Tait v Walters

[2000] QSC 70

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

TOWNSVILLE	No. 325 of 1999
Before the Hon. Justice Jones

[William “Billy” Peter Tait -v- Karen Walters, Commissioner of the Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Danvre Clement, President of the James Cook University Union, Russel Robinson, of Stanwell Corporation Limited] [2000] QSC 070

BETWEEN:  WILLIAM “BILLY” PETER TAIT

Applicant

AND:  KAREN WALTERS Commissioner of the
Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland

First Respondent

AND:  DANVRE CLEMENT President of the James Cook
University Union

Second Respondent

AND:  RUSSEL ROBINSON of Stanwell Corporation Limited

Third Respondent

JONES J

Judgment delivered 23rd Day of March, 2000

1.     The applications filed respectively on 23rd August 1999 and 30th August 1999, be dismissed.

2.     The applicant pay to each of the first, second and third respondents its costs of and incidental to the

applications to be taxed.

Catchwords:	PRACTICE - ABUSE OF PROCESS - Applications for various orders sought - Respondents sought to have applications dismissed because they precede final orders dismissing the matter - Applications are incompetent, vexatious and an abuse of process - Applications dismissed.
Counsel:	N/A as decision on the papers and without oral hearing.
Solicitors:	Self for the Applicant

Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland for the First Respondent
Suthers & Taylor for the Second Respondent

Freehill Hollingdale & Page for the Third Respondent

Hearing date:  N/A as decision on the papers and without oral hearing.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

TOWNSVILLE	Writ No. 325 of 1999
BETWEEN:	WILLIAM “BILLY” PETER TAIT

Applicant

AND:  KAREN WALTERS Commissioner of the
Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland

First Respondent

AND:  DANVRE CLEMENT President of the James Cook
University Union

Second Respondent

AND:  RUSSEL ROBINSON of Stanwell Corporation Limited

Third Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE JONES

DELIVERED THE DAY OF MARCH, 2000

1. Before me are two applications by the applicant filed respectively on 23rd

   August 1999 and 30th August 1999. The second application, in the main, seeks to

   amend the former.

2. These applications follow closely on the hearing of an earlier application by

   the applicant for judicial review. On 24th day of August 1999, my reasons for

   judgment concerning that application were published by the Registrar of the

   Supreme Court in Townsville, pursuant to r. 664 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (“UCPR”). Those orders were that that application as amended be dismissed

   and that the applicant pay to each of the first, second and third respondents its

   costs, including reserved costs, of and incidental to defending the application.

3. On the day before my reasons were formally published, the 23rd day of

   August 1999, that is before the determination of the earlier application, the

   applicant filed a further 16-page “Application for Directions” at the Registry in

   Townsville.

4. The orders sought by that application can be summarised as follows:

(1) That the application be determined “on the papers”, pursuant to r. 489
of the UCPR.
That the respondents pay the costs to establish, maintain and update as
required a world wide web page, which is preferably administered by
the Supreme Court of Queensland, on which all documentation that has
been appropriately filed and full copies of the transcripts in this
application will be displayed.

(2) That all applications and submissions made to the courts by the respondents, other than those which go only to a respondent’s powers and procedures under their respective empowering legislation, shall be struck from the record.

(3)	That my reasons for decisions made 18 May 1999 “contain errors in law and fact”, and should be declared invalid and struck from the record, including the transcript of proceedings to which they relate.
(4)	That some of the causes of action outlined in the applications for review “are set back”.
(5)	“That claims to suit each of these causes of action are selected and any necessary amendments made to ensure the appropriate claims are made.”
(6)	“That appropriate orders pursuant to Order 81, rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court” be made.
(7)	“That a date for a determination upon the application is set.”
(8)	That a copy of files held by the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner be filed in the court by the first respondent.
(9)	“That the cause of action in damages, including any amendments or other interlocutory steps, not be considered until all other causes of action have been resolved or otherwise finally determined.”

(10) That directions relating to the second respondent and third respondent be made so that the applicant “not be responsible for service of documents on the other parties” and that the applicant “be indemnified with regards to costs of filing documents … and [costs] incurred by other parties, or any Court, as a result of the proceedings.”

(11) “That the applications for reviews which relate to the details under the ‘union decision’ heading in the review application be separated from those that relate to the details under the ‘SCL decision’ heading and two separate applications for review regarding the SCL and union decisions respectively be heard.”

(12) “That the injunctions sought in the application for reviews to restrain, or similar conditional injunctions to restrain, the second and third respondents with respect to the business of the proposed sports foundations and proposed baseload power station respectively be made.”

(13) That the first respondent pay one-half of the costs of the proceeding, that the second respondent pay one-quarter of the costs of the proceeding and that the third respondent pay one-quarter of the costs of the proceeding. Those costs include all immediate costs required to be paid before the applicant can proceed further and any other costs regarding the applicant’s access to office facilities and legal resources which relate to the proceedings.

(14) That such other orders as the court may make of its own accord or on the appropriate application from one of the parties be made, where it is just and necessary that such orders be made.

1. One week later, by which time my orders dismissing the earlier proceedings

   had been made, the applicant filed a further application (entitled “Ex parte

   Application”), seeking to amend the application of 23rd August 1999. The orders

   sought by this subsequent application can be summarised as follows:

   (1) That the application filed at Townsville on 23rd August 1999 be

   amended so as to be an ex parte application.

   (2) That “all material filed in the court, including all transcripts, be accessible to the general public at the Supreme Court of Queensland world wide web page.”

(3)	That the orders made in my reasons for judgment, delivered on 24th day of August 1999, “be suspended, varied or revoked.”
(4)	That questions proposed to the council of the second respondent in 1998 regarding approval of the sports foundation “can only be constitutionally and legally determined by way of a referendum.”

1. As was the case on the earlier occasion, each of the respondents has applied

   to have these applications dismissed. The grounds relied on by each respondent

   are essentially the same and have been enunciated succinctly in separate responses

   to these applications. It is, therefore, appropriate and convenient to deal with each

   of these before I consider the original lengthy application and the application of

   30th August 1999.

2. None of the respondents raise any objection to the applications being

   determined without an oral hearing. The bases upon which the respondents rely for

   the applications to be dismissed are as follows:-

   (i)      The application of 23rd August 1999 precedes my reasons for judgment

   delivered on 24th August 1999. Those reasons dealt finally with all

   matters in issue between the applicant and the respondents.

   (ii) The application should be dismissed as incompetent, frivolous,

   vexatious, misconceived, mischievous and an abuse of the process of

   the Court. The applicant’s material is repetitive, prolix and merely

   repeats material already before the Court and/or is irrelevant to any live

   issue between the applicant and the respondents.

   (iii) The Court has no jurisdiction to make the orders sought in the

   application, with respect to the establishment of some internet

   procedure for the conduct of the ongoing litigation between the

   applicant and the respondents.

3. I will deal with each of these grounds for dismissal in turn.

   That the application precedes final orders dismissing the matter

4. It is clear enough on any reading of the orders made on 24th August 1999 that

   the matter had been determined finally and there would be no further scope for

   examining the issues raised in those earlier applications. But that is exactly what

   the applicant sought to do here, make further applications on substantially the same

   issues as those already canvassed and resolved.

5. It is important that I address, however, that in his affidavit sworn on 6th

   September 1999, the applicant deposes that he:

“(i)

received no notice that the judgement handed down on the 24th August 1999 was to be handed down on that day, and, only discovered that this had taken place when one Pam Roberts of Deeragun at Townsville informed me - sometime after 5:00pm on the 24th August 1999 - that she had been informed on that day that some judgement - with respect to the case of Tait v Walters & Ors - was to be handed down on the 24 August 1999; and;

(ii)

through no fault of his own, was absent from the Court when the orders made by and reasons given for, Justice S.G. Jones’ decisions were handed down in the Court, at Townsville, on the 24th August 1999.” [1]

[1] Affidavit of William “Billy” Peter Tait, sworn on 6th September 1999, para. 4.

1. The Court has a discretion in r. 667(2)(a) of the UCPR to set aside an order at

   any time if the order was made in the absence of a party. I can see no reason,

   however, for exercising my discretion in this regard here. Whether or not the

   applicant was present when the Registrar delivered my reasons would have no

   influence on the orders which were made. Given that the applicant resides in

   Townsville and the application was necessarily heard in Cairns, it was always

   going to be the case that I would not be present during the formal publishing of my

   reasons. My reasons for judgment were final and were published, for the sake of

   convenience, by the Registrar in Townsville. The absence of the applicant during

   the formal delivery of my reasons does not prejudice him nor does it require me to

   set aside the orders.

2. I can’t help but feel from a reading of the material filed by the applicant that

   what he was seeking was, in substance, an appeal of my earlier decision on 24th

   August 1999. The following passages, extracted from various documents filed by

   the applicant, are illustrative of the appeal-like nature of some aspects of this

   application:

   The applicant is applying to the Court for an order “that Justice Jones reasons for decisions made 18 May 1999 (this document contains errors in law and fact), the transcript of the proceedings to which they relate, and, the transcript of proceedings held 30th July 1999 be declared invalid and struck from the record.” [2]

   [2] Application for Directions, filed 23rd August 1999, para. 3.

   …
   The applicant is applying to the Court for an order “that the orders:

   (a)      To dismiss the application filed on 21 April, 1999 as amended by the application of 10 May, 1999; and

   (b)      That the first applicant pay to each of the first, second and third respondents its costs of and incidental to defending the application, including costs reserved on 18 May, 1999;

   Be suspended, varied or revoked.” [3]
   …
   “I understand there are facts relevant to the matters before the court
   which the court has not considered. I do not understand the reasoning
   behind particular reasons for the decisions handed down on 24 August
   1999.” [4]
   …
   “There is new evidence for the Court to consider, specifically that which
   is most relevant at this time is … exhibited in the affidavit affirmed by
   

   [3] Ex parte Application, filed 30th August 1999, para. 1(ii).

   [4] Document entitled “Submissions with regard to Application to Amend Application filed at

   [5] Document entitled “Further submissions No. 2 with regard to Application made 30th August 1999”,

   Billy Tait at Townsville on 30th August 1999.” [5]

3. I raised my concern with the Registrar of the Supreme Court Registry in

   Townsville and he sent a letter to the applicant, dated 7th September 1999.

   Materially, it contained the following: “I am concerned that you may be misled

   into thinking that your applications in some way constitute an appeal from the

   decision of Justice Jones which I delivered under Rule 664 on 24th August, 1999.

   If you intend to appeal from that decision you must appeal to the Court of Appeal

   under the provisions of Chapter 18 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.”

4. Regardless of this notice, the applicant pursued this application which I now

   find to be incompetent. For this reason alone, I would dismiss the application, but

   for completeness’ sake I will examine the further grounds raised for dismissal of

   the applications.

   That the application is incompetent, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process

5. The applicant’s material - despite consisting of the original 16-page application, 5-page amending application, his Affidavit of 30th August 1999 with Exhibits, his Affidavit of 6th September 1999 with Exhibits, a 30-page 134-dot

   point document entitled Submissions, a 15-page document entitled Additional

   Submissions, a 4-page document entitled Further Submissions, a 3-page document

   entitled Further Submissions No.2 and an 11-page document entitled Clarification

   of Material - contains nothing of any substance or value that goes further than the

   applications previously disposed of. The respondents, therefore, have sought to

   have the applications dismissed for being “incompetent, frivolous, vexatious,

   misconceived, mischievous and an abuse of the process of the Court.”

6. The Court of Appeal dealt with this issue in Professional Nominees Pty Ltd v

   Walsh & Anor and Law Partners Mortgages Pty Ltd v Walsh. [6] The Court,

   comprising of McMurdo P, Thomas JA and Shepherdson J, commented:

   “[T]he Supreme Court of Queensland has inherent jurisdiction to strike out process (including an appeal) if it can clearly be seen to be an abuse of the Court’s process, or as frivolous or vexatious. Dixon J has described the power as arising under the inherent jurisdiction of the court ‘to stop the abuse of its process when it is employed for groundless claims’. It needs however to be very clear that a claim is groundless before a court will summarily dismiss it thereby preventing a hearing and determination in the usual way. Some cases are identified as an abuse of process by reason of the way in which a party prosecutes or fails to prosecute the process. Others may be seen to be groundless from inherent lack of logic or unsustainability of a point that is asserted as the basis of the claim.” [7]

However, their Honours went on further to observe:

“When submissions of this kind are received, the Court should not lightly reach the conclusion that they are nonsense, even if that is one’s initial impression. There may be a close line between the profound and spurious.” 8

[6] [1998] QCA 296 (29 September 1998).

[7] At para 2.

1. I have spent some time examining the strengths, weaknesses and validity of

   the applications, but still find that they can clearly be seen as an abuse of the

   Court’s process and either frivolous or vexatious. I have already found that a similar application was groundless on an earlier occasion and have found this to

   again be the case in respect of these applications.

2. This was not a conclusion that I have reached lightly. There is no denying

   that the applicant is passionate about these causes. It is unfortunate that his efforts

   and energy have been focused, however, on these misguided - and expensive -

   applications.

   That the Court has no jurisdiction to make some of the Orders sought

3. The applications request several orders that the Court can not make. For

   example, the applicant has not directed me to any provisions on which he relies for

   requesting such orders as the establishment of a world wide web site, paid for by

   the respondents:

   “From which; all documentation that has been appropriately filed, or otherwise admitted to be filed with leave of a judge - including full copies of the transcripts of all proceedings which have not been struck from the record or otherwise declared by a judge to be invalid - with [this] application … filed at Townsville; will be displayed.” 9

4. I view many of the other orders sought by the applicant - those seeking to

   have the respondents’ applications and submissions struck from the record, those

   seeking to have my earlier reasons for decision declared invalid and struck from

   the record, those seeking that the applicant not be responsible for the service of

   documents to the respondents and those seeking an order that the respondents

   essentially finance the applicant’s legal actions - to be equally incompetent. For

   these reasons I would also dismiss the applications.

8 At para 9.

Costs

1. Each of the first, second and third respondents has sought their costs of and

   incidental to this application. The respondents have again been made party to

   applications with no merit and have been forced to incur further expense in arguing

   against the applicant’s claims.

2. As I have mentioned, the applicant went as far as requesting orders that all of

   his costs be paid for by one or all of the respondents, presumably because of the

   financial inequality perceived by him to exist between himself and the respondents.

   Where the injustice lies is permitting a litigant to bring frivolous or unmeritorious

   court actions, causing great expense to the other parties who have no prospect of

   recovering their costs, if an order to that effect is made.

3. As both of the applicant’s applications have to be dismissed for the reasons

   set out above, I will accordingly order that he pay the costs of each respondent.

   Orders

4. I order that:-

1. The applications filed respectively on 23rd August 1999 and 30th

August 1999, be dismissed.

2.       The applicant pay to each of the first, second and third respondents its

costs of and incidental to the applications to be taxed.

9 Application for Directions, filed 23rd August 1999, para. 1(d).




Townsville on 23 August 1999”, paras. 1 and 2.

para. 1.