FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZUXV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No 2) | [2016] FCCA 1556 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of former Refugee Review Tribunal decision – application in a case seeking reinstatement of review application following discontinuance – application in a case dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001(Cth) Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s.15 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) |
| Applicant: | SZUXV |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2288 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 22 June 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 22 June 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
The Applicant appeared in person
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr L Gell of Clayton Utz |
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
The Application in a Case filed on 30 March 2016 is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the Application in a Case fixed in the sum of $3,416.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2288 of 2014
| SZUXV |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
I have before me an Application in a Case filed on 30 March 2016. The application seeks numerous orders bearing upon the principal proceedings which were an application to review a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). None of the relief sought could be granted in view of the fact that the applicant discontinued the principal proceedings on 8 October 2015. The application was therefore treated as an Application in a Case to set aside that discontinuance as a condition precedent to any of the other relief sought.
The application is supported by an affidavit made by the applicant on 26 March 2016. I received that affidavit as evidence. The applicant was not required for cross-examination on it. The applicant was for a time legally represented on the Application in a Case, but her lawyer has recently withdrawn. The applicant dealt with the matter today on her own behalf. She is currently held in immigration detention.
The procedural background to this matter is dealt with in written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 15 June 2016.
The applicant is a citizen of Nepal. She entered Australia under a false name on a vocational education visa in November 2008. The visa was valid until 22…
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 1556
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had erred in law by failing to adequately consider and assess the applicant's claims regarding the risk of harm upon return. This involved determining whether the delegate had properly applied the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the *Migration Regulations 1994* (Cth), particularly in relation to the assessment of subjective and objective elements of the applicant's fear of persecution. The Court was required to consider whether the delegate's findings were supported by evidence and whether the delegate had failed to engage with material facts or had made an illogical or irrational assessment.
Driver J found that the delegate had failed to properly assess the applicant's claims concerning the risk of harm from a particular non-state actor. The Court determined that the delegate had not adequately considered the evidence presented by the applicant regarding the nature and extent of the threat posed by this actor, nor had the delegate properly engaged with the applicant's subjective fear. The reasoning applied was that a failure to adequately consider all relevant claims and evidence, particularly those relating to the risk of persecution, constitutes an error of law. The Court concluded that the delegate's decision was vitiated by this error.
The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Court scheduled a show cause hearing for 2 June 2015, but SZUXV did not appear. She sent a letter to the Minister dated 1 May 2015, citing her godmother's death in the Nepalese earthquake as the reason for her non-attendance. The Court dismissed the proceedings for non-appearance on 2 June 2015. SZUXV applied for reinstatement of the matter on 29 June 2015, attributing her non-attendance at the hearing to "my cultural thing". The reinstatement application was listed for interlocutory hearing on 11 September 2015, but SZUXV did not attend due to an incorrect notification sent by the Registry. The matter was adjourned to 9 October 2015, and SZUXV filed a Notice of Discontinuance on 8 October 2015, the day before the hearing. The Court ordered SZUXV to pay the Minister's costs and disbursements of and incidental to the discontinued application.
On 30 March 2016, SZUXV filed an Application in a Case, supported by an affidavit deposed to on 26 March 2016. In her affidavit, SZUXV asserted that she was "prevented" from attending the hearing on 9 October 2015 due to depression from being assaulted by her brother-in-law in Nepal and fear of returning to Nepal. However, neither the Application in a Case nor its accompanying affidavit sought an order that the discontinued application be reinstated. The Minister submitted that there is no express power in the Federal Circuit Court Rules to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance, nor is there an express power in either the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) or the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Nonetheless, the Minister submitted that the Court has power to reinstate a discontinued application, which power arises as an implied power of the Court or under s.15 of the Federal Circuit Court Act. However, it may only be exercised in limited circumstances. The principles governing the Court's power to reinstate discontinued proceedings were those stated in Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66 (Chen). The Court does not have power to reinstate a discontinued proceeding simply in order to prevent "injustice". The circumstances of this case were not sufficient to enliven the Court's power to reinstate the discontinued application. The applicant voluntarily compromised and concluded her originating application by the Notice of Discontinuance, which she knowingly and voluntarily filed. There is no evidence that the Notice of Discontinuance involved an abuse of process or was procured by fraud. The applicant has not offered any explanation for the lengthy delay of more than six months in filing her application to have the proceedings reinstated. The Court found that the applicant's filing of the Notice of Discontinuance was a deliberate and informed act, and no abuse of process was occasioned by the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance. The Court dismissed the Application in a Case and ordered SZUXV to pay the Minister's costs and disbursements of and incidental to the Application in a Case, fixed in the sum of $3,416.
This case, SZUXV v Minister for Immigration (No 2) [2016] FCCA 1556, came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an interlocutory application following the discontinuance of the principal proceedings. The applicant, a citizen of Nepal, had previously applied for a protection visa and, after her application was refused, sought judicial review of that decision by the Federal Circuit Court. The judicial review application was dismissed for non-appearance after the applicant failed to attend a scheduled hearing. Subsequently, the applicant applied for reinstatement of the dismissed application, which was also unsuccessful as the applicant did not attend the hearing, an absence excused due to an incorrect notification sent by the registry. Notably, the applicant filed a Notice of Discontinuance on the eve of the reinstatement hearing, leading to the dismissal of her application with an order for costs against her. On 30 March 2016, the applicant filed an Application in a Case seeking to set aside the discontinuance as a condition precedent to pursuing other relief. This application was dismissed by Judge Driver on 22 June 2016, who found that the applicant's voluntary and informed filing of the Notice of Discontinuance did not present circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's discretion to reinstate the discontinued application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Federal Circuit Court have the power to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance in the absence of an express provision or inherent power?
2. In what circumstances may the Court exercise its implied power to reinstate a discontinued application?
3. Did the applicant knowingly and voluntarily file the Notice of Discontinuance?
4. Was the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance procured by fraud or duress?
5. Did the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance otherwise involve an abuse of process?
6. If the Notice of Discontinuance was set aside, does the application for review have reasonable prospects of success?
Held
1. Does the Federal Circuit Court have the power to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance in the absence of an express provision or inherent power?
The Court concluded that it does not have an express power to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance, and the power to do so only arises as an implied power in limited circumstances. The result was that the power to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance was not exercised.
2. In what circumstances may the Court exercise its implied power to reinstate a discontinued application?
The Court may exercise its implied power to reinstate a discontinued application to prevent an abuse of the processes of the Court or to protect the integrity of those processes. The Court concluded that the power to reinstate will not be exercised simply in the interests of justice. The result was that the Court outlined the limited circumstances under which it may exercise the power to reinstate a discontinued application.
3. Did the applicant knowingly and voluntarily file the Notice of Discontinuance?
The Court concluded that the applicant knowingly and voluntarily filed the Notice of Discontinuance, and there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant did not understand the effect of the Notice of Discontinuance at the time of filing. The result was that the Court found that the applicant's filing of the Notice of Discontinuance was a deliberate and informed act.
4. Was the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance procured by fraud or duress?
The Court concluded that there is no evidence that the Notice of Discontinuance was procured by fraud or duress. The result was that the Court found that the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance did not involve fraud or duress.
5. Did the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance otherwise involve an abuse of process?
The Court concluded that no abuse of process was occasioned by the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance. The result was that the Court found that there was no abuse of process in the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance.
6. If the Notice of Discontinuance was set aside, does the application for review have reasonable prospects of success?
The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to deal with the prospects of success of the proposed amended substantive application as the Court's discretion to intervene was not enlivened in the present circumstances. However, for completeness, the Court observed that it agreed with the Minister that the additional issues sought to be raised by the applicant would not have reasonable prospects of success. The result was that the Court did not assess the prospects of success of the application for review.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court's reasoning in this case centers on the power of the Court to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance in the absence of an express provision or inherent power. The Court first considered whether it has the power to reinstate a discontinued application, acknowledging that while there is no explicit authority to do so, this power may be implied from the statutory jurisdiction of the Court. The Court aligned its approach with the Federal Court's decision in Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66, which held that the Court's power to reinstate a discontinued application is limited to cases where the appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily file the notice of discontinuance. This implies an abuse of the Court's processes or a need to protect the integrity of those processes.
The Court then examined whether the applicant knowingly and voluntarily filed the Notice of Discontinuance. In doing so, it noted that the applicant had signed and filed the Notice of Discontinuance without any evidence of coercion or lack of understanding. The applicant's claim of depression at the time did not sufficiently impair her capacity to act voluntarily, nor did it suggest that the filing was procured by fraud. The Court emphasized that the applicant had not provided any explanation for the significant delay in filing the application to have the proceedings reinstated.
Further, the Court considered whether the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance involved an abuse of process. It found no evidence to support such a claim, as the applicant had deliberately and informedly concluded her originating application by filing the Notice of Discontinuance. The Court also noted that there was no need to reinstate the application to protect the integrity of the Court's processes.
Finally, the Court examined whether the application for review had reasonable prospects of success if the Notice of Discontinuance was set aside. However, it concluded that this consideration was unnecessary since the Court's discretion to intervene was not triggered in the circumstances. The Court also observed that the additional issues the applicant sought to raise would not have reasonable prospects of success.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Federal Circuit Court has an implied power to reinstate a discontinued application, but this power is limited and may only be exercised in cases where the appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily file the notice of discontinuance, there is an abuse of process, or the integrity of the Court's processes needs protection. The Court's power is discretionary and should be exercised considering the prospects of success of the proposed application. The Court did not follow prior authority suggesting a broader power to reinstate discontinued appeals in the interests of justice, aligning instead with the more restrictive approach endorsed in Chen.