SZUUP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUUP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 857

Appeal from: SZUUP v Minister For Immigration [2016] FCCA 3455
File number(s): NSD 2200 of 2016
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 26 July 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision by Federal Circuit Court not to extend time under s 477(2), Migration Act – application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 476A, 477

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), 39B)

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd [1986] NSWCA 1 (16 June 1986)

MZZVK v Minister [2016] FCA 854

SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224

SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCAFC 129

Date of hearing: 27 July 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 20
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 2200 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZUUP

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 JULY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Federal Circuit Court of Australia be joined as the third respondent to the proceedings.

2.The application is dismissed.

3.The applicant is to pay the Minister’s costs as agreed or as assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from transcript)

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived in Australia on 7 May 2011.  On 30 March 2012 he lodged an application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) claiming to fear persecution in Pakistan by reason of his ethnicity, religion and political opinion.  His application for a protection visa was refused on 12 September 2012 by a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister).  That decision was affirmed by the (then) Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 14 March 2014.

  2. On 23 July 2014, the applicant commenced proceedings for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court (the Court below). The application in the Court below was not filed until 23 July 2014 and therefore was outside the 35 day time limit for the institution of proceedings under s 477(1) of the Act. As a result, it was necessary for the applicant to seek an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Act, as the Court below held. That application was refused by the Court below on 23 November 2016.

  3. The applicant seeks judicial review of the decision by the Federal Circuit Court.  In his application, the applicant requests this Court “to consider the precarious…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 857
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, SZUUP, sought judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court not to extend time under section 477(2) of the Migration Act. The applicant had previously sought protection from persecution in Pakistan, claims which were dismissed by the Tribunal and upheld by the Federal Circuit Court. The legal issues for the Court were to determine if the Federal Circuit Court's decision contained a jurisdictional error, and whether the decision to not extend time was just and reasonable.

The Court found that while it had jurisdiction to review the decision under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), its review was limited to examining whether the decision was attended by jurisdictional error. The Court noted that an inferior court's failure to take into account a matter it was required to consider does not ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error. In this case, the Federal Circuit Court had considered the applicant's reasons for delay and the merits of his application, and concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to extend time. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the decision, and dismissed the application.

The Court further noted that the Federal Circuit Court had correctly applied the law in considering the applicant's explanations for delay and the merits of his application. The Court held that the decision was just and reasonable, and there was no error in the decision-making process.

The final orders of the Court were to join the Federal Circuit Court as the third respondent to the proceedings, dismiss the application for judicial review, and order the applicant to pay the Minister's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia be joined as the third respondent to the proceedings.

2. The application is dismissed.

3. The applicant is to pay the Minister’s costs as agreed or as assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant did not have legal representation in the Court below or in this Court. While the applicant did not file written submissions, he made oral submissions with the assistance of an interpreter. The Minister filed written submissions in advance of the hearing. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The Tribunal’s decision Before the Tribunal, the applicant claimed to fear harm in Pakistan from both the government and the Taliban because of his Pashtun race, his Shia religion and his anti-government political opinion. He claimed to have been threatened by the Taliban in 2008 and subsequently after he participated in a protest in “region B”. The Tribunal identified that it had difficulties in accepting these claims. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant had not been harmed in the past and, taking account also of the country information, was not satisfied that there was a real chance that he would be persecuted by the Taliban in his home area, region B. The applicant claimed to fear that the ISI would kill him if he were returned to Pakistan because he protested and openly accused the ISI, the Taliban and the Pakistan Army of certain unlawful conduct. In rejecting his claims, the Tribunal found that the applicant had done no more than repeat what the country reports suggested is a prevalent view in Pakistan. The Tribunal also considered that it was unlikely that, if the applicant were of concern or interest to the ISI, he would have remained in Pakistan undetected for nearly a year, had his passport issued, and then departed Pakistan via the airport. In addition, the Tribunal took into account that the applicant delayed in applying for a protection visa and did not consider that his behaviour was consistent with someone who came to Australia because he feared persecution, rejecting his explanations for the delay. The Tribunal then found that:23. …the Tribunal does not accept the applicant has been targeted in the past or that he will be individually targeted in the future because the ISI is now looking for him. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has been or is wanted by the government. Neither does the Tribunal accept that he has applied for asylum after having been wanted or that if he returns after having sought asylum, he will again be persecuted. While the Tribunal accepts that the applicant may continue to protest if he returns to Pakistan, he has not said anything of sufficient concern to the ISI or Taliban in the past, and the Tribunal is not satisfied he will do so in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal concluded that it did not accept that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for the reasons which he claimed if he returned to his home region (region B) now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. As such the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention so as to satisfy the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Act or to engage Australia’s complementary protection obligations for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa). 2.2 The decision of the Federal Circuit Court

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal concluded that it did not accept that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for the reasons which he claimed if he returned to his home region (region B) now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. As such the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention so as to satisfy the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Act or to engage Australia’s complementary protection obligations for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa). 2.2 The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The Court below dismissed the application for an extension of time on the grounds that it did not consider that the applicant’s explanation for his delay in instituting the proceedings were satisfactorily explained and that there was insufficient merit in the grounds raised in the application to warrant being considered at trial. The Court below concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to extend time.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Jurisdiction to entertain the application for judicial review of the decision of the Court below While no appeal lies to this Court from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court by virtue of s 476A(3) and s 477(2) of the Act, the Court has jurisdiction to hear this application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224, affirmed on appeal in SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCAFC 129. However, the Court’s jurisdiction is “confined to examining whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is affected by an error of the kind in relation to which relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act would be available, that is, examining whether or not the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended by jurisdictional error: see for example SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224 (at [11]-[12]) referring to Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163”: MZZVK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 854 (MZZVK) at [31]. In this regard, the High Court in Craig distinguished between the circumstances in which an inferior court will exceed its jurisdiction as opposed to falling into appellable error, holding at 179-180 that: … the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of law encompasses authority to decide questions of law, as well as questions of fact, involved in matters which it has jurisdiction to determine. The identification of relevant issues, the formulation of relevant questions and the determination of what is and what is not relevant evidence are all routine steps in the discharge of that ordinary jurisdiction. Demonstrable mistake in the identification of such issues or the formulation of such questions will commonly involve error of law which may, if an appeal is available and is pursued, be corrected by an appellate court and, depending on the circumstances, found an order setting aside the order or decision of the inferior court. Such a mistake on the part of an inferior court entrusted with authority to identify, formulate and determine such issues and questions will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error. Similarly, a failure by an inferior court to take into account some matter which it was, as a matter of law, required to take into account in determining a question within jurisdiction or reliance by such a court upon some irrelevant matter upon which it was, as a matter of law, not entitled to rely in determining such a question will not ordinarily involve jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court below dismissed the application for an extension of time on the grounds that it did not consider that the applicant’s explanation for his delay in instituting the proceedings were satisfactorily explained and that there was insufficient merit in the grounds raised in the application to warrant being considered at trial. The Court below concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to extend time.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Jurisdiction to entertain the application for judicial review of the decision of the Court below While no appeal lies to this Court from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court by virtue of s 476A(3) and s 477(2) of the Act, the Court has jurisdiction to hear this application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224, affirmed on appeal in SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCAFC 129. However, the Court’s jurisdiction is “confined to examining whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is affected by an error of the kind in relation to which relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act would be available, that is, examining whether or not the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended by jurisdictional error: see for example SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224 (at [11]-[12]) referring to Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163”: MZZVK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 854 (MZZVK) at [31]. In this regard, the High Court in Craig distinguished between the circumstances in which an inferior court will exceed its jurisdiction as opposed to falling into appellable error, holding at 179-180 that: … the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of law encompasses authority to decide questions of law, as well as questions of fact, involved in matters which it has jurisdiction to determine. The identification of relevant issues, the formulation of relevant questions and the determination of what is and what is not relevant evidence are all routine steps in the discharge of that ordinary jurisdiction. Demonstrable mistake in the identification of such issues or the formulation of such questions will commonly involve error of law which may, if an appeal is available and is pursued, be corrected by an appellate court and, depending on the circumstances, found an order setting aside the order or decision of the inferior court. Such a mistake on the part of an inferior court entrusted with authority to identify, formulate and determine such issues and questions will not, however, ordinarily constitute jurisdictional error. Similarly, a failure by an inferior court to take into account some matter which it was, as a matter of law, required to take into account in determining a question within jurisdiction or reliance by such a court upon some irrelevant matter upon which it was, as a matter of law, not entitled to rely in determining such a question will not ordinarily involve jurisdictional error.