Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd

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[2008] HCATrans 266

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M31 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

TABCORP HOLDINGS LTD

Applicant

and

BOWEN INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 1 AUGUST 2008, AT 11.22 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR N.J. YOUNG, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR C.C. MACAULAY, SC and MR E. WOODWARD for the applicant.  (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

MR M.J. COLBRAN, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR T.D. BEST, for the respondent.  (instructed by Scanlan Carroll Business Lawyers)

GLEESON CJ:   Mr Young, I think the Registrar notified the solicitors for the parties that I have a modest parcel of shares in your client.

MR YOUNG:   Yes, your Honour.  Yes, we were pleased to see that, your Honour.

GLEESON CJ:   I was not complaining about it or asking for sympathy. 

MR YOUNG:   Yes.  If the Court pleases, there are, in our submissions, three reasons for the grant of special leave to appeal.  Two of them concern the rule in Joyner v Weeks.  The first is that Joyner should no longer be regarded as good law in Australia because it is an anomalous common law rule productive of injustice.  The second question concerns the scope of the Joyner rule; did it in fact apply to the covenant not to make alterations without approval in clause 2.13 and, further, in what circumstances would the rule be displaced?

The third question concerns the interests of justice.  It is our case that the Full Court exceeded its proper function and role and denied procedural fairness in raising points for the first time on appeal and disposing of the case on that basis when they had never previously been contended for.

GLEESON CJ:   What was the point of departure between Justice Rares in the Full Court and the other members of the Full Court?

MR YOUNG:   I think one of emphasis rather than substance, your Honour.  Justice Rares construed the package of clauses, clauses 2.10 to 2.13, as amounting to a covenant to make good.  His Honour seems to have assumed that the Joyner rule applies to a covenant to make good, rather than the different reinstatement rule.  Thirdly, his Honour focused heavily on the role of personal preference in an assessment of reasonableness.  So there were those differences of emphasis, your Honour, but fundamentally, in our submission, there is not any major point of departure.

CRENNAN J:   I think he recognised, did he not, that the rule was – he described it as anomalous, as you have just done, but regarded himself as bound.

MR YOUNG:   Yes, your Honour.  Justice Rares regarded it as beyond his province to pass upon the question whether Joyner should be regarded any longer as good law, leaving that effectively for this Court.  In…

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Case
[2008] HCATrans 266
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Victoria concerning a dispute between Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (the tenant) and Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (the landlord). The central issue revolved around the interpretation of a lease agreement and the extent of the tenant's obligations to restore the premises upon termination of the lease. The landlord alleged that the tenant had breached the lease by failing to restore the premises to their original condition, as required by a specific clause.

The primary legal question before the High Court was whether the tenant's obligation to "make good" the premises extended to restoring them to the condition they were in at the commencement of the lease, or merely to rectifying damage caused during the tenancy. This involved an analysis of the language used in the lease agreement, particularly the clause detailing the tenant's restoration obligations, and how that language interacted with the common law principles governing leasehold covenants.

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the tenant's obligation to "make good" the premises encompassed restoring them to the condition they were in at the commencement of the lease, not just repairing damage caused during the term. The Court reasoned that the plain language of the lease, when read as a whole, indicated an intention for the premises to be returned to their original state, irrespective of whether the alterations were made with the landlord's consent. The Court emphasised that the tenant had undertaken a positive obligation to restore, which was not limited to remedying breaches of covenant during the tenancy. The matter was remitted to the trial judge for assessment of damages.

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