Taipa v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Broken Bay

Case [2022] NSWSC 692


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Taipa v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Broken Bay [2022] NSWSC 692
Hearing dates: 18 May 2022
Date of orders: 18 May 2022
Decision date: 18 May 2022
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Hamill J
Decision:

(1) Pursuant to s 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981 (NSW), the plaintiff is granted leave to commence and maintain his civil proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (2021/00286580) with such orders made nunc pro tunc and taking effect from 8 October 2021.

(2) The parties are to bear their own costs of and incidental to today’s notice of motion.

Catchwords:

CIVIL LAW – procedure – leave to commence proceedings – plaintiff in custody at the time proceedings commenced – Felons Act – institutional abuse suffered as a child – whether parties should bear their own costs when leave sought retrospectively

Legislation Cited:

Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Thurston v State of New South Wales [2021] NSWSC 226

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Dion Robert Taiapa (Plaintiff)
Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Broken Bay (First Defendant)
Trustees of the Marist Brothers (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
J Masur (Plaintiff)
O Saxton (First Defendant)
C Aus (Second Defendant)

Solicitors:
North Star Law (Plaintiff)
Wotton + Kearney (First Defendant)
Barry.Nilsson. (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2021/00286580

EX TEMPORE Judgment (REVISED)

  1. Dion Robert Taiapa commenced proceedings by way of statement of claim on 8 October 2021. He now seeks an order granting him leave to commence those proceedings under the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981 (NSW). He seeks that order on the basis that leave will apply retrospectively, that is, as judges and lawyers insist on saying, nunc pro tunc, which means for those (like myself) not versed in Latin “now as then”. [1]

  2. Mr Taiapa relies on (1) an affidavit of his solicitor, which includes (2) the originating process, (3) his own evidentiary statement and (4) a psychologist’s report. Based on that material, and without any contest on the part of those representing the defendants, I am satisfied that leave should be granted.

  3. My reasons, in very short form, are these. First, Mr Taiapa is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in Queensland for drug related offences. Based on his solicitor’s affidavit, I am satisfied that the offence for which he is incarcerated is a “serious indictable offence” for the purpose of s 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act. Accordingly, he requires leave under that section of the Act to commence proceedings. Second, based on his statement, the psychologist’s report and the allegations made in the statement of claim, I am satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of process, and I am also satisfied that there are prima facie grounds for the proceedings.

  4. Accordingly, I propose to make order 1 in the notice of motion.

  5. There was a brief dispute between the parties in relation to order 2, which was in these terms: “An order that costs of the motion be costs in the cause.” The first defendant submitted that it was inappropriate for his client to be placed at risk of paying costs of this notice of motion and today’s brief hearing, because the application for leave ought properly to have been made at the time that the proceedings were instituted, rather than attending some months later and seeking leave retrospectively.

  6. The power of the Court to make such orders retrospectively is well established, and it is not uncommon for matters to come to the court seeking retrospective leave after proceedings have been commenced. I discussed that in Thurston v The State of New South Wales [2021] NSWSC 226 at [2]-[3]. Nevertheless, a plaintiff should be encouraged to make their application for leave at the time the proceedings are instituted. So, rather than ordering that costs be costs in the cause, I will order that the parties bear their own costs of today’s motion.

  7. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

  1. Pursuant to s 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981 (NSW), the plaintiff is granted leave to commence and maintain his civil proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales - that is, proceedings 2021/00286580 - with such orders made nunc pro tunc and taking effect from 8 October 2021;

  2. The parties are to bear their own costs of and incidental to the notice of motion.

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Endnote

Details
AGLC
Taipa v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Broken Bay [2022] NSWSC 692
Case
[2022] NSWSC 692
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Taipa v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Broken Bay involved a plaintiff, Taipa, who sought to commence proceedings against the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Broken Bay, alleging institutional abuse suffered as a child. Taipa was in custody at the time the proceedings were commenced, which presented a unique procedural challenge under the Felons Act. The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with his claim despite being in custody, and whether the parties should bear their own costs when leave to proceed was sought retrospectively.

The court considered the statutory provisions of the Felons Act and the principles of procedural fairness and justice. It was noted that the Felons Act generally prohibits a prisoner from instituting legal proceedings without leave of the court, but the court has discretion to grant such leave where it is just and equitable to do so. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations of institutional abuse were serious and warranted consideration, and that it was in the interests of justice for the plaintiff to be able to pursue his claim. The court exercised its discretion to grant leave to proceed, recognising the importance of providing redress for historical institutional abuse. The court also determined that it was appropriate for the parties to bear their own costs in light of the retrospective nature of the application for leave.

The court's decision highlighted the delicate balance between statutory requirements and the need to provide access to justice, particularly in cases involving serious allegations of abuse. The outcome underscored the importance of considering the individual circumstances of each case when exercising discretionary powers under the Felons Act. The court granted leave to proceed with the action, and ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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