FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 736
Citation: SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 736 Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1572 Parties: SZVIV and SZVIW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 635 of 2015 Judge: FARRELL J Date of judgment: 20 July 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review – decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of Minister to refuse protection visa – consideration of merits of proposed grounds of appeal Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1572Date of hearing: 20 July 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A Wong of DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 635 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZVIV
First ApplicantSZVIW
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JULY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2.The application be dismissed.
3.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 635 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZVIV
First ApplicantSZVIW
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE:
20 JULY 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal a judgment of Judge Nicholls of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 13 May 2015: see SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1572 (“SZVIV”).
At the commencement of the hearing, the Minister sought leave to change the name of the second respondent to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”. I granted that leave.
BACKGROUND
The applicants are husband and wife who are citizens of the People’s…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 736
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the application for an extension of time to appeal and the leave to appeal itself had merit. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had failed to adequately assess the risk of persecution they would face if returned to China, and that the Tribunal's process was unfair due to the inability to provide certain documentation. The Minister argued that the appeal lacked merit and would not succeed, and that some grounds were improperly brought for the first time at the appeal stage. The court considered the prospects of success of the substantive appeal and whether any jurisdictional or legal errors had been made by the Tribunal or the primary judge.
The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal did not disclose any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal or legal error by the primary judge. The court was satisfied with the reasoning provided by the primary judge and found no basis for the applicants’ claims of unfair process or inadequate risk assessment. The court concluded that the appeal lacked merit and had no prospect of success. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was dismissed, with the applicants ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The second respondent's name was also changed to the "Administrative Appeals Tribunal" as per the Minister's request.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
2. The application be dismissed.
3. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants appeared in person and with the assistance of an interpreter. They provided no written submissions. The Minister provided written submission and appeared by his representative.CONSIDERATION The Minister’s representative submitted that both the grant of an extension of time and leave to appeal should not be allowed because the substantive appeal lacks merit and has no prospect of success. The Minister accepted that the Court would not treat the short delay as an impediment to the grant of an extension of time if the proposed grounds were sufficiently meritorious and that it would suffer no material prejudice if the extension of time were granted. The primary focus of the Court at the hearing was the prospects of success of the substantive appeal. The hearing was conducted on the basis that grounds one to three of the application are directed to the application for an extension of time and did not require further consideration. Grounds four to eight are directed to the substantive grounds of appeal on the basis of which leave to appeal is sought. The wife’s submissions in relation to grounds five, six and eight were essentially the same: she submitted that the Tribunal failed to provide a “risk assessment”, that is, it did not consider that if she had been dismissed by her employer for the reasons set out in her application for protection and if she returned to China she will not be able to survive because the Department of Public Security will find her and she will not be able to work. She says the Tribunal did not sufficiently take into account that if she were returned to China she would not be able to find employment and therefore could not survive. She submitted that persecution need not be physical; it can be mental resulting from incapacity to work. The wife confirmed that her concerns arose out of events in China, not because of anything which has occurred since she left China. In relation to ground seven, the wife submitted that the Tribunal’s process was not fair because it required evidence of her father’s detention, but she says that the applicants left China secretly and it was not possible to take documentation of that kind through customs. The Minister’s written submissions contended that ground four invites impermissible merits review and the other grounds were insufficiently particularised and did not relate to the grounds considered by the primary judge. With the benefit of the applicants’ oral submissions, grounds four, six, seven and eight raise essentially the same issues as those raised before the primary judge with some elaboration in relation to the nature of the meaning of “persecution”. For the reasons given by the primary judge, I consider that it was open to the Tribunal to make the findings which it did and to draw the conclusions as to the credibility of the applicants and their claims to protection that it did. No jurisdictional error by the Tribunal or legal error by the primary judge is disclosed. Grounds four, six, seven and eight should therefore be rejected. In relation to ground five, the applicants failed to provide any particulars and the ground was not argued before the primary judge. Having regard to the Tribunal’s detailed Statement, I see no basis on which to find that the applicants were not afforded a hearing as required by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and I would not be disposed to grant leave to appeal to raise it now.