FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZVBX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 113
Appeal from: SZVBX & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2463 File number: NSD 1127 of 2015 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 19 February 2016 Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A) Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
SCAA v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668
SZVBX & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2463
Date of hearing: 11 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Applicants: The Second Applicant appeared in person and on behalf of the First Applicant Solicitor for the Respondents: Nicole Maddocks, DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 1127 of 2015 BETWEEN: SZVBX
First Applicant
SZVBY
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court filed on 21 September 2015 be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
This is an application for leave to appeal from a judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) of a decision of the second respondent (at the time the Refugee Review Tribunal) (the Tribunal): see SZVBX & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2463 (SZVBX). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) visas.
The orders made by the primary judge were made pursuant to rule 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (FCC Rules). The orders are therefore interlocutory and the applicants require leave to appeal the orders and judgment in SZVBX pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act).
The applicants filed their notice of appeal on 21 September 2015 which was within the 14 day period required by rule 35.13(a) of the Federal Court Rules2011. On that basis the Minister submits, and I accept, that the notice of appeal filed by the applicants ought to be treated as an application for leave to appeal.
BACKGROUND
The applicants, a wife and husband, are citizens of China. They arrived in Australia on 20 November 2012 holding tourist visas. On 19 February 2013, the applicants applied for Protection (Class XA)…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered each ground for appeal in turn. Regarding the allegation of bias, the applicants did not provide any evidence to support this claim. The primary judge had invited the second applicant to raise any concerns about the Tribunal's decision and process, but the second applicant was unable to do so. The court found no evidence to suggest that the primary judge did not approach the hearing with an open mind. The court also found no error in the approach of the primary judge. Regarding the failure to hear evidence, the court found that the applicants' claims were adequately considered by the Tribunal and the primary judge. Finally, the court found no jurisdictional error by the Minister.
Based on the above, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicants to pay the Minister's costs. The court found that there was insufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary judge's judgment to warrant review and that, if the judgment were wrong, the applicants would not suffer substantial injustice. The court also found that the applicants' grounds for appeal were without merit.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court filed on 21 September 2015 be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The draft notice of appeal sets out the following grounds (as written):(1).Bias of the Honour, Judge of Federal Magistrate Court against the Applicant.(2).Error of the Honour, Judge of Federal Magistrate Court, in failing to hear the evidence given by the applicant.(3).Error of the Honour, Judge of Federal Magistrate Court, in failing to identify the jurisdictional error made by the Second Respondent.CONSIDERATION The applicants have not filed any written submissions. The second applicant appeared at the hearing and informed the Court that he was in attendance on his own behalf and on the behalf of the first applicant. When queried, the second applicant suggested that the applicants had not received the Minister’s submissions although he conceded that they may have arrived but, because he does not speak English, he did not take any notice of them. The solicitor for the Minister relied on an affidavit of Rachael Nadine Fresta affirmed 10 February 2016 in which Ms Fresta gave evidence of service of the Minister’s submissions at the two addresses included in the draft Notice of Appeal. Based on that evidence, I accept the submissions were properly served and, given the second applicant’s concession, probably received. In any event, I was informed that a copy of the Minister’s submissions were provided to the second applicant prior to the matter being called on for hearing and read to him by the interpreter. When invited to make oral submissions at the hearing, the second applicant submitted that:(1)the primary judge treated the applicants unfairly in relation to their experience of persecution in China; and(2)the Tribunal member did not believe the applicants’ evidence about the forced termination or the second applicant’s experience in detention. As already noted the primary judge’s judgment is interlocutory and the applicants need leave to appeal from it. In order to succeed on their application for leave to appeal the applicants must demonstrate that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the judgment of the primary judge to warrant review and that, if the judgment of the primary judge is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicants if leave to appeal were refused: see Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. I turn then to consider each of the grounds raised in the draft notice of appeal. Ground 1 alleges bias on the part of the primary judge. An allegation of bias needs to be distinctly made and clearly proved: see Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [127] (Kirby J). The applicants do not rely on any evidence in support of this ground. It is rare that an allegation of bias will be made out solely on the face of the published reasons: see SCAA v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 668 at [38]. In any event, the primary judge invited the second applicant, who appeared at the hearing on behalf of both applicants, to tell him anything that concerned him about the Tribunal’s decision and the process it had followed. The second applicant was not able to do so: SZVBX at [23]. I accept the Minister’s submission that there is nothing to suggest that the primary judge did not approach the hearing of the matter with an open mind. There is no error in the approach of the primary judge.