SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 736

Citation: SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 736
Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1572
Parties: SZVIV and SZVIW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 635 of 2015
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 20 July 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review – decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of Minister to refuse protection visa – consideration of merits of proposed grounds of appeal
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425
Cases cited:

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1572

Date of hearing: 20 July 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A Wong of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 635 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZVIV
First Applicant

SZVIW
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JULY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2.The application be dismissed.

3.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 635 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZVIV
First Applicant

SZVIW
Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE:

20 JULY 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal a judgment of Judge Nicholls of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 13 May 2015: see SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1572 (“SZVIV”).

  2. At the commencement of the hearing, the Minister sought leave to change the name of the second respondent to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”. I granted that leave.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The applicants are husband and wife who are citizens of the People’s…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 736
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In SZVIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicants, a husband and wife from the People's Republic of China, sought an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed their application for judicial review of a Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) decision. The wife had applied for a protection visa, which was ultimately refused. The basis of her claim was her status as a Falun Gong practitioner and the alleged harm she had suffered in China due to her practice. The Tribunal found that the wife had fabricated her claims and evidence, leading to the affirmation of the delegate's decision to refuse the visa.

The legal issues before the court were whether the application for an extension of time to appeal and the leave to appeal itself had merit. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had failed to adequately assess the risk of persecution they would face if returned to China, and that the Tribunal's process was unfair due to the inability to provide certain documentation. The Minister argued that the appeal lacked merit and would not succeed, and that some grounds were improperly brought for the first time at the appeal stage. The court considered the prospects of success of the substantive appeal and whether any jurisdictional or legal errors had been made by the Tribunal or the primary judge.

The court found that the proposed grounds of appeal did not disclose any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal or legal error by the primary judge. The court was satisfied with the reasoning provided by the primary judge and found no basis for the applicants’ claims of unfair process or inadequate risk assessment. The court concluded that the appeal lacked merit and had no prospect of success. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was dismissed, with the applicants ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The second respondent's name was also changed to the "Administrative Appeals Tribunal" as per the Minister's request.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The application be dismissed.

3. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the commencement of the hearing, the Minister sought leave to change the name of the second respondent to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”. I granted that leave. BACKGROUND The applicants are husband and wife who are citizens of the People’s Republic of China. Only the first applicant (“wife”) made a claim to protection. The second applicant (“husband”) was included in the visa application as her spouse. The first applicant arrived in Australia on 19 April 2012 as the holder of a tourist visa, which expired on 19 July 2012. The first applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 12 July 2012. The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 11 October 2012. The basis for the wife’s claim for protection was set out at [4]-[5] of the primary judge’s judgment as follows (references to the court book omitted):The applicant claimed to fear harm in China because she is a Falun Gong practitioner. She claimed to have begun practicing “Falun doctrines” to improve her health. The applicant claimed that her parents, and one of her sisters, were Falun Gong practitioners. Further, that her mother had been imprisoned, and injected with a needle while detained, which the applicant believes led to her mother’s death after she was released. Her sister also passed away at this time. The applicant also claimed that she unsuccessfully sought to “clarify” with the authorities details relating to her mother’s name, and that she raised concerns about her mother’s “murder”. She claims that, in “retribution”, the government sought out her employer and the second applicant’s employer to “put pressure” on her. She then withdrew her application to “be left in peace”. The applicant’s father was allegedly detained by police on 13 January 2012 and his house was “raided”. The applicant received a “Criminal Detention Notice” stating that her father was detained “for utilizing cult organization to crush the legal system”. Her father was released on 23 January 2012 and urged the applicant to leave China. Later in the year her father was taken by the government for “brainwashing classes” and they threatened him with “danger” towards the applicant. TRIBUNAL DECISION The wife applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it was then known) for review of the delegate’s decision on 7 November 2012. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 30 September 2014. The Tribunal summarised its conclusions at [33]-[34] of its Statement of Decision and Reasons (“Statement”): … I am not satisfied that the applicant’s fear is genuine. I do not accept that the applicant’s claims are true. I am satisfied that she has fabricated her claims to be a Falun Gong practitioner and to have experienced harm in the past for this reason. To the extent that the second applicant has provided evidence in support of the applicant’s protection claims, I am satisfied that he has fabricated that evidence in order to support the applicant’s protection claims. I find that neither applicant has told the truth in their evidence.It follows, therefore, that there is no basis on which I could be satisfied that her fear is well-founded (the refugee criterion for a protection visa), and neither is there any basis on which I could be satisfied that there is a real risk of significant harm (the complementary protection criterion).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The basis for the wife’s claim for protection was set out at [4]-[5] of the primary judge’s judgment as follows (references to the court book omitted):The applicant claimed to fear harm in China because she is a Falun Gong practitioner. She claimed to have begun practicing “Falun doctrines” to improve her health. The applicant claimed that her parents, and one of her sisters, were Falun Gong practitioners. Further, that her mother had been imprisoned, and injected with a needle while detained, which the applicant believes led to her mother’s death after she was released. Her sister also passed away at this time. The applicant also claimed that she unsuccessfully sought to “clarify” with the authorities details relating to her mother’s name, and that she raised concerns about her mother’s “murder”. She claims that, in “retribution”, the government sought out her employer and the second applicant’s employer to “put pressure” on her. She then withdrew her application to “be left in peace”. The applicant’s father was allegedly detained by police on 13 January 2012 and his house was “raided”. The applicant received a “Criminal Detention Notice” stating that her father was detained “for utilizing cult organization to crush the legal system”. Her father was released on 23 January 2012 and urged the applicant to leave China. Later in the year her father was taken by the government for “brainwashing classes” and they threatened him with “danger” towards the applicant. TRIBUNAL DECISION The wife applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it was then known) for review of the delegate’s decision on 7 November 2012. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 30 September 2014. The Tribunal summarised its conclusions at [33]-[34] of its Statement of Decision and Reasons (“Statement”): … I am not satisfied that the applicant’s fear is genuine. I do not accept that the applicant’s claims are true. I am satisfied that she has fabricated her claims to be a Falun Gong practitioner and to have experienced harm in the past for this reason. To the extent that the second applicant has provided evidence in support of the applicant’s protection claims, I am satisfied that he has fabricated that evidence in order to support the applicant’s protection claims. I find that neither applicant has told the truth in their evidence.It follows, therefore, that there is no basis on which I could be satisfied that her fear is well-founded (the refugee criterion for a protection visa), and neither is there any basis on which I could be satisfied that there is a real risk of significant harm (the complementary protection criterion). The Tribunal found that the wife’s evidence at the Tribunal’s hearing differed from the claims she presented in her protection visa application and written statement: see [41] of the Statement. It was of “greatest concern” to the Tribunal that she had raised several new protection claims for the first time at the hearing. One of the new claims was that she had been dismissed from her job in 2009 and unemployed in 2010 as a result of pursuing her inquiry into her mother’s cause of death.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants appeared in person and with the assistance of an interpreter. They provided no written submissions. The Minister provided written submission and appeared by his representative.CONSIDERATION The Minister’s representative submitted that both the grant of an extension of time and leave to appeal should not be allowed because the substantive appeal lacks merit and has no prospect of success. The Minister accepted that the Court would not treat the short delay as an impediment to the grant of an extension of time if the proposed grounds were sufficiently meritorious and that it would suffer no material prejudice if the extension of time were granted. The primary focus of the Court at the hearing was the prospects of success of the substantive appeal. The hearing was conducted on the basis that grounds one to three of the application are directed to the application for an extension of time and did not require further consideration. Grounds four to eight are directed to the substantive grounds of appeal on the basis of which leave to appeal is sought. The wife’s submissions in relation to grounds five, six and eight were essentially the same: she submitted that the Tribunal failed to provide a “risk assessment”, that is, it did not consider that if she had been dismissed by her employer for the reasons set out in her application for protection and if she returned to China she will not be able to survive because the Department of Public Security will find her and she will not be able to work. She says the Tribunal did not sufficiently take into account that if she were returned to China she would not be able to find employment and therefore could not survive. She submitted that persecution need not be physical; it can be mental resulting from incapacity to work. The wife confirmed that her concerns arose out of events in China, not because of anything which has occurred since she left China. In relation to ground seven, the wife submitted that the Tribunal’s process was not fair because it required evidence of her father’s detention, but she says that the applicants left China secretly and it was not possible to take documentation of that kind through customs. The Minister’s written submissions contended that ground four invites impermissible merits review and the other grounds were insufficiently particularised and did not relate to the grounds considered by the primary judge. With the benefit of the applicants’ oral submissions, grounds four, six, seven and eight raise essentially the same issues as those raised before the primary judge with some elaboration in relation to the nature of the meaning of “persecution”. For the reasons given by the primary judge, I consider that it was open to the Tribunal to make the findings which it did and to draw the conclusions as to the credibility of the applicants and their claims to protection that it did. No jurisdictional error by the Tribunal or legal error by the primary judge is disclosed. Grounds four, six, seven and eight should therefore be rejected. In relation to ground five, the applicants failed to provide any particulars and the ground was not argued before the primary judge. Having regard to the Tribunal’s detailed Statement, I see no basis on which to find that the applicants were not afforded a hearing as required by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and I would not be disposed to grant leave to appeal to raise it now.