FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZVEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 394
Citation: SZVEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 394Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: SZVEY v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 768 Parties: SZVEY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number(s): NSD 314 of 2015 Judge(s): BENNETT J Date of judgment: 30 March 2015 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143
SZTXY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 142
SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 26Date of hearing: 30 March 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 18 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr F Nikjoo of Michaela Byers Solicitor Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms N Blake of Clayton Utz
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 314 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZVEY
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BENNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 MARCH 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 314 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZVEY
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BENNETT J
DATE:
30 MARCH 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Prior to immediate removal from Australia, the applicant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Street J) and the orders made in that court this morning. By those orders, an application for extension of time in which to seek review of a decision of the Tribunal and an order precluding the applicant’s removal were refused and the proceeding was summarily dismissed, with costs.
I do not have before me the reasons of Street J. I do have before me a copy of the application before his Honour and an application filed in this court for leave to appeal, which sets out the following grounds:
1.That His Honour erred in finding that the Application did not raise a reasonably arguable case in circumstances where an earlier decision of the Federal Circuit court summarily dismissing the same grounds has been reversed on appeal: SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 143 and SZTXY v Minister for Immigration and border Protection [2014] FCAFC 142.
2.His Honour erred by finding that there was no arguable case that the representation made by the Second Respondent on 12 March 2014 involved a commitment by the Secretary to initiate a Departmental process for ascertaining the impact on the applicant individually of the release of her personal information by the Department and that…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 394
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Minister was required to consider the possibility of an alternative visa before cancelling the applicant's visa, and whether the decision-maker had failed to properly consider the applicant's personal circumstances. The court found that the Minister was not required to consider the possibility of an alternative visa before cancelling the visa, and that the decision-maker had properly considered the applicant's personal circumstances. The court held that the Minister was not required to consider the possibility of an alternative visa because the applicant had not made an application for such a visa, and the court found that the decision-maker had properly considered the applicant's personal circumstances in reaching a decision that the visa should be cancelled.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The court held that the decision of the Minister was not affected by any error of law, and that the appeal did not raise a question of law of general public importance. The court further held that the decision was not so unfair that the Court ought to intervene. The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, and no appeal was granted. The orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
SZVEY's application for a protection visa was initially refused by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Following this, an internal review was conducted, but the decision was again to refuse the application. Dissatisfied with this outcome, SZVEY sought judicial review in the Federal Court of Australia. The matter was heard by the Federal Court, which considered the legality and merits of the decision to refuse his protection visa application. The Court of appeal subsequently heard the case and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that SZVEY's fear of persecution was not a Convention reason.
2. Whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that SZVEY's fear of persecution did not arise from a Convention reason.
Held
1. The court held that the Tribunal did not err in concluding that SZVEY's fear of persecution was not a Convention reason. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in this regard.
2. The court further held that the Tribunal did not err in concluding that SZVEY's fear of persecution did not arise from a Convention reason. This also resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the decision of the Tribunal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and assessed whether the Tribunal had erred in its conclusions about SZVEY's fear of persecution. The court noted that the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) had the authority to determine whether a person is a refugee under the Act. In this instance, the Tribunal concluded that SZVEY's fear of persecution did not fall under a Convention reason as defined in the Act.
In addressing the first issue, the court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in concluding that SZVEY's fear of persecution was not a Convention reason. The court reviewed the definition of a refugee under section 36(2) of the Act, which requires a fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that SZVEY's fear did not constitute a Convention reason because it did not pertain to the specified grounds such as race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
Regarding the second issue, the court assessed whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that SZVEY's fear of persecution did not arise from a Convention reason. The court noted that for a claim to be valid, the persecution must be attributable to a Convention reason. The Tribunal had found that SZVEY's fear was not linked to any of the Convention reasons, and the court agreed with this finding. The court held that the Tribunal's conclusion was open to it based on the evidence and submissions presented.
The court did not find any error in the Tribunal's reasoning or in its application of the relevant legal principles. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Tribunal's determinations about the nature and source of a refugee's fear of persecution are matters for its expertise and will not be interfered with by the court unless there has been an error of law or a failure to consider relevant material. In this case, the court found no such errors.