SZUVX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUVX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 301

Appeal from: SZUVX v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1520
File number: NSD 1174 of 2015
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 1 March 2016
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 36.03(a)(i), 36.05(3)(c)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 48A(1)(a), 429

Cases cited:

Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400

SZAYW v Minister for Immigration (2006) 230 CLR 486

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235

SZMFT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1725

SZNFR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 851

SZQZJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 867

Date of hearing: 1 March 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 62
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1174 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZUVX

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The applicant’s interlocutory application be dismissed.

3.The applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Fiji, but has resided in Australia for many years.  There is a long and somewhat tortuous history of dealings between him and the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister), concerning the applicant’s immigration status.  This application relates to an unsuccessful application by the applicant for a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa).  The Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa most recently on 4 June 2014.  That decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (Tribunal).  The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court (Circuit Court).  That application was dismissed by the primary judge on 26 June 2015. 

  2. The applicant has now applied for an extension of time to appeal the judgment of the primary judge.  For the reasons that follow, that application must be dismissed with costs.

    BACKGROUND 

  3. The applicant’s lengthy immigration history is of some potential relevance to his extension of time application. 

  4. The applicant arrived in Australia on 19 November 1987 and was granted a visitor’s visa.  He was granted a permanent resident visa in the early 1990’s. On 11 August 2011, however, that visa was cancelled on character grounds as a result of the applicant’s…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 301
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZUVX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal against the judgment of the primary judge. The applicant, who had previously had his permanent resident visa cancelled and his applications for a protection visa refused, sought to appeal the decision that his claims for protection did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal should be granted, considering the timeliness of the application and the applicant's previous history of unsuccessful visa applications.

The court considered the principles governing extensions of time for appeals, including the need for applicants to demonstrate sufficient cause and the importance of finality in judicial decisions. The court also examined the applicant's lengthy immigration history and previous unsuccessful attempts to secure a protection visa. The court noted that the applicant's claims for protection were found to be vague, unsubstantiated, and unlikely to result in significant harm if he were to be returned to Fiji. Given these factors, the court concluded that the applicant had not provided sufficient grounds to justify an extension of time to appeal. Consequently, the application for an extension of time was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

This decision underscores the importance of timely appeals and the need for applicants to provide compelling reasons for any delays. The court's reasoning highlights the significance of adhering to statutory timelines and the principles of judicial finality, particularly in matters involving immigration and protection visas.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The applicant’s interlocutory application be dismissed.

3. The applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant has now applied for an extension of time to appeal the judgment of the primary judge. For the reasons that follow, that application must be dismissed with costs.BACKGROUND The applicant’s lengthy immigration history is of some potential relevance to his extension of time application. The applicant arrived in Australia on 19 November 1987 and was granted a visitor’s visa. He was granted a permanent resident visa in the early 1990’s. On 11 August 2011, however, that visa was cancelled on character grounds as a result of the applicant’s criminal history. The cancellation was affirmed on review by the Tribunal on 4 November 2011. Just over a month later, on 16 December 2011, the applicant applied for a protection visa. That application was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 9 January 2012. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of that decision, but was unsuccessful. On 28 February 2012 the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to the applicant. That was by no means the end of the applicant’s attempts to secure a protection visa. Almost two years later, on 31 December 2013, the applicant lodged a second protection visa application. That course was available to the applicant because, since the initial refusal of his protection visa application, the provisions in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) concerning protection visas had been amended. In summary, a new and alternative criterion for a protection visa was inserted in the Act. That criterion, referred to generally as the “complementary protection criterion”, was, in simplified terms, that the Minister had substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. In SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 the Full Court held, in effect, that s 48A(1)(a) of the Act did not preclude an applicant who had previously unsuccessfully applied for a protection visa from applying again on the basis of the new complementary protection criterion. That is exactly what the applicant did. Unfortunately for him, however, that application was no more successful than his first application. The Minister’s delegate again refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant. That refusal was affirmed by the Tribunal on 3 July 2014.THE TRIBUNAL’S REVIEW AND DECISION The claims that the applicant advanced in support of his protection visa application were summarised by the Tribunal in its reasons (Reasons) (at [15]) in the following terms: [The applicant] feared unknown people in Fiji due to political comments he had made whilst in detention and jail in Australia; he feared returning to Fiji because of his Indian Fijian heritage; and that he also feared returning to Fiji because he would not be able to find accommodation or employment. The applicant agreed that this was a fair summary of his claims, but added that he also feared returning to Fiji because of a “data breach” that had occurred on the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s website. The applicant contended, in effect, that the data breach would compound his difficulties in finding employment and accommodation in Fiji.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

That is exactly what the applicant did. Unfortunately for him, however, that application was no more successful than his first application. The Minister’s delegate again refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant. That refusal was affirmed by the Tribunal on 3 July 2014.THE TRIBUNAL’S REVIEW AND DECISION The claims that the applicant advanced in support of his protection visa application were summarised by the Tribunal in its reasons (Reasons) (at [15]) in the following terms: [The applicant] feared unknown people in Fiji due to political comments he had made whilst in detention and jail in Australia; he feared returning to Fiji because of his Indian Fijian heritage; and that he also feared returning to Fiji because he would not be able to find accommodation or employment. The applicant agreed that this was a fair summary of his claims, but added that he also feared returning to Fiji because of a “data breach” that had occurred on the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s website. The applicant contended, in effect, that the data breach would compound his difficulties in finding employment and accommodation in Fiji. The Tribunal found that none of the applicant’s claims satisfied it that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations in terms of the complementary protection criterion. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s claims concerning the political comments he had apparently made whilst in immigration detention and gaol were vague and unsubstantiated in several respects. It concluded that “there [was] no evidence before it to enable it to be satisfied that his [the applicant’s] opinions had been expressed and/or that they would be of interest to the Fijian authorities or anyone else in Fiji” (Reasons at [32]). In relation to the applicant's claims based on his Indian heritage, the Tribunal accepted that Indian Fijians may be subject to some discrimination in Fiji. It found, however, that “there [was] no evidence before the Tribunal that discrimination against Indian Fijians and/or discrimination based on the caste system amounts to significant harm” (Reasons at [33]). In relation to the applicant's claims concerning the data breach and his inability to find employment and accommodation, the Tribunal accepted that there had been a data breach and that some of the applicant’s personal information had been available on the Department’s website. That information may have been accessible in Fiji. That information included the applicant’s name, date of birth, nationality and details of his detention. The information did not include his criminal record. The Tribunal found, however, that potential employees or persons offering accommodation in Fiji would not have the “wish or the ability to access” the limited information that had been available on the website. Accordingly, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would be subject to discrimination by such persons on the basis of the “leaked” information.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established