SZWAT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZWAT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 280

Appeal from: SZWAT v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1933
File numbers: NSD 1440 of 2016
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 21 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court – whether the primary judge erred in finding that certain of the Tribunal’s findings were subsumed in findings of greater generality in accordance with principles explained in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593 – no error identified – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 476A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.32, 1.34, 36.01, 36.01(1)(a), 36.03(a)

Cases cited: Port of Newcastle Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal [2017] FCAFC 124; (2017) 346 ALR 669
Date of hearing: 21 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 17
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Hillary
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs
Table of Corrections
13 March 2018 The year of the decision appealed from has been changed to “[2016]”

ORDERS

NSD 1440 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZWAT

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to FCR 1.32 and/or 1.34, the time of filing the notice of appeal be taken to be the date upon which the document entitled “Originating application for review of a migration decision” was filed in this Court.

2.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A        INTRODUCTION

  1. Although presently unrepresented, the appellant was at one time represented, although not at the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court which led to the orders he now seeks to challenge.  Those orders of the Federal Circuit Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal).    

  2. Prior to coming to the substance of the appellant’s attack on the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, it is necessary to deal with a preliminary procedural matter. 

  3. The proceeding before this Court was sought to be initiated by way of a document entitled “Originating application for review of a migration decision”, which was filed in August 2016. This originating application was filed while the appellant was legally represented. The application was said to have been made pursuant to s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). Of course, that section…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 280
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZWAT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his appeal against the refusal of a Protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant had arrived in Australia in July 2012 and applied for a protection visa in November 2012. His application was refused by a delegate of the Minister in July 2013, and he sought review of that decision by the Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision in January 2015, and the appellant commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal in March 2015. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the primary judge erred in finding that certain of the Tribunal’s findings were subsumed in findings of greater generality.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal’s findings were subsumed in findings of greater generality. The court considered whether the Tribunal had adequately dealt with the appellant’s claims, and whether the primary judge had correctly found that the Tribunal’s findings were sufficient. The court noted that the Tribunal was not required to refer to every single piece of evidence provided by the appellant, and that the Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it. The court found that the Tribunal had adequately dealt with the appellant’s claims and that the primary judge had correctly found that the Tribunal’s findings were sufficient.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the time of filing the notice of appeal be taken to be the date upon which the document entitled “Originating application for review of a migration decision” was filed in the Federal Circuit Court. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court found that the primary judge had correctly concluded that the Tribunal had dealt with the appellant’s claim as required, and that the Tribunal’s findings were sufficient. The court also found that the primary judge had correctly determined that the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal had failed to consider certain aspects of his claim was not made out.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to FCR 1.32 and/or 1.34, the time of filing the notice of appeal be taken to be the date upon which the document entitled “Originating application for review of a migration decision” was filed in this Court.

2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before returning to whether this ground of appeal has any substance, I should say something about the background and circumstances which have led to the hearing of this appeal.B BACKGROUND The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen who arrived in Australia in July 2012 and subsequently applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa in November 2012. The application for a protection visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister in July 2013 and the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision in August 2013. Both written and oral material in support of the appellant’s claim was received by the Tribunal. Eventually, in January 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant commenced proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court in January 2015, ultimately relying upon three grounds which were articulated in an amended application filed in March 2015. The grounds relied upon (and the bases upon which they were disposed of by the primary judge) can be summarised as follows: (a)Ground 1 asserted that the Tribunal fell into error when it asked the wrong questions regarding detention, and failed to assess the appellant’s claim for detention. The primary judge found that this was not made out having regard to the Tribunal’s findings at [24] and [44] of the Tribunal’s reasons (TR).(b)Ground 2 alleged that the Tribunal failed to assess the appellant’s claim of detention for illegal departure, or misconstrued s 91R of the Act. The primary judge found that this was not made out, having regard to the Tribunal’s findings at TR [53].(c)Ground 3 alleged that the Tribunal failed to consider the membership by the appellant of a particular social group, being young Tamil males in Sri Lanka and/or young Tamil males suspected of having links with an organisation known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Again, her Honour found that this was not made out having regard to the Tribunal’s findings at TR [53].C CONSIDERATION As should by now be obvious, the issue raised in this Court by the Notice of Appeal is narrower than as agitated below and focuses on the way in which her Honour dealt with Ground 1 below. Ground 1 before the primary judge was somewhat different to the appellant’s contention as presently formulated, but, given the essence of the appellant’s contention in the Notice of Appeal is that the primary judge fell into error in failing to uphold Ground 1 below, it is convenient, despite its length, to set out how this aspect of the argument below was dealt with at [20]-[29] of her Honour’s reasons:[20] Ground 1 also asserts that the Tribunal did not deal with the applicant’s “claim of persecution, ill treatment, such as working at the base, as a result of such random detentions and whether such forced tasks amounted to persecution”. In support, the applicant stated that the Tribunal did not deal with what would happen to him if he was to return to Sri Lanka.[21] In the applicant’s statement accompanying his protection visa application, the applicant made the following claim about being taken to “the base”:“14. We soon realised that things had not improved for Tamils in Batticaloa despite the end of the conflict. In Batticaloa there are both military and police checkpoints. At these checkpoints if you are Tamil you are stopped and questioned. Even if there are no checkpoints the police or army will stop you and question you. I have to show my ID card and give my address. They say they do not believe me and take me to their base. They are all Singhalese. I am kept there all day. They ask me to work, clean for them in the base without any pay. This happened 3 times. I was not tortured like when I was younger but I was so frightened because of how I had been treated before.”(Errors in original). [22] In its decision record, the Tribunal referred specifically to those claims. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been detained and released unharmed on three occasions between 2011 and his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012.[23] Ground 1 at Particular 1.3 asserts that the Tribunal did not deal with the applicant’s claim that being forced to undertake tasks at the army base amounted to persecution. The first respondent conceded that the Tribunal did not make a specific finding in relation to that claim. However, the first respondent submitted that it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to make a finding on that particular matter, in circumstances where it was subsumed in the Tribunal’s findings of greater generality (see Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ) (“WAEE”). [24] Whilst the Tribunal does not appear to have made a specific finding in respect of that claim, at paragraph 44 of its decision record, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not suspected of LTTE engagement or support. Additionally, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a real chance of suffering serious harm in Sri Lanka as a suspected LTTE supporter. Paragraph 44 of the Tribunal’s decision record is as follows: “44. The applicant's agent said “once a pro-LTTE imputation has been levelled against an individual in Sri Lanka, the consequences can be dire.” However, even based on his own admission, neither the applicant nor any close family member had ever been associated with, or a supporter of, the LTTE. At any rate, the Tribunal is satisfied the limited interest (as elaborated at [17] & [24] herein) in the applicant by the Sri Lanka authorities/army after the cessation of hostilities in May 2009 is a clear indication he is not suspected of LTTE engagement or support. The applicant also conceded that after the war, neither he nor any family member was placed in any rehabilitation (or other) camp – and the Tribunal believes this to be clear evidence of the lack of any interest in him. Neither does the applicant have a profile in Australia (based on his claimed activities), that would suggest he may be banned on return.”[25] The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was of adverse interest to the authorities in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not at a real risk of serious or significant harm if he returned to Sri Lanka as required under s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. [26] It is well-established that the Tribunal is not required to refer to every single piece of evidence that an applicant may provide (WAEE at [46] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ). In my view, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record suggests that the issue of whether the applicant was made to work at the army base, and the consequences of that, were subsumed in findings of greater generality in accordance with the principles referred to in WAEE. [27] In any event, it is well-established that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant (see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J). Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out (see Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J).[28] The Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it, and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal (see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J). A credit finding is sound if it was “open to [the Tribunal] on the material, was based on rational grounds and was arrived at on consideration of matters that were logically probative of the issue of credibility” (see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547).[29] Accordingly, Ground 1 is not made out.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows the primary judge was correct to conclude that the Tribunal dealt with the appellant’s claim (as it was required to do).D CONCLUSION AND ORDERS The Notice of Appeal will be taken to have been filed within time, but the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established