SZVST v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVST v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1069

Appeal from: SZVST v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1153
File number: NSD 812 of 2016
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 2 September 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether primary Judge erred in failing to discern denial of procedural fairness – whether primary Judge erred in failing to find that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal acted unreasonably in refusing adjournment application – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa)
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Zaoui v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 70

Date of hearing: 10 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Bodisco
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 812 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZVST

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 SEPTEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER J:

  1. This is an appeal from a Federal Circuit Court decision dated 9 May 2016, where the primary Judge dismissed the appellant’s amended application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal). In its decision the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in Australia on a false Indian passport (which appeared on its face to have been issued on 19 November 2012) and was granted a visa referable to that passport on 22 August 2013. The appellant then applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) on 19 September 2013 in a name claimed by the appellant to be his true name.

  3. The appellant alleged that he feared being killed or physically harmed by Muslims extremists in Bangladesh, on account of him being Buddhist. The appellant claimed that he and his family had been persecuted in Bangladesh, as members of a Buddhist minority, and that his father was beaten and killed by a local Muslim leader in relation to a land dispute. He said that his family land was taken over by that local Muslim leader. The appellant claimed that his mother was forced to flee her home and live with her sister due to threats and physical torture by persons who had taken over their family land. Further, the appellant stated that false charges had been laid…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1069
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZVST v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, who sought a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant claimed to fear persecution in Bangladesh due to his Buddhist religion and alleged past persecution and threats against his family. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) reviewed the decision of the delegate and ultimately concluded that Australia did not owe the appellant protection obligations under sections 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The appellant appealed to the Federal Circuit Court, arguing that the Tribunal had erred in refusing his request for an adjournment. The primary Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Tribunal's refusal of the adjournment request was unreasonable or that there had been a denial of procedural fairness.

The key legal issues in this case were whether the primary Judge erred in failing to discern a denial of procedural fairness and whether the primary Judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in refusing the appellant's adjournment application. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had erred in refusing the adjournment request because he was unrepresented, had difficulties finding and instructing a lawyer, was impecunious, and had missed important opportunities to advance his case due to an erroneous address for notice being provided to the Department of Immigration. The appellant contended that these circumstances warranted an adjournment to allow him to obtain legal representation and properly brief his lawyer. The Court had to determine whether these circumstances amounted to a denial of procedural fairness and whether the Tribunal's refusal of the adjournment request was unreasonable.

The Court held that the primary Judge did not err in dismissing the appeal. The Court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Tribunal's refusal of the adjournment request was unreasonable or that there had been a denial of procedural fairness. The Court observed that the appellant had indicated he was ready to proceed with the hearing, and there was no evidence that the appellant did not have a genuine hearing or that there was any jurisdictional error made by the Tribunal. The Court also noted that proceeding with the hearing despite the appellant's potential ability to obtain legal representation did not necessarily mean that the Tribunal had proceeded on an unreasonable basis, especially since no specific lawyer had been identified by the appellant. Furthermore, the Court held that the missed opportunities to advance the appellant's case were due to the appellant's own conduct and not the result of conduct by the Tribunal.

ORDERS:
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The Court noted that the entry of orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal concluded that Australia did not owe the appellant protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act, as the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had a real chance of being persecuted, based on his religion, if he returned to Bangladesh, nor was it satisfied that the appellant had a genuine fear of harm.Federal Circuit Court decision On 9 May 2016, the primary Judge dismissed the appellant’s amended application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal. The ground of review upon which the appellant relied in the Federal Circuit Court were as follows:1.The Tribunal erred refusing to grant the Applicant an adjournment, the Tribunal made a decision so unreasonable no reasonable person would have made it.ParticularsThe Tribunal erred refusing to grant the applicant an adjournment in circumstances where the Applicant was unrepresented in the hearing, had difficulties in finding and instructing a lawyer/agent, was impecunious, had missed important opportunities to advance his cause due to an erroneous address for notice being provided to the Department of Immigration. The appellant was legally represented in the Federal Circuit Court proceedings. Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant’s application for adjournment in the Tribunal was re-enlivened by communications received from the Tribunal. The primary Judge was not satisfied that any communications from the Tribunal or any exchanges which occurred at the commencement of (or during) the hearing were treated as the appellant making a formal application for adjournment. Even had that been the case, the primary Judge considered that the appellant had indicated he was ready to proceed, and it was reasonable for the Tribunal to proceed on that basis. Further, the primary Judge held that there was nothing which suggested that the appellant did not have a genuine hearing, or that there was any jurisdictional error made by the Tribunal in refusing to grant the appellant’s request for an adjournment. His Honour observed that proceeding with the Tribunal hearing when the appellant might have be able to obtain legal representation did not mean that the Tribunal had proceeded on an unreasonable basis, particularly where no lawyer was identified by the appellant. The missed opportunities referenced by the appellant were due to the appellant’s own conduct, and not the result of conduct of the Tribunal.Appeal to this Court At the hearing of the appeal both the appellant and the Minister were represented by Counsel. The Court granted leave to the appellant to file an amended notice of appeal, which set out the following grounds of appeal:1. GROUND ONE:His Honour erred in failing to discern that there had been a denial of procedural fairness in circumstances where the Appellant:a) Was unrepresented;b) Could not properly brief a lawyer due to late notice of proceedings;c)There was no abandonment of his application for an adjournment nor intelligible justification for refusing it.2. GROUND TWO:His Honour erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had acted unreasonably in refusing the Appellant’s adjournment application:a)His Honour erred in finding that the Appellant was not disadvantaged in circumstances where he was not represented and yet, at paragraph [28] of the decision, giving weight to the fact that the Appellant was unable to identify a lawyer;b)His Honour erred in holding that the missed opportunities to advance his case were as a result of that Appellant’s “own conduct” at paragraph [29] in circumstances where the erroneous notification of an address was not due to the Appellant’s own conduct and nor was it an attempt to evade his responsibilities to keep the Tribunal informed.The case of the appellant

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in Australia on a false Indian passport (which appeared on its face to have been issued on 19 November 2012) and was granted a visa referable to that passport on 22 August 2013. The appellant then applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) on 19 September 2013 in a name claimed by the appellant to be his true name. The appellant alleged that he feared being killed or physically harmed by Muslims extremists in Bangladesh, on account of him being Buddhist. The appellant claimed that he and his family had been persecuted in Bangladesh, as members of a Buddhist minority, and that his father was beaten and killed by a local Muslim leader in relation to a land dispute. He said that his family land was taken over by that local Muslim leader. The appellant claimed that his mother was forced to flee her home and live with her sister due to threats and physical torture by persons who had taken over their family land. Further, the appellant stated that false charges had been laid against him in Bangladesh (in relation to keeping firearms) and that he did not attend court for this matter. The appellant stated that he feared returning to Bangladesh as he believed he would be killed by the Muslim group or that he would face harm from the police for the firearm charges against him. Finally, the appellant feared that if he were to travel to Bangladesh through India he would be harmed by Indian authorities because he had used a false Indian passport.Tribunal decision The appellant sought review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal. The Tribunal hearing took place on 24 October 2014 after being adjourned once after the Tribunal had been informed that its letter notifying the appellant of the hearing had been sent to the incorrect address, and that the appellant wished to seek legal representation. At the rescheduled hearing on 24 October 2014 the appellant requested that the hearing be adjourned again. The Tribunal refused his request. (I note that this refusal is of particular importance to the present appeal, and will return to it later in this judgment.) The Tribunal upheld the decision of the delegate of the Minister. It found that while the appellant had been truthful about some of the claims he made, he had exaggerated or fabricated others. In particular, the Tribunal had concerns about the appellant’s claims in relation to the circumstances surrounding the death of his father, the harm suffered by his mother, the evidence concerning an attack on the appellant in 2011, and the evidence about the firearms charges against the appellant. The Tribunal concluded that there were many discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence and the documentary reports he had supplied. The Tribunal concluded that Australia did not owe the appellant protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act, as the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had a real chance of being persecuted, based on his religion, if he returned to Bangladesh, nor was it satisfied that the appellant had a genuine fear of harm.Federal Circuit Court decision