Background
Background to the litigation
Before turning to the grounds of appeal it is useful to set out the background facts.Background The first appellant is a Nepalese Hindu woman, aged 30, who arrived in Australia on 22 October 2007, as a dependent on her ex-husband’s student visa. At some point, the first appellant’s relationship with her ex-husband broke down. They separated. The first appellant then commenced a relationship with another man, also a citizen of Nepal, to whom she became pregnant (Person X). The first appellant gave birth to a child on 4 April 2012. That child is the second appellant in these proceedings. It appears that the first appellant’s relationship with Person X has also broken down, and she is now caring for her child alone. The first appellant’s divorce from her ex-husband was finalised in May 2014. On 2 September 2013, the appellants applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa with the assistance of a migration agent. The contents of the application was summarised by the primary Judge in the following terms:[2]… The basis for that application was set out in a statement by the applicant. Essentially, it was that because she was divorced from her husband and was a single mother and, given the nature of Nepalese society, she would be regarded as a pariah and her child as an abomination and that her child would suffer by being called bad names. She would not be able to practice her Hindu religion and had lost the support of her family. She also claimed that she would suffer as a result of the rise in violence against women in Nepal and in particular, against women of similar circumstances to her. It was also claimed that the second applicant, as an illegitimate child, would, first of all, be stateless and secondly, would be discriminated against for belonging to a particular social group of Nepalese children born abroad. On 2 April 2014, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) refused the first and second appellant’s applications on the basis that the appellant’s did not satisfy s 36(2) of the Migration Act, because there were no substantial grounds to believe that the appellant’s would suffer serious harm should they return to Nepal. On 12 December 2014, following the filing of an application for review of the Minister’s decision, the appellants appeared before the Tribunal. The appellants were represented by registered migration agents.Decision of the Tribunal In its decision of 18 January 2015, the Tribunal accepted that the first appellant was Nepalese, of an elite caste in Nepal, had married in Nepal and arrived in Australia as a dependent of her husband, and was now divorced. Nonetheless the Tribunal held concerns about the balance of the first appellant’s claims. In summary, the Tribunal noted:·The first appellant provided no evidence to support the claim that she would be unable to practice her Hindu faith in Nepal in much the same way that she described practicing it in Australia, namely by occasionally attending a Hindu temple and by praying and making offerings to Hindu Gods in her home.·The Tribunal was not satisfied that unkind words which people in Nepal might make to her amounted to serious or significant harm as contemplated by the Refugee Convention.·The evidence of the first appellant did not suggest that she was estranged from her family or that she had lost her family’s support.·Cumulatively, the Tribunal’s concerns in respect of the appellants’ evidence meant that the Tribunal experienced significant doubt in respect of the reliability and truth of central aspects of the claims and evidence advanced by the appellants. In particular:○The first appellant claimed that her fears formed when, around eight months after the birth of her child, she read media reports which suggested that she may face mistreatment and/or discrimination in Hindu society in Nepal as a single woman who has had a child from an extra-marital relationship. The Tribunal considered this claim unconvincing in the context of the first appellant’s religious, cultural and educational background.○The Tribunal was not satisfied that the first appellant had any valid reason to delay seeking Australia’s protection for around 17 months after the birth of her child, and over two years after she claims to have become aware that she was pregnant with a child from an extra-marital relationship.○The Tribunal discussed with the first appellant independent information suggesting that Kathmandu was more tolerant, diverse and open-minded than in rural areas. The Tribunal also raised with the first appellant information concerning the existence of non-government organisations in Nepal which existed to assist single mothers and children born out of wedlock. The first appellant was dismissive of this information, however the Tribunal considered that the first appellant’s views were based on nothing other than her own insistence and a demonstrated absence of any genuine enquiries being made by her into what, if any, services would be available in Nepal.○The Tribunal considered that the evidence given by the first appellant concerning her relationship with her ex-husband, and the date of her separation from him, was very inconsistent. This inconsistency was compounded by records of the Department of Immigration indicating that the first appellant was nominated as a dependent spouse by her ex-husband on various visa-related documents at various times after she claimed to have separated from him. In the Tribunal’s view such inconsistency casts significant doubt on the truth of the claims made regarding the appellants’ circumstances and fears in Nepal and the truth and nature of the first appellants’ claimed relationships with her ex-husband and Person X.○Evidence of the first appellant concerning her relationship with Person X, from whom she was estranged, was inconsistent. The Tribunal noted that, although the first appellant claimed that she had a relationship with Person X, she appeared to know little about Person X. So, for example, she did not know the date of birth or age of Person X, or whether he had siblings. The Tribunal also noted that although the first appellant gave evidence that Person X abandoned her when she informed him that she intended to keep the child, there is evidence that suggests that Person X began living at the address given by the first appellant at about the time the second appellant was born.
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 12 December 2014, following the filing of an application for review of the Minister’s decision, the appellants appeared before the Tribunal. The appellants were represented by registered migration agents.Decision of the Tribunal In its decision of 18 January 2015, the Tribunal accepted that the first appellant was Nepalese, of an elite caste in Nepal, had married in Nepal and arrived in Australia as a dependent of her husband, and was now divorced. Nonetheless the Tribunal held concerns about the balance of the first appellant’s claims. In summary, the Tribunal noted:·The first appellant provided no evidence to support the claim that she would be unable to practice her Hindu faith in Nepal in much the same way that she described practicing it in Australia, namely by occasionally attending a Hindu temple and by praying and making offerings to Hindu Gods in her home.·The Tribunal was not satisfied that unkind words which people in Nepal might make to her amounted to serious or significant harm as contemplated by the Refugee Convention.·The evidence of the first appellant did not suggest that she was estranged from her family or that she had lost her family’s support.·Cumulatively, the Tribunal’s concerns in respect of the appellants’ evidence meant that the Tribunal experienced significant doubt in respect of the reliability and truth of central aspects of the claims and evidence advanced by the appellants. In particular:○The first appellant claimed that her fears formed when, around eight months after the birth of her child, she read media reports which suggested that she may face mistreatment and/or discrimination in Hindu society in Nepal as a single woman who has had a child from an extra-marital relationship. The Tribunal considered this claim unconvincing in the context of the first appellant’s religious, cultural and educational background.○The Tribunal was not satisfied that the first appellant had any valid reason to delay seeking Australia’s protection for around 17 months after the birth of her child, and over two years after she claims to have become aware that she was pregnant with a child from an extra-marital relationship.○The Tribunal discussed with the first appellant independent information suggesting that Kathmandu was more tolerant, diverse and open-minded than in rural areas. The Tribunal also raised with the first appellant information concerning the existence of non-government organisations in Nepal which existed to assist single mothers and children born out of wedlock. The first appellant was dismissive of this information, however the Tribunal considered that the first appellant’s views were based on nothing other than her own insistence and a demonstrated absence of any genuine enquiries being made by her into what, if any, services would be available in Nepal.○The Tribunal considered that the evidence given by the first appellant concerning her relationship with her ex-husband, and the date of her separation from him, was very inconsistent. This inconsistency was compounded by records of the Department of Immigration indicating that the first appellant was nominated as a dependent spouse by her ex-husband on various visa-related documents at various times after she claimed to have separated from him. In the Tribunal’s view such inconsistency casts significant doubt on the truth of the claims made regarding the appellants’ circumstances and fears in Nepal and the truth and nature of the first appellants’ claimed relationships with her ex-husband and Person X.○Evidence of the first appellant concerning her relationship with Person X, from whom she was estranged, was inconsistent. The Tribunal noted that, although the first appellant claimed that she had a relationship with Person X, she appeared to know little about Person X. So, for example, she did not know the date of birth or age of Person X, or whether he had siblings. The Tribunal also noted that although the first appellant gave evidence that Person X abandoned her when she informed him that she intended to keep the child, there is evidence that suggests that Person X began living at the address given by the first appellant at about the time the second appellant was born.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant seeks the following orders:1. That the appeal be allowed.2.The orders made by Federal Circuit Court Judge Smith on 04 June 2015 be set aside in lieu thereof it be ordered that the application be dismissed.3.The first Respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the application before Judge Smith.Consideration At the hearing the first appellant appeared in person with the aid of an interpreter. The Minister was legally represented. The appellants provided no written submissions to the Court, however the first appellant made oral submissions. In summary, she submitted:·the Tribunal misunderstood her at the hearing, possibly because of language problems. The first appellant only realised this misunderstanding after the hearing;·the Tribunal failed to listen to her;·the first appellant is ready to obtain proof of her assertions;·the first appellant did not realise that the Tribunal doubted her credibility;·the first appellant did not understand why the Tribunal did not believe her evidence concerning, for example, her divorce, when she had provided evidence in writing to them. With minor modifications the grounds of appeal in this Court reflect the grounds of review in the Court below. Notwithstanding the issues raised by the appellants I am unable to identify any error in either the decision of the primary Judge or the Tribunal. In particular:·I agree with the view of the primary Judge that the Tribunal did not take an arbitrary view of the appellants’ circumstances, or that there had been a breach of the rules of procedural fairness and natural justice. Indeed, as the primary Judge observed, the decision of the Tribunal was lengthy, detailed, measured and considered.·I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to address and evaluate all relevant material before it. Indeed it is clear that the Tribunal gave detailed and thoughtful consideration to all of the appellants’ material. Rather, it seems that an underlying concern of the appellants is referable to a failure of the appellants to put on material to which the Tribunal could refer. This is not a defect which can be attributed to the Tribunal.·I am not satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal evinced any lack of good faith on the part of the Tribunal.·I am not satisfied that the Tribunal ignored the first appellant’s claim that she could be subject to serious harm in Nepal because she is a single woman with a child. The Tribunal gave this issue considerable attention, and concluded that the evidence which was before it indicated that the appellants would not be subjected to serious harm. While I am somewhat troubled at the prospect of the second appellant being the subject of unquantified social ostracism, as a general proposition the authorities indicate that this in itself does not constitute “serious harm” within the meaning of the Migration Act (see, for example, comments of Kirby and Heydon JJ in SZLAI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] HCASL 456 at [4]-[7]).·I am not satisfied that the Tribunal relied on unreasonable evidence or that the Tribunal applied a wrong test.