Taiapa v The Queen

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Mr Taiapa, who had been convicted of possession of and trafficking in a dangerous drug. The central issue on appeal was whether the Queensland Court of Appeal had erred in holding that the evidence presented did not disclose a case fit for consideration by the jury regarding the defence of compulsion under section 31(1)(d) of the Criminal Code (Q).

The legal issue before the High Court was whether there were reasonable grounds for the applicant's belief that he was otherwise unable to escape the carrying out of threats made against him, as required by section 31(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. This involved determining whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favourable to the applicant, could lead a jury to conclude that he had no reasonable alternative but to commit the offence to avoid the threatened harm. The court also considered the onus of proof, noting that while the legal burden rests on the Crown to disprove compulsion beyond reasonable doubt, the evidential burden to raise the issue lies with the accused.

The High Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, finding that the evidence did not support a reasonable belief that the applicant was unable to escape the carrying out of the threats. The court reasoned that the applicant's belief that he lacked sufficient information to identify his tormentors to the police, or his general concern that police protection might not be "100 per cent safe," did not constitute reasonable grounds for believing he had no alternative but to commit the drug offences. The court noted that the applicant had ample opportunity to seek police assistance and that the police might have had their own means of investigating or apprehending the individuals. The mere fact that the threats were made with a gun and included instructions not to contact the police did not, in itself, negate the reasonableness of seeking police protection.

The High Court extended the time for filing the application for special leave to appeal, granted special leave, and then treated the appeal as instituted and heard instanter, ultimately dismissing it.