SZUMT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 466
•13 May 2015
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUMT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 466
Citation: SZUMT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 466 Parties: SZUMT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 147 of 2015 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 13 May 2015 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 35.12 (2)(d), 36.01(1) and (2)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 r 44.12(1)(a)Date of hearing: 13 May 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 8 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms A Carr of DLA Piper
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 147 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZUMT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MAY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal filed 19 February 2015 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 147 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZUMT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
13 MAY 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 13 May 2015, I dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCC”): SZUMT v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 257, dismissing, pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (“FCC Rules”), an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”).
I set out below my reasons for doing so.
First, the applicant did not file and serve a draft notice of appeal that complied with rr 36.01(1) and (2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (“Rules”) as required by r 35.12 (2)(d) of the Rules, nor as per direction [3] made by Registrar Morgan on 24 February 2015.
In consequence, there are no grounds of appeal by reference to which one can evaluate the utility of granting leave by reference to the criterion of the merit of the proposed appeal.
Second, even if one was to treat the grounds of the application for leave to appeal as being coterminous with the grounds of appeal, as the Minister’s written outline of submissions do, the applicant’s application for leave to appeal is not improved.
The first ground of the application for leave to appeal reads:
The FM failed to consider that the Tribunal acted in a manifestly unreasonable way when dealing with the applicant claims and ignoring the aspect of persecution and harm in terms of Sec.91R of the Act. The Tribunal failed to observe the obligation amounted to a breach of Statutory Obligation.
This amounts to no more than saying that the FCC got it wrong when it concluded at [38] of its reasons that the applicant had failed to establish any arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. In reaching this conclusion, the FCC considered each of the four grounds in the applicant’s show cause application at [24] to [31] of its reasons, as well as the ground of bias at [32] to [36] of its reasons and the ground that the applicant was not afforded a fair opportunity before the Tribunal at [37] of its reasons, the latter two grounds being raised in the applicant’s written submissions. In my view, the FCC did not get it wrong on any of the grounds raised.
The second ground of the application for leave to appeal reads:
The learned Judge dismissed the application without considering the legal and factual errors contained in the decision of RRT.
Apart from the fact that these alleged legal and factual errors in the RRT’s decision are not identified, let alone particularised, I agree with the conclusion reached at [38] of the FCC’s reasons.
In my view, neither of these grounds of the application for leave to appeal would have any prospect of success as grounds of appeal if I was to accede to the applicant’s application.
I certify that the preceding eight (8) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Edmonds. Associate:
Dated: 14 May 2015
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