SZVLC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVLC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 761

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal and extension of time: SZVLC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 3371
File number: NSD 2169 of 2016
Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 7 July 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – extension of time refused
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a) and (aa)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 44.12

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.39, 35.13

Cases cited:

AZAEY v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 341

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

SZVBT v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 355

Date of hearing: 17 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms B Rayment
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2169 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZVLC

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 JULY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be refused.

2.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing the applicant’s judicial review application under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). A decision under r 44.12 is interlocutory, so leave is required to appeal to this Court: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A). The applicant also seeks an extension of time to bring the application for leave to appeal.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 7 May 2013 and applied for a protection visa on 30 July 2013.  On 16 January 2014, the applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the first respondent and on 20 January 2014 his application for a protection visa was refused.  On 10 February 2014, he made an application for review of the delegate’s…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 761
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZVLC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The applicant was dissatisfied with the interlocutory decision and believed there were grounds for an appeal. The primary judge of the Federal Circuit Court, who presided over the matter, dismissed the application for leave to appeal, and the applicant sought to challenge that decision in the High Court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal should be granted. The applicant argued that there was sufficient doubt about the primary judge's decision to warrant reconsideration on appeal. The first respondent submitted that the application for an extension of time should be refused due to the insufficient explanation for the delay and the lack of merit in the proposed appeal.

The court considered the relevant factors in determining the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal. While the court acknowledged that the applicant may have had difficulty understanding the court's processes, the proposed appeal did not have any merit. The court found that the applicant's complaints were essentially a challenge to the primary judge's adverse credibility findings, which did not give rise to an appellable error. Therefore, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the application for an extension of time be refused, the application for leave to appeal be dismissed, and the applicant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court's decision highlights the importance of meeting the relevant time limits for filing applications and the need for a valid basis for an appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be refused.

2. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Again, this ground is really a complaint about the Tribunal’s refusal, on the basis of reasonably open adverse credibility findings, to accept the applicant’s claims with respect to “the persecutions, humiliations and sufferings” that he allegedly suffered in Bangladesh. No appellable error arises from those findings.Conclusion For the reasons given above, the decision of the primary doubt is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal. The applications for an extension of time and leave to appeal will be dismissed. The applicant should pay the first respondent’s costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant did not file any written submissions in support of the applications before this Court. When given an opportunity to make oral submissions at the hearing before me on 17 May 2017, the applicant stated that he was telling the truth and sought to challenge the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings. The applicant also challenged the Tribunal’s finding that certain documents relied upon by the applicant were not authentic.CONSIDERATIONExtension of time The Court has a general power to extend a time fixed by the Rules: r 1.39. At the hearing of these applications on 17 May 2017, the Court asked the applicant to provide a reason for the delay in filing, to inform the Court’s decision as to whether the 14-day time limit should be extended. Through an interpreter, the applicant stated:I was late in applying – four days late because I didn’t know the time frame when I should be doing it. I thought it was between 28 days – within 28 days I had to file. Your Honour, I don’t know much about the law. I didn’t go to any lawyer, I couldn’t go, and I am doing all things by myself for my case, and that is why this delay in filing in court. And that is why. I’m really sorry. My apologies. That is why. This is my humble request to the court. Please forgive me and accept my application. The first respondent submitted that the relevant considerations for the Court in determining the application for an extension are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, any prejudice to the respondents and the merits of the proposed appeal. I accept that those are among the considerations relevant to exercise of the Court’s unfettered discretion to grant an extension of time in the circumstances: see generally AZAEY v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 341 at [10]. The first respondent acknowledged, quite properly, that there would be no prejudice to the first respondent if the extension were granted, but submitted nonetheless that the applicant had provided an insufficient explanation for the delay and that the application for an extension should be refused. The applicant is unrepresented and does not speak English. I accept that he may have had difficulty understanding the Court’s processes. Given the small period delay and the lack of prejudice to the respondents, I may have been prepared to grant the extension of time sought, had the proposed appeal had any merit. For the reasons that follow, however, the application for an extension of time and the application for leave to appeal will be dismissed.Application for leave to appeal In order for the applicant to obtain leave to appeal, I must be satisfied that in all the circumstances, the decision of the FCCA is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and, assuming that the decision is wrong, that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9.