SZUFG v Minister for Immigration

[2015] FCCA 218

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUFG & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 218

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application seeking review of a decision of Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse to grant applicants Protection (Class XA) visas – whether Tribunal failed to make obvious enquiries – no reviewable error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 422B, 424A

Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs& Anor (2005) 216 ALR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI & Anor (2009) 259 ALR 429
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] (2001) 205 CLR 507
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Anor (2006) 156 FCR 419
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H & Anor (2001) 179 ALR 425
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749

First Applicant: SZUFG

Second Applicant: SZUFH

Third Applicant: SZUFI

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1045 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Lloyd-Jones

Hearing date: 11 December 2014

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 4 February 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicants: The first applicant appeared in person with a Bengali interpreter

Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms F Taah of Australian Government Solicitor

The Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1045 of 2014

SZUFG

First Applicant

SZUFH

Second Applicant

SZUFI

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. Before the Court is an application filed on 15 April 2014 under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), being RRT Case Number 1300245, a decision of Tribunal Member C. Long dated 26 March 2014, affirming the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the “Minister”) (at the time of the application to this Court the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship) to refuse to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) visas.

2. The solicitors for the Minister filed on 10 June 2014, pursuant to orders of the Court, a folder which was indexed, labelled and paginated, containing all documents that may be relevant to the hearing. The volume of material provided has been identified as the Court Book (CB) and marked as Exhibit “A”.  

3. The applicants were granted leave on 17 June 2014 to file and serve any amended application, affidavit evidence, written submissions or list of authorities upon which they sought to rely, however, elected not to do so.

Background

1. In setting out the following background material I have quoted directly from the Court Book and submissions prepared by the Minister. I have not made further attribution as this would make the summary unwieldy. Where this information is extracted from the Court Book, each item contains a reference (“CB”) for that material.

2. The applicants are citizens of Bangladesh. They arrived in Australia on visitor visas on 20 July 2012 (CB 73, 76-77).

3. On 16 August 2012, the first applicant lodged an application for Protection visas, with the second and third applicants included in the application as members of his family unit (CB 1-42). The second applicant is the first applicant’s wife and the third applicant is the first and second applicants’ daughter, who is four years old.

4. In the period prior to his arrival in Australia, the first applicant had either lived in or visited the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), the United States, India and the United Kingdom. He had worked in the UAE for over 10 years, between 1991 and 2002 (CB 16).

5. On 5 November 2012, the first applicant was interviewed by a delegate of the first respondent.  On 30 November 2012, the Protection visas application was refused (CB 49-66).

6. On 7 January 2013, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision (CB 67-72). They attended a Tribunal hearing on 25 February 2014 (CB 115), at which the first and second applicants gave oral evidence.

Applicants’ Protection Claims

1. The first applicant claimed to fear harm in Bangladesh from members of the Awami League due to his association with the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) (CB 19-22). He claimed to be one of the vice presidents of the Kishorgonj Sadar Thana BNP, and was also involved in politics in Dhaka.  As a businessman, the first applicant donated large sums of money to the BNP, but he was forced to sell his business due to extortion from the Awami League. The first applicant claimed that members of the Awami League arranged for the police and the ‘RAB’ to arrest and detain the first applicant, to prevent him from continuing with his political activities, and that the police and ‘RAB’ will arrest him if returned to Bangladesh as they are still searching for him.

2. At the interview with the Minister’s delegate, the first applicant also claimed that he was assaulted by Awami League supporters on 8 November 2011 at his grandfather’s house, as well as on 2 January 2012 whilst siting in his car (CB 55-56). He also submitted three documents to the delegate, being two supporting letters purportedly authored by members of the BNP, (one by the president of the Kishorgonj Sadar Thana BNP and the other from a Convenor of the BNP in Australia) (CB 43, 45) and an untranslated document (CB 44) which the first applicant claimed was an incident report lodged with the police regarding a telephone call that he received in May 2012 threatening his daughter (CB 56).

Tribunal’s Decision

1. On 26 March 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants Protection visas.

2. The Tribunal rejected the first applicant’s central claim that he was targeted by members of the Awami League, the police or the ‘RAB’ whilst in Bangladesh due to his association with the BNP (CB 123 at [23], 126 at [34]-[35]). The Tribunal considered the first applicant’s evidence to be implausible and changing in nature, and concluded that he was not being truthful about his business activities and his role within the BNP.

3. The Tribunal did not accept that after selling his business in May 2012, the first applicant and his family went into hiding in Dhaka until they departed Bangladesh on 19 July 2012 (CB 123 at [26]).  Nor did the Tribunal accept that the first applicant and his family had on two occasions unsuccessfully attempted to leave Bangladesh (CB 124 at [27]). The Tribunal noted that the first applicant’s initial oral evidence to the Tribunal was that the applicants attempted to leave a few days after selling his business in May 2012. When the Tribunal drew to the first applicant’s attention that his and his family’s visas were not granted until 6 June 2012, he changed his evidence, claiming that they attempted to leave on 12 June 2012(CB 124 at [27]).

4. The Tribunal considered the first applicant’s explanation as to why he was targeted by members of the Awami League in November 2011 and in January 2012 as unreasonable and implausible, given he claimed to be associated with the BNP from 2007 and had provided financial assistance to the party from that time (CB 124 at [29]).

5. Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the first applicant was a BNP supporter, it did not accept that he was an activist or the vice president of the party in Kishorganj due to the first applicant’s conflicting, changing and vague evidence regarding when and how he became involved with the party and his activities within the party (CB 125 at [30]). The Tribunal also considered that the first applicant’s participation in BNP activities on only three occasions since his arrival in Australia was inconsistent with the claim that he was a BNP activist (CB 125 at [31]).

6. The Tribunal referred to country information about the prevalence of fraudulent documentation in Bangladesh and found the first applicant’s documentary evidence to be unreliable (CB 126 at [32]). The Tribunal, in particular, gave no weight to a letter which was said to be authored by the Convenor of the BNP in Australia that, contrary to the first applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal, stated that he had been attending all BNP programs since his arrival in Australia (CB 126 at [33]).

7. The Tribunal considered that there was no plausible evidence before it supporting the first applicant’s claims that he suffered persecution in Bangladesh and concluded that none of the applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh for a Convention reason (CB 126 at [36]-[37]).

8. The Tribunal considered the alternative criteria in s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. In particular, it did not accept that the first applicant would face a real risk of suffering significant harm due to his attendance at BNP meetings in Australia (CB 125 at [31]), or from being targeted by the Awami League, the police or the ‘RAB’ (CB 126 at [35]). The Tribunal concluded that the applicants did not satisfy s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act (CB 127 at [38]).

Current Proceedings

1. On 15 April 2014, the applicants lodged an application for review in this Court. The application is supported by the following four grounds (verbatim):

   1.  The Tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction for its failure to take into consideration my oral and other documentary evidence in relation to my claim to be a refugee.

   2.  The Tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction and denied procedural fairness by not giving me the opportunity to submit my explanations for any adverse information that the tribunal may have. If I would be given the opportunity to explain that could have led to a different decision by the tribunal.

   3.  The tribunal biased by the country information and considered my case on average without giving any weight on my claims and didn’t look the matter individually.

   4.  The tribunal denied the natural justice in determining my review application that the Tribunal is biased, or in the alternative, there was an apprehension of bias in the making of purported decision.

Applicants’ Submissions

1. The first applicant, appearing on behalf of the second and third applicants, indicated at the outset of the hearing he had not prepared any written submissions and wished to proceed by way of oral submissions.

2. The first applicant submitted that the Tribunal should have checked the veracity of his persecution claims and political involvement.  Had it done so, the Tribunal would have realised the first applicant’s claims were true.  The first applicant further referred to a number of documents he had submitted in support of his protection claims, as well as threats that he and his family had received.

Minister’s Submissions

1. Reproduced below are the Minister’s written submissions.  Ms Taah indicated at the hearing she sought to rely on these submissions to address the applicants’ written grounds contained in their application.

Ground 1

1. The allegation that the Tribunal failed to take into consideration the applicant’s oral and documentary evidence cannot be sustained on the evidence as it is not factually supported by the Tribunal’s decision record. 

2. The Minister submits the Tribunal considered the first applicant’s only claim to fear harm from the Awami league and other organisations, however, rejected that claim on the basis of credibility, finding the first applicant’s oral evidence to be implausible, changing and confusing at times. This finding was open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it. The credibility findings of a Tribunal are matters par excellence for the Tribunal: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J. Further, the Tribunal did not have to uncritically accept the applicants’ claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J.

3. This ground is without merit and should be dismissed.

Ground 2

1. It is unclear what the first applicant is alleging in this ground. If it is an allegation of denial of procedural fairness because the Tribunal had ‘adverse information’ specifically about the applicants and they were denied the opportunity to comment on that information, then such an allegation should be rejected as it is not supported by the Tribunal’s Decision Record, nor is there any evidence before this Court that could sustain such an allegation.

2. The Tribunal did not rely on any adverse information about the applicants.  Rather, it discussed the first applicant’s own oral and documentary evidence with him at the hearing. The first applicant plainly knew the Tribunal's relevant concerns in relation to his evidence, being the implausibility and changing nature of his evidence on which he was given the opportunity to respond. In those circumstances, no denial of procedural fairness arises.

Ground 3

1. The allegation that the Tribunal was ‘biased by country information’ and that it did not consider the applicants’ matter ‘individually’ is also without merit. These complaints appear to be expressions of the first applicant’s disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision.

2. Insofar as the first applicant may be complaining about the Tribunal’s rejection of his documentary evidence on the basis of country information that was before it, the first respondent submits that the choice and weight of that country information was a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11] – [13]; Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 216 ALR 1 at [8] per Gleeson CJ; NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Anor (2006) 156 FCR 419 at [81] – [84]. There is no error in the Tribunal’s assessment of the first applicant’s documentary evidence.

3. The allegation the Tribunal did not consider the applicants’ case ‘individually’ is baseless. The Tribunal considered and rejected the claims made by the first applicant. As submitted at [23] above, those findings were open to the Tribunal.

Ground 4

1. Insofar as the first part of this ground is an allegation of a denial of procedural fairness, the Minister argues such an allegation has no merit. The applicants were invited to a hearing. The first and second applicants attended and gave evidence at the hearing, and issues arising in relation to the decision under review were discussed.

2. As to the allegation of actual and/or apprehended bias, such an allegation is not made out simply because the Tribunal did not believe the first applicant’s claims or evidence. The allegation is a serious one, that must be distinctly made and clearly proven: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749; and Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H & Anor (2001) 179 ALR 425.

3. The allegation is not supported by any particulars, nor is there any evidence before the Court that is capable of substantiating such an allegation. In particular, there is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons that would enable the Court to draw the inference that the Tribunal member approached its task other than in good faith, and with a mind open to persuasion. Nor can the test of apprehended bias, that is, whether a hypothetical fair-minded lay person who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to its task, be made out on the basis of the Tribunal’s Decision Record.

Oral Submissions

1. Ms Taah, appearing for the Minister, indicated she relied on her written submissions in respect of the pleaded grounds in the application.  She submitted the applicant’s oral submissions could be categorised as three separate complaints.

2. In respect of the first complaint, Ms Taah submitted the applicant alleges the Tribunal was required to make enquiries.  However, it was up to the applicant to put his case forward to the Tribunal, and on what was before the Tribunal, there was nothing that warranted further enquiries.  There was no critical fact that the Tribunal had to ascertain and, in fact, the Tribunal accepted the first applicant was a supporter of the BNP.  The Tribunal simply rejected the claims the first applicant made in respect of harm and persecution, which was open for it to do on the material before it.

3. In respect of the second complaint made by the first applicant, Ms Taah contends this was a statement by the applicant that he required a further hearing before the Tribunal to ventilate his claims.  Ms Taah argued that the applicant was given a proper opportunity to make submissions in support of his claim at the hearing that occurred, and there was no obligation for the Tribunal to invite him to a further hearing.

4. In respect of the third contention, Ms Taah categorised this as a claim by the first applicant that it failed to consider three items of the applicant’s documentary evidence.  Ms Taah submitted the Tribunal did, in fact, expressly refer to all three of the documents provided by the applicant.  The Tribunal specifically rejected or placed no weight on them, or it considered they were unreliable for three reasons, namely:

   a)Because it had concerns with the first applicant’s own credibility;

   b)Because it had referred to the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh; and

   c)Because the contents of the documents were inconsistent with the applicant’s own evidence.

   There was no error in the Tribunal’s consideration of the applicants’ documentary evidence.

Applicant’s Submissions in Reply

1. In reply, the first applicant questioned the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the three documents he had submitted.  He also questioned how the Tribunal made its adverse credibility findings against him.

Consideration

Ground 1

1. Ground 1 of the application alleges the Tribunal failed to consider the applicants’ oral and documentary evidence.

2. However, this claim is not supported by the Decision Record.  In respect of the first applicant’s documentary evidence, the Tribunal noted at [10] of the Decision Record that the first applicant had produced the three documents (CB 121).  At [15] the Tribunal stated:

   15.    The Tribunals (sic) spoke with the applicant about his claims and about the documents that he submitted in support of his claims.  The Tribunal also spoke with the second named applicant.

3. The Tribunal then proceeded to make detailed findings in respect of the applicants’ claims at [17]-[38] of the Decision Record (CB 122-127).  The first applicant’s claims in respect of feared harm are set out at [18] of the Decision Record (CB 122).  The first applicant claimed to fear harm from the Awami League, authorities in Bangladesh and people he fears in Bangladesh.  He also claimed to fear harm in Bangladesh because of his activities with and support of the BNP.

1. The Tribunal went on to consider these claims, but rejected them on the basis of the first applicant’s lack of credibility, particularly finding his oral evidence to be implausible, changing and confusing at times (see Decision Record at [24]-[31]).  On a fair reading of the Decision Record, these findings were open to the Tribunal on the material before it for the reasons it gave.  Credibility findings are a matter for the Tribunal par excellence; see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (supra) at [67] per McHugh J. In any case, the Tribunal did not have to uncritically accept the applicants’ claims; see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (supra) at 451 per Beaumont J.

2. In respect of the documents submitted by the applicants in support of their claims, the Tribunal gave those documents no weight (see Decision Record at [32]-[33] (CB 126)).  Again, these findings were open to the Tribunal on the material before it and for the reasons it gave.  I am satisfied the Tribunal did, in fact, have regard to all the documentary evidence provided by the applicants.

3. Accordingly, this ground cannot be sustained and should be dismissed.

Ground 2

1. This ground appears to allege that the applicants were denied procedural fairness because they were not given the opportunity to comment on adverse information the Tribunal had in respect of them.  This ground was not expanded on in any detail by the first applicant at the hearing.

2. On a fair reading of the Tribunal’s Decision Record it is clear there was no adverse information relied on by it that engaged any obligation under s.424A of the Migration Act. Rather, the Tribunal discussed with the first applicant his own oral and documentary evidence at the hearing. The Minister correctly submits that it was clear the first applicant knew the Tribunal’s relevant concerns, being the implausibility and changing nature of his evidence, in respect of which he was given an opportunity to respond.

3. Accordingly, it is clear that no denial of procedural fairness occurred and this ground cannot succeed.

Ground 3

1. This ground contains two separate allegations.

2. The first allegation is that the Tribunal was biased in respect of its reliance on country information relating to the documentary evidence provided by the first applicant to it.  The choice of and weight placed on independent country information was a matter for the Tribunal: see NAHI (supra) at [11]-[13]. On a fair reading of the Decision Record, no error is apparent in the Tribunal’s reliance on country information and this claim has not been elaborated on by the applicant. Accordingly, this aspect of the ground cannot be sustained.

3. The second allegation pleaded in this ground is that the Tribunal failed to look at the applicants’ claims “individually”.  This has not been elaborated on in any respect by the first applicant.  On a fair reading of the Decision Record, the Tribunal considered all of the applicants’ claims, made findings and gave reasons for making such findings.  Such a claim is baseless and cannot be sustained.

4. Accordingly, Ground 3 cannot be sustained and must fail.

Ground 4

1. There are two claims contained in Ground 4 of the application.

2. The first is that the Tribunal denied the applicants natural justice. However, such a claim cannot be sustained. Sections 422B-429A of the Migration Act are an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule the Tribunal is required to comply with in respect of matters it deals with.

3. However, this aspect of the ground is completely unparticularised.  Having regard to the Court Book, the applicants were validly invited to a hearing before the Tribunal, which they attended.  The first and second applicants gave evidence at the hearing.  Further, issues dispositive of the applicants Protection visa application were discussed at the hearing.  On a fair reading of the relevant legislation together with the Court Book, there has been no denial of procedural fairness or natural justice to the applicants.

4. The second aspect of this ground alleges an apprehension of bias or actual bias on the part of the Tribunal, but has not been otherwise particularised.

5. An allegation of actual or apprehended bias on the part of a decision-maker must be distinctly made and clearly proven: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (supra) at [127].

6. There are no particulars in support of this claim, nor is there any evidence before the Court capable of substantiating such a claim.  The applicant has failed to provide a transcript of the Tribunal hearing, and has not proceeded to address this claim in oral submissions.  I agree with the Minister’s submissions that:

   [T]here is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons that would enable the Court to draw the inference that the Tribunal member approached its task other than in good faith, and with a mind open to persuasion. Nor can the test of apprehended bias, that is, whether a hypothetical fair-minded lay person who is properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to its task, be made out on the basis of the Tribunal’s decision record.

7. Accordingly, this aspect of the ground must also fail and the ground as a whole should be dismissed.

Oral Submissions

1. The first aspect of the first applicant’s oral submissions to be considered is the claim that the Tribunal failed to discharge its duty to make inquiries as to the veracity of the documents provided by him to the Tribunal.  The requirements on the Tribunal to make inquiries of this nature have been considered by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI & Anor (2009) 259 ALR 429 where their Honours French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated at [1] and [25]:

   1.  The class of “RRT-reviewable decisions” includes decisions by delegates of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (“the Minister”) refusing the grant of protection visas.2 In the exercise of its review function, the Tribunal may obtain such information as it considers relevant.3 In this sense it has an inquisitorial function. That does not, however, impose upon it a general duty to undertake its own inquiries in addition to information provided to it by the applicant and otherwise under the Act.

   …

   25. Although decisions in the Federal Court concerned with a failure to make obvious inquiries have led to references to a “duty to inquire”, that term is apt to direct consideration away from the question whether the decision which is under review is vitiated by jurisdictional error. The duty imposed upon the Tribunal by the Migration Act is a duty to review. It may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

2. In these proceedings, I am not satisfied there was anything contained within the three documents submitted by the applicants to the Tribunal that engaged such a duty to inquire.  The first applicant’s own evidence at the Tribunal hearing and in his written claim was inconsistent with some of the statements contained in these documents.  Further, the Tribunal noted it could not be satisfied, even if it contacted a mobile phone number noted in the document dated 4 November 2012 to confirm its contents, whom it would be speaking to (see CB 126 at [32]-[33]).  On a fair reading, having regard to the Tribunal’s findings, there was no obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which was easily ascertained, that it was under a duty to make.  Its primary reason for refusing the applicants’ claims was the first applicant’s lack of credibility, and it gave detailed reasons for reaching this conclusion.

3. In respect of the first applicant’s claim he should have been given a further hearing before the Tribunal, the Court’s consideration above at [46]-[48] address any such issue.  Accordingly, this claim cannot be sustained.

4. In respect of the first applicant’s claim the Tribunal failed to consider the documents he submitted, such a claim cannot be sustained. It squarely considered these documents at [32]-[33] of the Decision Record (CB 126), however, gave them no weight. These issues have already been considered in these reasons at [44] above, and no further consideration is needed. Accordingly, this claim cannot be sustained.

Conclusion

1. I am satisfied that none of the grounds pleaded in the application or made orally can be sustained.  Further, on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s Decision Record and the Court Book, no error on the part of the Tribunal is apparent.

2. The application should be dismissed with the first and second applicants ordered to pay the Minister’s costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Lloyd-Jones

Associate: 

Date:  4 February 2015