SZUZF v Minister for Immigration

[2016] FCCA 2831

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUZF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2831

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – whether Tribunal considered applicant’s claims – whether Tribunal made any jurisdictional error by asking questions about the applicant’s religious beliefs – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.424AA

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108

Applicant: SZUZF

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &

BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 2420 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis

Hearing date: 22 September 2015

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 4 November 2016

REPRESENTATION

The applicant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter

Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr A Keevers of Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2420 of 2014

SZUZF

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The applicant, who is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (China), seeks judicial review of a decision made by the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).

Applicant’s claims for protection

1. In a statement that formed part of the applicant’s application for a Protection visa,[1] the applicant claimed to fear harm due to her commitment to Christianity and the Local Church, together with her status as an unmarried mother. According to that statement, the applicant’s father was a Christian and served as the Elder of the Local Church where the applicant attended as a child and was baptised. The applicant’s mother was not religious, and “the stark division between them over the faith” lead to their divorce in 2003. The applicant went to live with her mother, while her two sisters lived with her father.

   [1] CB27-29

2. The applicant continued to practice her Christian faith. During her second year of middle school, the applicant was arrested by the local government for attending the “Sunday Gathering”. The gathering was warned they would be sent to the police if they were to be found holding an unauthorised gathering again.

3. In Easter 2004 the local government came to an unauthorised gathering the applicant was attending. Several core members of the church were arrested, including the applicant’s father. They were turned over to the police and kept in custody for three days. Because of her young age, the policemen lectured the applicant and confined her for one day.  The applicant’s school was informed and, when she returned to school, the applicant was “reprimanded” by her teachers and “discriminated against by [her] classmates”.

4. The applicant did not give up her faith, and went on missionary tours during the summer holidays. During a missionary tour in her third year, the applicant and others were caught by policemen and detained for two days. The applicant and others were then escorted to the applicant’s town where they were imprisoned by the local police for another two days. When the applicant returned to school, she was called to see the headmaster who told her to “quit school or transfer to another school”. The applicant, feeling she had been “driven to the wall”, thought of going overseas as her way out. The applicant travelled to Australia with the help of her father.

5. During the first four years in Australia, the applicant “studied arduously”, and graduated from high school. The applicant’s father supported the applicant financially by establishing a small business which also subsidised the church’s missionary work. This all stopped when the government attempted to stop financing of the church and “began to find fault” with the applicant’s father and “pushed him out of the business”. The applicant lost her source of funds, and, therefore, had to “quit school”.

6. The applicant’s father planned to come to Australia to establish a Local Church. Because he was unable to obtain a visa, the applicant’s father sent another person to Australia who helped the applicant and others set up a small congregation of the Local Church. Many of the congregation’s members were overseas students. The congregation met every weekend, with the applicant’s father “giving us advices and sending people to organize spiritual seminars”. As a result of the changes in Australia’s immigration policy and the reduction in incoming students, the number of people attending the church “is becoming smaller and smaller”. Most of the congregation has returned to China, some of them being caught by the Department of Immigration and repatriated to China. The applicant was shocked and she “did not dare risk sending in any application, let alone contacting the department of immigration”.

7. The applicant then met a boy from her hometown and after a brief relationship fell pregnant. “Realis[ing] the value of an unborn life and the love of a mother”, the applicant decided to give birth to the baby despite not having the support of her child’s father, his family, or her own. The applicant again turned to her faith for support and “found a Local Church recently here in Australia” which she has been attending since. On the encouragement of the congregation the applicant was able to lodge her application for a Protection visa.

Tribunal’s decision

1. The Tribunal found the applicant was vague and non-responsive in relation to some of her claims, and inconsistent and contradictory in relation to other aspects. It also found several of the applicant’s claims to be implausible.[2] The Tribunal ultimately found the applicant was not a witness of truth, that she fabricated some of her claims, and that she falsified her financial circumstances for the purpose of obtaining a Protection visa.[3] The Tribunal relied on a number of matters.

   [2] CB106, [13]

   [3] CB106, [36]

2. First, the Tribunal found the applicant gave the following inconsistent evidence:

   a)In her written statement, the applicant claimed to have been arrested three times and detained twice, while before the Tribunal she gave evidence that she had been arrested and detained only once. [4]

   b)In her statement, the applicant said the headmaster had given the applicant the choice of quitting school or transferring to another school. Before the Tribunal, however, the applicant said that, because her English was not very good, she enrolled in a vocational school to study English to prepare for her coming to Australia. The applicant completed one semester at that school before receiving her visa to come to Australia.[5]

   c)In her written statement the applicant claimed she studied for four years and graduated high school. Before the Tribunal, however, the applicant gave evidence she only completed Year 11 because she enrolled in a Certificate IV in Business which she was unable to complete due to her father losing his business. The Tribunal put to the applicant Department of Education records which showed the applicant deferred high school as she had to extend her English studies and that she never completed high school in Australia. The applicant asserted in response that she “studied Year 11 and in her opinion that is completing high school”.[6]

   d)In her written statement, the applicant said her father sent out someone in 2007 to establish a small congregation of the Local Church, and that he left three months later. Before the Tribunal, however, the applicant said her father had sent out a person in 2009, and that the group broke down after twelve months.[7]

   [4] CB102-103, [14]

   [5] CB103, [15]

   [6] CB103, [16]-[219

   [7] CB104, [23]

3. Second, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s claims were inconsistent with other evidence:

   a)In her statement, the applicant said her father had established a business. The applicant, however, had supported her application for a student visa with a letter purportedly from her father’s employer stating the applicant’s father had worked as a sales manager since March 1993.[8]

   b)In her interview before the delegate, the applicant said the applicant’s two sisters had gone to Japan to study four years ago, and her father funded them. The Tribunal found that to be inconsistent with the applicant’s claims that her father was unable to support her from 2009 because the Chinese government “pushed” her father out of business.[9]

   [8] CB103, [20]

   [9] CB104, [21]-[22]

4. Third, before the Tribunal, the applicant said she began to attend the Local Church in Australia in September 2013, even though she arrived in Australia in 2005. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation that she could not find a Local Church in Australia.[10] The Tribunal found that, had the applicant been a member of the Local Church in China, as she claimed, the applicant would have found and attended a Local Church in Australia soon after she arrived.

   [10] CB104, [24]-[25]

5. Fourth, the applicant was unable to tell the Tribunal the story of Lazarus, or the identity of the person who wrote the Book of Revelations, or the story of Abraham. The applicant said she developed anxiety after she became pregnant, and she forgets things easily. The Tribunal did not accept those explanations for her inability to provide information to the Tribunal on these matters. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s knowledge was not consistent with her claims of having read the Bible, being a practising Christian since the age of 8, and her religion being important to her. [11]

   [11] CB105, [26]

6. Fifth, the applicant arrived in Australia on 16 October 2005 but she did not apply for a Protection visa until 28 October 2013. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation for the delay, namely that she was unaware of her right to do so until after she heard about it when she began to attend the Local Church in Australia.[12]

   [12] CB105, [27]

7. Sixth, the Tribunal accepted that on her return to China, the applicant would be liable to pay a social compensation fee to secure household registration for her child,[13] and that the child’s father does not provide the applicant with financial support for the child.[14] The Tribunal did not accept, however, that the applicant’s family does not accept the applicant and her child, or that the applicant does not have money, friends, or family, or that the applicant does not have the financial resources to pay the social compensation fee in relation to her daughter.[15] The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant’s father has been supporting the applicant and her child,[16] and did not accept that the applicant’s father cannot or will not support the applicant and her child if they return to China.[17]

   [13] CB105, [29]

   [14] CB107, [41]

   [15] CB107, [41]

   [16] CB108, [44]

   [17] CB108, [45]

8. The Tribunal accepted the applicant would face some discrimination as an unmarried mother. The Tribunal did not accept, however, that such discrimination would amount to serious harm,[18] or that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia, there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm as an unmarried mother.[19]

   [18] CB106, [34]

   [19] CB109, [109]

9. The Tribunal, therefore, found the applicant does not face a real chance of suffering serious harm now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future, in China because of her religious convictions or status as an unmarried mother.[20] The Tribunal also found there are no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant returning to China, that there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm.[21]

   [20] CB108, [47]

   [21] CB118-109, [48]-[54]

Grounds of review

1. The applicant, in a statement attached to her application, raises the following grounds under the heading “Attachment to Grounds of Application Orders sought by Applicant”:

   1/. I could not accept RRT’ s decision for me as they failed to take a good consideration in my case, especially my fear of return due to my commitment with Local Church that has been outlawed and persecuted in China. RRT ignored my statement and explanation on how my religious practice has continued after I came to Australia with little flock, RRT’s decision denying my faith and preaching gospel is unfair and unjustified.  (Ground 1)

   2/. RRT gave no careful consideration to my studying history in Australia and made unrealistic judgment to challenge my credibility. Without on site investigation, RRT made wrong judgment without giving me any chance to comment and this is unreasonable and lack of justice. (Ground 2)

   3/. RRT failed to give my statement and explanation a careful and prudent consideration and verification in terms of my family’s financial status which I truly presented in hearing. RRT’s decision in this matter is wrong and against the fact. (Ground 3)

   4/. RRT didi not willing to consider my account on why I find the Local Church late and make application for protection, making wrong judgment by no actual account to refuse my explanation. (Ground 4)

   5/. RRT member made judgment by checking my mobile phone but it is unfair to reject my cooperation by giving the right number and information of the person she wanted. I don’t feel it is fair and a reasonable to be treated as a single mother who’s fallen into difficulty and hardship. RRT’s attitude strengthens my stress and worries. (Ground 5)

   6/. RRT member made unfair judgment against my commitment of Christian faith by testing my biblical knowledge. I don’t think this is the fair and reasonable way for measuring a Christian, as it against the spirit of Holey bible and not in accordance with my religion practice of Local Church. (Ground 6)

   7/. RRT failed to consider my vulnerable child and reluctant to consider any compelling and compassionate circumstance in my case by requesting no further evidence provided or comments, making a negative decision very shortly after the hearing and this reflects its lack of interests, ignorance, misunderstanding, unfairness against a sound hearing procedure I believe. (Ground 7)

2. The applicant also raises the following four grounds under the heading “The Grounds of the Application are”:

   1/. I am on a student background from China. As a committed Christian I have involved myself in Local Church practice and baptized. I have commitment for preaching gospels and this outlawed in China. (Ground 8)

   2/. I have fear to return to origin due my religion and wish to serve in my current Local Church in Australia. (Ground 9)

   3/. My hard experience in China makes me scared to involve again in underground church practice and the reality of persecution on Local Church in origin remain unchanged. (Ground 10)

   4/. As an unmarried mother with a daughter out of wed log I am lack of ability to support her life without social care and family aid. I have strong concern and worry about her equal access to residence registration in China under the condition paying a large amount of social compensation which is mandatory and it is out of my financial ability as I am on debt. I couldn’t imagine what will happen on my innocent child if return, in particular the medical and education challenge and potential risk due to Family Planning penalty imposed as well as my commitment of religion. (Ground 11)

3. At the hearing, each of these grounds was interpreted to the applicant, who is not legally represented, and I invited the applicant to make submissions in relation to each ground.

4. In ground 1 the applicant claims the Tribunal did not properly consider the applicant’s case based on her fear of returning to China because of the applicant’s commitment to the Local Church. The applicant made no submission in relation to this ground.

5. In my opinion, the ground cannot be made out. The Tribunal identified the applicant’s claims based on her being a member of the Local Church and, for the reasons it gave, concluded the applicant’s claims were not credible. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to so conclude and for the reasons it gave. Ground 1, therefore, fails.

6. In ground 2, the applicant claims the Tribunal did not properly consider the applicant’s educational history in Australia, and made an unrealistic judgment of the applicant’s credibility. The ground claims the Tribunal failed to undertake an “on site investigation”, and did not provide the applicant an opportunity to comment. At the hearing, after this ground was interpreted to her, the applicant submitted the Tribunal said the applicant had terminated her study because she did not do well. The applicant submitted the Tribunal could not have made such finding “because of my father’s lack of financial capacity”.[22]

   [22] T7.20

7. This ground appears to be directed to the observation the Tribunal communicated to the applicant that the applicant’s not completing school in Australia appeared to be because of her  English language skills, rather than her father’s inability to fund her studies.[23] That observation, however, was reasonably open to the Tribunal, given that it was based on records from the Department of Education that showed the applicant deferred High School in Australia because she had to extend her English studies.[24] Further, the Tribunal put this observation to the applicant pursuant to s.424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) for the applicant’s comment, and the applicant reiterated her claim that her father’s business had failed, and that her sisters were also affected by that failure.[25]

   [23] CB103, [18]

   [24] CB103, [18]

   [25] CB103, [18]

8. Ground 2, therefore, fails.

9. Ground 3 claims the Tribunal failed to carefully and prudently consider the applicant’s evidence of the applicant’s family’s financial situation. At the hearing before me, after this ground was interpreted, the applicant repeated what she appears to have submitted to the Tribunal, namely, that her father’s business had failed as a result of which her family had difficulties supporting the applicant’s study.[26]

   [26] T7.40

10. I do not accept the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s evidence of her family’s situation. The Tribunal plainly did. It referred to the applicant’s evidence before the delegate that, after the applicant ceased her studies in Australia, the applicant’s father funded the applicant’s sisters’ studies in Japan,[27] and the applicant’s evidence that she had borrowed money from friends, including $7,000 from a person whom she claimed was a friend but whose name was not on the applicant’s telephone contact list.[28] It was reasonably open to the Tribunal, for the reasons it gave, to reject the applicant’s claims that she was not supported, and would not be supported by her father in the future.

    [27] CB104, [22]

    [28] CB105, [30]

11. Ground 3, therefore, fails.

12. Ground 4 claims, in effect, that the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s explanations for why she only began to attend the Local Church in Australia in 2013, and for the timing of her application for a Protection visa. After this ground was interpreted to the applicant, the applicant said she did not apply for a Protection visa earlier because she initially was on a student visa, the immigration policy was constantly changing, and the applicant’s father’s business was failing. The applicant also submitted she was not able to locate the Local Church because she “was not sure about these things in the first place”.[29]

    [29] T8.25

13. I do not accept ground 4. The Tribunal recorded in its reasons of decision the explanations the applicant gave for not attending a Local Church before 2013 and not lodging an application for a Protection visa before 28 October 2013. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation about her attending a Local Church because the Tribunal member, as was disclosed to the applicant, undertook an Internet search using the words “Chinese Local Church Sydney”, and the search revealed plenty of information.[30] The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation for her delay in applying for a Protection visa because the Tribunal was of the view that, had the applicant genuinely feared persecution, she would have researched the Internet and checked with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.[31] It was reasonably open to the Tribunal not to accept the applicant’s explanations for the reasons the Tribunal gave.

    [30] CB104, [24]

    [31] CB105, [28]

1. The matters the applicant raised in her submissions in relation to ground 4 reveal no jurisdictional error. The submissions repeat the substance of the claims on this issue the applicant made before the Tribunal, and, to that extent, seek merits review.

2. Ground 5 claims it was unfair for the Tribunal to have asked the applicant to identify whether the name of the person from whom the applicant claimed she borrowed $7,000 was on the applicant’s mobile telephone contact list. After this ground was interpreted to her, the applicant claimed that after the name she gave to the Tribunal was not in the contact list under that name, the applicant said the name was entered in her mobile telephone contacts list as a nickname. The applicant submitted to me that she found the nickname, and gave that name to the Tribunal, but the Tribunal said “no need now”. A little later in the hearing, the applicant said to me that during the hearing, she said to the Tribunal member that her friend’s nickname was in the mobile telephone, and she asked “do you need it”, to which the Tribunal member said “no”.[32] The applicant also said during the hearing before me that she asked the Tribunal: “do you need the number in here?” to which the Tribunal member said: “no”.[33]

   [32] T11.30

   [33] T11.40

3. What the applicant said at the hearing before me may be inconsistent with what the Tribunal records in its reasons for decision. The Tribunal records the following:[34]

   The Tribunal asked her to show it the name of the friend to whom she owed nearly $7,000 on the contact list on her mobile telephone. This name was not on her mobile telephone. When the Tribunal raised this as an issue, she had difficulty responding. She then stated that it could be under a different name such as her nick name but was unable to show that to the Tribunal.

   [34] CB105, [30]

4. Although the applicant had an opportunity to file a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, she did not do so. I did, however, direct the Minister to provide to me an audio recording of the hearing for the purpose of my listening to that part of the hearing dealing with the applicant’s mobile telephone contacts list. I listened to the relevant part of the audio recording.[35] It was difficult to hear all that was said, largely because a baby was at times screaming. From what I could hear, the Tribunal member asked the applicant to turn to her contacts list on her mobile telephone. The Tribunal member asked the interpreter to find three names. The first name was XL. After some time, the interpreter said she could not find it. The Tribunal member then said to the applicant “the name is not there”. The applicant read out a number and gave a street address. After some silence, the Tribunal member asked the applicant whether she was “putting her name in now”. The applicant said “no”. After some more time, the applicant said something about the person’s name being in sim card storage. After further time passed, the Tribunal member asked: “what are you doing?” The applicant said: “her nickname is in there”, and then she stated a name. The Tribunal member then asked the interpreter to find two other names. Those two other names were in the contacts list. Towards the end of this part of the hearing, the Tribunal member said “thank you”. After a short pause, the applicant said something, and the interpreter appeared to have begun a new sentence commencing with the words “the phone number”. However, as the interpreter said those words, the Tribunal member went on to a new topic by asking “and what do you think will happen if you return to China?”

   [35] Hearing, part 2, from 17:51 to 23:53. I have marked the disc containing the audio recording as “Exhibit A”.

5. On my hearing of the audio recording, I did not hear the Tribunal member saying words to the effect “no need now”, or the applicant, through the interpreter, say words to the effect of “do you need it”, or “do you need the number in here?”  The applicant asserted XL was listed in the contacts list under a nickname after the interpreter said the name of XL was not in the list, after the applicant was asked whether she was entering XL’s name in the list, after the applicant said something about XL’s name being in the sim card storage, and after the Tribunal asked the applicant what she was doing. The Tribunal member made no comment after the applicant stated the nickname of XL was in the contacts list; the Tribunal member simply stated a second name which the member requested the interpreter identify in the contacts list. That name was identified in the contacts list, as was the third name the Tribunal member requested the interpreter to search in the applicant’s mobile telephone contacts list. It is true, as I have noted, the interpreter appears to have begun a new sentence which she did not complete. If the applicant intended to give the Tribunal further information, but she did not do so because the Tribunal began a new question, I am not satisfied the Tribunal intentionally interrupted the applicant from giving any further information.

6. The passage from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision I have set out suggests the applicant was unable to identify in the contacts list the nickname the applicant asserted XL had. If that is the correct interpretation of the Tribunal’s passage, the audio recording does not indicate the Tribunal asked to see whether the name the applicant claimed was the nickname of XL was in the contacts list. That means that the Tribunal made a factual error to the extent it proceeded on the basis that the applicant did not show the name the applicant asserted was the nickname for XL was in the list. An alternative construction of the passage from the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, however, is that the reference to the applicant’s being “unable to show that to the Tribunal” is a finding that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the name identified as the nickname of XL was in fact the nickname of XL.

7. In my opinion, it does not matter which construction of the passage from the Tribunal’s decision is correct. If the Tribunal made an error by incorrectly finding that the applicant could not point to a name in her contacts list which she claimed was the nickname of XL, it is an error of fact within jurisdiction, and an error which is insignificant. Even if the applicant did point in her contacts list to a name which she claimed was the nickname of XL, it is impossible to imagine this could have made any difference to the Tribunal’s conclusions. The only evidence that XL had a nickname was the applicant’s assertion; and she made that assertion only after the Tribunal member was told XL’s name was not in the contacts list, and then only after further time passed where the applicant apparently was looking through her telephone. If, on the other hand, the correct construction of the Tribunal’s passage is the Tribunal was not satisfied XL had a nickname, that was a finding that was reasonably open to the Tribunal.

8. Ground 5, therefore, fails.

9. Ground 6 complains about the Tribunal’s relying on the applicant’s knowledge of the Bible. After this ground was interpreted, the applicant submitted that her understanding about faith is that “you have faith which is contained in your own mind”, and it did not necessarily mean “you are particularly familiar with the Bible”.[36]

   [36] T9.15

10. The legitimacy and limits of a Tribunal’s asking questions about an applicant’s beliefs were considered by Kenny J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP:[37]

    As the authorities emphasize, there is nothing objectionable in the Tribunal questioning an applicant about his or her beliefs. When the Tribunal does so, it is not prohibited from evaluating the applicant’s answers against probative material evincing the doctrines of the religion in question, and the weight to be given to that evaluation will generally be a matter for the Tribunal.

    If the Tribunal is to avoid jurisdictional error, however, certain qualifications must be added to the preceding statements. Where the Tribunal rejects an applicant’s claim based on perceived deficiencies in the applicant’s knowledge of religious doctrine, there must be a basis for concluding that the particular elements of doctrine in question are elements that an adherent to the religion in the applicant’s position might be reasonably expected to know. If this condition is satisfied, and the applicant is wholly ignorant of the relevant doctrinal elements, it will be a short step to infer that the applicant is not a follower of the religion as he or she claims. Where the Tribunal’s material and the applicant’s answers differ in matters of expression, emphasis or detail, however, the issue becomes more complex. In these circumstances, the perceived variations between the Tribunal’s material and the applicant’s answers must be such that there is a logical connection between those variations and the conclusion that the applicant is not an adherent of the religion. Depending on the facts of a particular case, trivial variations in detail or superficial differences in expression may not rationally justify the conclusion that an applicant’s knowledge is less than would be expected of a genuine adherent. Under such circumstances, jurisdictional error is a possibility.  

    [37] [2010] FCAFC 108 at [38]-[39]

11. When considering this ground, it is relevant to note that the Tribunal did not simply rely on the applicant’s inability to provide answers to the questions it asked. The Tribunal’s finding was based on what it considered the applicant ought to have known, having regard to the applicant’s claims. As the Tribunal noted, the applicant did not simply claim she was a Christian; the Tribunal took the applicant to have claimed that she read the bible, that she had been a practising Christian since the age of 8 years, and that her religion was important to her;[38] and the Tribunal’s finding was that her lack of knowledge of the Bible was inconsistent with those claims. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to adopt this reasoning.

    [38] CB105, [27]

12. Ground 6, therefore, fails.

13. Ground 7 claims the Tribunal did not consider the interests of her child, and was “reluctant to consider compelling and compassionate circumstance” of the applicant’s case by requesting further information. The ground also complains about the speed with which the Tribunal made its decision, the applicant claiming this reflects a lack of interest, misunderstanding, unfairness, and unsound hearing procedure by the Tribunal. After this ground was interpreted, the applicant made statements about the difficult circumstances she and her daughter have experienced, her not knowing what she and her daughter would do if they returned to China, and her not being able to provide a decent life for her daughter in China.

14. The ground, as stated, does not raise any jurisdictional error. First, the Tribunal considered the significance of the imposition of a social compensation fee, and concluded the applicant did have the financial resources to pay that fee, and, therefore, secure the registration of the applicant’s child. Second, compassion is not by itself a ground the Tribunal could consider when considering whether the applicant’s claims were credible, or whether the applicant otherwise satisfied the criteria for the grant of a Protection visa. Third, the speed with which the Tribunal made its decision does not by itself support an inference that the Tribunal did not properly consider the applicant’s claims. The Tribunal did consider those claims.

15. Ground 7, therefore, fails.

16. Grounds 8, 9, 10, and 11 do not disclose any jurisdictional error. They only repeat the claims the applicant made to the Tribunal, and invite merits review. This Court has no jurisdiction to review the merits of the applicant’s claims for protection.

17. At the end of the hearing before me, the applicant said the Tribunal member may have had some bias against her. The applicant said that, at the beginning of the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant forgot to bring formula for “the kids”. [39] Her daughter woke up, and began to cry. The applicant left the hearing room, leaving her child there to buy formula. When she returned, the Tribunal member asked why the applicant left her daughter there. I asked the applicant whether she had a complaint about what the Tribunal said. The applicant did not directly answer my question. She said that she felt she did not leave a good first impression on the Tribunal, and that might have led the Tribunal to make an unfavourable decision against the applicant.

    [39] T28.05

18. I listened to the beginning of the audio recording of the hearing before the Tribunal. That records a baby crying, and the applicant leaving the hearing room. The Tribunal member indicated she was having some difficulty with her computer, and adjourned the hearing. When the hearing resumed, nothing was said about the applicant’s having left the hearing room. If, therefore, the Tribunal member asked why the applicant had left the baby, it was asked during the adjournment.

19. In my opinion, assuming the Tribunal did ask why the applicant left the baby in the hearing room, that does not indicate any bias by the Tribunal, and does not indicate any grounds on which bias may reasonably be apprehended.

Conclusion and disposition

1. The applicant has not succeeded on any of her grounds. I propose, therefore, to dismiss the application. I also propose to order that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis

Date: 4 November 2016