Tam v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs

Case

[1988] FCA 855

8 Apr 1988

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN TEE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
) No. G 301 of 1988
)
GENERAL DIVISION
Between: DANNY SIU WING TAM

Applicant

And :  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION LOCAL
-
GOVERNMENT & ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

CORAM: Einfeld J.

DATE:  - 8 April 1988

PLACE: Sydney

EX-TEMPORE JUDGMENT

This is an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial

Review) Act 1977 (the Judicial Review Act) f o r an order of review in
respect of the proposed deportation of Danny Siu Wing Tam (the

applicant). The decision to sign the deportation order was taken by the

NSW State Director of the Department of Immigration, Local Government

and Ethnic Affairs (the department) on 2 November 1987.
robbery on, respectively, 17 April, 25 September and 4 October 1983.
The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (China) who
claims to have entered Australia in Sydney in July 1982 as a stowaway

aboard a container ship which he had joined in Hong Kong. It is apparent

that the applicant committed a number of offences in Hong Kong, after

which he came to Australia where he pleaded guilty to three offences of

In the course of these criminal activities, he married an Australian
citizen on 26 July 1983. For the offences which he committed in

Australia, the applicant was sentenced by Judge Smythe in the District

Court to a number of different sentences. The total period of
imprisonment provided f o r was 12 years’ penal servitude, with a non-
parole period of seven years, to date from 5 October 1983. His Honour
staggered the particular sentences so as to provide for a lesser period

of imprisonment for the earlier two offences than for the third offence
for which eight years was separately prescribed.

It appears that the applicant was subsequently granted parole to take effect from 28 July 1987. He was then serving his sentence at Cessnock

gaol. However, on 21 July 1987, a direction under section 39 of the
Migration Act 1966 (the Act) was served on the officer in charge of that
gaol to hold the applicant in custody or retain him in detention. On a
day near the end of July. the applicant was in fact removed from

Cessnock to the Metropolitan Remand Centre at Malabar, where he has been ever since. An application was made to Justice Foster for the release

of the applicant, but on 17 March last, his Honour refused that

application.

The substantive grounds of this application for review of the

deportation order are effectively fivefold:-

1.      That the delegate erred in considering the actual charges of which the applicant was convicted

This ground in amplification is that the delegate was misled by some of the documents which he considered, particularly some of those that were

before the DORS Committee in relation to an earlier application for

refugee status by the applicant. These and other documents, it is said,

led the delegate into believing that in fact the man was convicted of

armed robbery and not assault and rob, or robbery itself; that he was

persuaded that the sentences were higher than in fact.they were, or indicative of more serious charges than were actually the subjects of the pleas of guilty; and that the delegate did not appreciate the

difference between the various charges, because he was not supplied with

information which would have helped him to distinguish the penalties

inflicted by Judge Smythe in respect of the three offences on which he

pleaded guilty. It was also submitted that the delegate was led to a

belief by some of the documentation available to him that in fact the

applicant was also guilty of some other offences, in respect of which
the Attorney General of New South Wales decided not to file a bill of

indictment.

There is no evidence to support these arguments. It appears that the
delegate considered precisely what he was entitled and bound to
consider, namely, the offences which the applicant did commit. Even if
it were the fact that he also considered other matters, it appears from

his statement of reasons that the matters he took into account were in

substance the correct matters.

The delegate did describe the offences as armed robbery, but the
material available suggests that he did not give much attention to the

actual terminology of the charges but rather to their substance. The

sentence was accurately accounted for by the delegate in terms referring
to the total of 12 years penal servitude with the correct non-parole
period.

2.       That the delegate misunderstood the sentences pronounced

The thrust or gist of this argument was that the delegate took the
global figure of 12 years penal servitude against a document which
indicated that the maximum penalty for the relevant offence was 14
years, and therefore must have considered the offences to be more
serious than they were.

There is no material upon which any such conclusion can be drawn, but
even if it were true, it seems to me that the delegate would have been
perfectly entitled to conclude that the offences for which the man was
sentenced, and the sentences which were pronounced, including the

observations of the trial judge (which have been placed before me in

summary form) were of considerable severity. I have no reason to believe

that the details, in terms of their precise division, would have made

any difference, or were taken into consideration adversely to the
applicant. The delegate, in fact, concluded in favour of the applicant

that his role in these crimes was secondary. This disposes of any

argument that in other respects the delegate did not appreciate the

correct position.

3 .       That the delegate did not expressly take into account the applicant's rehabilitation

Primarily under this heading of rehabilitation was the applicant's
alleged adoption of the Christian faith whilst in prison, and his
adoption of community responsibility in place of the criminal life which
he had previously followed. The applicant submitted that the delegate
should have obtained the opinions of experts on the question of his
rehabilitation.

In fact, the delegate expressly considered the question of
rehabilitation in giving attention to whether the applicant should be
granted resident status. He concluded that the applicant was not a
'reformed character' after taking into account in favour of the
applicant the other matters of his conversion to a life of faith and

communal responsibility. The delegate's rejection of the applicant's
reformed character took into account the favourable report of his
behaviour by the prison authorities, and the presumed view of the
Probation and Parole Board, as a necessary prerequisite to approving his

release, that the applicant was unlikely to offend again. The delegate

also took into account the applicant's own statement, the views of his

wife and of those who were supporting him.

The delegate treated the likelihood of the applicant becoming a 'proper'
member of society as of a speculative nature. This conclusion has been
criticised by senior counsel for the applicant who argued that such an
approach was unfair and did not represent any form of reasonable
determination. It seems to me that all statements about anyone's future

life and behaviour are inherently speculative and that there were

definite bases for the delegate in this particular case to determine

those matters against the applicant.

It cannot be that because a number of people, however highly qualified,

say that they believe someone is going to behave in particular manner
in the future, the matter necessarily finishes and the delegate is

thereby bound by those views. Nor can, for example, statements by the
applicant and his wife be determinative. These are merely matters of
evidence which the delegate must weigh. The delegate is under no
obligation to call the various people before him to cross-examine them

or hear them put their views. The delegate must merely bona fide
consider them and take them into account. In this case he has done so ,
but has concluded against the applicant's contentions, as he was quite
entitled to do.
In paragraph 22 of his reasons, the delegate also lists the other
matters which he considered against those matters in favour relating to

the applicant's so-called reformed character. Some of these are very

serious:

j

i (a) the serious nature of his criminal convictions in Australia;

(h) the manner of his illegal entry into Australia;

(C) his criminal convictions in Hong Kong which have not been

denied;

(d)

the fact that these applications were only lodged after the apprehension of the applicant on criminal charges and his

consequent identification as a prohibited non-citizen.
Senior counsel for the applicant submits that there is a real suspicion
that the delegate was influenced by a whole range of superfluous
matters. He argued that the DORS Committee, who rejected the applicant's

claim for refugee status, proceeded on a false basis and argues further
that there were a number of irrelevant considerations taken into account
all of which amount to grossly unfair treatment of the applicant.
This argument cannot be upheld. It seems to me that all matters taken
into account by the delegate were proper matters for him to consider and

he would have been seriously recreant in his duty had he not done so.
It is true that documents of the DORS Committee may indicate some

misapprehension on their part of certain aspects of the matter but there

is no suggestion that the delegate in this case was influenced by any

errors made. In any case, the errors were substantially overwhelmed by

the large majority of other matters considered by the WRS Committee

which have not been challenged. I see no reason to select one or two errors or possible misapprehensions as being matters which decisively influenced the delegate and reject the vast majority of other matters

which remained unchallenged.

4 .       That the delegate failed to take into account the consequences of deportation

The consequences the applicant is referring to are:

(i) the certainty or likelihood of imprisonment upon return to

China;

(ii)    the possibility of execution; and even

(iii)
the possibility that China may not accept him.
There is little evidence to support these assertions although I accept
that there is certainly no guarantee that China will accept his wife who

is an Australian citizen, and who has said that she would accompany the
applicant if he were deported back there. Senior counsel for the
applicant in his usual talented and enthusiastic way has reserved his
most vigorous assault against the delegate's views under this heading.
Be has submitted that the fundamental task of the delegate which he

totally failed to do, was to contact the Chinese Ambassador in Canberra
to ascertain what the Chinese government would or would not do with the

applicant should he be returned. He says that the Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade who, it might be noted, is amongst the membership of

the DORS Committee, would undoubtedly have available sufficient

information to forecast, or discover, what the Chinese authorities will

do with the applicant when he returns.

Senior counsel for the applicant put this obligation on the delegate to
inform himself in this way as: 
" ... a reasonable burden on the bureaucracy of a civilized
country to inquire of the possible consequences."
Be argued that what the delegate did here was a "glib justification" of
what had already been determined and was not an independent judgment but
an exercise of what he described as a "callous bureaucratic
justification".

I regret being unable to see that any of these assaults are justified by

the evidence. No leader or public servant in' Australia would willingly

participate in sending the applicant to his death, but the fact is that

there is no evidence at all, other than the applicant's ow assessment,
that this consequence is, or.is likely, to result from his deportation.

In any event, whatever be the humanitarian arguments Australia might put

to the Government concerned, the administration of Australia's

immigration laws could never be fixed by reference to what another

government will do r even what it says it will do to its own citizens.

Australian immigration laws just cannot be determined by reference to a

decision that may be made in some part of China or any of the other
countries from where illegal immigrants arrive in Australia seeking
residency here.

It would be highly commendable, were it possible, for Australia to

absorb every person in the world who is facing execution or persecution

in the person's own country but, of course, it is impossible that this

be done. In this case the delegate did consider the whole question of

possible hardship and persecution. In paragraph 20(b) of his reasons,

the delegate says that the fact that the applicant would face hardship

and possible persecution should he return to China weighed n favour of
his application for resident status. In this respect, learned senior

counsel for the applicant submitted that what the delegate is really

doing here is taking such matters into account and rejecting them. This

submission is literally correct but identifies no error of law, as the
delegate is not only entitled, but bound, to act in that way, if that
is the conclusion considered to be correct.
Counsel further submitted that in a document annexed to his affidavit

and on which he was not cross-examined (these documents were tendered by

the applicant), the delegate is telling an untruth when he says that he
considered the persecution matter in the applicant's favour. I am not
prepared to reach that conclusion. I am also not prepared to conclude in
this case that the NSW State Director of the department would ignore'and

baselessly reject a claim that the applicant may face .persecution were

he to return to China.

I do not accept that the delegate had an obligation to write to the
Chinese Ambassador nor do I accept that the Australian people have an
obligation to maintain the applicant i Australia at the pleasure of the

Chinese Government while they consider whether they are going to reply
truthfully and comprehensively, if at all. This would render the
administration of the migration program and the regulation of illegal

immigrants in Australia virtually impossible. It might even do harm to

the applicant by directing the explicit and adverse attention of the

Chinese authorities to a man who might otherwise pass into China without notice.

Accepting that the applicant's fears are correct (as to possible

persecution on return to China), and even accepting at worst that such

fears were confirmed by the Chinese Ambassador in Canberra as being

possible or even probable, it cannot be said that such matters would be

completely determinative of the matter. The consequences, however dire,

of deportation is something a person who illegally enters Australia
undertakes voluntarily. Australia has no absolute obligation to grant

residence to such a person facing these consequences. The Judicial

Review Act merely requires that consideration be given to them in weighing up the decision that should be made.

It is not right to turn this matter, as the applicant sought to do, into an emotional argument about whether the civilized standards of the

Australian people would voluntarily connive n the possible execution of
someone. This is simply a question of the person concerned facing up to

the possible consequences of the course of action on which he embarked without the consent and against the laws of the Australian community. General Matters

There is nothing in section 6A of the Act that would permit the
maintenance of someone in Australia, still less the granting of an entry
permit here, on grounds that may be described as general questions of
justice or the Australian people's concept of fairness. There is nothing
in section 6A of the Act to support the submission that it was open to
the Minister to permit a person to be here if he considered it to be in
the interests of the Australian people that the particular person remain
here. In any event, to say the least, it is difficult to accede to the
argument in this case that there are overwhelmingly powerful interests
of the Australian people that demand the retention in this country of
the applicant or that justice and fairness demand permanent entry for
him.
The question of persecution may be a matter th would in this case be
entitled to very strong weight in suppo~ .t of t :he grant of resident
status and, as might be expected, the delegate has indicated that he did
take it significantly into account. The question is whether the delegate
in some way misdirected himself in the way in which he weighed up the
various matters in favour of entry against those that were in favour of
deportation.
I can see no such misdirection or error of law. It was submitted that
section 6A. particularly subsection (l)(e) which provides a means for
non-citizens to be granted entry permits on strong compassionate or
humanitarian grounds, was irrelevant to this case although this would
appear to me to have been the only real basis on which the applicant's
case for residence in Australia could have been built. It is relevant
because although the applicant was not the holder of a temporary entry
permit, the practice of the department, and the evidence before me, is
that that would not be held against him if the strong compassionate and
humanitarian grounds existed. A temporary entry permit would be granted
in order to enable him to qualify if the possible consequences of
deportation established the ground. In any event, the delegate gave it
deep and careful consideration.
For those reasons it is my view that despite the powerful and able
arguments that have been advanced in support of these various matters,
they cannot succeed.
5. Section 39 of the Migration Act 1966
The applicant also seeks an order of release from his current custody,
following the change of his detention from Cessnock gaol to the
Metropolitan Remand Centre in the circumstances to which I have already
adverted. It is submitted that section 39 (1) of the Act requires,
preparatory to the detention i custody of a deportee as referred to in
that section, the arrest of that person. The submission is that in this
case the applicant was not arrested because in the events that occurred,
he was merely transferred by a person or persons unknown from one place

of State custody to another place of State custody even though the
justification for his detention appears to have changed from State law

to Federal law.

It was argued that the arrest must take place by an officer. "Officer"

is defined in section 5(1) of the Act as being an officer of the

department, someone exercising duties under the Customs Act 1901, a
member of the Australian Federal Police or of a State or Territory
police, or some person who is authorised by the Minister. This

submission is twofold:

(a) that there was no arrest at all;

(b) that there was no arrest by a du auth orised or def 'ined
officer .
As to (b), there is no evidence at ll. The applicant would know whether
he was taken at first instance by police offlcers or prison officials

but has led no evidence to that effect. The more substantive question,

however, is whether the applicant was in fact arrested. This question

has not been strongly argued with detailed reference to authority, but I

feel that it is proper to glean that the events that took place did, in

fact, embrace the arrest of the applicant.

The applicant was due to be released from custody on 28 July. On or just
before that date, he was moved in custody and under appropriate
restraint from one prison to another. This can be implied as an rrest

of someone who would otherwise have been entitled enter the community as

a free citizen.

In all the circumstances, I am not of the view that the circumstances

under which the applicant changed his status, albeit notionally and
rather oddly, represents a breach of section 39 (1) of the Act by the
authorities, particularly by the respondent.

I therefore dismiss the application for review, including what I
apprehend to be an order seeking a review of the detention under section

39 (1) of the Act. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent.

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

0