FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZVVB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 207
Appeal from: SZVVB v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 2245 File number: NSD 1758 of 2016 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 2 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) visa – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCC”) – whether the FCC erred by failing to find jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant, a citizen of Syria, had a right to return to Lebanon for the purposes of s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where the appellant claimed that the law in Lebanon had changed since the Tribunal’s decision such that he no longer had a right to enter and reside in Lebanon – where the primary judge found that the law change post-dating the Tribunal’s decision could not support an argument of jurisdictional error – no error in the primary judge’s approach – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(3), 36(4), 36(5), 36(5A), 474 Cases cited: Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129
Date of hearing: 2 March 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 17 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1758 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZVVB
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or as taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMBERG J:
The appellant is a citizen of Syria but has lived most of his life in Lebanon. He arrived in Australia on 10 August 2012. On 18 September 2012, the appellant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (“visa”). On 15 February 2013, a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refused the appellant’s application. On 20 March 2014, the Refugee Review Tribunal, a predecessor of the second respondent (“Tribunal”) affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The subject of this appeal is the primary judge’s dismissal of that application on 29 September 2016. The primary judge’s judgment is published as SZVVB v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 2245.
The task of the primary judge was to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 207
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge correctly identified the scope of the court's review under section 474 of the Migration Act and whether the appellant's claims of changed circumstances in Lebanon post-dating the Tribunal's decision could constitute a jurisdictional error. The court had to balance the appellant's argument about the changed Lebanese law against the established principle that the court's role is to determine if the primary judge's judgment is affected by appellable error, as highlighted in SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The court needed to ensure that the primary judge's approach was correct in determining that the appellant's claims did not affect the jurisdictional integrity of the Tribunal's decision.
The court found no error in the primary judge's approach, confirming that the appellant's post-dating law change argument did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The court emphasised that the primary judge's task was to review the Tribunal's decision for jurisdictional error, not to re-evaluate the merits of the appellant's claims. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that changes in law post-dating the Tribunal's decision do not affect the jurisdictional integrity of that decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or as taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or as taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The task of the primary judge was to determine whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error: s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) and Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. The task of this Court is to determine whether the primary judge’s judgment is affected by appellable error: SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129 at [11] (Branson, Finn and Finkelstein JJ). The appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of his political opinion if he was returned to Syria. He also raised fears about returning to Lebanon because harm would be inflicted upon him by agents of Syria by reason of his political opinion and because of the general situation of violence in Tripoli. The Tribunal addressed those claims. In dealing with the appellant’s claims in relation to Lebanon, it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider subsections (3), (4), (5) and (5A) of s 36 of the Migration Act. An understanding of the Tribunal’s decision requires reference to those provisions and it is convenient that I set them out now: …(3)Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national. (4)However, subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a country in respect of which: (a)the non-citizen has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or (b)the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen availing himself or herself of a right mentioned in subsection (3), there would be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm in relation to the country. (5)Subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a country if the non-citizen has a well-founded fear that: (a) the country will return the non-citizen to another country; and (b)the non-citizen will be persecuted in that other country for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (5A) Also, subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a country if: (a)the non-citizen has a well-founded fear that the country will return the non-citizen to another country; and (b)the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen availing himself or herself of a right mentioned in subsection (3), there would be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm in relation to the other country.… The reasons given by the primary judge provide a sufficient summary of the Tribunal’s decision and it is convenient that I set out the relevant paragraphs here (footnotes omitted):[9]The Tribunal expressed significant concerns about the applicant’s credibility and found that he had fabricated and changed his evidence in order to strengthen his protection claims. [10]Despite this view, the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the applicant had previously been involved in the Iraqi Baath Party (IBP), and that he had travelled to Iraq in the in the late 1970s to avoid military service. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant had been imprisoned in Syria between 1986 and 1995 because he had deserted from the Army and because of his “imputed political opinions as a result of his former connection with the IBP”.[11]The Tribunal found, however, that the applicant’s claims of ongoing political involvement since his release from prison were inconsistent and not believable. Specifically, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that he had been involved in anti-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon in 2011 or 2012, or that his wife had been threatened by representatives of the Syrian regime since he arrived in Australia.[12]The Tribunal accepted that, in light of the current “dire situation in Syria”, there was a real chance that the applicant would suffer significant harm on account of his imputed political opinion if he were to be returned to Syria.[13]The Tribunal, however, found that s.36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) applied to the applicant’s claims in respect of the risk of harm upon return to Syria. That section provides: Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national. [14]In this regard, the Tribunal found that the applicant was the holder of a permanent residence visa in Lebanon. It further found that, although this visa way due to expire on 20 November 2014, the applicant had a right to re-enter Lebanon and be granted a further six-month visa. The Tribunal found, therefore, that the applicant had not availed himself of the right to enter and reside in Lebanon on his permanent residence visa.[15]The Tribunal further found that s.36(4) did not apply to the applicant’s case. Specifically, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims that he would suffer harm in Lebanon. It found that he had a “very low, if non-existent, political profile in Lebanon” and the prospect of him being harmed on account of his political opinion would be remote. The Tribunal, after considering relevant country information, also found that the applicant would not face a risk of harm because of his Syrian nationality or Sunni religion. [16]The Tribunal also found that there was not a real chance that the applicant would be returned by Lebanon to Syria. As such, the Tribunal found that s.36(5) and s.36(5A) were not applicable to the applicant’s case.