SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 752

Citation: SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 752
Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1144
Parties: SZUOB, SZUOC and SZUOD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 644 of 2015
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 22 July 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review – decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision of delegate of Minister to refuse protection visa – consideration of merits of proposed grounds of appeal
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 424A
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26
SZQBV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1391
SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1144
Date of hearing: 22 July 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the First Applicant: The first applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the Second and Third Applicants: The second and third applicants did not appear
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Warner Knight of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 644 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZUOB
First Applicant

SZUOC
Second Applicant

SZUOD
Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 JULY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2.The application be dismissed.

3.The first applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 644 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZUOB
First Applicant

SZUOC
Second Applicant

SZUOD
Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE:

22 JULY 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal a judgment of Judge Nicholls of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 6 May 2015: see SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 752
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZUOB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a Nepalese citizen, sought an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing her application for judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant her a protection visa. The applicant claimed to fear harm in Nepal due to her husband and in-laws believing she was a witch and due to her separation from her husband, as well as the threat of Maoists who had previously demanded money from her husband. The legal issues involved whether the applicant had demonstrated sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the lower court's decision and whether granting leave to appeal would result in substantial injustice if refused.

The court found that the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit and did not constitute an appellable error. The applicant's submissions merely disagreed with the Tribunal's findings without advancing any new grounds, effectively inviting impermissible merits review. The court dismissed the application for extension of time and leave to appeal, noting that the merits of the case did not warrant further judicial consideration. The court also ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.

The court's decision was grounded in the principles that leave to appeal must be granted if there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the judgment below and if the applicant would suffer substantial injustice if leave were refused. Given the lack of merit in the proposed grounds and the applicant's failure to provide a legally acceptable excuse for the delay, the court found no basis to grant the extension of time and leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the second respondent be changed so as to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

2. The application be dismissed.

3. The first applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister made an application to amend the name of the second respondent to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”. I granted that application.BACKGROUND The first applicant (to whom I will refer as “applicant”) is a citizen of Nepal. Before arriving in Australia on a tourist visa on 19 June 2012, she had been resident in Singapore for 14 years as a dependent spouse of her husband. Her husband was an officer serving in the Gurkha contingent with the Singapore police service. The second and third applicants are the applicants’ children, a daughter who was 13 and a son who was 12 at the time the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it was then known) made its decision on 27 May 2014. Both children are Nepalese citizens born in Singapore. The applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 19 July 2012, the day her visitor’s visa expired. The children applied as members of her family unit. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the protection visa on 20 March 2013. The primary judge summarised the basis for the applicant’s claim for protection in SZUOB at [28] (reference to the Court Book omitted):The applicant claimed to fear harm on return to Nepal from her husband, and in-laws, because they believe she is a witch, and because she has separated from her husband. Further, that she was a victim of domestic violence. She also claimed that she may be killed by Maoists as she is anti-Maoist and, in the past, they have demanded money from her husband. TRIBUNAL DECISION On 10 April 2013, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 27 May 2014. A summary of the Tribunal’s decision is at [21] of its Statement of Decision and Reasons (“Statement”):The Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence regarding central aspects of her claims vague, implausible and unsupported, including by country information from independent sources. Considered together, the reasons discussed below, lead the Tribunal to conclude that her claims are not credible. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is in genuine fear of persecution for a Convention reason or that there is a real chance that she will suffer serious or significant harm on her return to Nepal. In summary, the applicant alleged that her husband had become distant, abusive and violent towards her since March 2011 and had told her that he considered her his “property and he could do as he wanted to [her]”. She says the domestic violence was because her father-in-law accused her of being a witch who caused her mother-in-law to be sick with shivers and fever for a week during a visit to Nepal in late 2010. He also blamed her for not teaching the children Nepali and for not being a good mother, but he never threatened to remove the children. She says that in January 2012 her husband bound, slapped and abused her and threatened her with a knife. She did not report the incident for fear that her husband would lose his job and they would be returned to Nepal and because she did not want anything to happen to the children. She was also concerned because she did not think that she would be believed (because her husband was “very nice on the outside”). She felt her life was at risk if she stayed with him. The applicant says that while the family was staying with her in-laws in late 2010, Maoists came to the house demanding money and threatened harm to the family if the full amount demanded was not paid.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge summarised the basis for the applicant’s claim for protection in SZUOB at [28] (reference to the Court Book omitted):The applicant claimed to fear harm on return to Nepal from her husband, and in-laws, because they believe she is a witch, and because she has separated from her husband. Further, that she was a victim of domestic violence. She also claimed that she may be killed by Maoists as she is anti-Maoist and, in the past, they have demanded money from her husband. TRIBUNAL DECISION On 10 April 2013, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 27 May 2014. A summary of the Tribunal’s decision is at [21] of its Statement of Decision and Reasons (“Statement”):The Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence regarding central aspects of her claims vague, implausible and unsupported, including by country information from independent sources. Considered together, the reasons discussed below, lead the Tribunal to conclude that her claims are not credible. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is in genuine fear of persecution for a Convention reason or that there is a real chance that she will suffer serious or significant harm on her return to Nepal. In summary, the applicant alleged that her husband had become distant, abusive and violent towards her since March 2011 and had told her that he considered her his “property and he could do as he wanted to [her]”. She says the domestic violence was because her father-in-law accused her of being a witch who caused her mother-in-law to be sick with shivers and fever for a week during a visit to Nepal in late 2010. He also blamed her for not teaching the children Nepali and for not being a good mother, but he never threatened to remove the children. She says that in January 2012 her husband bound, slapped and abused her and threatened her with a knife. She did not report the incident for fear that her husband would lose his job and they would be returned to Nepal and because she did not want anything to happen to the children. She was also concerned because she did not think that she would be believed (because her husband was “very nice on the outside”). She felt her life was at risk if she stayed with him. The applicant says that while the family was staying with her in-laws in late 2010, Maoists came to the house demanding money and threatened harm to the family if the full amount demanded was not paid. The Tribunal did not find it plausible that if the applicant’s husband suspected her of being a witch, he would be cooperative in providing copies of his personal documents and necessary consents for the applicant and their children to obtain visitor’s visas for Australia and pay for the airline tickets: Statement at [23]. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence concerning her husband’s attitudes towards women and witchcraft was implausible in light of (1) his tolerant treatment of the applicant’s unmarried younger sister who lived independently in Sydney when she questioned him about his treatment of the applicant during a visit to Singapore in early 2012, and (2) the fact that he allowed her to take his children to Australia, which would be unlikely if he regarded her as a witch: Statement at [24]. The Tribunal also found that it was not plausible that her husband, an officer in the “prestigious Gurkha contingent” who had lived and worked in highly-developed Singapore for 13 years, would be influenced by village superstition about witchcraft notwithstanding submissions by the applicant’s advisers that such a mindset can persist: Statement at [25].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering whether leave to appeal should be granted, it must be shown that there is sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the judgment below, and that, if the judgment below is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398. CONSIDERATION The Minister accepts that the delay is short and that it would not suffer prejudice if the extension of time were granted. However, the Minister submits that an extension of time and leave to appeal should be refused because the grounds sought to be raised by the applicants lack merit so that there is no utility in the Court granting an extension of time, and the reasons given for the delay are insufficient. Further, the Minister submits that should the extension of time and leave to appeal nevertheless be granted, the appeal should be dismissed. Although the applicant has offered no legally acceptable excuse for her delay, the delay would be no impediment to the Court granting an extension of time and leave to appeal if the substantive appeal appeared to have merit. It does not. The applicant appeared at the hearing with the assistance of an interpreter. She filed no written submissions. Her oral submissions were that she did not lie to the psychologist or to the Tribunal. In her opinion, she was the person who suffered domestic violence and in a position to know the truth, and therefore the Tribunal’s decision was wrong. As these submissions express only disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision, they do not advance the grounds raised by the applicants and invite impermissible merits review. The applicant also submits it was inappropriate for the Tribunal to use her visitor’s visa application information in the context of her protection visa; I reject that submission for the reason set out below. The applicant’s first proposed ground is essentially the same as that considered by the primary judge at [54]-[64] of his reasons. The applicant’s second proposed ground is essentially the same as that addressed at [52] of the primary judge’s reasons. The applicant’s third proposed ground is essentially the same as those addressed at [53] and [67]-[70] of the primary judge’s reasons. After careful review of the Statement and SZUOB in light of the grounds proposed by the applicant and her submissions, I perceive no appellable error on the part of the primary judge, and no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. I dismiss the application. As the second and third applicants are children, I order that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.