FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZULN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 2455 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – whether Tribunal conducted review in circumstances as to reasonably give rise to apprehension of bias – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa) |
| Applicant: | SZULN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1479 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 24 March 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 11 September 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
The Applicant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Ms K Hooper of DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal be substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1479 of 2014
| SZULN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant, who is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (China), seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) to affirm the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.
The proceedings were commenced by the applicant through a legal representative. By the time of the hearing, the legal representative ceased to act on behalf of the applicant, and the applicant represented herself. Although the applicant raised a number of grounds for challenging the decision of the Tribunal, the principal ground on which the applicant relied at the hearing was prejudgment by the Tribunal.
The asserted factual premises of that ground are that:
a)the Tribunal member asked the applicant extensive questions about her knowledge of her Christian faith;
b)the applicant answered those questions correctly, thus demonstrating knowledge of her Christian faith; and
c)the Tribunal held, without any basis, that the applicant’s knowledge of Christianity was superficial, lacked spontaneity, and constituted the mere recital of memorised information.
The applicant also submitted that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant’s knowledge did not manifest a genuine belief in Christianity was illogical.
Applicant’s claims for protection
The applicant arrived in Australia in October 2009 as a student guardian of her son. In December 2009 the applicant discovered her husband, who had remained in China, was having an affair. In January 2010 the applicant was introduced to a church in Dee Why. The applicant became a devout Christian, and was baptised on 2 December 2010. In February 2011 the applicant and her husband reconciled. The husband, together with a friend of the…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 2455
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Refugee Convention criteria, as incorporated into Australian domestic law, had been met. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the applicant's fear of persecution, should they be returned to their country of origin, was well-founded and if that fear was based on one of the five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
Judge Manousaridis considered the evidence presented by the applicant regarding their past experiences and the general country information pertaining to their home country. The Court applied the principles established in *Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs* and *Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, which require an assessment of whether there is a real chance of persecution. The Court found that the applicant had not discharged the onus of proving a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, as the evidence did not establish a sufficient nexus between the feared harm and any of the protected grounds.
The application for judicial review was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant raised three grounds for review, including claims of apprehended bias and procedural unfairness by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had asked the applicant extensive questions about her knowledge of Christianity and the applicant answered them substantially correctly. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was a genuinely practising Christian, even though she answered the questions correctly. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's not accepting her knowledge of Christianity as evidence that she was a genuinely practising Christian gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Tribunal was reasonably open to consider whether the applicant's demonstrated knowledge of the Christian faith was acquired for the purpose of enhancing her application for a Protection visa, or whether it reflected a heartfelt adherence to the Christian faith.
This case, SZULN v Minister for Immigration, was an application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration not to grant the applicant, a citizen of China, a Protection visa. The applicant, initially represented by a lawyer, appeared in person at the hearing assisted by an interpreter. The principal ground of the review was that the Tribunal exhibited prejudgment by asking the applicant extensive questions about her Christian faith, which she answered correctly, yet the Tribunal held that her knowledge was superficial and lacked spontaneity, constituting the mere recital of memorised information. The application was dismissed, and the applicant ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Tribunal conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
2. Whether the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question and thus did not arrive at an effective decision that is protected by Section 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
3. Whether the Tribunal breached Section 420 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and made jurisdictional error by denying the applicant procedural fairness by reason of there being a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Held
1. Whether the Tribunal conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not conduct itself in a way that gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court found that the Tribunal's questioning of the applicant's knowledge of Christianity was a legitimate subject of inquiry and that the Tribunal's decision not to accept the applicant's knowledge of Christianity as evidence of a genuine Christian faith did not constitute bias.
Result: The first ground of review failed.
2. Whether the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question and thus did not arrive at an effective decision that is protected by Section 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not ask itself the wrong question. The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa was based on objective facts and not solely on the applicant's knowledge of Christianity.
Result: The second ground of review failed.
3. Whether the Tribunal breached Section 420 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and made jurisdictional error by denying the applicant procedural fairness by reason of there being a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not breach Section 420 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or make a jurisdictional error by denying the applicant procedural fairness. The court found that the statutory task of the Tribunal was to conduct a review that comes validly before it and to affirm the decision of the delegate if the Tribunal is not satisfied Australia owes the applicant protection obligations, or to make a different decision if the Tribunal is so satisfied.
Result: The third ground of review failed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court first examined the ground of review that the Tribunal conducted itself in a way that would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had prejudged the case and exhibited bias by questioning her knowledge of Christianity and then finding that her knowledge was superficial and memorized. The court noted that while there are dangers in extensively questioning an applicant about their religious beliefs, it can be a legitimate subject of inquiry in assessing claims for protection based on religion. The court held that the Tribunal's not accepting the applicant's knowledge of Christianity as evidence of her genuine belief did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, especially given the other matters the Tribunal relied on in rejecting the applicant's claims.
The court then turned to the second ground of review that the Tribunal asked itself the wrong question. The applicant argued the Tribunal did not consider whether she had a well-founded fear of persecution, but instead focused on her knowledge of Christianity. The court rejected this ground, finding that the Tribunal was satisfied there was no real chance the applicant would suffer persecution in China based on objective facts, not her knowledge of Christianity.
The third ground of review was that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by denying the applicant a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that there is no requirement for the Tribunal to give the applicant the "benefit of the doubt." The statutory task of the Tribunal is to conduct a valid review and affirm or make a different decision based on whether Australia owes the applicant protection obligations.
In conclusion, the court found none of the grounds of review made out and dismissed the application, ordering the applicant to pay the Minister's costs. The court's reasoning demonstrates that a Tribunal is not in breach of procedural fairness by questioning an applicant's knowledge of their claimed religion and not accepting that knowledge as evidence of a genuine belief, provided the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's claims is based on other reasonable grounds.