SZVKX v Minister for Immigration

[2016] FCCA 324

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVKX & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 324

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.91R(3), 422B, 424AA

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297

First Applicant: SZVKX

Second Applicant: SZVKY

Third Applicant: SZVKZ

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 3070 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Barnes

Hearing date: 8 February 2016

Date of Last Submission: 8 February 2016

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 8 February 2016

REPRESENTATION

The First Applicant: In person

Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

1. The name of the Second Respondent be amended to read "Administrative Appeals Tribunal".

2. The application be dismissed.

3. The First and Second Applicants pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $5,800.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3070 of 2014

SZVKX

First Applicant

SZVKY

Second Applicant

SZVKZ

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(revised from transcript)

1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) dated 14 October 2014 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicants protection visas.  The First Applicant, referred to for convenience as the Applicant, is a citizen of China, who arrived in Australia in 2009 as the holder of a student visa.  She applied for protection in March 2013.  The Second Applicant (her husband) and the Third Applicant (their child) were included in the application as members of her family unit. 

2. In support of the protection visa application, the Applicant provided a personal statement.  The application was refused by the delegate and the Applicants sought review by the Tribunal.  The First Applicant attended the first tribunal hearing held in April 2014, although I note that all three Applicants were invited.  Subsequently, the Tribunal was reconstituted and the Applicants were invited to a hearing before the newly reconstituted Tribunal. 

3. The Applicants attended the second tribunal hearing in October 2014.  Both the First and Second Applicants gave evidence with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. 

4. As indicated, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.  The claims made by the Applicant in connection with her protection visa application were set out in detail in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision.  In essence and as summarised by the Tribunal, she claimed that she was raised as a Christian and attended underground Christian gatherings in China, that her mother was arrested on two occasions, and her father was arrested and detained and forced to close his business.  She claimed that her sister’s children had been denied hukou registration, that her family were monitored by the authorities, that the authorities had threatened to detain her if she returned to China and that she phoned a detention centre in China where her father was being held.  She made claims to fear harm on the basis of her religion, because she called the detention centre and under Fujian family planning laws (as her son was born out of wedlock). 

5. The Tribunal set out the evidence and independent country information to which it had regard.  It stated that it had a number of concerns in relation to the Applicant’s claims and credibility. 

6. First, it had regard to what it saw as a significant delay in lodgement of the protection visa application which raised doubts about the truthfulness of the claims.  As the Tribunal stated that it had discussed with the Applicant at the hearing, she arrived in Australia in August 2009 and her visa ceased in March 2010.  She claimed she found out that her parents had disappeared in August 2010 and that her mother telephoned her and told her the police were asking about her in November 2010 but that she did not find out about protection visas until 2011.  The application for protection was not lodged until March 2013.  The Applicant’s explanation for the delay was that if she was not successful in getting this type of visa when she went back to China she would be interrogated.  The Tribunal did not find this persuasive.  It was of the view that if the Applicant had a genuine fear of returning to China and the events claimed had occurred, she would have no reason to believe that her application would be refused.  The Tribunal considered that the Applicant would have lodged the application rather than risk being caught for staying illegally in Australia.  It acknowledged that there may be good reasons for delay and that delay in an application did not necessarily preclude an applicant from having a well-founded fear of persecution, but it did not accept the explanation in this case and considered the delay cast doubt on the truthfulness of the Applicant’s claims. 

7. The Tribunal also had serious concerns in relation to the Applicant’s claim that she had telephoned a detention centre in Fujian Province in relation to her father’s detention.  It set out her written claim in this respect, including her claim that she did not receive information about her father (who was said to have been detained in August 2010) until November 2010 and that she called the detention centre because she could not stand it and questioned them about how they could detain a law-abiding citizen for such a long time without written notice.  She claimed she had a conversation with a chief guard, argued with him and told him she was in Australia and that she would let foreign media “expose their dirty actions”.

8. The Tribunal referred to the discussion of these claims at the Tribunal hearings.  It had regard to the Applicant’s concession that she did not in fact go to the media in Australia.  She explained this on the basis that she did not know where they were.  The Tribunal did not find this explanation persuasive.  Nor did it find it credible that the Applicant would have called the detention centre and placed her family at risk by so doing or that she would have told the authorities she was in Australia during any such call.  In that context, it had regard to the fact that the Applicant had stated at the hearing that her mother was under surveillance, that her mother had been arrested previously on two separate occasions and warned not to have any connection with overseas Christian groups, and that her father was (on her claim) still in detention.  The Tribunal did not find it credible that in such a situation the Applicant would have placed her family in further danger by ringing the detention centre, challenging their authority and telling them she was in Australia and would go to the Australian media.  It did not find the Applicant’s explanation that she did this because she was angry to be persuasive.  It was not satisfied that the Applicant made any such call to the detention centre. 

9. Nor did the Tribunal find the Applicant’s evidence in relation to her practice of Christianity in China to be persuasive or consistent.  The Tribunal recorded that at the hearing the Applicant had initially stated that she used to attend church in China on a weekly basis until November 2007.  It had put to her that this did not appear to be consistent with her evidence at the Departmental interview that she stopped attending church in China in 2000.  The Tribunal recorded that the Applicant then changed her evidence and stated that she stopped attending church in 2000 because a large church was built.  She stated that she subsequently studied at night with her mother, but then changed her evidence again and stated that she continued to attend gatherings every two to three weeks between 2000 and 2007 but stopped when her mother was arrested and thereafter studied at night with her mother who continued to attend gatherings. 

10. The Tribunal did not find the Applicant’s changing and inconsistent evidence persuasive.  It was not satisfied the Applicant was attending Christian gatherings on a regular basis in China.

11. In addition, the Tribunal did not find it credible that if the Applicant was raised as a Christian in China, she would not have been baptised until some time in 2014.  The Tribunal did not find her explanation that she did not feel her knowledge was sufficient until 2014 to be persuasive.  It had regard to the fact that neither she nor the Second Applicant could recall when in 2014 she was baptised and that she claimed she had been attending church in Australia since 2009. 

12. The Tribunal also did not find it persuasive that the Third Applicant had not been baptised in Australia, particularly in light of the Applicant’s claim that she had been unable to be baptised in China because of government persecution of their church.  It did not find persuasive her explanation that she was waiting until the child could read and understand the greatness of God. 

13. The Tribunal had regard to the Applicant’s evidence about her financial position.  It recorded that at the first hearing she had stated that her parents were supportive, but did not have the financial means to assist her.  When she was asked whether that was what she had put in her student visa application, the Applicant had then stated that in her student visa application she had claimed her parents were well-paid because otherwise she would not have been allowed to come to Australia.  The Tribunal considered that either the Applicant was not being truthful about her parents’ financial situation or else she had knowingly provided false information in her student visa application, and that either of these scenarios did not reflect well on her credibility. 

14. The Tribunal referred to matters that it stated it had put to the Applicant under s.424AA of the Migration Act1958 (Cth). I note in that respect that the only evidence of what occurred in the Tribunal hearings is the Tribunal reasons for decision.

15. The Tribunal indicated that at the second hearing it had put to the Applicant that specified financial information provided with her student visa application suggested that her family was in a good financial position.  In response the Applicant was said to have stated (inconsistently with her evidence at the first hearing) that the information was correct and genuine, but that the family situation had changed because of the arrest of her parents.  The Tribunal did not find this explanation satisfactory, given its serious concerns about the Applicant’s claims about events in China and because it was inconsistent with the Applicant’s evidence at the first hearing. 

16. The Tribunal recorded that it also put to the Applicant that the information on her student file suggested that the Australian Embassy had investigated her financial documentation and found it to be genuine and that this undermined her original claim that the information was false.  The Applicant was said to have claimed that the information was genuine, but that her family’s situation had changed because her parents were arrested.  However, the Tribunal stated that it had significant concerns in relation to the truthfulness of the claim that the Applicant’s parents had been arrested in 2010 (as discussed later in its reasons for decision). 

17. The Tribunal had regard to its concerns about the Applicant’s claims about what had happened to her family in China because of their religious beliefs.  It noted that there was an inconsistency between her written claim that her parents were required to report monthly and her oral claim that they had been required to report weekly since being released from detention.  It did not find her explanation for this inconsistent evidence (that she was nervous) to be persuasive. 

18. The Tribunal also had regard to inconsistency in the Applicant’s evidence as to why she had applied for a passport, in particular, whether it was because her mother had been arrested, given that the passport was issued before the claimed arrest of her mother.  The Tribunal found that the Applicant had changed her evidence in response to this matter being put to her.  The Tribunal was of the view that the Applicant’s inconsistent and changing evidence about why she applied for a passport raised concerns about whether her mother was arrested as claimed. 

19. The Tribunal then considered the Applicant’s claims that both her parents had been arrested in August 2010 and that her father was not released until May 2011. It had regard to the fact that when it discussed the Applicant’s family situation with her husband (the Second Applicant) he had stated that he had met the Applicant in around March or April 2011, but also that he did not know whether any of her family had ever been arrested or detained in China. As it recorded that it had put to the Applicant under s.424AA of the Act, the Tribunal found that it would expect that, given that the Applicants met at a time her father was said to be in detention, the Second Applicant would have been aware that the Applicant’s parents had been detained previously, even if he did not know the detail. It considered the Applicant’s response that she was sure she had told her husband about this, but that it was a long time ago, so maybe he had forgotten. The Tribunal did not find it credible that the Applicant’s husband, facing return to China with the Applicant, would not be aware that his parents‑in‑law had been detained and that his father-in-law was in detention at the time he got to know his wife. It did not find it credible that the Applicant would not have told her husband about her family’s difficulties and did not find her claim that she did not want to burden him persuasive.

20. The Tribunal also had regard to the fact that while the Applicant had claimed that the authorities would not register her sister’s two children as a result of the arrest of her parents, when the Second Applicant was asked by the Tribunal about his nephews he had stated that he believed they were registered, as he did not know why they would not be.  The Tribunal recorded that in response to this evidence the Applicant had appeared to change her evidence and stated that the children were not registered because her sister was not rich and could not afford to pay the fines.  The Tribunal did not find this change in evidence persuasive.  It was not satisfied that the Applicant’s nephews had been unable to be registered because of her parents’ Christianity. 

21. The Tribunal also addressed concerns about the Applicant’s claim that she would attract the adverse interest of the authorities because her parents had been arrested and she was a member of their family (even though she had not been arrested).  It had regard to the fact that her brother was living with their parents and there was no suggestion that he had had any difficulties in China.  The Tribunal was of the view that this suggested that the authorities were not interested in family members of the Applicant’s parents as she had claimed. 

22. The Tribunal also found the Applicant’s evidence about why she did not return to China when her student visa ceased to be inconsistent and unpersuasive.  It detailed the inconsistencies in the evidence in that regard (in particular as to the relevance and timing of her mother’s claimed arrest).  

23. The Tribunal concluded that its concerns were so significant that it was not satisfied that the Applicant had been truthful in her claims.  It was not satisfied that she was a credible witness in relation to core aspects of her claims.  It was not satisfied she was raised as a Christian or attended underground Christian gatherings in China, that her parents were arrested as claimed, that her father was forced to close his business, that her sister’s children were denied registration, that the family was monitored or that the authorities had threatened to detain her if she returned to China.  Nor was it satisfied that she had telephoned the detention centre as claimed. 

24. Despite having rejected these claims, the Tribunal went on to consider the Applicant’s consistent claims to be Christian. It accepted that the Applicant had demonstrated knowledge of Christianity at the departmental interview and described the church she attended in Australia. It found that she did not attempt to embellish these claims. The Tribunal was willing to accept that the Applicant had attended Christian services in Australia and that she held genuine Christian beliefs. The Tribunal therefore found that s.91R(3) of the Migration Act was not enlivened.  It did not disregard the Applicant’s Christianity for the purpose of assessing whether she had a well-founded fear of persecution.

25. The Tribunal accepted that if the Applicant were to return to China, she would wish to practise her Christian beliefs and that she would attend an underground church.  It acknowledged that she made a brief reference to spreading information if she returned to China, but found that she did not appear to pursue this claim.  In light of her evidence at the second hearing that she was not involved in any church activities in Australia, besides attending a weekly service and a mother’s group, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant would be involved in any evangelising if she returned to China.  It was of the view that if she was interested in such activities she would have been involved in them in Australia, where she was free to do so without fear of harm.

26. The Tribunal stated that it had given careful consideration to the country information it had referred to about the treatment of underground Christians in China.  This was clearly a reference to a number of items of independent country information extracted and summarised at paragraphs 15 to 34 of the Tribunal decision.  The Tribunal acknowledged that this included information which suggested that house churches in Fujian Province faced the risk of being closed and the members punished.  However the Tribunal found that the country information also indicated there was a large population of Christians in China, especially in Fujian Province where there were large numbers of independent house churches and that the local government seemed fairly tolerant of unregistered believers.  It addressed the Applicant’s claim that this information was superficial, that a lot of people were persecuted in China but did not report it and that other Christians did not have problems because they attended a public church.  The Tribunal acknowledged that not every incident that took place was reported and that the application of government policy could vary from place to place in China.  However it found that the weight of available independent information indicated that official religious policy had been applied relatively liberally in Fujian and that there was nothing before it to indicate that the situation was different in the Applicant’s specific area. 

27. In light of the country information, the Tribunal’s credibility concerns and its finding about the absence of any past harm to the Applicant in China, it found that there was not a real chance she would face serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future if she returned to China and continued to practise her faith as a Christian or because of her family, their religion or their participation in an underground church. 

28. Although the Second and Third Applicants had not raised any claims about practising as Christians, as the evidence before the Tribunal suggested that the Second Applicant was a Christian and the Third Applicant was being raised as a Christian, the Tribunal considered whether there was a real chance of harm as a result.  However, having regard to independent country information it was not so satisfied.  In particular, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the child would have no religious freedom or fairness in China, as there was provision for Christians to practise their faith legally and the Fujian authorities appeared to be relatively tolerant of those who chose to practise in underground gatherings outside the official churches.

1. In addition, the Tribunal was not satisfied the Applicant would be arrested, harassed or detained for practising Christianity in China and hence was not satisfied that the Third Applicant would be harmed as a result of his mother’s detention or harassment. 

2. The Tribunal then returned to the Applicant’s claim that she had telephoned the detention centre.  It reiterated that it did not find the Applicant to be a credible witness or that her evidence about calling the detention centre was persuasive and that it was not satisfied that her parents had been detained as claimed.  Hence the Tribunal found that the Applicant would not appear to have any motivation for calling the detention centre.  It was not satisfied she made any such call and hence was not satisfied there was a real chance of harm as a result of such a call. 

3. The Tribunal addressed in some detail the claims made relating to application of Fujian Province family planning laws  It accepted the Third Applicant was the child of the First and Second Applicants and that he was, as they claimed, born out of wedlock (having been born a couple of months before their marriage).  It considered the relevant provisions of the Fujian family planning laws (which it set out).  It accepted that as the child was born out of wedlock a social compensation fee would be payable for him to be registered in China.  The Tribunal took into account the Applicant’s statement that she lived in a rural and not an urban area and also information that there was provision for the possibility of making payments by instalments.  It reiterated that it was not satisfied that the Applicant was credible or had been truthful about her family situation, particularly her parents’ financial situation. 

4. The Tribunal had regard to the Applicant’s evidence that she and her husband had regular contact with both their families and that her husband’s family had been financially supporting him and his brother in Australia in the past.  It was satisfied that she and her husband were both in contact with their families, who were supportive of them.  It had regard to the support that had been provided in relation to their travel to Australia on student visas.  It appeared to the Tribunal that the Applicant and her family had been able to access significant funds previously when required.  It also had regard to evidence that the Second Applicant had been working in Australia laying carpets.  It considered he would be able to find employment if he returned to China.

5. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant would not be able to pay for her son to be registered in China.  This conclusion was said to be supported by the evidence of the husband at the second hearing that they would be able to afford to pay the social compensation fee if it was in the vicinity of $3,300 to $5,500 (which was equivalent to the amount in RMB the information suggested would be payable in light of the Applicants’ claimed circumstances).  It did not find persuasive the Applicant’s suggestion that her husband was referring to the cost of registration of the child in Australia, given that there was no requirement for them to pay money to have the child registered in Australia. 

6. The Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claim that the authorities would not allow the child to be registered because of her Christian activities and those of her family.  It found that there was no independent evidence to suggest that the authorities withheld registration for children of underground Christians or to suggest that returning Christians were subject to adverse attention from the authorities.  It was not satisfied that the authorities had refused to register the Applicant’s nephews in China because of her parents’ arrest.  The Tribunal was not satisfied there was a real chance the Third Applicant would be refused registration by the authorities if the social compensation fee was paid. 

7. In light of its findings in relation to the Applicant’s ability to pay this fee, it followed that the Tribunal was not satisfied there was a real chance or risk of harm to the Applicants because the child was not registered.  Nor was it satisfied that the imposition of the fee or any financial loss suffered in having to pay it would constitute serious or significant harm. 

8. Considering the Applicants’ circumstances individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal was not satisfied there was a real chance they would suffer serious or significant harm as a result of the breach of China’s family planning laws.

9. While the Applicant had not directly raised a claim about returning to China as a failed asylum seeker, the Tribunal acknowledged that she had referred to a fear of being interrogated by the police as an unsuccessful protection visa applicant.  It had regard to independent country information, but found that the Applicant did not have the high profile that would put her at risk in this respect and that there was no evidence or claims that the authorities were aware of her protection visa application or that they would be likely to become aware in circumstances where the process was confidential.  The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Chinese authorities would be aware the Applicant had lodged an unsuccessful protection visa application. 

10. The Tribunal was not satisfied there was a real chance the Applicant would be harmed as a result of her protection visa application or as a returning failed asylum seeker. 

11. The Tribunal considered all the Applicants’ claims individually and cumulatively, but was not satisfied they met the Refugees Convention criterion.  For the same reasons, it was not satisfied that the Applicants met the complementary protection criterion.  It affirmed the delegate’s decision. 

12. The Applicants sought review by application filed in this Court on 5 November 2014.  The application contains five grounds.  The Applicants did not file written submissions.  The Applicant made oral submissions today. 

13. The first ground is a generally expressed contention that the Tribunal deprived the First Applicant of natural justice. There is no evidence before the Court and nor is it apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations under Part 7 of the Migration Act (see s.422B) or that it in any way denied any of the Applicants procedural fairness.

14. I note in that respect that when the Tribunal was reconstituted, the second Tribunal Member conducted a fresh hearing which the Applicants attended and at which they gave evidence and presented arguments. On the Tribunal’s account it put information to the Applicant (including information from her husband) under s.424AA of the Act.

15. In submissions today, the Applicant in essence took issue with the Tribunal’s conclusions.  In so doing she invited the Court to undertake impermissible merits review.  The Tribunal’s findings, including in relation to the Applicant’s credibility, were open to it on the material before it for the detailed reasons which it gave. 

16. There is nothing in the material before the Court to establish a denial of natural justice.  Ground 1 is not made out. 

17. Ground 2 is an assertion that the Applicant has more evidence and enough information for a fair complementary protection review.  However, the fact that the Applicant now claims that she has further evidence and information does not establish that the Tribunal fell into error on the material before it at the time of its decision.  The Tribunal considered the claims of all the Applicants to complementary protection.  In its reasons it referred to both serious and significant harm.  Given the nature of its findings, it was open to the Tribunal to deal with complementary protection in the general way that it did at the conclusion of its reasons for decision.  The Applicant’s assertion about the availability of more evidence does not demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.  There is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that the Applicant sought more time to provide further evidence to the Tribunal or that is otherwise such as to raise a concern in that respect.  Ground 2 is not made out. 

18. Ground 3 is as follows:

    Trying to send me back home will result in jeopardising my life, pushing me into life-threatening situations, being physically harmed, mentally tortured and emotionally unstabled for the rest of my life.

19. The Applicant repeated these contentions in submissions today.  This ground invites the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.  It does not establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. 

20. Ground 4 is that:

    The Tribunal made an error of law for not considering my submissions.

21. There are no written submissions in the Court Book.  I asked the Applicant what she meant by this ground.  She indicated that she meant oral submissions she made at the Tribunal hearings.  There is, however, no evidence before the Court to establish that the Tribunal failed, let alone failed in a manner constituting jurisdictional error, to consider any such submissions. 

22. Ground 5 is a claim that:

    The Tribunal failed to consider evidences which were significant and critical to the decision under review.

    When asked what she meant by “evidence” in this context, the Applicant indicated that she meant her oral evidence.  Again, there is nothing in the material before the court to support any contention that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence that was significant and critical to the decision under review.  As indicated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1 it is for the Applicant to establish a basis on which it may be inferred that material has not been considered by the Tribunal. There has been no attempt by the Applicant in this case to establish such a basis. Nor is it apparent on the material before the Court that the Tribunal failed to consider submissions or evidence in a manner constituting jurisdictional error. (In that respect, compare Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317 and Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297 at 527).

23. While grounds 4 and 5 are expressed in conventional terms that may raise a jurisdictional error in certain circumstances there is simply nothing in the material before the Court or in what the Applicant said today to establish jurisdictional error on either basis.  Neither ground 4 nor ground 5 is made out. 

24. Insofar as the Applicant also made claims today about her fears on return to China, it is apparent from the Tribunal reasons for decision that the Tribunal addressed those claims, including her claim that she would have to hide.  The Tribunal made a clear finding that there was not a real risk or chance that the Applicant would face serious or significant harm if she continued to practise Christianity in an underground church in her home region in China. 

25. To the extent that the Applicant claimed today that the Tribunal did not consider the effect of her religious practice or her mother’s religious practice on her child, that is contrary to the Tribunal reasons for decision.  The Tribunal expressly considered the situation of the child.  It accepted that while not baptised, the child would be raised as a Christian.  It considered whether there was a real chance of harm as a result of this and also whether there was a risk of harm to the child having regard to his mother’s claims that she would be arrested, harassed or detained for practising Christianity in China.  The Tribunal was not satisfied that this would occur. 

26. In submissions in reply, the Applicant took issue with the Tribunal’s approach to independent country information in relation to the practice of Christianity in underground churches in Fujian Province.  She seemed to indicate that she did not know the basis on which the Tribunal had reached its conclusions or what the information was on which the Tribunal had relied. 

27. As indicated above, the Tribunal referred in considerable detail (in paragraphs 15 to 34 of its decision) to independent country information about the situation of Christians in China to which it had regard.  In discussing such information the Tribunal acknowledged that some issues were raised by the country information, including information suggesting that house churches in Fujian faced the risk of being closed and the members punished.  However, as indicated, the Tribunal went on to find on the basis of the evidence before it, and notwithstanding the Applicant’s contentions in that respect (which it addressed), that there was not a real chance the Applicant would face serious harm if she continued to practise her faith as a Christian in China, including in an underground church.

28. The Applicant’s disagreement with the Tribunal’s approach to independent country information is not indicative of jurisdictional error.  The selection and weight to be given to items of independent country information is a matter for the Tribunal.  The Applicant’s disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning or thought processes in this respect or the weight to be given to items of independent country information is not indicative of jurisdictional error.

29. As no jurisdictional error has been established, the application must be dismissed.

30. The Applicants have been unsuccessful.  It is appropriate that the adult applicants should pay the costs of the First Respondent.  The amount sought is reasonable in light of the nature of this and other similar matters. 

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Barnes

Date: 18 February 2016