entry permits, will not readily be given permanent

residence while they remain in Australia. -

Their breaches of immigration law and requirements

will weigh heavily against them ..."

The policy then lists circumstances which will weigh heavily

against the applicant if they exist. These include "that the

applicant entered Australia unlawfully: the applicant. although entering Australia lawfully, violated conditions of entry, such

as working without permission: the period of illegal residence by

I -

the applicant." The policy continues: I

"Changed circumstances advanced in support of an

application to remain (e.g. development of ties in expiry of an entry permit, normally will be aiven little weight.

l

A temporary separation and the costs arising from return home to apply for migration in the normal manner will not normally be reuarded as mitigating circumstances accorded significant weight.

In the case of applications to remain made after

apprehension, it will be rare indeed that illegal

immigrants will be granted permission to remain in

Australia. "

rJnder the heading "Marriage", the policy states:

. 9.

"The Micrration Act and migration policy provide

eligibility concessions for foreign nationals who

have married an Australian citizen or permanent

resident or who have an Australian citizen child.

But eliuibility to awl? for residence does not

carry an automatic entitlement to residence. In

such circumstances. the interests of the resident family or child are taken into account and are weighed, along with other factors, in the eventual

decision.

Marriaqe to an Australian or the existence of an

Australian citizen child do not confer upon illegal

immigrants the right to choose their country of

residence.	Each	case will be treated on its	own
merits.

iThe words underlined are so emphasised in the statement.)

It is clear from the statement of reasons referred to

t

above that the deleqate gave the policy considerable weight. In

paragraph 15 of the reasons given on the 19 November 1985. it	was
said:

"In forminq the opinion on the application for

resiQent status the resident status section

consi'dered the case in light of the current policy

l	announced by the Minister in October 1985."
i

The factors that the reasons list as having been taken into

account are clearly referable to statements in the policy. These

include the applicant's marriaqe having been entered into when

the applicant was illegally in Australia: that an application	for
change of status was not submitted until the 31 October 1985.

? -

after the applicant's apprehension as a prohibited non-citizen on

the 25 October 1985: the fact that the illness of his parents

l

. 10.

occurred since the applicant's arrival in Australia but after the

expiration of his temporary entry permit: and, most importantly,

%he observation that a temporary separation and the costs arising

from return home to apply for migration in the normal manner were

not mitigating circumstances to be accorded significant weight.

Paragraph 17 states:

i

"After weighing these factors carefully in light of

the Minister's policy statement in October, I

decided to refuse the application for	grar.;	of
permanent resident status."

a The final parauraph says:

"In addition. I formed the opinion that it is in the

public interest to ensure that persons abide by

normal migration selection processes and do not

queue-jump by entering or remaining illegally in

Australia to the prejudice of prospective migrants who abide by the procedures. The presence of such queue-jumpers is inimical to Government control of

immigration programs as well as impacting upon job

availability for legal residents. I considered

that prohibited non-citizen5 should expect to face

i. the prospect of deportation when located unless there are strong countervailing reasons to allow

E

them to remain. I considered that the applicant's

reasons for wishing to remain in Australia are

insufficiently compelling to warrant departure from

policy the deportation on prohibited of

non-citizens, and I accordingly decided to deport

the applicant from Australia."

The appellants argue that the policy is unlawful, that

it led to an exercise of discretionary power at the direction or

behest of another person, that the policy was applied inflexibly

without a consideration of the merits of the case. and that it

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11.

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involved the taking into account of irrelevant considerations and

the exclusion of relevant considerations.

Mr. Dwyer Q.C. for the appellants argues that the policy

is unlawful because it is inconsistent with the Act and in

particular with s.6A(l)(b). He arques that this paragraph sets

aside marriaqe as a specific and therefore important ground under

which persons in Australia without temporary entry permits may be

qranted an entry permit and that. Ynerefore, it is inconsistent

to apply the queue-jumping policy to persons applying under this

sectlon. Mr. Dwyer concedes that this argument is pertinent only

I f the view 'is taken that the whole of the policy is to be

applied to cases under s.6A(l)(b). The other reading is that

only what appears in the policy under the heading "Marriage" is

to be applied to cases under s.6A(l)(b); if so, Mr. Dwyer

submits, the policy was applied wrongly because not only what

appears under that heading, but also the queue-jumping policy and

related aspects, were applied.

It is now well established that where a statutory

discretion exists, and where the statute itself does not specify

the way in which the discretion is to be exercised, the

decision-maker is entitled to formulate a policy in relation to

of Authoritv, Ex Partn Kvnoch Limited (1919) that discretion. - R v. Port of London

the exercise

1 K.B. 176; Schmidt V.

Secretary of State, Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch. 149; British

Oxvqen Company v. Board of Trade (1971) A . C . 610; Saqnata Limited

12.

v. Norwich Corporakion (1971) 2 Q.B. 614; Re Drake No. 2 2 A.L.D.

634: Leqal Services Commission v. Stephens (1981) 2 N.S.W.L.R.

i

697.

In Re Drake (above). Brennan J. set out the limits upon

the formulation and application of a policy:

'I...	a policy must be consistent with the statute. It must allow the Minister to take into account the
relevhlit circumstances. it must not require him to
take into account irrelevant circumstances. and it
must not serve a purpose foreign to the purpose for I
which the policy which contravenes these criteria would be discretionary power was created. A
inconsistent with the statute ... Also, it would i -
be inconsistent with ss.12 and 13 of the Miqration I

t	-	Act if the Minister's policy sought to preclude
consideration of relevant arguments running counter
to an adopted policy which might be reasonably
advanced in particular cases ... His discretion
cannot be so truncated by a policy as to preclude consideration of the merits of Specified classes of
cases. A fetter of that kind would be
objectionable. even though it were adopted by the
Minister on his own initiative ...
That is not to deny the lawfulness of adopting an
appropriate policy which guides but does not
control? the makinu of decisions, a policy which is informartive of the standards and values which the Minister usually applies. There is a distinction
between an unlawful policy which creates a fetter
z	purporting to limit the range of discretion
I	conferred by a statute and a lawful policy which
i	leaves
the quidinq the exercise of the power." range of discretion in tact while

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The distinction between guiding the making of decisions,	on the	I
i

one hand, and controlling them, on the other, is one of degree I .

and not of kind. The ultimate question is whether there has been

"an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule

, .

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13.   l

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or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case"

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( s . 5 ( 2 . ) ( f ) of the Judicial Review Act. I

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2	!

L	The	discretion in	question	here	conferred	is	by	s . 6	12)	r
:	I

" of the Miqration Act, under which a non-citizen may be granted an

I

entry permit. The Act gives no express indication as to how the

discretion is to be exercised: it does not specify considerations

to be taken into account nor say what will be strong reasons for

granting an entry permit. An important question raised is

whether the policy statement lawfully fills the qap.

Before saying more about that, however, it is necessary

to deal with the argument that only the paragraphs in the policy

with respect to marriage should be applied to applicants under

s.6A(l)(b), because these paragraphs appear under the separate

heading "Marriage". That contention has been accepted by my

brother Davies, whose reasons I have read, but I cannot, with

respect, concur. There is a paragraph on p.8 of the policy which

reads :

"The Miuration Act severely limits the circumstances

under which people illegally in Australia can

change their immigration status to permanent

resident.

It then uoes on to talk about "These limited provisions . . ."

Because it deals with people illegally in Australia. this

paragraph could only be referring to applicants under s.6A(l)(a)

. t

14.

% .

and (b) and there is nothinu to suogest that it contemplates only

the former. That is. the passage just mentioned suggests that

the part of the policy not under the heading "Marriage" is

intended to be applied to applicants relying on s.6A(l)(b) and

the part of the policy under the heading "Marriage" does not

.	purport to deal exhaustively with those	in that category. As
against that. the "Marriage" section is	so framed as to convey

the notion that marriage to an Australian citizen gives some

expectation of favourable consideration even to illegal

immigrants, whereas the general part of the policy says illegal

immigrants "will not readily be given permanent residence while

they remain in Australia" and makes other remarks to similar

effect. In trying to understand the policy so far as it relates

to this case, the sentence "Each case will be treated on its own

merits". immediately following reference to marriage of an

: illegal immigrant to an Australian. might be thought to create a

difficulty. The sentence just quoted, read in isolation, may be argued to mean that applications from illegal immigrants who are

married to Australians will be considered in the light of the

individual circumstances of each applicant rather than. as one

i

would gather from the general part of the policy, being

practically doomed at the outset. Treatment of the appellant's

case "on its own merits" without a strong predeliction to deport

him as an illegal immigrant could hardly have led to the

decisions being attacked.

The better view appears to be that the reference to

i

15.

treatinu cases of marriaue to an Australian on their merits

should, construinq the document as a whole. be read down,

treatinu the other relevant parts of the policy as dominant. I

think it unlikely that the draftsman of the policy intended that

the strictures mentioned elsewhere in the policy should not apply

to those cases dealt with under "Marriage".

It follows that. in my view, the delegate applied the

policy correctly in this respect. That is. the delegate was

right in thinking that, for example, the appellant was caught by

the statement in the policy:

"In the case of applications to remain made after

apprehe,nsion. it will be rare indeed that illeual

immigrants will be granted permission to remain in

Australia."

However, even if the delegate had misread the policy in this

respect (as he did not, in my view) that would not in itself

vitiate his decision. Misapplication of a policy setting out the

way in which discretions under a statute are to be exercised is

not necessarily a breach of the statute: to act inconsistently

with a policy having no statutory force is not necessarily such

an error as is spoken of in 9.5 of the Judicial Review Act.

The question whether the policy is inconsistent with the

b

Act. insofar as it has been applied to the appellant's case.

depends in the first instance upon whether it, to adapt the

E

16.

. .

lanquage of Brennan J. quoted above. merely guides and does not

control the making of the decisions in question: I take the word

"control" to refer, in the context. to such a constraint on the

exercise of a discretion uiven by a statute as to make that

exercise illusory - converting the discretion to application of a

fixed rule having no parliamentary authority.

In s.6A(1). Parliament has dealt with two categories of

non-citizens. Those in pars.(a) and (b) are to be distinguished

from those mentioned in the balance of the sub-section: the

former may be qranted	an	entry permit althouuh they hold no	i
I
I

temporary entry permit. The effect of the policy, if faithfully	I
I '

applied by the relevant officials. will be that those in

categories (a) and (b) will usually be refused an entry permit:

to use the language of one part of the policy, they "will not

readily be given permanent residence while they remain in

Australia". As to one sub-category, the policy is particularly

strict: "In the case of applications to remain after

apprehension, it will be rare indeed that illegal immigrants will

be qranted permission to remain in Australia". It was contended

that the policy should discriminate. in dealing with non-citizens

in Australia without a temporary entry permit. in favour of those

!I

mentioned in pars. (a) and (b) of s.6A(1).

The authorities say that a policy of this kind does not

entail any illegality as long as it genuinely leaves the door I

open for exceptional cases; what Parliament has given as a

I .

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. .	17	i l
!

dlscretion cannot be transformed into an absolute rule bv

administrative fiat. It is my view that the policy in question,

so far as relevant to this case. passes the test of validity I

have mentioned. Further, l cannot see that it is necessarlly

implicit in s.6(A)ll)(a) and (h) that Parliament requlred the

I	s . 6 r 2 ) discretion	to	be	exercised in a particular	way:	it	has
!

I. merely said that except In certain instances the discretion

1

cannot be exercised at all.

I turn next to the question whether relevant

considerations were left out of account.

Under this headmu. only two points need to be

considered. The first is whether the deleuate failed to take

account of the fact that the appellant‘s parents and two siblinqs !

were Australian citizens. Certificates of Citizenship of the

appellant’s wife and father were attached to the application for

i

resident status sent on 31 October 1985. In the list of material

on which the findinas were based. included in the statement of reasons supplied on 19 November 1985. there is a copy of the

Certificate of Citizenship €or the appellant’s wife, but no

mention of the parents’ certificate. Also. somewhat curiously,

while the wife is referred to as an Australian citizen in the

reasons. the parents and the younger brother and sister	are	I
referred to merely as “permanent residents“.

Althouuh the contrary was argued, the contrast of

18

lanuuaae and omission of the documents iust referred to make it

seem probable. in mv opinion. that the delegate either failed to

notice. or failed to attach any importance to, the fact of the

citizenship of the parents.

Mere errors of fact and degree by the decision-maker are

not necessarily enough to enliven this Court's jurisdlction under

the Judicial Review Act: see Koh Ah So0 v. Tuchin (unreported.

3 0 April 19861, a decision of Beaumont J. It is not hard to

find, in this area, similar judicial exhortations not to

interfere too readily. Not everything which is to be found in a

statement of reasons needs to be indisputably correct. either as

to fact or law. for the reasons to survive attack under the

Judicial Review Act. The decisions point towards the view that

only fairly clear and significant errors are to be regarded as

grounds on which an order may be made under 9.16.

An examination of recent statutes shows that the law

currently attaches considerable weiqht to the concept of

r.

Australian citizenship. The Misration Act itself is an example.

Prior to 1948, when the Australian Citizenship Act became law, the only national status which Australians possessed was that of

British subject. Now, although there is still much legislation

in this country which retains the notion of being a British

subject as a nationality qualification, Australian citizenship is

constantly assuming greater legal importance. For example, under

recent amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, Members

r

19.

I .

. P

of Parliament and voters must be Australian citizens: under the

! Public Service Reform Act of 1984, only Australian citizens may

I	be appointed as public servants.
L

Takinq a broader view, it is obvlously right that

holding citizenship in our nation should be regarded as a matter

of importance. bringing with it special rights and obligations.

I am tempted to say that the decision mal:zr has

overlooked a relevant matter and to infer that. had he not done

so, his decision miqht well have been otherwise: after all. it

seems a strong thing to deport an apparently respectable son of

Australian citizens, married to an Australian citizen, and with

an Australian brother and sister. all living in this country.

With considerable hesitation. however. I have come to the

conclusion that the deleuate's mistake in this respect was not of

sufficient importance to warrant an order in favour of the

appellant. Lookina at the reasons as a whole. he appears to have

been animated mainly by the considerations that the appellant had

lonq run out of entry permits and had been apprehended. in

consequence of which it was thought that the policy almost

compelled deportation. except in quite unusual circumstances.

The second point to be considered under this head is a

statement referred to above in another context: par.16 of the

reasons of 19 November 1985 says:

2 0 .

"While deportation of the applicant must temporarily

disrupt his relationship with his wife and his

family it is possible for him to be sponsored as a

spouse. I consider that a temporary separation and the costs arisinu from return home to apply for

migration in the normal manner were not mitigating circumstances to be accorded significant weight."

The implication one would take from this is that the

separation is likely to be of such length as to be, in truth,

only an inconvenience - a disadvantage comparable with the

necessity of paying another air fare. It was argued that the

repeated reference temporariness to was a complete

misapprehension. on an important point, on the part of the

rleleqate. In the very document on which he placed so much

reliance, the Policy on Illegal Immigrants, under the heading

"Limitation on return to Australia". the true position is to be

found. The effect of this part of the policy is that being an

illegal immiurant "can militate against favourable consideration

of re-entry requests". and there are set out time limits for

re-entry. They are not inflexible: readmission inside the time

limits "may be given in exceptional circumstances". However, the

prima facie limit applicable to the appellant is five years from

the date of departure.

The delegate has, no doubt rightly, had regard to the

possibility that the appellant's wife and parents may not choose

to leave Australia because of his deportation. But insofar as

the delegate appeared to reason that in that case the disruptive

separation from wife and family would only be temporary and not

!

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I	I
1

of "sianlficant welght", it appears to me that he fell into

I

substantial error. The policy makesl'it clear that there is no

I

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guarantee that the appellant would ever be readmitted. even if ! '

there were no consideration auainst his application in that

behalf other than those appearing in the reasons under review.

Further, he is faced, unless he ' can show "exceptional

circumstances". with the five year limit mentioned.

Perhaps '-?-e delegate intended by this passage to do no

more than intimate that an applicatlon for re-entry after five

years would be favourably viewed, or that he saw in the case

exceptional circumstances such as to justify waiver of the

five-year limit. But the reasons cannot be defended on that

basis. It would not be a proper exercise of discretion for a

delegate. while declining to flnd anything exceptional in the

case to warrant the grant of an entry permit despite the policy,

nevertheless to anticipate others seeing exceptional

circumstances justifying early re-entry.

It must be added that the origin of the passage which

has, in my view, proved fatal to the decision, is clear enough; similar lanuuage is to be found in the policy itself on p.10. It is not easy to envisage practical circumstances in which that

passage could properly guide a decision-maker. but there may be

some: it is enouqh for present purposes to say that insofar as

%he decision in question here relied upon the view that there

would be a merely temporary separation and one not of

2 2 .

"significant weiqht", it was in error In failing to take into

i account the strict barriers against re-entry.

It may be convenient to summarjse the views expressed

above. I have considered, but found it unnecessary to state my

views on, the allegatlons of breach of the rules	of natural
justice.

1.     So far as applicable to the appellant, the Policy on Illegal

Immigrants is not invalid as being inconsistent with the

Act: more particularly, it is not invalid as unduly

fetterinq the statutory discretion to grant an entry permit

to such an applicant as is mentioned in s.6A(l)(b) of the

Micrration Act.

i

2. The decision-maker appears to have fallen into error in not

noticing that the appellant is a child of Australian
citizens: that is not, in the whole of the circumstances. a sufficiently significant mistake to justify review.
3 .	The deleqate also erred in making an assumption that the
appellant's separation from his wife and family, if he left
Australia without them, would be temporary only; the policy he was applying required the prima facie assumption that. if

l

the appellant were ever allowed to re-enter. that would not

occur for five years.

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I would allow the appeal with costs and substitute for

the order made bv the learned trlal iudqe an order that the

. I

decisions under review be set aside and that the matter he

rPmltted for reconsideration. I would also order the respondents

to pay the costs of the hearinu before the learned trlal iudge.

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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
VICTORIAN DISTRICT REGISTRY	) VG 2 9 2 of 1985
GENERAL DIVISION	1

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ON APPEAL FROM THE	I
HONOURABLE MR.

.~~~ ~ ~

JUSTICE SHEF'PARD OF

THE FEDERAL	COURT OF
AUSTRALIA

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BETWEEN:	KHOI TRI TANG (Also known as CH1	TZO	TSENG	1
and CANDICE HUI NHI CH0

Appellants

AND :	THE HONOWSLE CHRISTOPHER JOHN m E ' O R D ,
MINISTER OF STATE FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC
AFFAIRS t

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Respondent

CORRIGENDA

Amendment to the judgment of Evatt, Dames and Pincus JJ. dated	4
July 1986 -

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Under "Catchwords", final authority	"Kohn Ahsoo v. Tuchin" should
read "Koh Ah So0 v. Tuchin".

j5L-d 'c$-.

J.A. Lyons

Associate to Pincus	J.	i
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